Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.
(Cullen Jennings) (was Yes) Discuss
Discuss (2010-03-08 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
AD to check LC comments.
(Jari Arkko) Yes
(Ron Bonica) No Objection
(Ross Callon) No Objection
(Ralph Droms) No Objection
(Lisa Dusseault) No Objection
Lars Eggert No Objection
(Pasi Eronen) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Adrian Farrel) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Russ Housley) No Objection
(Alexey Melnikov) (was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2010-03-11 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
1) Recommendation to use EKU. The document currently says: As specified by RFC 5280  section 126.96.36.199, implementations MUST check for restrictions on certificate usage declared by any extendedKeyUsage extentions in the certificate. The SIP Extended Key Usage (EKU) document  defines an extendedKeyUsage for SIP. Question (mostly to the Security ADs): are we going to require use of EKU for other protocols from now on? Tim said that this doesn't have to be a requirement for all protocols.
(Tim Polk) No Objection
(Dan Romascanu) No Objection
(Robert Sparks) No Objection
Comment (2010-03-10 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
The first sentence of the introduction may have been accurate when this work started years ago. The phrase "has started to appear" is dated now, and should be updated.