Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-l3vpn-
SecDir review of draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-l3vpn-02
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.
This specification define a set of procedures to overcome challenges with deployment of Resource Reservation Protocols over BGP/MPLS VPNs.
The BGP/MPLS VPN (RFC 4364) is a VPN technique that doesn't rely encryption to ensure secrecy or message integrity. The security properties are instead dependent on the security of the network infrastructure.
It appears that this draft makes a serious effort to describe and analyze relevant security considerations. With my limited expertise in this particular area I can't find any thing that is obviously missing.
However, one question that comes to my mind, which might be worth looking at from a security perspective, is whether the procedures introduced by this document requires the communication to be unencrypted and if so, whether deployment of this protocol blocks or prevents legitimate use of e.g. IPsec based VPN as discussed in RFC 4364 and RFC 4023. If this is the case, should it be discussed in the security considerations section?