v6ops J. Palet Martinez
Internet-Draft The IPv6 Company
Intended status: Best Current Practice May 29, 2018
Expires: November 30, 2018
NAT64 Deployment Guidelines in Operator and Enterprise Networks
draft-palet-v6ops-nat64-deployment-01
Abstract
This document describes how NAT64 can be deployed in an IPv6 operator
or enterprise network and the issues to be considered when having an
IPv6-only access link, regarding: a) DNS64, b) applications or
devices that use literal IPv4 addresses or non-IPv6 compliant APIs,
and c) IPv4-only hosts or applications.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 30, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. DNSSEC Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. NAT64 Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Service Provider NAT64 without DNS64 . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Service Provider NAT64 with DNS64 . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Service Provider NAT64; DNS64 in the IPv6 hosts . . . . . 7
4.4. Service Provider NAT64; DNS64 in the IPv4-only remote
network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Service Provider offering 464XLAT, without DNS64 . . . . 9
4.6. Service Provider offering 464XLAT, with DNS64 . . . . . . 10
5. Possible Solutions to the DNSSEC Issue . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Not using DNS64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. DNSSEC validator aware of DNS64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Stub validator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. CLAT with DNS proxy and validator . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. ACL of clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.6. Mapping-out IPv4 addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. DNS64 and Reverse Mapping Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Issue with IPv4 literals and old APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Issue with IPv4-only Hosts or Applications . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Using 464XLAT with/without DNS64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Manual Configuration of Foreign DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. CLAT Translation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Summary of Deployment Recommendations for NAT64 . . . . . . . 15
13. Deployment of NAT64 in Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . 16
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
16. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
NAT64 ([RFC6146]) describes a stateful IPv6 to IPv4 translation,
which allows IPv6-only hosts to contact IPv4 servers using unicast
UDP, TCP or ICMP, by means of a single or a set of IPv4 public
addresses assigned to the translator, to be shared by the IPv6-only
clients.
The translation of the packet headers is done using the IP/ICMP
Translation Algorithm defined in [RFC7915] and algorithmically
translating the IPv4-hosts addresses to IPv6 ones following
[RFC6052].
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To avoid changes in both, the IPv6-only hosts and the IPv4-only
server, NAT64 requires also the use of a DNS64 ([RFC6147]), in charge
for the synthesis of AAAA records from the A records.
However, the use of NAT64 and/or DNS64 present three issues:
a. Because DNS64 ([RFC6147]) modifies DNS answers, and DNSSEC is
designed to detect such modifications, DNS64 ([RFC6147]) can
potentially break DNSSEC, depending on a number of factors, such
as the location of the DNS64 function (at a DNS server or
validator, at the end host, ...), how as been configured, if the
end-hosts is validating, etc.
b. Because the need of using DNS64 ([RFC6147]), there is a major
issue for NAT64 ([RFC6146]), as doesn't work when literal
addresses or non-IPv6 compliant APIs are being used.
c. NAT64 alone, doesn't provide a solution for IPv4-only hosts or
applications located within a network which are connected to a
service provider IPv6-only access.
The same issues are true if part of an enterprise or similar network,
is connected to other parts of the same network or third party
networks by means of IPv6-only links.
According to that, across this document, the use of "operator
network" is interchangeable with equivalent cases of enterprise (or
similar) networks.
This document looks into different possible NAT64 ([RFC6146])
deployment scenarios in operators and enterprise networks, and
provides guidelines to avoid the above mentioned issues.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. DNSSEC Considerations
As indicated in Section 8 of [RFC6147] (DNS64, Security
Considerations), because DNS64 modifies DNS answers and DNSSEC is
designed to detect such modifications, DNS64 can break DNSSEC.
If a device connected to an IPv6-only WAN queries for a domain name
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in a signed zone, by means of a recursive name server that supports
DNS64, and the result is a synthesized AAAA record, and the recursive
name server is configured to perform DNSSEC validation and has a
valid chain of trust to the zone in question, it will
cryptographically validate the negative response from the
authoritative name server. So, the recursive name server actually
lie to the client device, however in most of the cases, the client
will not notice it, because generally they don't perform validation
themselves as instead rely on their recursive name servers.
If the client device performs DNSSEC validation on the AAAA record,
it will fail as it is a synthesized record.
The best possible scenario from DNSSEC point of view is when the
client requests the DNS64 server to perform the DNSSEC validation (by
setting the DO bit to 1 and the CD bit to 0). In this case, the
DNS64 server validates the data thus tampering may only happen inside
the DNS64 server (which is considered as a trusted part, thus its
likelihood is low) or between the DNS64 server and the client. All
other parts of the system (including transmission and caching) are
protected by DNSSEC ([Threat-DNS64]).
Similarly, if the client querying the recursive name server is
another name server configured to use it as a forwarder, and is
performing DNSSEC validation, it will also fail on any synthesized
AAAA record.
The obvious solution to avoid DNSSEC issues, will be that all the
signed zones also provide IPv6 connectivity, together with the
corresponding AAAA records. Previous data seems to indicate, that
the figures of DNSSEC broken by using DNS64 will be around 1.7%
([About-DNS64]).
4. NAT64 Deployment Scenarios
Section 7 of DNS64 ([RFC6147]), provides 3 scenarios, looking at the
location of the DNS64. However, since the publication of that
document, there are new possible scenarios and NAT64 use cases that
need to be considered.
The perspective in this document is to broader those scenarios,
including a few new ones. However, in order to be able to reduce the
number of possible cases, we work under the assumption that the
service provider want to make sure that all the customers have a
service without failures. This means considering the worst possible
case:
a. There are hosts that will be validating DNSSEC.
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b. Literal addresses and non-IPv6 compliant APIs are being used.
c. There are IPv4-only hosts or applications beyond the IPv6-only
link.
We use a common set of possible "participant entities":
1. An IPv6-only access network (IPv6).
2. An IPv4-only remote network (IPv4).
3. The NAT64 of the service provider (NAT64).
4. The DNS64 function (DNS64).
5. An external service provider offering the NAT64 and/or the DNS64
function (extNAT64/extDNS64).
6. 464XLAT customer side translator (CLAT).
4.1. Service Provider NAT64 without DNS64
In this scenario, the service provider offers a NAT64, however there
is no DNS64 function support.
As a consequence, an IPv6 host in the IPv6-only access network, will
not be able to detect the presence of DNS64 neither learning the IPv6
prefix to be used for the NAT64.
This can be sorted out as indicated in Section 5.1.
However, despite that, because the lack of the DNS64 function, the
IPv6 host will not be able to obtain AAAA synthesised records, so the
NAT64 becomes useless.
An exception to this "useless" scenario will be manually configure
mappings between the A records of each of the IPv4-only remote hosts
and the corresponding AAAA records, with the WKP (Well-Known Prefix)
or NSP (Network-Specific Prefix) used by the service provider NAT64,
as if they were synthesised by a DNS64.
This mapping could be done by several means, typically at the
authoritative DNS server, or at the service provider resolvers by
means of DNS RPZ (Response Policy Zones). The latest, may have
implications in DNSSEC, if the zone is signed. Also, if the service
provider is using a NSP, having the mapping at the authoritative
server, will mean that may create troubles to other parties trying to
use different NSP or the WKP, unless multiple DNS "views" are also
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being used at the authoritative servers.
Generally, the mappings alternative, will only make sense if a few
set of IPv4-only remote hosts need to be accessed by a single network
or reduced set of them, which support IPv6-only in the access, with
some kind of mutual agreement for using this procedure, so it doesn't
care if they become a trouble for other parties across Internet
("closed services").
In any case, this scenario doesn't solve the issue of literal
addresses or non-IPv6 compliant APIs, neither it solves the problem
of IPv4-only hosts within that IPv6-only access network.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | | | |
| IPv6 +--------+ NAT64 +--------+ IPv4 |
| | | | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 1: Scenario of NAT64 without DNS64
4.2. Service Provider NAT64 with DNS64
In this scenario, the service provider offers both, the NAT64 and the
DNS64 function.
This is probably the most common scenario, however also has the
implications related the DNSSEC.
This scenario also fails to solve the issue of literal addresses or
non-IPv6 compliant APIs, as well as the issue of IPv4-only hosts or
applications inside the IPv6-only access network.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | NAT64 | | |
| IPv6 +--------+ + +--------+ IPv4 |
| | | DNS64 | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 2: Scenario of NAT64 with DNS64
A totally equivalent scenario will be if the service provider offers
only the DNS64 function, and the NAT64 function is provided by an
agreement with an external provider. All the considerations in the
previous paragraphs of this section are the same for this sub-case.
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+----------+
| |
| extNAT64 |
| |
+----+-----+
|
|
+----------+ +----+-----+ +----------+
| | | | | |
| IPv6 +--------+ DNS64 +--------+ IPv4 |
| | | | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 3: Scenario of DNS64; NAT64 in external service provider
As well, is equivalent to the scenario where the agreement with the
external provider is to provide both the NAT64 and DNS64 function.
Once more, all the considerations in the previous paragraphs of this
section are the same for this sub-case.
+----------+
| extNAT64 |
| + |
| extDNS64 |
+----+-----+
|
+----------+ | +----------+
| | | | |
| IPv6 +-------------+--------------+ IPv4 |
| | | |
+----------+ +----------+
Figure 4: Scenario of NAT64 and DNS64 in external provider
4.3. Service Provider NAT64; DNS64 in the IPv6 hosts
In this scenario, the service provider offers the NAT64, but not the
DNS64. However, the IPv6 hosts have a built-in DNS64 function.
This may become common if the DNS64 function is implemented in all
the IPv6 hosts/stacks, which is not the actual situation. At this
way, the DNSSEC validation is performed on the A record, and then the
host can use the DNS64 function so to be able to use the NAT64,
without any DNSSEC issues.
This scenario fails to solve the issue of literal addresses or non-
IPv6 compliant APIs, unless the IPv6 hosts also supports Happy
Eyeballs v2 ([RFC8305]), which may solve that issue.
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However, this scenario still fails to solve the problem of IPv4-only
hosts or applications inside the IPv6-only access network.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| IPv6 | | | | |
| + +--------+ NAT64 +--------+ IPv4 |
| DNS64 | | | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 5: Scenario of NAT64; DNS64 in IPv6 hosts
4.4. Service Provider NAT64; DNS64 in the IPv4-only remote network
In this scenario, the service provider offers the NAT64 only. The
remote IPv4-only network offers the DNS64 function.
This is not common, and looks like doesn't make too much sense that a
remote network, not deploying IPv6, is providing a DNS64 function and
as, in the case of the scenario depicted in Section 4.1, it will only
work if both sides are using the WKP or the same NSP, etc., so the
same considerations apply.
This scenario still fails to solve the issue of literal addresses or
non-IPv6 compliant APIs.
This scenario also fails to solve the problem of IPv4-only hosts or
applications inside the IPv6-only access network.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| | | | | IPv4 |
| IPv6 +--------+ NAT64 +--------+ + |
| | | | | DNS64 |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 6: Scenario of NAT64; DNS64 in the IPv4-only
A totally equivalent scenario will be if the service provider offers
the NAT64 only, and the DNS64 function is provided by an external
provider without an specific agreement among them. This is an
scenario already feasible today, as several "global" service
providers provide open DNS64 services and users often configure
manually their DNS. All the considerations in the previous
paragraphs of this section are the same for this sub-case.
If the user instead of configuring a DNS64 uses a regular external
DNS, the situation is even much worst, because in that case, NAT64
will not work at all with any IPv4-only remote host.
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However, if the external DNS64 is agreed with the service provider,
then we are in the same case, in terms of considerations of issues,
as in Section 4.2.
+----------+
| |
| extDNS64 |
| |
+----+-----+
|
|
+----------+ +----+-----+ +----------+
| | | | | |
| IPv6 +--------+ NAT64 +--------+ IPv4 |
| | | | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 7: Scenario of NAT64; DNS64 by external provider
4.5. Service Provider offering 464XLAT, without DNS64
464XLAT ([RFC6877]) describes an architecture that provides IPv4
connectivity across a network, or part of it, when it is only
natively transporting IPv6.
In order to do that, 464XLAT ([RFC6877]) relies on the combination of
existing protocols:
1. The customer-side translator (CLAT) is a stateless IPv4 to IPv6
translator (NAT46) ([RFC7915]) implemented in the end-user device
or CE, located at the "customer" edge of the network.
2. The provider-side translator (PLAT) is a stateful NAT64
([RFC6146]), implemented typically at the opposite edge of the
operator network, that provides access to both IPv4 and IPv6
upstreams.
3. Optionally, DNS64 ([RFC6147]), implemented as part of the PLAT
allows an optimization (a single translation at the NAT64,
instead of two translations - NAT46+NAT64), when the application
at the end-user device supports IPv6 DNS (uses AAAA RR).
In this scenario, using 464XLAT without DNS64, the service provider
ensures that DNSSEC is not broken.
464XLAT ([RFC6877]) is a very simple approach to cope with the major
NAT64+DNS64 drawback: Not working with applications or devices that
use literal IPv4 addresses or non-IPv6 compliant APIs.
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464XLAT ([RFC6877]) has been used initially in IPv6 cellular
networks, so providing an IPv6-only access network, the end-user
device applications can access IPv4-only end-networks/applications,
despite those applications or devices use literal IPv4 addresses or
non-IPv6 compliant APIs.
In addition to that, in the same example of the cellular network
above, if the User Equipment (UE) provides tethering, other devices
behind it will be presented with a traditional NAT44, in addition to
the native IPv6 support, so clearly it allows IPv4-only hosts inside
the IPv6-only access network.
Furthermore, 464XLAT ([RFC6877]) can be used in non-cellular IPv6
wired (xDSL, DOCSIS, FTTH, Ethernet, ...) and wireless (WiFi) network
architectures, by implementing the CLAT functionality at the CE.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| IPv6 | | | | |
| + +--------+ NAT64 +--------+ IPv4 |
| CLAT | | | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 8: Scenario of 464XLAT, without DNS64
4.6. Service Provider offering 464XLAT, with DNS64
In this scenario the service provider deploys 464XLAT with DNS64.
As a consequence, the DNSSEC issues remain.
However, in this scenario, as in the previous one, there are no
issues related to IPv4-only hosts inside the IPv6-only access
network, neither to the usage of IPv4 literals or non-IPv6 compliant
APIs.
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| IPv6 | | NAT64 | | |
| + +--------+ + +--------+ IPv4 |
| CLAT | | DNS64 | | |
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+
Figure 9: Scenario of 464XLAT, with DNS64
5. Possible Solutions to the DNSSEC Issue
As already mention, the scenarios in the precious section, are in
fact somehow simplified, looking at the worst case, because breaking
DNSSEC will not happen, if the end-host is not doing validation, and/
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or some countermeasures are taken, depicted in the next sections.
5.1. Not using DNS64
The ideal solution will be to avoid using DNS64, but as already
indicated this is not possible in all the scenarios.
However, not having a DNS64, means that is not possible to
heuristically discover the NAT64 ([RFC7050]) and consequently, an
IPv6 host in the IPv6-only access network, will not be able to detect
the presence of the DNS64, neither to learn the IPv6 prefix to be
used for the NAT64.
The learning of the IPv6 prefix could be solved by means of adding
the relevant AAAA records to the ipv4only.arpa. zone of the service
provider recursive servers, i.e., if using the WKP (64:ff9b::/96):
ipv4only.arpa. SOA . . 0 0 0 0 0
ipv4only.arpa. NS .
ipv4only.arpa. AAAA 64:ff9b::192.0.0.170
ipv4only.arpa. AAAA 64:ff9b::192.0.0.171
ipv4only.arpa. A 192.0.0.170
ipv4only.arpa. A 192.0.0.171
An alternative option to the above, is the use of DNS RPZ (Response
Policy Zones).
One more alternative, only valid in environments with PCP support
(for both the hosts or CEs and for the service provider network), to
follow [RFC7225] (Discovering NAT64 IPv6 Prefixes using PCP).
5.2. DNSSEC validator aware of DNS64
In general, DNS servers with DNS64 function, by default, will not
synthesize AAAA responses if the DNSSEC OK (DO) flag was set in the
query. In this case, as only an A record is available, it means that
the CLAT will take the responsibility, as in the case of literal IPv4
addresses, to keep that traffic flow end-to-end as IPv4, so DNSSEC is
not broken. However, this will not work if a CLAT is not present as
the hosts will not be able to use IPv4 (scenarios without 464XLAT).
5.3. Stub validator
If the DO flag is set and the client device performs DNSSEC
validation, and the Checking Disabled (CD) flag is set for a query,
as the DNS64 recursive server will not synthesize AAAA responses, the
client could perform the DNSSEC validation with the A record and then
may query the network for a NAT64 prefix ([RFC7050]) in order to
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synthesize the AAAA ([RFC6052]). This allows the client device to
avoid using the CLAT and still use NAT64 even with DNSSEC.
If the end-host is IPv4-only, this will not work if a CLAT is not
present (scenarios without 464XLAT).
Some devices/OSs may implement, instead of CLAT, a simliar function
by using Bump-in-the-Host ([RFC6535]). In this case, the
considerations in the above paragraphs are also applicable.
5.4. CLAT with DNS proxy and validator
If a CE includes CLAT support and also a DNS proxy, as indicated in
Section 6.4 of [RFC6877], the CE could behave as a stub validator on
behalf of the client devices, following the same approach described
in the precedent section (Stub validator). So the DNS proxy actually
lie to the client devices, which in most of the cases will not notice
it unless they perform validation themselves. Again, this allow the
clients devices to avoid using the CLAT and still use NAT64 with
DNSSEC.
Once more, this will not work without a CLAT (scenarios without
464XLAT).
5.5. ACL of clients
In cases of dual-stack clients, stub resolvers should send the AAAA
queries before the A ones. So such clients, if DNS64 is enabled,
will never get A records, even for IPv4-only servers, and they may be
in the path before the NAT64 and accesible by IPv4. If DNSSEC is
being used for all those flows, specific addresses or prefixes can be
left-out the DNS64 synthesis by means of ACLs.
Once more, this will not work without a CLAT (scenarios without
464XLAT).
5.6. Mapping-out IPv4 addresses
If there are well-known specific IPv4 addresses or prefixes using
DNSSEC, they can be mapped-out of the DNS64 synthesis.
Even if this is not related to DNSSEC, this "mapping-out" feature is
actually quite commonly used to ensure that [RFC1918] addresses (for
example used by LAN servers) are not synthesized to AAAA.
Once more, this will not work without a CLAT (scenarios without
464XLAT).
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6. DNS64 and Reverse Mapping Considerations
When a client device, using a name server configured to perform
DNS64, tries to reverse-map a synthesized IPv6 address, the name
server responds with a CNAME record pointing the domain name used to
reverse-map the synthesized IPv6 address (the one under ip6.arpa), to
the domain name corresponding to the embedded IPv4 address (under in-
addr.arpa).
This is the expected behaviour, so no issues to be considered
regarding DNS reverse mapping.
7. Issue with IPv4 literals and old APIs
A hosts or application using literal IPv4 addresses or older APIs,
behind a network with IPv6-only access, will not work unless a CLAT
is present.
A possible alternative approach is described as part of Happy
Eyeballs v2 Section 7.1 ([RFC8305]), or if not supporting HEv2,
directly using Bump-in-the-Host ([RFC6535]), and then a DNS64
function.
Those alternatives will solve the problem for and end-hosts, however,
if that end-hosts is providing "tethering" or an equivalent service
to others hosts, that need to be considered as well. In other words,
in a case of a cellular network, it resolves the issue for the
cellular device itself, but may be not for hosts behind it.
Otherwise, 464XLAT is the only valid approach to resolve this issue.
8. Issue with IPv4-only Hosts or Applications
An IPv4-only hosts or application behind a network with IPv6-only
access, will not work unless a CLAT is present. 464XLAT is the only
valid approach to resolve this issue.
9. Using 464XLAT with/without DNS64
In the case the client device is IPv6-only (either because the stack
is IPv6-only, or because it is connected via an IPv6-only LAN) and
the server is IPv4-only (either because the stack is IPv4-only, or
because it is connected via an IPv4-only LAN), only NAT64 combined
with DNS64 will be able to provide access among both. Because DNS64
is then required, DNSSEC validation will be only possible if the
recursive name server is validating the negative response from the
authoritative name server and the client is not performing
validation.
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However, when the client device is dual-stack and/or connected in a
dual-stack LAN by means of a CLAT (or has the built-in CLAT), DNS64
is an option.
1. With DNS64: If DNS64 is used, most of the IPv4 traffic (except if
using literal IPv4 addresses or non-IPv6 compliant APIs) will not
use the CLAT, so will use the IPv6 path and only one translation
will be done at the NAT64. This may break DNSSEC, unless
measures as described in the precedent section are taken.
2. Without DNS64: If DNS64 is not used, all the IPv4 traffic will
make use of the CLAT, so two translations are required (NAT46 at
the CLAT and NAT64 at the PLAT), which adds some overhead in
terms of the extra NAT46 translation, however avoids the AAAA
synthesis and consequently will never break DNSSEC.
10. Manual Configuration of Foreign DNS
When clients in a service provider network use DNS servers from other
networks, for example manually configured by users, they may support
or not DNS64, so the considerations in Section 9 will apply as well.
Even in the case that the external DNS supports DNS64 function, we
may be in the situation of providing incorrect configurations
parameters, as explained in Section 4.4. Having a CLAT and using an
external DNS without DNS64, ensures that everything will work.
However, it needs to be reinforced, that if there is not a CLAT
(scenarios without 464XLAT), an external DNS without DNS64 support,
will not only guarantee that DNSSEC is broken, but also disallow any
access to IPv4-only networks, so will behave as in the Section 4.1.
11. CLAT Translation Considerations
As described in Section 6.3 of [RFC6877] (IPv6 Prefix Handling), if
the CLAT can be configured with a dedicated /64 prefix for the NAT46
translation, then it will be possible to do a more efficient
stateless translation.
However, if this dedicated prefix is not available, the CLAT will
need to do a stateful translation, for example performing stateful
NAT44 for all the IPv4 LAN packets, so they appear as coming from a
single IPv4 address, and then in turn, stateless translated to a
single IPv6 address.
The obvious recommended setup, in order to maximize the CLAT
performance, is to configure the dedicated translation prefix. This
can be easily achieved automatically, if the CE or end-user device is
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able to obtain a shorter prefix by means of DHCPv6-PD ([RFC3633]), so
the CE can use a /64 for that.
The above recommendation is often not posible for cellular networks,
when connecting UEs (some broadband cellular use DHCPv6-PD
([RFC3633]), but smartphones, in general, not), as they provide a
single /64 for each PDP context and use /64 prefix sharing
([RFC6877]). So in this case, the UEs typically have a build-in CLAT
client, which is doing a stateful NAT44 before the stateless NAT46.
12. Summary of Deployment Recommendations for NAT64
Service providers willing to deploy NAT64, need to take into account
the considerations of this document to avoid the issues depicted in
this document.
In the case it is a non-cellular network and the operator is
providing the CEs to the customers, or suggesting them some specific
models, they MUST support the customer-side translator (CLAT), in
order to fully support the actual user needs (IPv4-only devices and
applications, usage of literals and old APIs).
If the operator offers DNS services, in order to increase performance
by reducing the double translation for all the IPv4 traffic, and
avoid breaking DNSSEC, they MAY support DNS64. In this case, if the
DNS service is offering DNSSEC validation, then it MUST be in such
way that it is aware of the DNS64. This is considered de simpler and
safer approach, and MAY be combined as well with the other possible
solutions described in this document:
o Devices running CLAT SHOULD follow the indications in the "Stub
validator" section recommendation. However, most of the time,
this is out of the control of the operator.
o CEs SHOULD include a DNS proxy and validador. This is relevant if
the operator is providing the CE or suggesting it to customers.
o ACL of clients and Mapping-out IPv4 addresses MAY be considered by
each operator, depending on their own infrastructure.
This "increased performance" approach has the disadvantage of
potentially breaking DNSSEC for a small percentage of validating end-
hosts.
If CE performance is not an issue, then a much safer approach is to
not use DNS64 at all, and consequently ensure that all the IPv4
traffic is translated at the CLAT.
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If DNS64 is not used, one of the alternatives described in
Section 5.1, MUST be followed.
The ideal configuration for CEs supporting CLAT, is that they support
DHCPv6-PD ([RFC3633]) and internally reserve one /64 for the
stateless NAT46 translation. The operator MUST ensure that the
customers get allocated prefixes shorter than /64 in order to support
this optimization. One way or the other, this is not impacting the
performance of the operator network.
As indicated in Section 7 of [RFC6877] (Deployment Considerations),
operators MAY follow those suggestions in order to take advantage of
traffic engineering.
In the case of cellular networks, the considerations regarding DNSSEC
may appear as out-of-scope, because UEs OSs, commonly don't support
DNSSEC, however applications running on them may do, or it may be an
OS "built-in" support in the future. Moreover, if those devices
offer tethering, other client devices may be doing the validation,
hence the relevance of a proper DNSSEC support by the operator
network.
Furthermore, cellular networks supporting 464XLAT ([RFC6877]) and
"Discovery of the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis"
([RFC7050]), allow a progressive IPv6 deployment, with a single APN
supporting all types of PDP context (IPv4, IPv6, IPv4v6), in such way
that the network is able to automatically serve all the possible
combinations of UEs.
Finally, if the operator choose to secure the NAT64 prefix, it MUST
follow the advise indicated in Section 3.1.1. of [RFC7050]
(Validation of Discovered Pref64::/n).
13. Deployment of NAT64 in Enterprise Networks
The recommendations of this documents can be used as well in
enterprise networks, campus and other similar scenarios, when the
NAT64 is under the control of that network, and for whatever reasons,
there is a need to provide "IPv6-only access" to any part of that
network or it is IPv6-only connected to third party networks.
An example of that is the IETF meetings network itself, where a NAT64
and DNS64 are provided, presenting in this case the same issues as
per Section 4.2. If there is a CLAT in the IETF network, then there
is no need to use DNS64 and it falls under the considerations of
Section 4.5. Both scenarios have been tested and verified already in
the IETF network itself.
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14. Security Considerations
This document does not have any new specific security considerations.
15. IANA Considerations
This document does not have any new specific IANA considerations.
Note: This section is assuming that https://www.rfc-
editor.org/errata/eid5152 is resolved, otherwise, this section may
include the required text to resolve the issue.
16. Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the inputs of Gabor Lencse, TBD
...
Conversations with Marcelo Bagnulo, one of the co-authors of NAT64
and DNS64, as well as several emails in mailing lists from Mark
Andrews, have been very useful for this work.
Christian Huitema inspired working in this document by suggesting
that DNS64 should never be used, during a discussion regarding the
deployment of CLAT in the IETF network.
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3633] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3633, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3633>.
[RFC6052] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6052, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6052>.
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[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC6147] Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6147, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6147>.
[RFC6535] Huang, B., Deng, H., and T. Savolainen, "Dual-Stack Hosts
Using "Bump-in-the-Host" (BIH)", RFC 6535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6535, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6535>.
[RFC7050] Savolainen, T., Korhonen, J., and D. Wing, "Discovery of
the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis",
RFC 7050, DOI 10.17487/RFC7050, November 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7050>.
[RFC7225] Boucadair, M., "Discovering NAT64 IPv6 Prefixes Using the
Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 7225,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7225, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7225>.
[RFC7915] Bao, C., Li, X., Baker, F., Anderson, T., and F. Gont,
"IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm", RFC 7915,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7915, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7915>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8305] Schinazi, D. and T. Pauly, "Happy Eyeballs Version 2:
Better Connectivity Using Concurrency", RFC 8305,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
17.2. Informative References
[About-DNS64]
J. Linkova, "Let's talk about IPv6 DNS64 & DNSSEC", 2016,
<https://blog.apnic.net/2016/06/09/
lets-talk-ipv6-dns64-dnssec/>.
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[RFC6877] Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT:
Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation",
RFC 6877, DOI 10.17487/RFC6877, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6877>.
[Threat-DNS64]
G. Lencse and Y. Kadobayashi, "Methodology for the
identification of potential security issues of different
IPv6 transition technologies: Threat analysis of DNS64 and
stateful NAT64", September 2018.
Author's Address
Jordi Palet Martinez
The IPv6 Company
Molino de la Navata, 75
La Navata - Galapagar, Madrid 28420
Spain
Email: jordi.palet@theipv6company.com
URI: http://www.theipv6company.com/
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