Last Call Review of draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06

Request Review of draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2018-04-27
Requested 2018-04-13
Authors Jim Schaad, Blake Ramsdell, Sean Turner
Draft last updated 2018-05-04
Completed reviews Opsdir Last Call review of -06 by Éric Vyncke (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -05 by Ines Robles (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Matthew Miller (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -06 by Ines Robles (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Éric Vyncke 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06-opsdir-lc-vyncke-2018-05-04
Reviewed rev. 06 (document currently at 08)
Review result Ready
Review completed: 2018-05-04


Reviewer: Eric Vyncke
Review result: Ready

I have reviewed this document as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

Document reviewed: draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06
Intended Status: Standards Track

As the title indicates, this document is about how certificates are to be handled by a S/MIME client; both for sending and receiving. It is well written and clear.

Section 1.3 to 1.6 are explicitly about compatibility and interoperation with previous version of the S/MIME specification. 

Section 4 is about the provisioning of the certificates of other parties. In the absence of a protocol for this purpose, the proposed technique is archaic and manual; far from being easy for operations but I am afraid that there is no other choice.

Section 4.3 specifies key lengths, which also means that another RFC will have to be authored when those key lengths will become too weak.

In case of trouble or invalid certificates, the only specified action is to inform the end user; which is again the usual procedure when dealing with certificates.