anima Y. Li
Internet-Draft L. Shen
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies
Expires: December 30, 2021 June 28, 2021
Autonomic IP Address To Access Control Groups Mapping
draft-yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups-00
Abstract
This document defines the autonomic technical objectives for IP
address/prefix to access control groups mapping. The objectives
defined can be used in Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)
to make the policy enforcement point receive IP address and its tied
access control groups information directly from the access
authentication points and then execute the group based policies.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2021.
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
Requesting Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
Providing Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Objectives . . 8
5.1. IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective Option . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Objective Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
Ubiquitous group based policy management makes sure that the users
can obtain the same network access permission and QoS assurance
wherever they access the campus network. That is, the permission and
QoS assurance are tied to user role, rather than access points and/or
IP address assigned.
Group means a number of endpoints connecting to the network that
share common network policies. It facilitates the easy design and
provision of policy. A user's role is usually a group indicated by a
group ID. Group based policy management has been replacing the
traditional IP address and/or port number based policy widely.
The policy enforcement point (PEP) requires the IP address/prefix and
access control group mapping information of user in order to execute
the group based policy. This mapping information is usually first
available at the access authentication point (AAP) during the
procedures of user access and authentication/authorization. However
PEP may not be the access authentication point. Therefore IP and
group mappings has to be passed to PEP.
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This document defines the autonomic technical objectives for IP
address/prefix and access control group mapping. In this document,
group is also used for short to refer to the access control group.
The Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP) [RFC8990] can make
use of these technical objectives as the basic building blocks of a
ubiquitous group based policy management solution, especially for a
campus network.
Autonomic Networking Infrastructure (ANI) is designed to provide the
elementary functions and services to be further integrated and used
by Autonomic Service Agents (ASA) on nodes. The campus policy
management ASA can integrate the function introduced in this document
when necessary.
2. Terminologies
This document uses terminology defined in [RFC7575].
PEP: Policy Enforcement Point. A logical entity that enforces
policy decisions [RFC3198]. The policy decisions are group based
policies in this document.
AAP: Access Authentication Point. A logical entity that obtains the
information of the attaching clients' assigned IP address/prefix
and their access control groups. AAP may get the information from
one or different resources, for example, DHCP [RFC2131] [RFC8415]
server and/or RADIUS [RFC3198] server.
3. Problems
The traditional policy in a campus network is normally presented as
IP prefix/address based, for example, "Deny the traffic from IP
prefix X to IP prefix Y". Each of the access port of the switches is
assigned a subnet prefix and each subnet implies a group. It works
well when the end hosts are static. With the increasing deployment
of wireless accessed users and more complicated and dynamic
requirements of campus network policy, such an assumption no longer
hold. For instance, a user from the engineering department may bring
the laptop to access the campus network via a WiFi access point.
Then it will be assigned an IP address from a different subnet prefix
from the other fixed end hosts in the same engineering department.
It is hard and tedious to provision the consistent policy with the
other hosts in the same group for this specific IP address. Another
example is a user can belong to more than one group, say group of
department A and also VIP group. Group assignment is much more
flexible than subnet defined IP address assignment.
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Therefore group based policy is used in such cases. No matter what
IP address is assigned to the user, its belonging access control
groups have no change and the group based policies has no change too.
For example, the policy can be "Allow the traffic from group
engineering to group testing, and assign the traffic destined to VIP
group the highest priority". In order to make group based policy
work, the IP address and its group mapping information has to be
stored on PEP so that IP addresses carried in data packet can be
mapped to the group ID first and then the policy can be enforced.
IP and group mapping information is usually first available at the
access authentication point (AAP). Figure 1 show a typical campus
network. The policy enforcement point (PEP) can be core switches,
while the access authentication point (AAP) is the access switch in
the figure. AAP serves as the DHCP relay which remembers the IP
address assigned to the client and/or at the same time it talks to
AAA server to get the client's group information based on client's
identity.
+-------+ +-------+
| core1 | --- | core2 | core switches (PEP)
+-------+ /+-------+
| \ / | \
| \ / | \
| \ / | \
| \ / | \
| \ | \
+-------+ / \ +-------+ +-------+
| acc1 |/ \| acc2 | | acc3 | access switches
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ (AAP)
|
|
|
|
+-------+
| WiFi |
| AP1 | wifi access point
+-------+
Figure 1: Hierarchical Campus Network
A more complex campus network is shown in Figure 2. There are 4 PEPs
are deployed at the key positions for different types of traffic.
The AAPs obtaining a user's IP and group ID mapping information are
access switches (not fully shown in the figure) which are the access
nodes for the attaching clients.
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The problem to be solved by Autonomic Networking here is how to make
IP address/prefix and access control group mapping information
available at PEP from AAP.
via SSL VPN tunnel -----
+--------+ / \
| user2 |-----------+Internet |
|(group1)| | |
+--------+ \-------/
|
|
|
+---------------------|--------+
----- | | |
/ \ | +--------+ +--------+ |
| WAN | --------------| WAN | |SSL VPN | |
| | | | border | |Internet| |
\-------/ | |firewall| |gateway | |
| | +--------+ +--------+ |
| | |PEP3 | PEP2 |
| | | +----+ |
+------|---------+ | | | |
| | | | +--------+ | +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | | core |---+ | | |
| | core | | | | switch |-----|firewall| |
| | switch | | | +--------+ +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | | PEP1 |
| |PEP4 | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | +--------+ +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | | switch | --- | switch | |
| | switch | | | +--------+ +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | +--------+ +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | | user1 | | user3 | |
| | user4 | | | |(group1)| |(group2)| |
| |(group2)| | | +--------+ +--------+ |
| +--------+ | | |
| | | |
| | | |
|Branch | | Headquarter |
+----------------+ +------------------------------+
Figure 2: Campus Networks with remote access
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Some deployment uses a centralized controller to solve this problem.
Every single AAP reports its IP and group ID mapping information to
the controller. When a PEP receives a data packet, it queries the
controller for the group IDs of the source and/or destination IP
addresses and then enforce the group based policy. This approach
requires an explicit controller able to talk to each and every AAP
and PEP. In the deployment where the headquarter and branch campus
networks are far apart, it will require controllers for each site to
exchange information or have another super-controller to help
exchange the information among sites. It introduces the complexity
and interoperability issues.
Autonomic Networking (AN) puts the intelligence at the node level, to
minimize dependency on human administrators and central management
such as a controller. The Autonomic Networking approach discussed in
this document is based on the assumption that there is a generic
discovery and negotiation protocol that enables direct negotiation
between the routers or switches. GRASP [RFC8990] is intended to be
such a protocol which can make use of the technical objectives
defined in the following sections as the basic building blocks of a
ubiquitous group based policy management solution, especially for a
campus network. The ultimate goal is self-management of campus
networks which can expand over multiple sites and share the same set
of policies, including self-configuration, self-optimization, self-
healing and self-protection (sometimes collectively called self-X).
4. Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping Procedures
An Autonomic Service Agent (ASA) participates in IP address/prefix to
access control groups mapping is called
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA in this document. The procedures
carried out by IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA is illustrated
below.
4.1. Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
Requesting Nodes
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups requesting node is usually a PEP in a
domain which executes the group based policy. So it needs to map an
IP address/prefix to one or more group IDs first. Such mapping
information will be stored locally until either timeout or withdrawn.
The request can be triggered by a data packet. Group based policy
requires both the source and destination group IDs which are normally
mapped from source and destination IP addresses. If any of such
mapping is not locally available, the requesting node needs to ask
for it. In some implementation, data packet encapsulation includes
the source group ID directly such as in the reserved field in VXLAN
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[RFC7348]. Therefore it is up to the requesting node to determine if
both source and destination groups or only one of them to be queried.
In some cases that the requesting node is a tunnel endpoint, it
should be noted that usually the inner rather than outer IP addresses
are to be used to query for the corresponding group id.
The request can also be sent periodically or voluntarily. It can
happen when a newly booted requesting node wants to get the whole
batch of IP address and access control group mapping information or
when a requesting node would like have an explicit refreshment on the
information.
The IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA should send out a GRASP
Discovery message that contains a IPAddressToAccessControlGroups
Objective option in order to discover peers supporting this option.
The requesting ASA acts as a GRASP synchronization initiator by
sending a GRASP Request message with a IPAddressToAccessControlGroups
Objective option. The ASA indicates an IP prefix or address in this
option. This starts a GRASP synchronization process.
4.2. Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
Providing Nodes
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups providing node is usually an AAP of a
user in a domain. It obtains the mapping of IP address and group IDs
of an endpoint in various ways. For instance, use RADIUS [RFC2865]
or CAPWAP [RFC5415] to get the user's access control group IDs during
authentication phase and/or use DHCP snooping to get the user's
assigned IP address. Sometimes such mapping information can be
statically provisioned based on port or VLAN. The mapping
information is stored locally on AAP.
A device that receives a Discovery message with a
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option should respond with a
GRASP Response message if it contains a
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA. When this ASA receives a
subsequent Request message, it should reply with a GRASP
Synchronization messages. The Synchronization messages carry a
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option, which will indicate
the mappings between the IP address/prefix and group IDs. Optionally
the expiration time can be tied to each mapping.
The IP address to access control groups mapping providing node can
send the Flood Synchronization message if it has any update or
withdraw regarding its providing mapping information.
The providing nodes of address to access control groups mapping
information are usually at the edges and can be added or replaced
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with the expansion of the network. The requesting nodes are normally
aggregation or core nodes with more storage and capability to enforce
the policy. Therefore the number of mapping information providing
nodes is usually more than the number of requesting nodes. The
providing node can be the one initiating the GRASP Discovery message
as well and/or send the unsolicited Synchronization message
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp-distribution].
5. Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Objectives
This section defines the GRASP technical objective options that are
used to support autonomic IP address/prefix to access control groups
mapping.
5.1. IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective Option
The IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option is a GRASP
objective option conforming to [RFC8990]. The name of this option is
"IPAddressToAccessControlGroups". It carries the IP prefix/address
and its mapping access control group id. The format of
IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option in CBOR (Concise
Binary Object Representation [RFC8949]) is show in Concise data
definition language (CDDL) [RFC8610] as follows. Tags for general
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and prefixes defined in
[I-D.ietf-cbor-network-addresses] are used.
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objective = ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups",
objective-flags, loop-count,
[ip-address-or-prefix, *group-id]]
group-id = uint
; copied from draft-ietf-cbor-network-addresses, RFC YYYY TBD:
ip-address-or-prefix = ipv6-address-or-prefix/ipv4-address-or-prefix
ipv6-address-or-prefix = #6.54(ipv6-address / ipv6-prefix)
ipv4-address-or-prefix = #6.52(ipv4-address / ipv4-prefix)
ipv6-prefix = [ipv6-prefix-length, ipv6-prefix-bytes]
ipv4-prefix = [ipv4-prefix-length, ipv4-prefix-bytes]
ipv6-prefix-length = 0..128
ipv4-prefix-length = 0..32
ipv6-prefix-bytes = bytes .size (uint .le 16)
ipv4-prefix-bytes = bytes .size (uint .le 4)
ipv6-address = bytes .size 16
ipv4-address = bytes .size 4
; copied from the GRASP specification, RFC 8990:
objective-flags = uint .bits objective-flag
objective-flag = &(
F_DISC: 0 ; valid for discovery
F_NEG: 1 ; valid for negotiation
F_SYNCH: 2 ; valid for synchronization
F_NEG_DRY: 3 ; negotiation is a dry run
)
loop-count = 0..255
A common practice currently usually uses 16 bits to present a group
ID. But the representation does not limit that. Zero group ID would
be used for full retraction of a prefix or address.
6. Security Considerations
Security consideration for GRASP [RFC8990] applies in this document.
The preferred security model is that devices are trusted following
the secure bootstrap procedure [RFC8995] and that a secure Autonomic
Control Plane (ACP) [RFC8994] is in place.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new GRASP Objective option name:
"IPAddressToAccessControlGroups". The IANA is requested to added it
to the "GRASP Objective Names" subregistry defined by [RFC8990].
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Carsten Bormann, Brian Carpenter and Michael Richardson for
useful suggestions and revising CDDL representations.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC7575] Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8990] Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8990>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp-distribution]
Liu, B., Xiao, X., Hecker, A., Jiang, S., Despotovic, Z.,
and Brian, "Information Distribution over GRASP", draft-
ietf-anima-grasp-distribution-02 (work in progress), March
2021.
[I-D.ietf-cbor-network-addresses]
Richardson, M., "CBOR tags for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and
prefixes", draft-ietf-cbor-network-addresses-04 (work in
progress), April 2021.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
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[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.
[RFC3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
Management", RFC 3198, DOI 10.17487/RFC3198, November
2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3198>.
[RFC5415] Calhoun, P., Ed., Montemurro, M., Ed., and D. Stanley,
Ed., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Specification", RFC 5415,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5415, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5415>.
[RFC7348] Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual
eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7348>.
[RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC8994] Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
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Appendix A. Objective Examples
This appendix shows a number of examples of objective defined in this
document conforming to the CDDL syntax given in Section 5.1.
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 101,
[54([4, h'A50386A78BA56FA4BBC734281C51']), 3506, 2698, 4562]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 5, 73, [52(h'9946B8A3'), 2881,
2265, 1720, 2450]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 161,
[54(h'39F3045B641AD291B057CD1857A7314A')]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 2, [52(h'98A1CE4F')]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 66, [52(h'69A16BFE'), 2601,
1851, 3876, 1405]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 254,
[54(h'38AB303B8895DC95068CE00248D2FE91'), 4019, 1166, 3113]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 63, [52([4, h'0B48']), 3035,
1181]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 44, [52(h'01F1D8FF'), 3099,
1577, 1138, 1670]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 181,
[54(h'2C74719F9355BA4E3BDE5689D1FE4CB0')]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 129, [52(h'A2EF97C7'), 3149,
2728]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 18,
[54(h'CD3868615B00D72A61A028822FEE6407'), 1832, 4605, 360, 3030]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 171,
[54(h'46929AE1103FDF6407A239323F71C234')]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 42, [52([7, h'8E05'])]]
["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 180,
[54([41, h'2D85855FA9C3772AAB2F']), 672, 1205]]
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Authors' Addresses
Yizhou Li
Huawei Technologies
Email: liyizhou@huawei.com
Li Shen
Huawei Technologies
Email: kevin.shenli@huawei.com
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