The Group Domain of Interpretation
RFC 3547
| Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(July 2003; No errata)
Obsoleted by RFC 6407
Was draft-ietf-msec-gdoi (msec WG)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hugh Harney , Thomas Hardjono , Brian Weis , Mark Baugher | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
| Replaces | draft-irtf-smug-gdoi | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 3547 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Steven Bellovin | ||
| Send notices to | <canetti@watson.ibm.com> | ||
Network Working Group M. Baugher
Request for Comments: 3547 B. Weis
Category: Standards Track Cisco
T. Hardjono
Verisign
H. Harney
Sparta
July 2003
The Group Domain of Interpretation
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document presents an ISAMKP Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for
group key management to support secure group communications. The
GDOI manages group security associations, which are used by IPSEC and
potentially other data security protocols running at the IP or
application layers. These security associations protect one or more
key-encrypting keys, traffic-encrypting keys, or data shared by group
members.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. GDOI Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Extending GDOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. GDOI Phase 1 protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. ISAKMP Phase 1 protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1. DOI value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. UDP port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. GROUPKEY-PULL Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Authorization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. ISAKMP Header Initialization . . . . . . . . . . 9
Baugher, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 3547 GDOI Domain of Interpretation July 2003
3.3. Initiator Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Receiver Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. GROUPKEY-PUSH Message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Forward and Backward Access Control. . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.1. Forward Access Control Requirements. . . . . . . 13
4.3. Delegation of Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Use of signature keys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. ISAKMP Header Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Deletion of SAs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. GCKS Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.8. Group Member Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Payloads and Defined Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Identification Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1.1. Identification Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. Security Association Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2.1. Payloads following the SA payload. . . . . . . . 19
5.3. SA KEK payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.1. KEK Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.2. KEK_MANAGEMENT_ALGORITHM . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.3. KEK_ALGORITHM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3.4. KEK_KEY_LENGTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3.5. KEK_KEY_LIFETIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.6. SIG_HASH_ALGORITHM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.7. SIG_ALGORITHM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.8. SIG_KEY_LENGTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3.9. KE_OAKLEY_GROUP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4. SA TEK Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.1. PROTO_IPSEC_ESP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4.2. Other Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5. Key Download Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5.1. TEK Download Type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.5.2. KEK Download Type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Show full document text