Policy-Mandated Labels Such as "Adv:" in Email Subject Headers Considered Ineffective At Best
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.
(Scott Hollenbeck) Yes
(Brian Carpenter) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Sam Hartman) No Objection
(Russ Housley) No Objection
(David Kessens) No Objection
Comment (2005-03-30 for -** No value found for 'p.get_dochistory.rev' **)
Comments from the Ops directorate by Pekka Savola (Mar 30 17:47:13 PST 2005): Seems like a useful document. I'm personally a bit dubious whether the solicitation class keywords approach has been sufficiently explored yet to know if it has issues or not.. but I guess we'll just have to see. (Also see draft-malamud-keyword-discovery-03.txt) A particular concern, possibly to be addressed in a different document, is the assumption that the users are able to insert properly formatted and correct solicitation keywords in the message, which can be sanely parsed by a computer. Effectively, this allows anyone to perform a DoS on someone else's resources (assuming specifying something like net.example.adv would result in everyone going and taking a look at "adv" policy at example.net -- then flooding example.net). A maliscious advertiser could also insert improperly formatted keywords, or insert 100 such keywords which will time out, consuming even more processing than receiving the message would have done. editorial: - in Abstract, s/Internet-Draft/memo/ also elsewhere in the draft - remove the 'Terminology' section and the SHOULD in section 6, it does not belong to an Informational RFC like this.
(Mark Townsley) (was Discuss) No Record
> is contained in [RFC2822]. The the normative requirements that apply > to all headers are: Double "the"