Analysis of OSPF Security According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
RFC 6863

Approval announcement
Draft of message to be sent after approval:

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>,
    karp mailing list <karp@ietf.org>,
    karp chair <karp-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Document Action: 'Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP Design Guide' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-06.txt)

The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP Design Guide'
  (draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-06.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Keying and Authentication for Routing
Protocols Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Stewart Bryant and Adrian Farrel.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis/


Technical Summary

This document analyzes the security mechanisms 
for OSPFv2 and OSPFv3, according to the guidelines 
set forth in RFC 6518. In analyzes the current state of 
each protocol, describes gaps, and discusses work 
that needs to be done to close those gaps. 

Working Group Summary

This document is the first of a series of documents analyzing 
routing protocol security, which is the initial mission of the 
working group. There was little controversy of note. 
Members and chairs of the OSPF WG were active in 
its development and review. 

Document Quality

The document meets the criteria for the phase 1 
analysis as defined in RFC 6518. Recommendations 
of methods of closing security gaps have already been 
included in I-Ds accepted as OSPF WG documents.


Personnel

Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> is the document shepherd.
Stewart Bryant <stbryant@cisco.com> is the responsible AD. 


RFC Editor Note

OLD
A security solution will be developed for OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 based on
the OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication option.  This solution will
have
NEW
It is recommended that the OSPF Working Group develop a 
solution for OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 based on the OSPFv2 
cryptographic authentication option. This solution would have
...
END