Internet-Draft | MASA Considerations | June 2020 |
Richardson & Pan | Expires 11 December 2020 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- anima Working Group
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-richardson-anima-masa-considerations-04
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
- Expires:
Operatonal Considerations for Voucher infrastructure for BRSKI MASA
Abstract
This document describes a number of operational modes that a BRSKI Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) may take on.¶
Each mode is defined, and then each mode is given a relevance within an over applicability of what kind of organization the MASA is deployed into. This document does not change any protocol mechanisms.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 December 2020.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] introduces a mechanism for new devices (called pledges) to be onboarded into a network without intervention from an expert operator.¶
This mechanism leverages the pre-existing relationship between a device and the manufacturer that built the device. There are two aspects to this relationship: the provision of an identity for the device by the manufacturer (the IDevID), and a mechanism which convinces the device to trust the new owner (the [RFC8366] voucher).¶
The manufacturer, or their designate, is involved in both aspects of this process. This requires the manufacturer to operate a significant process for each aspect.¶
This document offers a number of operational considerations for each aspect.¶
The first aspect is the device identity in the form of an [ieee802-1AR] certificate that is installed at manufacturing time in the device. The first section of this document deals with operational considerations of building this public key infrastructure.¶
The second aspect is the use of the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 2.5.4. The device needs to have the MASA anchor built in; the exact nature of the anchor is subject to many possibilities. The second section of this document deals with a number of options for architecting the security of the MASA relationship.¶
There are some additional considerations for a MASA that deals with constrained vouchers as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]. In particular in the COSE signed version, there are no PKI structure included in the voucher mechanism, so cryptographic hygiene needs a different set of tradeoffs.¶
7. IANA Considerations
This document makes no IANA requests.¶
8. Acknowledgements
Hello.¶
10. References
10.1. Normative References
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- [RFC8366]
- Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols", RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
- [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
- Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-07, , <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-07.txt>.
- [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
- Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41, , <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41.txt>.
- [I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations]
- Richardson, M., "Operational Considerations for BRSKI Registrar", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-registrar-considerations-03, , <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-anima-registrar-considerations-03.txt>.
- [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
- Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson, "Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-08, , <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-08.txt>.
- [threetier]
- Wikipedia, ., "Multitier architecture", , <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multitier_architecture>.
- [ieee802-1AR]
- IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", , <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
10.2. Informative References
- [RFC7030]
- Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
- [BedOfNails]
- Wikipedia, "In-circuit test", , <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-circuit_test#Bed_of_nails_tester>.
- [RambusCryptoManager]
- Qualcomm press release, "Qualcomm Licenses Rambus CryptoManager Key and Feature Management Security Solution", , <https://www.rambus.com/qualcomm-licenses-rambus-cryptomanager-key-and-feature-management-security-solution/>.
- [kskceremony]
- Verisign, "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone ZSK Operator", , <https://www.iana.org/dnssec/dps/zsk-operator/dps-zsk-operator-v2.0.pdf>.
- [rootkeyceremony]
- Community, "Root Key Ceremony, Cryptography Wiki", , <https://cryptography.fandom.com/wiki/Root_Key_Ceremony>.
- [keyceremony2]
- Digi-Sign, "SAS 70 Key Ceremony", , <http://www.digi-sign.com/compliance/key%20ceremony/index>.
- [nistsp800-57]
- NIST, "SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General", , <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-4/final>.