Efficient Augmented Password-Only Authentication and Key Exchange for IKEv2
RFC 6628

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 13 and is now closed.

(Sean Turner) Yes

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Wesley Eddy) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

(Stephen Farrell) No Objection

Comment (2012-03-15 for -14)
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- section 2.2.1 could badly do with some examples if that's possible.
I'd expect interop problems in any case, but more without that. Those
might be shared with the other scheme drafts.

- Section 2, last paragraph - that's confusing - which Y and K
calculation is to be done? I think you need to be much clearer about
this. 

- saying "server S does not store any plaintext passwords" is missing
2119 language. While a MUST would be most correct, perhaps a SHOULD
is right, in case someone wants to do this using an existing DB of
cleartext passwords.

- Providing a reference for "Shamir's trick" would be good.

(Russ Housley) No Objection

(Peter Saint-Andre) No Objection

Comment (2012-03-08 for -13)
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Both draft-harkins-ipsecme-spsk-auth and draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2 specify that the password will be prepared using SASLprep (RFC 4013). Why doesn't this specification also define how 'w' is prepared for input to other operations?

(Robert Sparks) No Objection