SDNAuth                                                        H. Rafiee
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               A. Petrescu
Intended Status: Informational
Expires: December 6, 2015                                   June 6, 2015


                    SDNauth Usecases and Requirements
                  <draft-rafiee-sdnauth-usecase-01.txt>

Abstract

   This document aims to explain the requirement and usecases for a
   secure authentication model for different SDN components (e.g. SDN
   switch, application, etc.). It also covers the standard structure for
   the communications of two SDN controllers or an application to
   different SDN controllers via a mediator service.



Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working
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   at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2015.





Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to
   BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
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   date of publication of this document. Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of


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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Use cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  User movements in carrier WiFi networks  . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Limited UI devices connections to public hotspot areas   .  5
     3.3.  Distributed SDN controllers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Requirements   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     8.1.  Normative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9



































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1.  Terminology

   There is already a good SDN terminology available [RFC74269]. Here is
   the list of terms that has special meaning in this document.

   - End system: any device that is used by a user to start its
   communication ? a laptop, a smartphone, etc.

   - Network element: any physical or logical network devices such as a
   switch, a router, virtual switch (vswitch), etc.

   - Application (App): In this document, application is any piece of
   software that wants to communicate with SDN controller to exchange
   information or enforce any policy via SDN controller on target
   switch(es). e.g. an authentication/authorization app

   - Traffic flow : a group of traffic with the similar source or
   destination and port

   - Foreign SDN controller: a SDN controller that an application is not
   authorized to run anything on it.

   - Home SDN controller: a SDN controller that an application is
   pre-configured with to enforce any policy on.


2.  Introduction

   Today, the advances of technology provide us with new capabilities
   and the possibility to use scalable logical networks and flexible and
   programmable virtual network devices (which uses Software Defined
   Network (SDN)[1,2], Network Function Virtualization (NFV) -based
   techniques or the combination of these two techniques. Since these
   techniques also promote the openness and abstraction concepts,
   authentication and authorization are both critical in such
   infrastructures.

   This is because, before two SDN components (e.g. an application, an
   SDN switch, a SDN router, etc.) want to communicate to a SDN
   controller, they need to be authenticated and authorized. This
   process will avoid the propagation of attacks on the whole SDN based
   infrastructure by preventing unauthenticated and unauthorized access
   to a centralized SDN controller and as a result to the network
   devices. The existing authentication scheme used in SDN solution is
   based on TLS certificates.

   The problem with the use of self-signed certificates is the spoofing
   attack at the beginning of the TLS establishments. In case the
   certificates are introduced to both SDN components, the problem is
   key management and scalability of such solution.

   The use of the existing public CA solves the scalability and key


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   management problem but this approach doesn't fit to the nature of a
   SDN solution. This is because, if the private key of a CA is
   compromised, then it might affect all SDN based infrastructure that
   has their certificates signed by the compromised CA which may result
   in serious damages on the operators' networks. One solution would be
   the use of local PKI models. This solution will reduce the range of
   attacks to a limited scope such as only one operator but cannot
   completely eliminate such attacks. Therefore, improving the
   authentication model of SDN components and reduce the range of
   attacks as much as possible is demanding and this is what this group
   wants to address.

   Furthermore, an operator might have distributed SDN controllers (each
   does different task) in different data centers that these SDN
   controllers belong to a vendor or there might be a case where an
   operator received its service from different vendors but wants to
   have overall information about its network. There might be also a
   case where SDN controllers belong to multi-operators. Therefore, the
   communications of these SDN controllers is one of the requirements
   for such distributed networks. At the moment, there is a lack of
   standard communication protocols for the communication of two SDN
   controllers for exchanging topology information or any other
   information which is demanding.

   Since the security of a SDN controller is really important. Having a
   single point of communication to a SDN controller reduces the range
   of attacks on a SDN controller. Therefore, the mediator service can
   be used to handle these communications among SDN controllers together
   and applications to SDN controllers. Since there is no standard model
   for this communication, this document introduces some use case
   scenarios for the communication of two SDN controller.

   This document addresses the following problems:

   - Requirements for a secure authentication model for a SDN based
   solution

   - Secure communications of a mediator service to apps that belong to
   different operators and running on different data centers

   - Secure communications of SDN controllers to exchange different
   information such as topology, user session, etc.


3.  Use cases

   The following subsections explain example use case scenarios that
   SDNAuth can address.


3.1.  User movements in carrier WiFi networks

   User A belongs to operator A network. It authenticates to the WiFi


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   interface in its home network (The protocol might be EAP and RADIUS).
   It moves to a new place that is in the domain of operator B. Operator
   A does not provide any service there but there is an agreement
   between these two operators so that user A can connect to this
   network. Operator B can define different access control for this
   guest user so that this user receives similar service as it had in
   its home network. This involves too much administrative works and it
   is a time consuming process. Here the purpose is to improve this
   process and reduce human interaction as much as possible by the use
   of SDN solution. Therefore, the purpose is to offer an improved model
   for this scenario via the communications of SDN controllers and
   exchanging user information and user session data.


3.2.  Limited UI devices connections to public hotspot areas

   A growing number of constrained devices are equipped with WiFi
   interfaces. But since they are not featuring full-blown User
   Interfaces traditionally used in larger devices (screens and
   keyboards on smartphones, tablets, PCs) these devices can connect to
   WiFi Access Points only by using pre-configured WiFi parameters, like
   the "ESSID" and network passwords. The pre-configuration operation
   involves using a smartphone or other device carrying a full UI.

   Under mobility conditions, it would be very difficult to manually
   re-configure these parameters such as to connect to public WiFi
   hotspots. It is impossible to stop by and and re-set the ESSID on a
   smartwatch without much additional effort.



   Other use-case involves devices requiring continuous Internet
   connection during mobility. For example, a multimedia personal device
   (mp3 player) needs to stream content from a server while the person
   moves from one hotspot to another. On these devices it is very
   difficult to re-set the ESSID and password at each public WiFi
   hotspot.



   Finally, On-Board Units carried by automobiles also need to connect
   to public WiFi hotspots. Whereas OBUs may be easily equipped with
   large screens and keyboards, the driver is forbidden from using these
   while driving the automobile - safety first. In this situation again,
   it is impossible to manually change the ESSID and password when
   moving from one public WiFi hotspot to another.



   It should be mentioned that ESSID and password are given only as
   examples of parameters which need to be re-configured in mobility
   situations from one public WiFi hotspot to another. Since WiFi
   Broadband Alliance (WBA) tries to improve the user authentication and


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   the purpose is to limit the use of web portals, this document only
   focuses on ESSID/passwords or similar authentication techniques but
   not web portals.

   Therefore, this problem can be solved by the use of SDN solution and
   the communication of SDN controllers can provide the authenticator
   application with the new place of this user and can assist in this
   scenario by exchanging information about the user's session.


3.3.  Distributed SDN controllers

   Tenant A has a distributed networks in two different data centers
   that each is under the control of different SDN controller. Tenant A
   wants to have overview of the overall network topology. At the moment
   there is no possibility to exchange data among these SDN controllers.
   Using a mediator service might help this process but lack of standard
   structure for the communication of this mediator service to different
   SDN controllers leads to complexity in deployment of such mediator.
   This is what SDNauth plans to address by offering a simple model for
   this mediator and divide its tasks to different applications so that
   the existing implementation of different protocols still can be used.



4.  Requirements

   This section defines the scope of this document and introduces the
   requirement.

   [1] A standard structure for the communications of two SDN
   controllers via mediator service and the applications (e.g. RADIUS)

   [2] To reduce human interactions and reduce time to receive service
   for users

   [3] To provide the user with similar access control as it had in its
   home network while by default some services might not be available in
   its visited network (e.g. VoIP)

   [4] It needs to provide an improved authentication model for the
   authentication of different SDN components such as applications to
   mediator, etc. to facilitate the authentication of application A from
   domain A to a mediator service in domain B. (a improved SDN based
   PKI)

   [5] It needs to provide high security and privacy especially for end
   systems

   [6] It needs to support different clients with different resources
   (Memory, Battery, CPU, etc.) -- Laptops, IPod, Smartphone, etc.

   Good performance for constrained devices.


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   [7] It needs to be backward compatible by the possibility to re-use
   the existing protocols while at the same time keep the mediator
   service so simple.

5.  Security Considerations

   There is no security consideration



6.  IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA consideration





7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank people who helped to improve this
   work.





8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., Simpson, W.,
             " Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",RFC
             2865, June 2000

   [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., Zorn, G.,
             "Diameter Base Protocol" RFC 6733, October 2012.

   [RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Pentikousis , K., Denazis , S.,
             Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., Koufopavlou , O.,
             "Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture
             Terminology", RFC 7426, January 2015

   [1] Haleplidis, E., Pentikousis , K., Denazis , S., Hadi Salim,
       J., Meyer, D., Koufopavlou , O., "Software-Defined Networking
       (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology", RFC 7426, January
       2015

   [2] Kreutz, D., Ramos, F.M.V., Esteves Verissimo, P., Esteve
       Rothenberg, C., "Software-Defined Networking: A Comprehensive
       Survey", DOI: 10.1109/JPROC.2014.2371999 , January 2015



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Authors' Addresses

      Hosnieh Rafiee
      Huawei
      Munich, Germany
      Phone: +49 (0)162 204 74 58
      E-mail: ietf@rozanak.com


      Alexandru Petrescu
      Email: alexandru.petrescu@gmail.com










































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