Additional Kerberos Naming Constraints
RFC 6111
Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(April 2011; No errata)
Updates RFC 4120
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Larry Zhu | ||
Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | (None) | |
Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 6111 (Proposed Standard) | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Tim Polk | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Zhu Request for Comments: 6111 Microsoft Corporation Updates: 4120 April 2011 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 Additional Kerberos Naming Constraints Abstract This document defines new naming constraints for well-known Kerberos principal names and well-known Kerberos realm names. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6111. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Zhu Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 6111 Kerberos Naming April 2011 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................2 2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................3 3. Definitions .....................................................3 3.1. Well-Known Kerberos Principal Names ........................3 3.2. Well-Known Kerberos Realm Names ............................4 4. Security Considerations .........................................5 5. Acknowledgements ................................................6 6. IANA Considerations .............................................6 7. References ......................................................6 7.1. Normative References .......................................6 7.2. Informative References .....................................6 1. Introduction Occasionally, protocol designers need to designate a Kerberos principal name or a Kerberos realm name to have a special meaning other than identifying a particular instance. An example is that the anonymous principal name and the anonymous realm name are defined for the Kerberos anonymity support [RFC6112]. This anonymity name pair conveys no more meaning than that the client's identity is not disclosed. In the case of the anonymity support, it is critical that deployed Kerberos implementations that do not support anonymity fail the authentication if the anonymity name pair is used; therefore, no access is granted accidentally to a principal who's name happens to match with that of the anonymous identity. However, Kerberos, as defined in [RFC4120], does not have such reserved names. As such, protocol designers have resolved to use names that are exceedingly unlikely to have been used to avoid collision. Even if a registry were set up to avoid collision of new implementations, there is no guarantee for deployed implementations preventing accidental reuse of names that can lead to access being granted unexpectedly. Zhu Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 6111 Kerberos Naming April 2011 The Kerberos realm name in [RFC4120] has a reserved name space although no specific name is defined and the criticality of unknown reserved realm names is not specified. This document remedies these issues by defining well-known KerberosShow full document text