Certificate Transparency
RFC 6962
| Document | Type |
RFC - Experimental
(June 2013; Errata)
Was draft-laurie-pki-sunlight (individual)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 6962 (Experimental) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Stephen Farrell | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Laurie
Request for Comments: 6962 A. Langley
Category: Experimental E. Kasper
ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
June 2013
Certificate Transparency
Abstract
This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging
the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they
are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit
certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of
suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs
themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to
honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing
CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.
Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for
submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and
evaluation.
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF
community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962.
Laurie, et al. Experimental [Page 1]
RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency June 2013
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Informal Introduction ...........................................3
1.1. Requirements Language ......................................4
1.2. Data Structures ............................................4
2. Cryptographic Components ........................................4
2.1. Merkle Hash Trees ..........................................4
2.1.1. Merkle Audit Paths ..................................5
2.1.2. Merkle Consistency Proofs ...........................6
2.1.3. Example .............................................7
2.1.4. Signatures ..........................................8
3. Log Format and Operation ........................................9
3.1. Log Entries ................................................9
3.2. Structure of the Signed Certificate Timestamp .............12
3.3. Including the Signed Certificate Timestamp in the
TLS Handshake .............................................13
3.3.1. TLS Extension ......................................15
3.4. Merkle Tree ...............................................15
3.5. Signed Tree Head ..........................................16
4. Log Client Messages ............................................17
4.1. Add Chain to Log ..........................................17
4.2. Add PreCertChain to Log ...................................18
4.3. Retrieve Latest Signed Tree Head ..........................18
4.4. Retrieve Merkle Consistency Proof between Two
Signed Tree Heads .........................................19
4.5. Retrieve Merkle Audit Proof from Log by Leaf Hash .........19
4.6. Retrieve Entries from Log .................................20
4.7. Retrieve Accepted Root Certificates .......................21
4.8. Retrieve Entry+Merkle Audit Proof from Log ................21
5. Clients ........................................................21
5.1. Submitters ................................................22
5.2. TLS Client ................................................22
5.3. Monitor ...................................................22
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