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Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET. draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01

Abstract

This document deprecates the use of the AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET types of the AS_PATH in BGPv4. This is done to simplify the design and implementation of the BGP protocol and to make the semantics of the originator of a route more clear.

Status of this Memo

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Internet-Draft	AS_SET,	AS_CONFED_	_SET deprecation	September 2010
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Table of Contents

<u>1</u> .	Introduction	3
<u>2</u> .	Requirements notation	4
<u>3</u> .	Terminology	5
<u>4</u> .	Deployment and modification of behavior	<u>6</u>
<u>5</u> .	IANA Considerations	7
<u>6</u> .	Security Considerations	8
<u>7</u> .	Acknowledgements	9
<u>8</u> .	Normative References 1	.0
Auth	or's Address	.1

1. Introduction

The AS SET path segment type of the AS PATH attribute ([RFC4271], Section 4.3) is created by a router that is performing route aggregation and contains an unordered set of ASs that the update has traversed. The AS CONFED SET path segment type ([RFC5065]) of the AS PATH attribute is created by a router that is performing route aggregation and contains an unordered set of Member AS Numbers in the local confederation that the update has traversed (AS CONFED SETs are very similar to AS SETs, but are used within a confederation).

By performing aggregation, a router is, in essence, combining multiple routes into a new route. This type of aggregation blurs the semantics of what it means to originate a route. These can cause operational issues that include reachability problems and traffic engineering issues.

From analysis of past Internet routing data it is apparent that aggregation that involves AS SETs is very seldom used in practice on the public network and, when it is, often contains reserved AS numbers ([RFC1930]) and / or only a single AS in the AS SET. The reductions in table size provided by the aggregation is outweighed by additional complexity in the BGP protocol and confusion regarding what exactly is meant by originating a route.

2. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

Deprecate: To mark (a component of a software standard) as obsolete to warn against its use in the future so that it may be phased out.

4. Deployment and modification of behavior

It is expected that initially AS SETs / AS CONFED SETs will be deprecated by the few operators that are currently generating them, and operator policy changed to filter them. Operators should take note that new technologies (such as those that make use of the RPKI) MAY not support routes with AS SETs / AS CONFED SETs in them, and MAY treat as infeasible routes containing them.

5. IANA Considerations

This document contains no IANA considerations.

6. Security Considerations

By removing support for the AS SET path segment type of the AS PATH attribute future BGP implementations can be simplified.. This will also simplify the design and implementation of the RPKI and systems that will rely on it. By removing corner cases we remove complexity and code that is not exercised very often, which decreases the attack surface.

7. Acknowledgements

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Apologies to those who I may have missed, it was not intentional.

8. Normative References

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