WiMAX Forum / 3GPP2 Proxy Mobile IPv4
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.
(Jari Arkko) Yes
Comment (2008-09-02 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
Three of the comments below are blocking (process issues and the EAP keying framework issue) in the sense that I would like to see them resolved before the IESG approves this spec according to RFC 3932 criteria. Given the small importance of those three issues, I am assuming that the authors are willing to do this. There is a fair number of other comments, which are not blocking but could affect interoperability, correctness of behaviour, or clarity of the specification. I am hoping that the authors are willing to revise the specification one more time in order to address these. Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. Section 10 mentions that the relevant keys will be "derived by the EAP keying framework". This seems incorrect in a number of ways. First, EAP keying framework (RFC 5247) is not a mechanism that can be applied, it is an explanation of the properties and requirements for the security of EAP keys. Perhaps saying something along the lines of "... derived from EAP authentication as specified in [WIMAX-DOC]" would be better. This resolves the issue for this document, but really hope that the Wimax specification employs MSK or draft-ietf-hokey-emsk and does not use EMSK directly. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? I understand the behaviour of this spec over Ethernet-like interfaces. IP stacks attempt to verify that their IP address is still valid. However, if you run this over PPP, bringing down the previous PPP connection and creating a new one would appear to cause the host to lose the IP address (and consequently, all ongoing sessions). There is no "confirm my address is valid" operation in PPP. The document does not at all discuss the role of the various identifiers (interface ID, device ID, subscriber ID, authentication NAI) and the access technology type. Note that RFC 5213 includes similar identifiers, but spends an extremely big part of the document in explaining what kind of logic rules are used to decide the behaviour of the PMIP nodes when faced with different situations. Is this not needed in PMIPv4 at all? Or is the document underspecified? Please clarify/extend the specification. In particular, it is unclear what happens when hosts have multiple interfaces. Note that RFC 5213 was built to be safe in these situations, is PMIPv4 safe? The document is silent on this and I cannot tell, but I suspect that the same issues apply. Section 3 claims IPv6 will work with PMIPv4 merely by the use of PMIPv4 and DSMIPv4 together. I find this hard to believe. To cite two examples where additional behavior might be needed: similar to RFC 5213, wouldn't MTU changes in the tunnel have to result in sending RAs with changed MTU options? And what about carrying the link-local address of the router? Or maybe that does not apply given that PMIPv4 supports only L2 LMAs? In any case, the document is too silent on this. Process issues: For full disclosure, I think it would be useful to mention somewhere that there exists an IETF standard proxy mobile, RFC 5213. Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference  does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well.