IDR G. Van de Velde
Internet-Draft K. Patel
Intended status: Standards Track D. Rao
Expires: January 1, 2015 Cisco Systems
R. Raszuk
NTT MCL Inc.
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
June 30, 2014
BGP Remote-Next-Hop
draft-vandevelde-idr-remote-next-hop-06
Abstract
The BGP Remote-Next-Hop is an optional transitive attribute intended
to facilitate automatic tunneling across an AS on a per address
family basis. The attribute carries one or more tunnel end-points
for a NLRI. Additionally, tunnel encapsulation information is
communicated to successfully setup these tunnels.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Tunnel Encapsulation attribute versus BGP Remote-Next-Hop
attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute TLV Format . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Encapsulation sub-TLVs for virtual network overlays . . . 5
4.1.1. Encapsulation sub-TLV for VXLAN . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Encapsulation sub-TLV for NVGRE . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3. Encapsulation sub-TLV for GTP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Use Case scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Stateless user-plane architecture for virtualized EPC
(vEPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Stateless User-plane Architecture for virtual Packet Edge 9
5.3. Multi-homing for IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Dynamic Network Overlay Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. The Tunnel end-point is NOT the originating BGP speaker . 10
5.6. Networks that do not support BGP Remote-Next-Hop
attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.7. Networks that do support BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute . 10
6. BGP Remote-Next-Hop Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Protecting the validity of the BGP Remote-Next-Hop
attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
[RFC5512] defines an attribute attached to an NLRI to signal tunnel
end-point encapsulation information between two BGP speakers for a
single tunnel. It assumes that the exchanged tunnel endpoint is the
NLRI.
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This document defines a new BGP transitive attribute known as a
Remote-Next-Hop BGP attribute for Intra-AS and Inter-AS usage which
removes the assumption of both a single tunel and that the exchanged
NLRI is the tunnel endpoint.
The tunnel endpoint information and the tunnel encapsulation
information is carried within a Remote-Next-Hop BGP attribute. This
attribute can be added to any BGP NLRI. This way the Address Family
(AF) of the NLRI exchanged is decoupled from the tunnel SAFI address-
family defined in [RFC5512].
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without any normative meaning.
3. Tunnel Encapsulation attribute versus BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute
The Tunnel Encapsulation attribute [RFC5512] is based on the
principle that the tunnel end-point is the BGP speaker originating
the update and is inserted as the NLRI in the exchange, with the
consequence that it is impossible to set the endpoint to an arbitrary
address. It is also assumed that there is only a single tunnel
between endpoints.
There are use cases where it is desired that the tunnel end-point
address should be a different address, or set of addresses, than the
originating BGP speaker. It is also useful to be able to signal
different encapsulation parameters for different prefixes with the
same remote tunnel end-point. The BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute
provides the ability to have one or more different tunnel end-point
addresses from IPv4, IPv6 and/or other address-families, and be able
to signal next-hop encapsulation parameters along with any prefix.
The sub-TLVs from the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute [RFC5512] are
reused for the BGP Next-Hop-Attribute.
Due to the intrinsic nature of both attributes, the tunnel
encapsulation end-point assumes that the tunnel end-point is both the
NLRI exchanged and the originating router, while the BGP Remote-Next-
Hop attribute is inserted for an exchanged NLRI by adding a set of
tunnel end-points and hence these two attributes are mutually
exclusive.
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4. BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute TLV Format
This attribute is an optional transitive attribute [RFC1771].
The BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute is is composed of a set of Type-
Length-Value (TLV) encodings. The type code of the attribute is
(IANA to assign). Each TLV contains information corresponding to a
particular tunnel technology and tunnel end-point address. The TLV
is structured as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Tunnel Type (2 Octets) | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Addr len | Tunnel Address (IPv4, IPv6, or L2 Address) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AS Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Tunnel Parameters |
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Tunnel Type (2 octets): identifies the type of tunneling technology
being signaled. This document specifies the following types:
- L2TPv3 over IP [RFC3931]: Tunnel Type = 1
- GRE [RFC2784]: Tunnel Type = 2
- IP in IP [RFC2003] [RFC4213]: Tunnel Type = 7
This document also defines the following types:
- VXLAN: Tunnel Type = 8
- NVGRE: Tunnel Type = 9
- GTP: Tunnel Type = 10
Unknown types MUST be ignored and skipped upon receipt.
Length (2 octets): the total number of octets of the value field.
Tunnel Address Length - Addr len (1 octet): Length of Tunnel
Address. Set to 4 bytes for an IPv4 address, 16 bytes for an
IPv6 address or 8 bytes for a MAC address.
AS Number - The AS number originating the BGP Remote-Next-Hop
attribute and is either a 2-byte AS or 4-Byte AS number
Tunnel Parameter - (variable): comprised of multiple sub-TLVs.
Each sub-TLV consists of three fields: a 1-octet type, 1-octet
length, and zero or more octets of value. The sub-TLV definitions
and the sub-TLV data are described in depth in [RFC5512].
4.1. Encapsulation sub-TLVs for virtual network overlays
A VN-ID may need to be signaled along with the encapsulation types
for DC overlay encapsulations such as [VXLAN] and [NVGRE]. The VN-ID
when present in the encapsulation sub-TLV for an overlay
encapsulation, MUST be processed by a receiving device if it is
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capable of understanding it. The details regarding how such a
signaled VN-ID is processed and used is defined in specifications
such as [IPVPN-overlay] and [EVPN-overlay].
4.1.1. Encapsulation sub-TLV for VXLAN
This document defines a new encapsulation sub-TLV format, defined in
[RFC5512], for VXLAN tunnels. When the tunnel type is VXLAN, the
following is the structure of the value field in the encapsulation
sub-TLV:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V|M|R|R|R|R|R|R| VN-ID (3 Octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Address (4 Octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Address (2 Octets) | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
V: When set to 1, it indicates that a valid VN-ID is present in the
encapsulation sub-TLV.
M: When set to 1, it indicates that a valid MAC Address is present
in the encapsulation sub-TLV.
R: The remaining bits in the 8-bit flags field are reserved for
further use. They MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored
on receipt.
VN-ID: Contains a 24-bit VN-ID value, if the 'V' flag bit is set.
If the 'V' flag is not set, it SHOULD be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt.
The VN-ID value is filled in the VNI field in the VXLAN packet
header as defined in [VXLAN].
MAC Address: Contains an Ethernet MAC address if the 'M' flag bit
is set. If the 'M' flag is not set, it SHOULD set to all zeroes and
MUST be ignored on receipt.
The MAC address is local to the device advertising the route, and
should be included as the destination MAC address in the inner
Ethernet header immediately following the outer VXLAN header, in
the packets destined to the advertiser.
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4.1.2. Encapsulation sub-TLV for NVGRE
This document defines a new encapsulation sub-TLV format, defined in
[RFC5512], for NVGRE tunnels. When the tunnel type is NVGRE, the
following is the structure of the value field in the encapsulation
sub-TLV:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V|M|R|R|R|R|R|R| VN-ID (3 Octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Address (4 Octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Address (2 Octets) | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
V: When set to 1, it indicates that a valid VN-ID is present in the
encapsulation sub-TLV.
M: When set to 1, it indicates that a valid MAC Address is present
in the encapsulation sub-TLV.
R: The remaining bits in the 8-bit flags field are reserved for
further use. They MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored
on receipt.
VN-ID: Contains a 24-bit VN-ID value, if the 'V' flag bit is set.
If the 'V' flag is not set, it SHOULD be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt.
The VN-ID value is filled in the VSID field in the NVGRE packet
header as defined in [NVGRE].
MAC Address: Contains an Ethernet MAC address if the 'M' flag bit is
set. If the 'M' flag is not set, it SHOULD set to all zeroes and
MUST be ignored on receipt.
The MAC address is local to the device advertising the route, and
should be included as the destination MAC address in the inner
Ethernet header immediately following the outer NVGRE header, in
the packets destined to
the advertiser.
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4.1.3. Encapsulation sub-TLV for GTP
This document defines a new encapsulation sub-TLV format, defined in
[RFC5512], for GTP tunnels. When the tunnel type is GTP, the
following is the structure of the value field in the encapsulation
sub-TLV:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Local TEID (4 Octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Local Endpoint Address (4/16 Octets (IPv4/IPv6)) |
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Local TEID: Contains a 32-bit Tunnel Endpoint Identifier of a
GTP tunnel assigned by EPC that is used to distinguish different
connections in received packets within the tunnel.
Local Endpoint Address: Indicates a 4-octets IPv4 address or
16-octets IPv6 address as a local endpoint address of GTP tunnel.
Local Endpoint Address element makes a tunnel endpoint router
allow to have multiple Local TEID spaces. Received GTP packets
are identified which tunnel connection by combination of Local
Endpoint Address and Local TEID.
5. Use Case scenarios
This section provides a short overview of some use-cases for the BGP
Remote-Next-Hop attribute. Use of the BGP Remote-Next-Hop is not
limited to the examples in this section.
5.1. Stateless user-plane architecture for virtualized EPC (vEPC)
The full usage case of BGP remote-next-hop regarding vEPC can be
found in [vEPC], while [RFC6459]documents IPv6 in 3GPP EPS.
3GPP introduces Evolved Packet Core (EPC) that is fully IP based
mobile system for LTE and -advanced in their Release-8 specification
and beyond. Operators are now deploying EPC for LTE services and
encounter rapid LTE traffic growth. There are various activities to
offload mobile traffic in 3GPP and IETF such as LIPA, SIPTO and DMM.
The concept is similar that traffic of OTT (Over The Top) application
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is offloaded at entity that is closer to the mobile node (ex. eNodeB
or closer anchor).
5.2. Stateless User-plane Architecture for virtual Packet Edge
With the emergence of the NfV technologies, different architectures
are proposed for virtualised Services. These functions will normally
run in the datacenter. BGP remote-next-hop can be used to inject
traffic into the virtualised services running in the datacenter for a
optimized, simple and clean routing architecture. BGP Remote Next
Hop can simplify the orchestration or provisioning layer by
signalling the tunnel endpoint (virtual provider edge router) and the
encapsulation protocol.
If this is used together with orchestrated traffic steering mechnisms
(i.e. BGP Flowspec) , it is possible to differentiate at application
level, and forward each different traffic types towards the desired
destination.
5.3. Multi-homing for IPv6
When an end-user IPv6 network is multi-homed to the Internet, it may
be assigned more than a single prefix originated by various upstream
ASs. Each AS prefers to only announce a supernet of all its assigned
IPv6 prefixes, unlike IPv4 where the AS announced the end-users
assigned prefix. The goal of this BGP policy behaviour is to keep
the number of entries in the IPv6 global BGP table to a minimum, it
also it also results in well known resiliency improvements.
For example, if an end-user IPv6 is peering with 2 different Service
providers AS1 and AS2. In this case the IPv6 end-user will have at
least one prefix assigned from each of these service providers. The
devices at the IPv6 end-user will each receive an address from these
prefixes. The devices will in most cases, when building IPv6
sessions (TCP, etc...), do so with only a single IPv6 address. The
decision which IPv6 address the device will use is documented in
[RFC3484].
If one of the links between the end-user and one the neighboring AS's
fails, a consequence will be that a set of sessions need to be reset,
or that a section of the end-user network becomes unreachable.
With usage of the BGP-remote-Next-Hop attribute the service provider
can tunnel that packet towards an alternate BGP Remote-Next-Hop at
the end-users alternate provider and restore the network connectivity
even though the local link towards the end-user is broken.
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5.4. Dynamic Network Overlay Infrastructure
The BGP Remote-Next-Hop extension allows signaling tunnel
encapsulations needed to build and dynamically create an overlay
tunneled network with traffic isolation and virtual private networks.
5.5. The Tunnel end-point is NOT the originating BGP speaker
Note that, in each network environment, the originating router is the
preferred tunnel end-point server. It may be that the network
administrator has deployed an independent set of tunnel end-point
servers across their network, which may or may not speak BGP. The
BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute provides the ability to signal this via
BGP.
5.6. Networks that do not support BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute
If a device does not support this attribute, and receives this
attribute, then normal NLRI BGP forwarding is used as the attribute
is optional and transitive.
5.7. Networks that do support BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute
If a BGP speaker does understand this attribute, and receives this
attribute, then the BGP speaker MAY, by configuration, skip use or
not use the information within this attribute.
6. BGP Remote-Next-Hop Community
place-holder for an BGP extension to signal valid prefixes allowed to
be considered as tunnel end-points. To be completed.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new BGP attribute known as a BGP Remote-Next-
Hop attribute. We request IANA to allocate a new attribute code from
the "BGP Path Attributes" registry with a symbolic name "Remote-Next-
Hop" attribute.
This document also defines new Tunnel types for BGP Remote-Next-Hop
attributes. We request IANA to create a new registry for BGP Remote-
Next-Hop Tunnel Types as follows:
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Under "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters":
Registry: "BGP Remote-Next-Hop Tunnel Types"
Reference: [RFC-to-Be]
Registration Procedure(s): Values 0-65535 Standards Action,
First Come, First Served
Value Code Reference
0 Reserved
1 L2TPv3 over IP [RFC-to-Be]
2 GRE [RFC-to-Be]
3 IP in IP [RFC-to-Be]
4 VXLAN [RFC-to-Be]
5 NVGRE [RFC-to-Be]
6 GTP [RFC-to-Be]
7-65535 Unassigned
65535 Reserved
8. Security Considerations
This technology could be used as technology as man in the middle
attack, however with existing RPKI validation for BGP that risk is
reduced.
The distribution of Tunnel end-point address information can result
in potential DoS attacks if the information is sent by malicious
organisations. Therefore is it strongly recommended to install
traffic filters, IDSs and IPSs at the perimeter of the tunneled
network infrastructure.
8.1. Protecting the validity of the BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute
It is possible to inject a rogue BGP Remote-Next-Hop attribute to an
NLRI resulting in Monkey-In-The-Middle attack (MITM). To avoid this
type of MITM attack, it is strongly recommended to use a technology a
mechanism to verify that for NLRI it is the expected BGP Remote-Next-
Hop. We anticipate that this can be done with an expansion of RPKI-
Based origin validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
This does not avoid the fact that rogue AS numbers may be inserted or
injected into the AS-Path. To achieve protection against that threat
BGP Path Validation should be used, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].
9. Privacy Considerations
This proposal may introduce privacy issues, however with BGP security
mechanisms in place they should be prevented.
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10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thanks Satoru Matsushima, Ryuji Wakikawa
and Miya Kohno for their usefull vEPC discussions. Istvan Kakonyi
provided insight in the vPE use case scenario.
11. Change Log
Initial Version: 16 May 2012
Hacked for -01: 17 July 2012
Hacked for -05: 07 January 2014
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC1771] Rekhter, Y. and T. Li, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
4)", RFC 1771, March 1995.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2784] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
March 2000.
[RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
[RFC3931] Lau, J., Townsley, M., and I. Goyret, "Layer Two Tunneling
Protocol - Version 3 (L2TPv3)", RFC 3931, March 2005.
[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005.
[RFC5512] Mohapatra, P. and E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation
Subsequent Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP
Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute", RFC 5512, April 2009.
[RFC6459] Korhonen, J., Soininen, J., Patil, B., Savolainen, T.,
Bajko, G., and K. Iisakkila, "IPv6 in 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) Evolved Packet System (EPS)",
RFC 6459, January 2012.
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12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-04 (work in progress),
December 2013.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", draft-ietf-sidr-
pfx-validate-10 (work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan]
Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "VXLAN: A
Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over
Layer 3 Networks", draft-mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan-02
(work in progress), August 2012.
[I-D.matsushima-stateless-uplane-vepc]
Matsushima, S. and R. Wakikawa, "Stateless user-plane
architecture for virtualized EPC (vEPC)", draft-
matsushima-stateless-uplane-vepc-01 (work in progress),
July 2013.
[I-D.sridharan-virtualization-nvgre]
Sridharan, M., Greenberg, A., Venkataramaiah, N., Wang,
Y., Duda, K., Ganga, I., Lin, G., Pearson, M., Thaler, P.,
and C. Tumuluri, "NVGRE: Network Virtualization using
Generic Routing Encapsulation", draft-sridharan-
virtualization-nvgre-02 (work in progress), February 2013.
Authors' Addresses
Gunter Van de Velde
Cisco Systems
De Kleetlaan 6a
Diegem 1831
Belgium
Phone: +32 2704 5473
Email: gvandeve@cisco.com
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Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124 95134
USA
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
Dhananjaya Rao
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124 95134
USA
Email: dhrao@cisco.com
Robert Raszuk
NTT MCL Inc.
101 S Ellsworth Avenue Suite 350
San Mateo, CA 94401
US
Email: robert@raszuk.net
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
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