Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT) Security Threats and Suggested Countermeasures
RFC 6404

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        J. Seedorf
Request for Comments: 6404                                  S. Niccolini
Category: Informational                                              NEC
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                  E. Chen
                                                                     NTT
                                                               H. Scholz
                                                              VOIPFUTURE
                                                           November 2011

        Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT)
             Security Threats and Suggested Countermeasures

Abstract

   The Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT) working
   group (WG) provides a peering framework that leverages the building
   blocks of existing IETF-defined protocols such as SIP and ENUM for
   the interconnection between SIP Service Providers (SSPs).  The
   objective of this document is to identify and enumerate SPEERMINT-
   specific threat vectors and to give guidance for implementers on
   selecting appropriate countermeasures.  Security requirements for
   SPEERMINT that have been derived from the threats detailed in this
   document can be found in RFC 6271; this document provides concrete
   countermeasures to meet those SPEERMINT security requirements.  In
   this document, the different security threats related to SPEERMINT
   are classified into threats to the Lookup Function (LUF), the
   Location Routing Function (LRF), the Signaling Function (SF), and the
   Media Function (MF) of a specific SIP Service Provider.  Various
   instances of the threats are briefly introduced inside the
   classification.  Finally, existing security solutions for SIP and
   RTP/RTCP (Real-time Transport Control Protocol) are presented to
   describe countermeasures currently available for such threats.  Each
   SSP may have connections to one or more remote SSPs through peering
   or transit contracts.  A potentially compromised remote SSP that
   attacks other SSPs is out of the scope of this document; this
   document focuses on attacks on an SSP from outside the trust domain
   such an SSP may have with other SSPs.

Seedorf, et al.               Informational                     [Page 1]
RFC 6404          SPEERMINT Threats and Countermeasures    November 2011

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6404.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Seedorf, et al.               Informational                     [Page 2]
RFC 6404          SPEERMINT Threats and Countermeasures    November 2011

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................4
   2. Security Threats Relevant to SPEERMINT ..........................5
      2.1. Threats to the Lookup Function (LUF) .......................5
           2.1.1. Threats to LUF Confidentiality ......................5
           2.1.2. Threats to LUF Integrity ............................6
           2.1.3. Threats to LUF Availability .........................6
      2.2. Threats to the Location Routing Function (LRF) .............6
           2.2.1. Threats to LRF Confidentiality ......................6
           2.2.2. Threats to LRF Integrity ............................7
           2.2.3. Threats to LRF Availability .........................7
      2.3. Threats to the Signaling Function (SF) .....................7
           2.3.1. Threats to SF Confidentiality .......................7
           2.3.2. Threats to SF Integrity .............................8
           2.3.3. Threats to SF Availability .........................10