OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: October 23, 2014 Ping Identity
N. Agarwal
Google
April 21, 2014
OAuth Symmetric Proof of Posession for Code Extension
draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03
Abstract
The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing authorization code grant is
susceptible to the code interception attack. This specification
describe a mechanism that acts as a control against this threat.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. code verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. code challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Client checks the server support . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. (optional) Client registers its desired code challenge
algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Client creates a code verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Client sends the code challenge with the authorization
request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.5. Server returns the code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.6. Client sends the code and the secret to the token
endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.7. Server verifies code_verifier before returning the tokens 5
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
Public clients in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] is suseptible to the "code"
interception attack. The "code" interception attack is an attack
that a malicious client intercepts the "code" returned from the
authorization endpoint and uses it to obtain the access token. This
is possible on a public client as there is no client secret
associated for it to be sent to the token endpoint. This is
especially true on some smartphone platform in which the "code" is
returned to a redirect URI with a custom scheme as there can be
multiple apps that can register the same scheme.Under this scenario,
the mitigation strategy stated in section 4.4.1 of [RFC6819] does not
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work as they rely on per-client instance secret or per client
instance redirect uri.
To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes dynamically created
cryptographically random key called 'code verifier'. The code
verifier is created for every authorization request and its
transformed value called code challenge is sent to the authorization
server to obtain the authorization code. The "code" obtained is then
sent to the token endpoint with the code verifier and the server
compairs it with the previously received reqeust code so that it can
perfom the proof of posession of the code verifier by the client.
This works as the mitigation since the attacker would not know the
one-time key.
2. Terminology
In addition to the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], this
specification defines the following terms.
2.1. code verifier
a cryptographically random string with big enough entropy that is
used to correlate the authorization request to the token request
2.2. code challenge
either the code verifier itself or some transformation of it that is
sent from the client to the server in the authorization request
NOTE 1: The client and the server MAY use mutually agreed pre-
negotiated algorithm such as base64url encoding of the left most
128bit of SHA256 hash.
NOTE 2: If no algorithm has been negotiated, it is treated as the
code verifier itself.
3. Protocol
3.1. Client checks the server support
Before starting the authorization process, the client MUST make sure
that the server supports this specification. It may be obtained out-
of-band or through some other mechanisms such as the discovery
document in OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]. The exact
mechanism on how the client obtains this information is out of scope
of this specification.
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The client that wishes to use this specification MUST stop proceeding
if the server does not support this extension.
3.2. (optional) Client registers its desired code challenge algorithm
In this specification, the client sends the transformation of the
code verifier to the authorization server in the front channel. The
default transformation is not doing transformation at all. If the
the server supports, the client MAY register its desired
transformation algorithm to the server. If the algorithm is
registered, the server MUST reject any request that does not conform
to the algorithm.
How does this client registers the algorithm is out of scope for this
specification.
Also, this specification does not define any transformation other
than the default transformation.
3.3. Client creates a code verifier
The client then creates a code verifier, "code_verifier", in the
following manner.
code_verifier = high entropy cryptographic random string of length
less than 128 bytes
NOTE: code verifier MUST have high enough entropy to make it
inpractical to guess the value.
3.4. Client sends the code challenge with the authorization request
Then, the client creates a code challenge, "code_challenge", by
applying the pre-negotiated algorithm between the client and the
server. The default behavior is no transofrmation, i.e.,
"code_challenge" == "code_verifier". The authorization server MUST
support this 'no transformation' algorithm.
The client sends the code challenge with the following parameter with
the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Authorization Request:
code_challenge REQUIRED. code challenge.
3.5. Server returns the code
When the server issues a "code", it MUST associate the
"code_challenge" value with the "code" so that it can be used later.
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Typically, the "code_challenge" value is stored in encrypted form in
the "code", but it could as well be just stored in the server in
association with the code. The server MUST NOT include the
"code_challenge" value in the form that any entity but itself can
extract it.
3.6. Client sends the code and the secret to the token endpoint
Upon receipt of the "code", the client sends the request to the token
endpoint. In addition to the parameters defined in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], it sends the following parameter:
code_verifier REQUIRED. code verifier
3.7. Server verifies code_verifier before returning the tokens
Upon receipt of the request at the token endpoint, the server
verifies it by calculating the code challenge from "code_verifier"
value and comparing it with the previously associated
"code_challenge". If they are equal, then the successful response
SHOULD be returned. If the values are not equal, an error response
indicating "invalid_grant" as described in section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] SHOULD be returned.
4. IANA Considerations
This specification makes a registration request as follows:
4.1. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA
OAuth Parameters registry defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
o Parameter name: code_verifier
o Parameter usage location: Access Token Request
o Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working
Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
o Specification document(s): this document
o Related information: None
o Parameter name: code_challenge
o Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
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o Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working
Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
o Specification document(s): this document
o Related information: None
5. Security Considerations
The security model relies on the fact that the code verifier is not
learned or guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to
adhear to this principle. As such, the code verifier has to be
created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random and has
high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess, and
if it is to be returned inside "code", it has to be encrypted in such
a manner that only the server can decrypt and extract it.
If the no transformation algorithm, which is the default algorithm,
is used, the client MUST make sure that the request channel is
adequately protected. On a platform that it is not possible, the
client and the server SHOULD utilize a transformation algorithm that
makes it reasonably hard to recalculate the code verifier from the
code challenge.
All the OAuth security analysis presented in [RFC6819] applies so
readers SHOULD carefully follow it.
6. Acknowledgements
The initial draft of this specification was created by the OpenID AB/
Connect Working Group of the OpenID Foundation, by most notably of
the following people:
o Naveen Agarwal, Google
o Dirk Belfanz, Google
o Sergey Beryozkin
o John Bradley, Ping Identity
o Brian Campbell, Ping Identity
o Phill Hunt, Oracle
o Ryo Ito, mixi
o Michael B. Jones, Microsoft
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o Torsten Lodderstadt, Deutsche Telekom
o Breno de Madeiros, Google
o Prateek Mishra, Oracle
o Anthony Nadalin, Microsoft
o Axel Nenker, Deutsche Telekom
o Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
7. Revision History
-02
o Changed title.
o Changed parameter names.
o Changed the default transformation algorithm and added crypto
agility.
o More text in the security consideration.
o Now references RFC 6819.
o Recorded more contributors.
-01
o Minor editorial changes.
-00
o Initial version.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
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[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
January 2013.
8.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", May 2013.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura (editor)
Nomura Research Institute
Email: sakimura@gmail.com
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: jbradley@pingidentity.com
Naveen Agarwal
Google
Email: naa@google.com
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