Telechat Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-gr-notification-15

Request Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-gr-notification
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 16)
Type Telechat Review
Team Routing Area Directorate (rtgdir)
Deadline 2018-05-17
Requested 2018-04-10
Requested by Alvaro Retana
Authors Keyur Patel, Rex Fernando, John Scudder, Jeffrey Haas
Draft last updated 2018-04-13
Completed reviews Rtgdir Early review of -03 by Mach Chen (diff)
Rtgdir Early review of -05 by Mach Chen (diff)
Rtgdir Early review of -07 by Emmanuel Baccelli (diff)
Rtgdir Telechat review of -15 by Bruno Decraene (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -15 by Qin Wu (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -15 by Yoav Nir (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Bruno Decraene
State Completed
Review review-ietf-idr-bgp-gr-notification-15-rtgdir-telechat-decraene-2018-04-13
Reviewed rev. 15 (document currently at 16)
Review result Ready
Review completed: 2018-04-13



I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft. The Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related drafts as they pass through IETF last call and IESG review, and sometimes on special request. The purpose of the review is to provide assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the Routing Directorate, please see ​

Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs, it would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other IETF Last Call comments that you receive, and strive to resolve them through discussion or by updating the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-idr-bgp-gr-notification-15
Reviewer: Bruno Decraene
Review Date: 2018-04-13
IETF LC End Date: 2018-04-24
Intended Status: Standards Track

Summary: No issues found. This document is ready for publication.


The document is very clear. I have particularly appreciated the high level summary of the document in the introduction section. Thanks to the authors.
The security consideration section adequately consider the security impacts of this specification.
I had already reviewed the document twice (WGLC, AD review) hence I really needed to push in order to find some comments. In this nitpicking context, any comment is really up to the authors.

Major Issues: No major issues found.

Minor Issues: 

I would not call these "minor issue", but it's beyond editorial so do not qualify as "Nits". Please find below 2 comments, on the nitpicking far side.

"If the "N" bit has not been exchanged with the peer, then to
        deal with possible consecutive restarts, a route (from the peer)
        previously marked as stale MUST be deleted."
"To put an upper bound on the amount of time a router retains the
        stale routes, an implementation MUST support a (configurable)
        timer, called the "stale timer", that imposes this upper bound."

In order to fully respect the semantic, in case of consecutive restarts (with partial route readvertisement), it seems that the stale timer would need to be on a per route basis. I don't think that this is the intention of the authors (nor that this is desirable). Altough this is a local consideration, hence not affecting the peer, the "MUST" make this statement strong. Eventually, a text could be added saying that the timer only needs to be on a per session basis. e.g., :s/this upper bound/this upper bound on a per session basis.
"This specification doesn't change the basic security model inherent
   in [RFC4724], with the exception that the protection against repeated
   resets is relaxed. To mitigate the consequent risk that an attacker
   could use repeated session resets to prevent stale routes from ever
   being deleted, we make the stale routes timer mandatory (in practice
   it is already ubiquitous)."

FYI, I'm not completely sure to see why this document change (i.e. negatively impacts) the security in case of repeated NOTIFICATION as I would assume that if an attacker could sends such NOTIFICATION, it could already advertise the routes that it wished were never deleted. Also this risk would be covered via an adequate protection against illegitimate messages (e.g. crypto checksum, GTSM for EBGP)
However I do see an increased risk with regards to Hold Time expiration which remains an attack vector even with the use of a crypto checksum protection, by simply filtering some BGP packets. Especially in deployments when the BGP session crosses a long distance or multiple links and nodes (e.g. IBGP, layer 2 network within an IXP cf RFC 8327).
May be I would propose to raise this point or slightly rephrase on the Hold Time expiration side, rater than the NOTIFICATION side.


RFC 2119 has been updated by RFC 8174.
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
      described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they
      appear in all capitals, as shown here.
+ New ref to RFC8174
"("N") is defined as the BGP Graceful Notification bit"
"its Graceful NOTIFICATION bit set (value 1)"

Nitpicking, naming is not consistent.

" This also implies support for the format for a BGP NOTIFICATION Cease message defined in [RFC4486]."

I'm not completely sure to see what this sentence is exactly saying. I feel that the sentence would benefit from beeing more specific. 
e.g. NEW:  This also implies support for the new "Hard Reset" subcode of the BGP NOTIFICATION Cease message, its new behavior and new encoding of the Data field.
"the reference this document and [RFC4724]"

       | Bit Position |       Name       | Short Name | Reference |
       |      0       | Forwarding State |     F      | [RFC4724] |
       |     1-7      |    unassigned    |            |           |

       | Bit Position |       Name       | Short Name |   Reference   |
       |      0       | Forwarding State |     F      |   [RFC4724]   |
       |     1-7      |    unassigned    |            | This document |