[Ballot comment]
The discussion that followed the Gen-ART Review by Brian Carpenter
  indicates that the reader would be served by a minor change.  All of
  the details from [SRP-6] that are needed to implement are included in
  draft-ietf-tls-srp-14.  For this reason [SRP-6] is an informational
  reference.  This fact should be stated in the document at the first
  place that a reference is made to [SRP-6].

[Ballot comment]
This is a weak abstain (I'm not asking other area directors to join my
position).  If the target were standards track, this would be a strong
abstain.

This a matter of application software architecture that applies to any
user-based authentication mechanism embedded in TLS that involves
or may involve unspecified server storage of per-user credential
information.

TLS stacks and the APIs to TLS stacks have started to ossify into
operating systems, mobile devices and shipping application software.
Such stacks are absolutely critical to application security, and are
already so complex that they are the cause of a significant number of
software defects and security updates.  I am very concerned about
adding unnecessary complexity to such a critical software component.
There is already a great deal of flux upgrading the cipher suites,
cipher modes and hash functions in these stacks.

Meanwhile, all the software infrastructure in applications surrounding
user identity, server credential repositories for users, and identity
federation is highly complex and in a great deal of flux.  If one looks
at the amount of complexity in the GSSAPI or deployed general
purpose SASL APIs and imagines the complexity of a software stack
including all those APIs blended with a TLS API, I find the prospect
daunting.  Indeed the complexity is sufficiently great that I consider
it bad architecture.

Meanwhile, there's a viable alternative.  If TLS and an authentication
framework such as GSSAPI, EAP or SASL are loosely bound using a
mechanism such as TLS channel bindings (TLS negotiates the security
layer which is subsequently bound to a completely separate user
authentication), then there is a very simple and clean boundary
between the two software stacks, leading to a much more pragmatic
real-world architecture.

IANA Last Call Comments:

Action 1:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make
the following assignments in the "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Extensions" registry located at

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values

sub-registry "ExtensionType Values"

Value Extension name Reference
----- --------------------------- ---------
[TBD1] srp [RFC-tls-srp-14]


Action 2:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make
the following assignments in the "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Parameters" registry located at

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters

sub-registry "TLS Cipher Suite Registry"

Value Description Reference
----------- -------------------------------------- ---------
0xC0,[TBD2] TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD3] TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD4] TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD5] TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD6] TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD7] TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD8] TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD9] TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]
0xC0,[TBD10] TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA [RFC-tls-srp-14]

We understand the above to be the only IANA Actions
for this document.

PROTO Write-Up:

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

Pasi Eronen. Yes.

(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?

The document went through WG last call, and although the number
people who commented the technical details was rather small,
I don't have concerns about the depth or breadth.

(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization or XML?

No concerns.

(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
this issue.

This document took quite long to get finished: the -00 version
was posted more than 6 (six) years ago...

There are three IPR disclosures that may be relevant:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?&ipr_id=25
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?&ipr_id=31
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?&ipr_id=63

Basically the only contentious issue was whether this should be
on Standards Track or not. A straw poll was held to gauge consensus;
there was no consensus for Standards Track, and thus this document
is now progressing with intended status of Informational.

(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?

Given the amount of comments about technical details, I'd
say the interest is rather limited.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)

Nobody has threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See
http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

Yes.

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

References are split into normative and informative; all normative
references look acceptable.

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document? If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

Everything looks OK here.

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?

The only (semi-)formal language used is the TLS presentation
language defined in RFC 4346 (the base TLS spec), for which
no automated tools are available. I have checked them manually.

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

This document adds Secure Remote Password (SRP) based
authentication to TLS.

Working Group Summary

This document is a product of the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Working Group.

Document Quality

There are at least four implementations of earlier
versions of this document.

(end)