Secure Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.
(Sean Turner) Yes
(Ron Bonica) No Objection
(Stewart Bryant) No Objection
(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection
(Wesley Eddy) No Objection
(Adrian Farrel) No Objection
Comment (2012-03-14 for -07)
I have no objection to the publiction of this document. I love the concept of "distilling entropy". This is, I think, really just hiding the absence of entropy, but I have no objection to the term being used in this document.
(Stephen Farrell) (was Discuss) No Objection
Thanks for addressing my comments (and ignoring the dumb one:-)
(Russ Housley) No Objection
(Peter Saint-Andre) No Objection
Comment (2012-03-08 for -06)
Section 6 states: The first step of pre-processing is to remove ambiguities that may arise due to internationalization. Each character-based password or passphrase MUST be pre-processed to remove that ambiguity by processing the character-based password or passphrase according to the rules of the [RFC4013] profile of [RFC3454]. Please be aware there there is work underway to obsolete RFC 3454 and RFC 4013, primarily because stringprep is limited to Unicode 3.2; see draft-melnikov-precis-saslprepbis. This is just a heads-up, and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you change the text to something like "use RFC 4013 or equivalent". However, when your experiment is done and you put this on the standards track, you'll probably be asked to update the internationalization to use saslprepbis (if the PRECIS WG finishes before your experiment does!).