Last Call Review of draft-ietf-16ng-ip-over-ethernet-over-802-dot-16-
review-ietf-16ng-ip-over-ethernet-over-802-dot-16-secdir-lc-meadows-2009-08-27-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-16ng-ip-over-ethernet-over-802-dot-16
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 12)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2009-09-08
Requested 2009-08-22
Draft last updated 2009-08-27
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Catherine Meadows
Assignment Reviewer Catherine Meadows
State Completed
Review review-ietf-16ng-ip-over-ethernet-over-802-dot-16-secdir-lc-meadows-2009-08-27
Review completed: 2009-08-27

Review
review-ietf-16ng-ip-over-ethernet-over-802-dot-16-secdir-lc-meadows-2009-08-27

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 

These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. 

 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. 

This ID describes the transmission of IP4/IP6 over Ethernet in an access network deploying

IEEE 802.16.   Security is mentioned only in the Security Considerations section, which reads 

This document does not introduce any new vulnerabilities to IPv4 and
   IPv6 specifications or operations.  The security of the IEEE 802.16
   air interface between SSs and BS is the subject of [

802.16

] and the
   security issues of Ethernet bridging are the subjects of [

802.1D

].
   The generic IP over Ethernet network using IEEE 802.16 emulates
   Ethernet link, since existing IPv4 and IPv6 security mechanisms over
   Ethernet can be still used.  While the public access network ensures
   secure isolation of each of upstream link between hosts and AR, it
   still adopts SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [

RFC3971

] for securing


   neighbor discovery processes and it does not introduce any new
   vulnerabilities over those of Ethernet bridging.


 

This I found very hard to draw any conclusions from, although that may be partly

because I don't have access to 802.16 or 802.1D.  However, I would like to see a little

more than just a blanket statement that this document does not introduce any new

vulnerabilities, e.g. some supporting information.  How are the security mechanisms

of IPv4 and IPv6 supposed to work together with those of 802.16? How do the security

issues of Ethernet bridging as described in 802.1D impact the security of IPv4 and IPv6?  I don't think

you need to go into a whole lot of detail here, since this is not the main focus of the document,

but I would like to see more evidence than this.  If there are other documents that address those

issues you can just point to them.

Cathy Meadows

Catherine Meadows

Naval Research Laboratory

Code 5543

4555 Overlook Ave., S.W.

Washington DC, 20375

phone: 202-767-3490

fax: 202-404-7942

email: 

catherine.meadows at nrl.navy.mil