ATM-Based xDSL Bonded Interfaces MIB
RFC 6768

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.

(Dan Romascanu) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Ralph Droms) No Objection

(Wesley Eddy) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

(Stephen Farrell) No Objection

Comment (2012-03-09 for -05)
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Just wondering: Could access to gBondAtmPortPmCur1DayUpDiffDelay
or similar measurements extend the reach of timing-based attacks on
cryptographic protocols? That is, if I could do a timing attack
on a node from its next hop router, access to this data might then
allow me to mount the same attack from further away. I guess in
principle that might increase the sensitivity of some of these
real-time measurements, however, its probably too low a probability
to make any change worthwhile and even if it was worthwhile to
note somewhere, it probably wouldn't be here.

(Russ Housley) No Objection

(Pete Resnick) No Objection

(Peter Saint-Andre) No Objection

(Robert Sparks) No Objection

(Sean Turner) No Objection