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HMAC SHA TSIG Algorithm Identifiers

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Status of This Document

This draft is intended to be become a Proposed Standard RFC. Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNSEXT working group mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>.

Abstract

Use of the Domain Name System TSIG resource record requires specification of a cryptographic message authentication code. Currently identifiers have been specified only for the HMAC MD5 (Message Digest) and GSS (Generic Security Service) TSIG algorithms. This document standardizes identifiers and implementation requirements for additional HMAC SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) TSIG algorithms and standardizes how to specify and handle the truncation of HMAC values in TSIG.

Copyright Notice

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1. Introduction

[RFC 2845] specifies a TSIG Resource Record (RR) that can be used to authenticate DNS (Domain Name System [STD 13]) queries and responses. This RR contains a domain name syntax data item which names the authentication algorithm used. [RFC 2845] defines the HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT name for authentication codes using the HMAC [RFC 2104] algorithm with the MD5 [RFC 1321] hash algorithm. IANA has also registered "gss-tsig" as an identifier for TSIG authentication where the cryptographic operations are delegated to the Generic Security Service (GSS) [RFC 3645].

It should be noted that use of TSIG presumes prior agreement, between the resolver and server involved, as to the algorithm and key to be used.

In Section 2, this document specifies additional names for TSIG authentication algorithms based on US NIST SHA (United States, National Institute of Science and Technology, Secure Hash Algorithm) algorithms and HMAC and specifies the implementation requirements for those algorithms.

In Section 3, this document specifies the effect of inequality between the normal output size of the specified hash function and the length of MAC (message authentication code) data given in the TSIG RR. In particular, it specifies that a shorter length field value specifies truncation and a longer length field is an error.

In Section 4, policy restrictions and implications related to truncation and a new error code to indicate truncation shorter than permitted by policy are described and specified.

The use herein of MUST, SHOULD, MAY, MUST NOT, and SHOULD NOT is as defined in [RFC 2119].

2. Algorithms and Identifiers

TSIG Resource Records (RRs) [RFC 2845] are used to authenticate DNS queries and responses. They are intended to be efficient symmetric authentication codes based on a shared secret. (Asymmetric signatures can be provided using the SIG RR [RFC 2931]. In particular, SIG(0) can be used for transaction signatures.) Used with a strong hash function, HMAC [RFC 2104] provides a way to calculate such symmetric authentication codes. The only specified HMAC based TSIG algorithm identifier has been HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT based on MD5 [RFC 1321].

The use of SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3174], which is a 160 bit hash, as compared with the 128 bits for MD5, and additional hash algorithms in the SHA family [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3874, SHA2draft] with 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits, may be preferred in some cases particularly since increasingly successful cryptanalytic attacks are being made on the shorter hashes.

Use of TSIG between a DNS resolver and server is by mutual agreement. That agreement can include the support of additional algorithms and criteria as to which algorithms and truncations are acceptable, subject to the restriction and guidelines in Section 3 and 4 below. Key agreement can be by the TKEY mechanism [RFC 2930] or other mutually agreeable method.

The current HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT and gss-tsig identifiers are included in the table below for convenience. Implementations which support TSIG MUST also implement HMAC SHA1 and HMAC SHA256 and MAY implement gss-tsig and the other algorithms listed below.

Mandatory	HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT
Optional	gss-tsig
Mandatory	hmac-sha1
Optional	hmac-sha224
Mandatory	hmac-sha256
Optional	hamc-sha384
Optional	hmac-sha512

SHA-1 truncated to 96 bits (12 octets) SHOULD be implemented.

3. Specifying Truncation

When space is at a premium and the strength of the full length of an HMAC is not needed, it is reasonable to truncate the HMAC output and use the truncated value for authentication. HMAC SHA-1 truncated to 96 bits is an option available in several IETF protocols including IPSEC and TLS.

The TSIG RR [RFC 2845] includes a "MAC size" field, which gives the size of the MAC field in octets. But [RFC 2845] does not specify what to do if this MAC size differs from the length of the output of HMAC for a particular hash function. Truncation is indicated by a MAC size less than the HMAC size as specified below.

3.1 Truncation Specification

The specification for TSIG handling is changed as follows:

1. If "MAC size" field is greater than HMAC output length:
   This case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause the packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned.

2. If "MAC size" field equals HMAC output length:
   Operation is as described in [RFC 2845] with the entire output HMAC output present.

3. "MAC size" field is less than HMAC output length but greater than that specified in case 4 below:
   This is sent when the signer has truncated the HMAC output to an allowable length, as described in RFC 2104, taking initial octets and discarding trailing octets. TSIG truncation can only be to an integral number of octets. On receipt of a packet with truncation thus indicated, the locally calculated MAC is similarly truncated and only the truncated values compared for authentication. The request MAC used when calculating the TSIG MAC for a reply is the truncated request MAC.

4. "MAC size" field is less than the larger of 10 (octets) and half the length of the hash function in use:
   With the exception of certain TSIG error messages described in RFC 2845 section 3.2 where it is permitted that the MAC size be zero, this case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause the packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned. The size limit for this case can also, for the hash functions mentioned in this document, be stated as less than half the hash function length for hash functions other than MD5 and less than 10 octets for MD5.

4. TSIG Truncation Policy and Error Provisions

Use of TSIG is by mutual agreement between a resolver and server. Implicit in such "agreement" are criterion as to acceptable keys and algorithms and, with the extensions in this document, truncations. Note that it is common for implementations to bind the TSIG secret key or keys that may be in place at a resolver and server to particular algorithms. Thus such implementations only permit the use of an algorithm if there is an associated key in place. Receipt of an unknown, unimplemented, or disabled algorithm typically results in a BADKEY error.

Local policies MAY require the rejection of TSIGs even though they use an algorithm for which implementation is mandatory.

When a local policy permits acceptance of a TSIG with a particular algorithm and a particular non-zero amount of truncation it SHOULD also permit the use of that algorithm with lesser truncation (a longer MAC) up to the full HMAC output.

Regardless of a lower acceptable truncated MAC length specified by local policy, a reply SHOULD be sent with a MAC at least as long as that in the corresponding request unless the request specified a MAC length longer than the HMAC output.

Implementations permitting multiple acceptable algorithms and/or truncations SHOULD permit this list to be ordered by presumed strength and SHOULD allow different truncations for the same algorithm to be treated as separate entities in this list. When so implemented, policies SHOULD accept a presumed stronger algorithm and truncation than the minimum strength required by the policy.

If a TSIG is received with truncation which is permitted under Section 3 above but the MAC is too short for the local policy in force, an RCODE of TBA [22 suggested](BADTRUNC) MUST be returned.

5. IANA Considerations

This document, on approval for publication as a standards track RFC, (1) registers the new TSIG algorithm identifiers listed in Section 2 with IANA and (2) allocates the BADTRUNC RCODE TBA [22 suggested] in Section 4. [RFC 2845]

6. Security Considerations

For all of the message authentication code algorithms listed herein, those producing longer values are believed to be stronger; however, while there have been some arguments that mild truncation can strengthen a MAC by reducing the information available to an attacker, excessive truncation clearly weakens authentication by reducing the number of bits an attacker has to try to break the authentication by brute force [RFC 2104].

Significant progress has been made recently in cryptanalysis of hash function of the type used herein, all of which ultimately derive from the design of MD4. While the results so far should not effect HMAC, the stronger SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms are being made mandatory due to caution.

See the Security Considerations section of [RFC 2845]. See also the Security Considerations section of [RFC 2104] from which the limits on truncation in this RFC were taken.

7. Copyright and Disclaimer

8. Normative References

[FIPS 180-2] - "Secure Hash Standard", (SHA-1/224/256/384/512) US Federal Information Processing Standard, with Change Notice 1, February 2004.

[RFC 1321] - Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ", RFC 1321, April 1992.

[RFC 2104] - Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.

[RFC 2119] - Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC 2845] - Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

[RFC 3174] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.

[RFC 3874] - R. Housely, "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224", September 2004,

[SHA2draft] - Eastlake, D., T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA)", draft-eastlake-sha2-*.txt, work in progress.

[STD 13]
Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

9. Informative References.

[RFC 2930] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.

[RFC 2931] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.

[RFC 3645] - Kwan, S., Garg, P., Gilroy, J., Esibov, L., Westhead, J., and R. Hall, "Generic Security Service Algorithm for Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)", RFC 3645, October 2003.

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Additional IPR Provisions

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