Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies
RFC 5393
Revision differences
Document history
Date | By | Action |
---|---|---|
2018-12-20
|
(System) | Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'This document normatively updates RFC 3261, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to address a security … Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'This document normatively updates RFC 3261, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to address a security vulnerability identified in SIP proxy behavior. This vulnerability enables an attack against SIP networks where a small number of legitimate, even authorized, SIP requests can stimulate massive amounts of proxy-to-proxy traffic. This document strengthens loop-detection requirements on SIP proxies when they fork requests (that is, forward a request to more than one destination). It also corrects and clarifies the description of the loop-detection algorithm such proxies are required to implement. Additionally, this document defines a Max-Breadth mechanism for limiting the number of concurrent branches pursued for any given request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]') |
2017-06-20
|
Jasmine Magallanes | Posted related IPR disclosure: Alcatel Lucent's Statement about IPR related to RFC 5393 |
2017-06-20
|
Jasmine Magallanes | Posted related IPR disclosure: Alcatel Lucent's Statement about IPR related to RFC 5393 |
2015-10-14
|
(System) | Notify list changed from sip-chairs@ietf.org, RjS@nostrum.com, draft-ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix@ietf.org to (None) |
2008-12-16
|
Cindy Morgan | State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Cindy Morgan |
2008-12-16
|
Cindy Morgan | [Note]: 'RFC 5393' added by Cindy Morgan |
2008-12-12
|
(System) | RFC published |