Telechat Review of draft-ietf-ospf-link-overload-11
review-ietf-ospf-link-overload-11-secdir-telechat-turner-2018-01-04-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-ospf-link-overload |
|---|---|---|
| Requested rev. | no specific revision (document currently at 16) | |
| Type | Telechat Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2018-01-23 | |
| Requested | 2017-12-19 | |
| Authors | Shraddha Hegde, Pushpasis Sarkar, Hannes Gredler, Mohan Nanduri, Luay Jalil | |
| Draft last updated | 2018-01-04 | |
| Completed reviews |
Rtgdir Last Call review of -09 by Martin Vigoureux
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -10 by Joel Halpern (diff) Secdir Telechat review of -11 by Sean Turner (diff) Opsdir Telechat review of -13 by Tim Chown (diff) Genart Last Call review of -11 by Joel Halpern (diff) Genart Telechat review of -12 by Joel Halpern (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Sean Turner |
| State | Completed | |
| Review | review-ietf-ospf-link-overload-11-secdir-telechat-turner-2018-01-04 | |
| Reviewed rev. | 11 (document currently at 16) | |
| Review result | Ready | |
| Review completed: | 2018-01-04 |
Review
review-ietf-ospf-link-overload-11-secdir-telechat-turner-2018-01-04
In reviewing this draft, I was most concerned that this mechanism could be used by an attacker to push traffic towards or away from a node. If the messages are authenticated then I tend to agree with your assessment that this draft doesn't introduce any new security considerations beyond those in [RFC2328]/[RFC5340]. If not, well all bets are off. I did note a couple of editorial nits, but I sent those directly to the authors.