Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol Generic Requirements
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.
(Ross Callon) Yes
(Jari Arkko) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Brian Carpenter) (was Discuss) No Objection
Less concrete issues from Gen-ART review by Robert Sparks: ISSUE 2: The extensibility requirements demand arbitrary objective functions. A discussion of the security implications of this requirement is needed. There are probably additional requirements on the protocol to be identified focusing on mitigating the risk of, for example, a PCC using complex objetives to intentionally drive a PCE into resource exhaustion. Does the protocol need to give the PCE tools to say "I tried to do that, but it's turning out to be harder than my policies allow."? ISSUE 4: There are several requirements of PCEs that have been captured here as requirements of the PCECP. Section 6.1.15 requires that the protocol "scale well", where it really means that the system using the protocol scales well. The numbers in this section are capacity and performance numbers for a PCE, and they are useful when designing the PCECP to make sure the protocol itself makes achieving those numbers sane. This section should be reworded to make this obvious. Similarly, section 8 should separate requirements on the protocol from the motivational requirements on CPE implementations (2119 words shouldn't be used in that motivation). ISSUE 5 (Apologies if my lack of domain expertise led me to miss something obvious here): Section 6.3.3 requires the protocol to carry information about the state of the network to the PCE that would normally come from the TED. Does this not introduce security concerns? Could a PCC use this poison CPE calculations for other PCCs? If this capability exists, there needs to be discussion about how the data gets used by the PCE (does it cache it?), but that discussion doesn't belong in this document. I suggest at a minimum that some discussion of the ramifications of this capability be included in the security consideration section of this document. ISSUE 7: The purpose of 6.2.1 is not clear. What is the real requirement being placed on the protocol, and how can we evaluate the protocol against that requirement. If there are no such explicit requirements, I suggest this be rewritten as advice on where the protocol is expected to be used and not use 2119 terms at all. I'm particularly puzzled about what impact operating in environments including "- packet and non-packet networks" is intended to have on the protocol itself. Nits: The draft passes the idnits checker (in spirit at least). The checker complains about the reference to 2119 in the boilerplate, and the unexpected use of "Authors' and Contributors' Addresses". These nits are in no particular order: NIT 1: The references to I-Ds that are works in progress do not include draft names, Please add them. NIT 2: Please expand PCE in the title. NIT 3: Section 6.1.6 uses "notification message" which is not yet defined - a forward reference would be helpful. NIT 3: Section 6.1.11 requires unsolicited notifications, but doesn't really define them. Are these reliable messages? Do they get responses? More detail about what's really being required would make the document more useful. NIT 4: The final requirement in 6.1.15 is redundant with requirements in both 6.1.8 and section 8. Consolodating those would make the document stronger. NIT 5: I suggest deleting "easily" in section 6.1.14: The PCECP MUST be easily extensible -> The PCECP MUST be extensible NIT 6: Sections 6.1.16 and .17 share some language that confuses me: "does not mean that the constraint must not be supported" and "does not mean that the objective function may not be supported" Is there a way to say this with fewer negations? You are trying to reinforce that these sets are extensible. Maybe you could just say that instead? NIT 7: The first sentence of 6.2.2 has at least two discrete requirements embedded in it. It would be easier to evaluate against the eventual protocol definition if these were separated. NIT 8: It's not clear to me what "resynchronization of information" means in section 6.3.2. Is there any way to add detail? Is it obvious to the community using this document what information is being resynchronized? NIT 9: Section 6.3.3, third paragraph. I suggest changing "large number of PCCs is going to simultaneously" to "large number of PCCs will simultaneously". A couple of final comments that I didn't think worthy of being called an issue or a nit: The draft requires response aggregation, but doesn't discuss the ramifications this will have on the reliability mechanisms that you will either use from a selected transport or have to build above it. Pointing out that there are non-trivial issues here would probably be useful. The security consideration section doesn't capture any thinking your group may have put in so far towards threats from elements that are part of the architecture. Capturing early thinking here will go a long way.
(Lisa Dusseault) No Objection
(Lars Eggert) No Objection
(Ted Hardie) No Objection
(Sam Hartman) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Russ Housley) (was No Record, Discuss) No Objection
(Dan Romascanu) No Objection
Comment (2006-05-24 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
1. From Section 8: 'PCECP operations MUST be modeled and controlled through appropriate MIB modules.' It looks to me that there are enough specific differences between PCCs and PCEs to lead to the need of defining separate MIB modules. I suggest that this is mentioned in Section 8. 3. 'The operator MUST be able to determine PCECP historical interactions and the success rate of requests using data from MIB modules.' The way this phrase is written the use of capitalization does not seem justified. Maybe a beter text would be: 'The MIB modules MUST provide information that will allow an operator to PCECP historical interactions and the success rate of requests.' 3. 'The new MIB modules should also be used to provide notifications (traps) when thresholds are crossed or when important events occur.' This is extremely vague and general for a requirement. I wsuggest that sepcific information be provided about what type of faults and events are critical and need to be reported in notifications. Maybe this paragraph needs to be merged with the last paragraph, where there is some mention about congestion and rate limitation indications.