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Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies
RFC 5393

Revision differences

Document history

Date By Action
2018-12-20
(System)
Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'This document normatively updates RFC 3261, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to address a security …
Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'This document normatively updates RFC 3261, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to address a security vulnerability identified in SIP proxy behavior. This vulnerability enables an attack against SIP networks where a small number of legitimate, even authorized, SIP requests can stimulate massive amounts of proxy-to-proxy traffic.

This document strengthens loop-detection requirements on SIP proxies when they fork requests (that is, forward a request to more than one destination). It also corrects and clarifies the description of the loop-detection algorithm such proxies are required to implement. Additionally, this document defines a Max-Breadth mechanism for limiting the number of concurrent branches pursued for any given request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]')
2017-06-20
Jasmine Magallanes Posted related IPR disclosure: Alcatel Lucent's Statement about IPR related to RFC 5393
2017-06-20
Jasmine Magallanes Posted related IPR disclosure: Alcatel Lucent's Statement about IPR related to RFC 5393
2015-10-14
(System) Notify list changed from sip-chairs@ietf.org, RjS@nostrum.com, draft-ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix@ietf.org to (None)
2008-12-16
Cindy Morgan State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Cindy Morgan
2008-12-16
Cindy Morgan [Note]: 'RFC 5393' added by Cindy Morgan
2008-12-12
(System) RFC published