Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-
review-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-secdir-lc-emery-2011-04-30-00
Review
review-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-secdir-lc-emery-2011-04-30
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
comments just like any other last call comments.
This informational draft describes how a Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) is interpreted in respect to a consumer of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). This interpretation is used in turn to validate
the origination of routes advertised by the Border Gateway Protocol.
The security considerations section does exist and gives guidance on
various validation implications in regards to prefix lengths, issuance
sequence, and aggregation. After reading draft-ietf-sidr-arch,
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate, et. al., I didn't find any additional
concerns/limitations.
General comments:
None.
Editorial comments:
None.
Shawn.
--