Network Working Group M. Kucherawy, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Updates: 6591 (if approved) E. Zwicky, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Yahoo!
Expires: January 16, 2014 July 15, 2013
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)
draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base-01
Abstract
This memo presents a proposal for a scalable mechanism by which a
mail sending organization can express, using the Domain Name System,
domain-level policies and preferences for message validation,
disposition, and reporting, and a mail receiving organization can use
those policies and preferences to improve mail handling.
The email ecosystem currently lacks a cohesive mechanism through
which email senders and receivers can make use of multiple
authentication protocols to establish reliable domain identifiers,
communicate policies about those identifiers, and report about mail
using those identifiers. This lack of cohesion has several effects:
receivers have difficulty providing feedback to senders about
authentication, senders therefore have difficulty evaluating their
authentication deployments, and as a result neither is able to make
effective use of existing authentication technology
The enclosed proposal is not intended to introduce mechanisms that
provide elevated delivery privilege of authenticated email. The
proposal presents a mechanism for policy distribution that enables a
continuum of increasingly strict handling of messages that fail
multiple authentication checks, from no action, through altered
delivery, up to message rejection.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Anti-Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. High-Level Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Sender/Domain Owner Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Mail Reciever Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Out Of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Identifier Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. DMARC Policy Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. DMARC URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2. General Record Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3. Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Policy Enforcement Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. Policy Fallback Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. DMARC Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Verifying External Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. Aggregate Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3. Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.4. Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8. Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. Domain Owner Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. Mail Receiver Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.1. Extract Author Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.2. Determine Handling Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10.3. Message Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10.4. Store Results of DMARC Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11. Feedback Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11.2. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. Capacity Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
13. Minimum Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
14. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.1. Data Exposure Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.2. Report Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.3. Report Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.4. Secure Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
15. Other Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
15.1. Use of RFC5322.From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
15.2. Issues Specific to SPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
15.3. DNS Load and Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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15.4. Rejecting Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
15.5. Identifier Alignment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 43
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
16.1. Authentication-Results Method Registry Update . . . . . . 44
16.2. Authentication-Results Result Registry Update . . . . . . 44
16.3. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry . . . . . . . . . . 46
16.4. DMARC Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
16.5. DMARC Report Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
17. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
17.1. Attacks on Reporting URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
17.2. DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
17.3. Display Name Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
17.4. External Reporting Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendix A. Technology Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.1. S/MIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.2. Method Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.3. Sender Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.4. Domain Existence Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.5. Issues With ADSP In Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.6. Organizational Domain Discovery Issues . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.1. Identifier Alignment examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.2. Domain Owner example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B.3. Mail Receiver Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
B.4. Utilization of Aggregate Feedback example . . . . . . . . 68
B.5. mailto Transport example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B.6. https Transport example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Appendix C. DMARC XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Appendix D. Public Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
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1. Introduction
For years, senders have leveraged SPF-authorized and DKIM-signed
messages to achieve domain-level email authentication. Based on that
authentication, various mail receivers have tried to protect senders
by using [DKIM] and/or [SPF] results to detect and block unauthorized
email. (A detailed discussion of the threats these systems attempt
to address can be found in [DKIM-THREATS].) However, there has been
no single widely accepted or publicly available mechanism to
communicate domain-specific message authentication policies, or to
request reporting of authentication and disposition of received mail.
As a result, senders who have implemented email authentication have
had difficulty determining how effective their authentication is, and
receivers have been unable to use authentication failures to reject
mail or mark it as less desirable.
Over time, one-on-one relationships were established between select
senders and receivers with privately communicated means to assert
policy and receive message traffic and authentication disposition
reporting. Although these ad hoc practices have been generally
successful, they require significant manual coordination between
parties.
This memo defines Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and
Compliance (DMARC), a mechanism by which email operators leverage
existing authentication and policy advertisement technologies to
enable both message-stream feedback and enforcement of policies
against unauthenticated email.
DMARC allows senders and receivers to collaborate by
1. Providing receivers with assertions about senders' policies
2. Providing feedback to senders so they can monitor authentication
and judge threats
The basic outline of DMARC is:
1. Senders make policy assertions about domains in DNS.
2. SMTP receivers compare the RFC5322 From: address in the mail to
the SPF and DKIM results if present and the policy in DNS.
1. The receiver can use these results to determine how the mail
is handled.
2. The receiver reports to the domain owner about mail claiming
to be from their domain.
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For the purposes of discussion, this document defines the word
"authentication" to include techniques used to verify message
integrity and/or sending-entity authorization.
DMARC differs from previous approaches to policy advertisement (e.g.,
[SPF] and [ADSP]) in that:
o Authentication technologies are:
1. decoupled from any technology-specific policy mechanisms; and
2. used solely to establish reliable per-message domain-level
identifiers.
o Multiple authentication technologies are used to:
1. reduce the impact of transient authentication errors
2. reduce the impact of site-specific configuration errors and
deployment gaps
3. enable more use cases than any individual technology supports
alone
o Receiver-generated feedback is required, allowing senders to
establish confidence in authentication practices.
o The domain name extracted from a message's RFC5322.From field is
the primary identifier in the DMARC mechanism. This identifier is
used in conjunction with the results of the underlying
authentication technologies to evaluate results under DMARC.
1.1. Scalability
Scalability is a major issue for systems that need to operate in a
system as widely deployed as current SMTP email. For this reason,
DMARC seeks to avoid the introduction of third parties or pre-sending
agreements between senders and receivers. This preserves the
positive aspects of the current email infrastructure.
Although DMARC does not introduce third parties to the email handling
flow, it also does not preclude them. Third parties are free to
provide services in conjunction with DMARC.
1.2. Anti-Phishing
DMARC is designed to prevent bad actors from sending mail which
claims to come from legitimate senders, particularly senders of
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transactional email. (official mail that is about business
transactions), One of the primary uses of this kind of spoofed mail
is phishing (enticing users to provide information by pretending to
be the legitimate service requesting the information). Thus, DMARC
is significantly informed by ongoing efforts to enact large-scale,
Internet-wide, anti-phishing measures.
Although DMARC can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-
domain spoofing directly, the DMARC mechanism is a substantial step
towards the creation of reliable and defensible message streams.
DMARC does not attempt to solve all problems with spoofed or
otherwise fraudulent email. In particular, it does not address the
use of visually similar domain names (cousin domains) or abuse of the
RFC5322 [MAIL].From human readable "display name".
2. Requirements
Specification of DMARC is guided by the following high-level goals,
security dependencies, detailed requirements, and items that are
documented as out-of-scope.
2.1. High-Level Goals
One common attack on Internet users involves imitating mail from a
reputable mail sender while including malicious content of some kind.
The most damaging version of this attack, both to end-users and to
organizations, uses the RFC5322 From: address of the reputable
sender. This kind of attack is more damaging to end-users than
attacks using other addresses because it is more believable and for
several reasons, more likely to be delivered to the inbox. (For
instance, many MUAs (Mail User Agents) support whitelisting of From:
domains by end-users.) It is more damaging to the organizations
being spoofed because the email, being indistinguishable to the user
from legitimate email, severely damages the reputation of the
organization.
Current email authentication systems appear sufficient to prevent
these attacks, since both SPF and DKIM should allow receiving systems
or users to distinguish between forged and genuine email from a
domain. In practice, however, these technologies are difficult to
implement correctly as a sender and therefore difficult to use safely
as a receiver. DMARC aims to bridge these gaps with minimal
interference to existing systmes.
DMARC is intended to reduce the success of attackers sending mail
pretending to be from a domain they do not control, with minimal
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changes to existing mail handling at both senders and receivers. It
is particularly intended to protect transactional email, as opposed
to mail between individuals.
That has resulted in the following goals:
o Allow mail senders to assert policy about domain authentication
for consumption by mail receivers.
o Allow mail senders to verify their authentication deployment.
o Minimize the effect on legitimate messages.
o Reduce the amount of successfully delivered spoofed email.
o Work at Internet scale.
o Minimize implementation complexity for both senders and receivers.
2.2. Sender/Domain Owner Requirements
DMARC assumes that entities who send messages with their domains in
the RFC5322.From field and wish to protect those messages with DMARC
can
1. Control DNS entries for the domains to be protected, including
adding arbitrary new subdomains with TXT records.
2. Receive and evaluate reports of significant size via SMTP at some
address, not necessarily associated with the domains to be
protected.
3. If they wish full protection, and valid mail streams exist,
control those mail streams and associated machines and DNS
servers sufficiently to make messages pass DKIM and/or SPF.
2.3. Mail Reciever Requirements
DMARC assumes that mail receivers are able to
1. Do additional DNS lookups, beyond those normally associated with
the receipt of a message, to look for DMARC policy and reporting
records. (This is a worst-case maximum of 3 additional lookups
per message, in addition to those required for DKIM and SPF.)
2. Log details required to generate forensic and aggreagate reports
about received messages for a minimum of 24 hours.
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3. Send outgoing aggregate reports from some DMARC-compliant sending
system (not necessarily the same as the system(s) receiving the
mail).
2.4. Out Of Scope
Items specifically not in scope for this work include:
o DMARC shall not be required to protect against any attacks against
components that are essential dependencies (e.g. DNS attacks,
bugs in DKIM verification, malware on the end-user machine or in
the sender's system). Compromised components at or near the
sender can cause passing results for mail which the sender did not
intend to be authenticated, while compromised components at the
receiver can cause either passing result for unauthenticated mail,
or failing results for authenticated mail.
o DMARC will not make a distinction between absent authentication
and failed authentication.
o DMARC will not allow for use of header fields other than the
RFC5322.From to field perform identifier alignment checks (see
Section 3.4).
o DMARC has no "short-circuit" provision, such as specifying that a
pass from one authentication test allows one to skip the other(s).
All are required for reporting.
o This first version of DMARC supports only a single reporting
format.
o DMARC makes no attempt to accommodate discovery of policy outside
of the DNS.
o DMARC provides no advice about handling of malformed messages that
might seek to exploit message processing weaknesses. There are
other specifications and operational documents that cover these
issues.
o DMARC reports only on the last-hop IP address, and does not
provide for reporting of the originating IP.
o DMARC does not address attacks that provide false information in
the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From field.
o Authentication of individuals rather than domains.
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o Handling of undesirable or malicious mail that is coming from the
domain from which it claims to be sent.
3. Terminology and Definitions
This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
For the purpose of establishing context, readers are encouraged to be
familiar with the contents of [EMAIL-ARCH]. In particular, that
document defines various roles in the messaging infrastructure that
can appear the same or separate in various contexts. For example, a
Domain Owner could, via the messaging security mechanisms on which
DMARC is based, delegate the ability to send mail as the Domain Owner
to some third party. This memo does not address the distinctions
among such roles; the reader is encouraged to become familiar with
that material before continuing.
The following terms are also used:
Authenticated Identifiers: Domain-level identifiers that are
established using authentication technologies are referred to as
"Authenticated Identifiers". See Section 3.1 for details about
the supported mechanisms.
Cousin Domain: A registered domain name that is deceptively similar
to a target domain name or other name of a known entity. The
target name is familiar to many users, and therefore imparts a
degree of trust. The deception is enacted by embedding the
essential parts of the target name in a new string (such as,
"companysecurity.example" to attack "company.example"), or it can
use some variant of the target name, such as replacing 'i' with
'1', which is known as a "homograph attack".
Domain Owner: An entity or organization that "owns" a DNS domain.
The term "owns" here indicates that the entity or organization
being referenced holds the registration of that DNS domain.
Entities that are Domain Owners range from complex, globally-
distributed organizations, to service providers working on behalf
of non-technical clients, to individuals responsible for
maintaining personal domains. This specification uses this term
as analogous to an Administrative Management Domain as defined in
[EMAIL-ARCH].
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Identifier Alignment: The concept of alignment between the
RFC5322.From address (i.e., the purported author of the message)
and the identifier(s) checked by message authentication schemes,
in particular SPF and DKIM.
Mail Receiver: The entity or organization that receives and
processes email. Mail Receivers operate one or more Internet-
facing Mail Transport Agents (MTAs).
Organizational Domain: For the purposes of this document, an
Organizational Domain is the domain that was registered with a
domain name registrar. In the absence of more accurate methods,
heuristics are used to determine this, since it is not always the
case that the registered domain name is simply a top-level DNS
domain plus one component (e.g., "example.com", where "com" is a
top-level domain). The Organizational Domain is determined by
applying the following algorithm:
1. Acquire a "public suffix" list, i.e., a list of DNS domain
names reserved for registrations. Some country TLDs make
specific registration requirements, e.g. the United Kingdom
places company registrations under ".co.uk"; other TLDs such
as ".com" appear in the IANA registry of top-level DNS
domains. A public suffix list is the union of all of these.
Appendix A.6.1 contains some discussion about obtaining a
public suffix list.
2. Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of "n" ordered
labels. Number these labels from right-to-left; e.g. for
"example.com", "com" would be label 1 and "example" would be
label 2.
3. Search the public suffix list for the name that matches the
largest number of labels found in the subject DNS domain. Let
that number be "x".
4. Construct a new DNS domain name using the name that matched
from the public suffix list and prefixing to it the "x+1"th
label from the subject domain. This new name is the
Organizational Domain.
Thus, since "com" is an IANA-registered TLD, a subject domain of
"a.b.c.d.example.com" would have an Organizational Domain of
"example.com".
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The process of determining a suffix is currently a heuristic one.
No list is guaranteed to be accurate or current.
3.1. Authentication Mechanisms
The following mechanisms for determining Authenticated Identifiers
are supported in the current version of DMARC:
o [DKIM], which provides a domain-level identifier in the content of
the "d=" tag of a validated signature.
o [SPF], which can authenticate the domain found in an [SMTP] MAIL
command.
3.2. Overview
A DMARC-enabled Domain Owner creates a DNS record to specify policy.
Mail sent for such a domain may or may not also be authenticated with
DKIM and/or SPF.
A DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver looks for DMARC records in DNS during
SMTP processing and uses them to filter mail at that time, and later
to provide feedback to the claimed sender.
DMARC's filtering component is based on whether SPF or DKIM can
provide a relevant authenticated identifier for the message under
consideration. Messages that purport to be from a Domain Owner's
domain and arrive from servers that are not authorized by SPF and do
not contain an appropriate DKIM signature can be affected by DMARC
policies.
DMARC's feedback component involves the collection of information
about received messages claiming to be from the Domain Owner for
periodic aggregate reports to the Domain Owner. The parameters and
format for such reports are discussed in later sections of this
document.
A DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver might also generate per-message reports
that contain information related to individual messages which fail
SPF and/or DKIM. Per-message failure reports are a useful source of
information when debugging deployments (if messages can be determined
to be legitimate even though failing authentication) or in analyzing
attacks. The capability for such services is enabled by DMARC but
defined in other referenced material.
It is important to note that the authentication mechanisms employed
by DMARC authenticate only a DNS domain, and do not authenticate the
local-part of any email address identifier found in a message.
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3.3. Flow Diagram
+--------+
| Author |<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+--------+ . . .
| . . .
V V V .
+------------+ +--------+ +----------+ +----------+ .
| Submission |<***>| DKIM | | DKIM | | SPF | .
| Service | | Signer | | Verifier | | Verifier | .
+------------+ +--------+ +----------+ +----------+ .
| ^ ^ .
| * * .
V V * .
+------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ * .
| sMTA |------->( other MTAs )------>| rMTA |<******** .
+------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ .
| ^ +----------+ .
| ****>| DMARC |<..
| | Verifier |
V +----------+
+---------+
| User |
| Mailbox |
+---------+
The above diagram shows the flow of messages through a DMARC-aware
system. Solid lines denote the actual message flow; dotted lines
involve Domain Name System queries used to retrieve message policy
related to the supported message authentication schemes; asterisk
lines indicate data exchange between message handling modules and
message authentication modules.
In essence the steps are as follows:
1. Author constructs an SPF policy and publishes it in its DNS
database as per [SPF]. Author also configures its system for
DKIM signing as described in [DKIM].
2. Author generates a message and hands the message to its
designated mail submission service.
3. Submission service passes relevant details to the DKIM signing
module in order to generate a DKIM signature to be applied to the
message.
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4. Submission service relays the now-signed message to its
designated transport service for routing to its intended
recipient(s).
5. Message may pass through other relays, but eventually arrives at
a recipient's transport service
6. Recipient transport service conducts SPF and DKIM authentication
checks by passing the necessary data to their respective modules,
each of which require queries to the author's DNS data.
7. The results of these are passed to the DMARC module along with
the Author domain. The DMARC module does a small number of
further DNS queries to the author domain to extract DMARC-
specific policy details. These, in combination, produce a DMARC
policy result, and can optionally cause one of two kinds of
reports to be generated (not shown).
8. Recipient transport service either delivers the message to the
recipient inbox, or takes other local policy action based on the
DMARC result (not shown).
3.4. Identifier Alignment
Email authentication technologies authenticate various (and
disparate) aspects of an individual message. For example, [DKIM]
authenticates the domain that affixed a signature to the message,
while [SPF] authenticates either the domain that appears in the
RFC5321.MailFrom portion of [SMTP] or the RFC5321.EHLO/HELO domain if
the RFC5321.MailFrom is null (in the case of Delivery Status
Notifications). These may be different domains, and none of these
domains are guaranteed to be visible to the end user.
DMARC uses the RFC5322 [MAIL].From domain to evaluate the
applicability of Authenticated Identifiers. The RFC5322 [MAIL].From
domain was selected as the central identity of the DMARC mechanism
because it is a required message header field and therefore
guaranteed to be present in compliant messages, and most MUAs
represent the RFC5322 [MAIL].From field as the originator of the
message and render some or all of this header field's content to end
users.
Domain names in this context are to be compared in a case-insensitive
manner, per [DNS-CASE].
It is important to note that identity alignment cannot occur with a
message that is not valid per [MAIL], particularly one with a
malformed or absent RFC5322.From field. Handling of such cases is
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left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.
3.4.1. DKIM-authenticated Identifiers
DMARC provides the option of applying DKIM in a strict mode or a
relaxed mode.
In relaxed mode, the Organizational Domains of both the [DKIM]-
authenticated signing domain (taken from the value of the "d=" tag in
the signature) and that of the RFC5322.From domain must be equal. In
strict mode, only an exact match between both of the Fully Qualified
Domain Names (FQDN) considered to produce identifier alignment.
To illustrate, in relaxed mode, if a validated DKIM signature
successfully verifies with a "d=" domain of "example.com", and the
RFC5322.From address is "alerts@news.example.com", the DKIM "d="
domain and the RFC5322.From domain are considered to be "in
alignment". In strict mode, this test would fail since the "d="
domain does not match the FQDN of the address.
However, a DKIM signature bearing a value of "d=com" would never
allow an "in alignment" result as "com" should appear on all public
suffix lists, and therefore cannot be an Organizational Domain.
Identifier alignment is required because mail can be validly signed
by an unrelated domain (for instance, a bad actor can sign it with a
Cousin Domain). By itself, DKIM does not make any assertions about
the identity visible to the end user.
Note that a single email can contain multiple DKIM signatures, and it
is considered to be a DMARC pass if any DKIM signature is aligned and
valid.
3.4.2. SPF-authenticated Identifiers
DMARC provides the option of applying SPF in a strict mode or a
relaxed mode.
In relaxed mode, the [SPF]-authenticated domain and RFC5322.From
domain must have the same Organizational Domain. In strict mode,
only an exact DNS domain match is considered to produce identifier
alignment.
For example, if a message passes an SPF check with an
RFC5321.MailFrom domain of "cbg.bounces.example.com", and the address
portion of the RFC5322.From field contains "payments@example.com",
the Authenticated RFC5321.MailFrom domain identifier and the
RFC5322.From domain are considered to be "in alignment" in relaxed
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mode, but not in strict mode.
3.4.3. Alignment and Extension Technologies
If DMARC is extended to include the use of other authentication
mechanisms, the extensions will need to allow for domain identifier
extraction so that alignment with the RFC5322.From domain can be
verified.
4. Policy
DMARC policies are published by Domain Owners and applied by Mail
Receivers.
A Domain Owner advertises DMARC participation of one or more sending
domains by adding a DNS TXT record (described in Section 5) to those
domains. In doing so, Domain Owners make specific requests of Mail
Receivers regarding the disposition of messages purporting to be from
one of the Domain Owner's domains and the provision of feedback about
those messages.
A Mail Receiver MUST consider an arriving message to pass the DMARC
test if and only if one or more of the underlying message
authentication mechanisms pass with proper identifier alignment.
DMARC considers only success; failure and nonexistence of
authentication mechanisms are equivalent.
A Domain Owner that does not advertise an SPF policy or sign with
DKIM is making an implicit statement that the use cases those
protocols satisfy are not to be considered when determining whether
the message under evaluation is valid. For example, not publishing
an SPF policy is an implicit message from Domain Owners to Mail
Receivers that successful path authorization is not to be taken as
sufficient evidence that the Domain Owner authorized the message.
A Mail Receiver implementing the DMARC mechanism makes a best-effort
attempt to adhere to the Domain Owner's published DMARC policy when a
message fails the DMARC test. Since email streams can be complicated
(due to forwarding, existing RFC5322.From domain-spoofing services,
etc.), Mail Receivers MAY deviate from a Domain Owner's published
policy during message processing and SHOULD make available the fact
of and reason for the deviation to the Domain Owner via feedback
reporting, specifically using the "PolicyOverride" feature of the
aggregate report (see Section 7.2).
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5. DMARC Policy Record
Domain Owner DMARC preferences are stored as DNS TXT records in
subdomains named "_dmarc". For example, the Domain Owner of
"example.com" would post DMARC preferences in a TXT record at
"_dmarc.example.com". Similarly, a Mail Receiver wishing to query
for DMARC preferences regarding mail with an RFC5322.From domain of
"example.com" would issue a TXT query to the DNS for the subdomain of
"_dmarc.example.com". The DNS-located DMARC preference data will
hereafter be called the "DMARC record".
DMARC's use of the Domain Name Service is driven by DMARC's use of
domain names and the nature of the query it performs. The query
requirement matches perfectly with the DNS, for obtaining simple
parametric information. It uses an established method of storing the
information, associated with the target domain name, namely an
isolated TXT record that is restricted to the DMARC context. Use of
the DNS as the query service has the considerable benefit of re-using
an extremely well-established operations, administration and
management infrastructure, rather than creating a new one.
Per [DNS], a TXT record can comprise several "character-string"
objects. Where this is the case, the module performing DMARC
evaluation MUST concatenate these strings by joining together the
objects in order and parsing the result as a single string.
5.1. DMARC URIs
[URI] defines a generic syntax for identifying a resource. The DMARC
mechanism uses this as the format by which a Domain Owner specifies
the destination for the two report types (RUA and RUF) that are
supported.
The place such URIs are specified (see Section 5.2) allows a list of
these to be provided. A report is to be sent to each listed URI.
Mail Receivers MAY impose a limit on the number of URIs that receive
reports, but MUST support at least two. The list of URIs is
separated by commas (ASCII 0x2C).
Each URI can have associated with it a maximum report size that may
be sent to it. This is accomplished by appending an exclamation
point (ASCII 0x21), followed by a maximum size indication, before a
separating comma or terminating semi-colon.
Thus, a DMARC URI is a URI within which any commas or exclamation
points are percent-encoded per [URI], followed by an OPTIONAL
exclamation point and a maximum size specification, and, if there are
additional reporting URIs in the list, a comma and the next URI.
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For example, the URI "mailto:reports@example.com%2550m" would request
a report be sent via email to "reports@example.com" so long as the
report payload does not exceed 50 megabytes.
A formal definition is provided in Section 5.3.
5.2. General Record Format
DMARC records follow the extensible "tag-value" syntax for DNS-based
key records defined in DKIM [DKIM]].
Section 16 creates a registry for known DMARC tags and registers the
initial set defined in this memo. Only tags defined in this memo or
in later extensions, and thus added to that registry, are to be
processed; unknown tags MUST be ignored. To avoid version
compatibility issues, tags added to the DMARC specification SHOULD
NOT change the semantics of existing records when processed by
implementations conforming to prior specifications.
The following tags are introduced as the initial valid DMARC tags:
adkim: (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "r".) Indicates whether or
not strict DKIM identifier alignment is required by the Domain
Owner. If and only if the value of the string is "s", strict mode
is in use. See Section 3.4.1 for details.
aspf: (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "r".) Indicates whether or
not strict SPF identifier alignment is required by the Domain
Owner. If and only if the value of the string is "s", strict mode
is in use. See Section 3.4.2 for details.
fo: Failure reporting options (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default "0"))
Provides requested options for generation of failure reports.
Report generators MAY choose to adhere to the requested options.
This tag's content MUST be ignored if a "ruf" tag (below) is not
also specified. The value of this tag is a colon-separated list
of characters that indicate failure reporting options as follows:
0: Generate a DMARC failure report if all underlying
authentication mechanisms failed to produce an aligned "pass"
result.
1: Generate a DMARC failure report if any underlying
authentication mechanism failed to produce an aligned "pass"
result.
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d: Generate a DKIM failure report if the message had a signature
that failed evaluation, regardless of its alignment. DKIM-
specific reporting is described in [AFRF-DKIM].
s: Generate an SPF failure report if the message failed SPF
evaluation, regardless of its alignment. SPF-specific
reporting is described in [AFRF-SPF].
p: Requested Mail Receiver policy (plain-text; REQUIRED for policy
records). Indicates the policy to be enacted by the Receiver at
the request of the Domain Owner. Policy applies to the domain
queried and to sub-domains unless sub-domain policy is explicitly
described using the "sp" tag. This tag is mandatory for policy
records only, but not for third-party reporting records (see
Section 7.1). Possible values are as follows:
none: The Domain Owner requests no specific action be taken
regarding delivery of messages.
quarantine: The Domain Owner wishes to have email that fails the
DMARC mechanism check to be treated by Mail Receivers as
suspicious. Depending on the capabilities of the Mail
Receiver, this can mean "place into spam folder", "scrutinize
with additional intensity", and/or "flag as suspicious".
reject: The Domain Owner wishes for Mail Receivers to reject
email that fails the DMARC mechanism check. Rejection SHOULD
occur during the SMTP transaction. See Section 15.4 for some
discussion of SMTP rejection methods and their implications.
pct: (plain-text integer between 0 and 100, inclusive; OPTIONAL;
default is 100). Percentage of messages from the DNS domain's
mail stream to which the DMARC mechanism is to be applied.
However, this MUST NOT be applied to the DMARC-generated reports,
all of which must be sent and received unhindered. The purpose of
the "pct" tag is to allow Domain Owners to enact a slow rollout
enforcement of the DMARC mechanism. The prospect of "all or
nothing" is recognized as preventing many organizations from
experimenting with strong authentication-based mechanisms. See
Section 6.1 for details. Note that random selection based on this
percentage, such as the following pseudocode, is adequate:
if (random mod 100) < pct then
selected = true
else
selected = false
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rf: Format to be used for message-specific failure reports (comma-
separated plain-text list of values; OPTIONAL; default "afrf").
The value of this tag is a list of one or more report formats as
requested by the Domain Owner to be used when a message fails both
[SPF] and [DKIM] tests to report details of the individual
failure. The values MUST be present in the registry of reporting
formats defined in Section 16; a Mail Receiver observing a
different value SHOULD ignore it, or MAY ignore the entire DMARC
record. Initial default values are "afrf" (defined in [AFRF]) and
"iodef" (defined in [IODEF]). See Section 7.3 for details.
ri: Interval requested between aggregate reports (plain-text, 32-bit
unsigned integer; OPTIONAL; default 86400). Indicates a request
to Receivers to generate aggregate reports separated by no more
than the requested number of seconds. DMARC implementations MUST
be able to provide daily reports and SHOULD be able to provide
hourly reports when requested. However, anything other than a
daily report is understood to be accommodated on a best-effort
basis.
rua: Addresses to which aggregate feedback is to be sent (comma-
separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs; OPTIONAL). A comma or
exclamation point that is part of such a DMARC URI MUST be encoded
per Section 2.1 of [URI] so as to distinguish it from the list
delimiter or an OPTIONAL size limit. Section 7.1 discusses
considerations that apply when the domain name of a URI differs
from that of the domain advertising the policy. See Section 17.4
for additional considerations. Any valid URI can be specified. A
Mail Receiver MUST implement support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e. the
ability to send a DMARC report via electronic mail. If not
provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback
reports. URIs not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored.
The aggregate feedback report format is described in Section 7.2.
ruf: Addresses to which message-specific failure information is to
be reported (comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs;
OPTIONAL). If present, the Domain Owner is requesting Mail
Receivers to send detailed failure reports about messages that
fail the DMARC evaluation in specific ways (see the "fo" tag
above). The format of the message to be generated MUST follow
that specified in the "rf" tag. Section 7.1 discusses
considerations that apply when the domain name of a URI differs
from that of the domain advertising the policy. A Mail Receiver
MUST implement support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e. the ability to
send a DMARC report via electronic mail. If not provided, Mail
Receivers MUST NOT generate failure reports. See Section 17.4 for
additional considerations.
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sp: Requested Mail Receiver policy for subdomains (plain-text;
OPTIONAL). Indicates the policy to be enacted by the Receiver at
the request of the Domain Owner. It applies only to subdomains of
the domain queried and not to the domain itself. Its syntax is
identical to that of the "p" tag defined above. If absent, the
policy specified by the "p" tag MUST be applied for subdomains.
v: Version (plain-text; REQUIRED). Identifies the record retrieved
as a DMARC record. It MUST have the value of "DMARC1". The value
of this tag MUST match precisely; if it does not or it is absent,
the entire retrieved record MUST be ignored. It MUST be the first
tag in the list.
A DMARC policy record MUST comply with the formal specification found
in Section 5.3 in that the "v" and "p" tags MUST be present and MUST
appear in that order. Unknown tags MUST be ignored. Syntax errors
in the remainder of the record SHOULD be discarded in favour of
default values (if any) or ignored outright.
Note that given the rules of the previous paragraph, addition of a
new tag into the registered list of tags does not itself require a
new version of DMARC to be generated (with a corresponding change to
the "v" tag's value), but a change to any existing tags does require
a new version of DMARC.
5.3. Formal Definition
The formal definition of the DMARC format using [ABNF] is as follows:
dmarc-uri = URI [ "!" 1*DIGIT [ "k" / "m" / "g" / "t" ] ]
; "URI" is imported from [URI]; commas (ASCII
; 0x2c) and exclamation points (ASCII 0x21)
; MUST be encoded; the numeric portion MUST fit
; within an unsigned 64-bit integer
dmarc-record = dmarc-version dmarc-sep
[dmarc-request]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-srequest]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-auri]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-furi]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-adkim]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-aspf]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-ainterval]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-rfmt]
[dmarc-sep dmarc-percent]
[dmarc-sep]
; components other than dmarc-version and
; dmarc-request may appear in any order
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dmarc-version = "v" *WSP "=DMARC1"
dmarc-sep = *WSP %3b *WSP
dmarc-request = "p" *WSP "=" *WSP
( "none" / "quarantine" / "reject" )
dmarc-srequest = "sp" *WSP "=" *WSP
( "none" / "quarantine" / "reject" )
dmarc-auri = "rua" *WSP "=" *WSP
dmarc-uri *(*WSP "," *WSP dmarc-uri)
dmarc-ainterval = "ri" *WSP "=" *WSP 1*DIGIT
dmarc-furi = "ruf" *WSP "=" *WSP
dmarc-uri *(*WSP "," *WSP dmarc-uri)
dmarc-rfmt = "rf" *WSP "=" *WSP
( "afrf" / "iodef" )
dmarc-percent = "pct" *WSP "=" *WSP
1*3DIGIT
dmarc-adkim = "adkim" *WSP "=" *WSP
( "r" / "s" )
dmarc-aspf = "aspf" *WSP "=" *WSP
( "r" / "s" )
A size limitation in a dmarc-uri, if provided, is interpreted as a
count of units followed by an OPTIONAL unit size ("k" for kilobytes,
"m" for megabytes, "g" for gigabytes, "t" for terabytes). Without a
unit, the number is presumed to be a basic byte count. Note that the
units are considered to be powers of two; a kilobyte is 2^10, a
megabyte is 2^20, etc.
Tag and value matching is case-insensitive.
6. Policy Enforcement Considerations
Mail Receivers MAY choose to reject or quarantine email even if email
passes the DMARC mechanism check. The DMARC mechanism does not
inform Mail Receivers whether an email stream is "good". Mail
Receivers are encouraged to maintain anti-abuse technologies to
combat the possibility of DMARC-enabled criminal campaigns.
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Mail Receivers MAY choose to accept email that fails the DMARC
mechanism check even if the Domain Owner has published a "reject"
policy. Mail Receivers need to make a best effort not to increase
the likelihood of accepting abusive mail if they choose not to comply
with a Domain Owner's reject, against policy. At a minimum, addition
of the Authentication-Results header field (see [AUTH-RESULTS]) is
RECOMMENDED when delivery of failing mail is done. When this is
done, the DNS domain name thus recorded MUST be encoded as an
A-label, as described in Section 2.3 of [IDNA].
Mail Receivers are only obligated to report reject or quarantine
policy actions in aggregate feedback reports that are due to DMARC
policy. They are not required to report reject or quarantine actions
that are the result of local policy. If local policy information is
exposed, abusers can gain insight into the effectiveness and delivery
rates of spam campaigns.
Final disposition of a message is always a matter of local policy.
An operator that wishes to favor DMARC policy over SPF policy, for
example, will disregard the SPF policy since enacting an SPF-
determined rejection prevents evaluation of DKIM; DKIM might
otherwise pass, satisfying the DMARC evaluation. There is a trade-
off to doing so, namely acceptance and processing of the entire
message body in exchange for the enhanced protection DMARC provides.
DMARC-compliant Mail Receivers typically disregard any mail handling
directive discovered as part of an authentication mechanism (e.g.,
ADSP, SPF) where a DMARC record is also discovered that specifies a
policy other than "none". Deviating from this practice introduces
inconsistency among DMARC operators in terms of handling of the
message. However, such deviation is not proscribed.
To enable Domain Owners to receive DMARC feedback without impacting
existing mail processing, discovered policies of "p=none" SHOULD NOT
modify existing mail disposition processing.
Mail Receivers SHOULD also implement reporting instructions of DMARC
in place of any extensions to SPF or DKIM that might enable such
reporting.
6.1. Policy Fallback Mechanism
If the "pct" tag is present in a policy record, application of policy
is done on a selective basis. The stated percentage of messages that
fail the DMARC test MUST be subjected to whatever policy is selected
by the "p" or "sp" tag (if present). Those that are not thus
selected MUST instead be subjected to the next policy lower in terms
of severity. In decreasing order of severity, the policies are
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"reject", "quarantine", and "none".
For example, in the presence of "pct=50" and "p=reject" in the DMARC
policy record for "example.com", half of the mesages with an
RFC5322.Fro domain of "example.com" that fail the DMARC test would be
subjected to "reject" action, and the remainder subjected to
"quarantine" action.
Mail receivers MAY implement pct via statistical mechanisms that
achieve a close approximation to the requested percentage. Mail
receivers SHOULD make a best-effort attempt to make the sampling even
across a reporting period.
7. DMARC Feedback
Providing Domain Owners with visibility into how Mail Receivers
implement and enforce the DMARC mechanism in the form of feedback is
critical to establishing and maintaining accurate authentication
deployments. When Domain Owners can see what effect their policies
and practices are having, they are better willing and able to use
quarantine and reject policies.
7.1. Verifying External Destinations
It is possible to specify destinations for the different reports that
are outside the domain making the request. This is enabled to allow
domains that do not have mail servers to request reports and have
them go someplace that is able to receive and process them.
Without checks, this would allow a bad actor to publish a DMARC
policy record that requests reports be sent to a victim address, and
then send a large volume of mail that will fail both DKIM and SPF
checks to a wide variety of destinations, which will in turn flood
the victim with unwanted reports. Therefore, a verification
mechanism is included.
When a Mail Receiver discovers a DMARC policy in the DNS, and the
domain at which that record was discovered is not identical to the
host part of the authority component of a [URI] specified in the
"rua" or "ruf" tag, the following verification steps SHOULD be taken:
1. Extract the host portion of the authority component of the URI.
Call this the "destination host".
2. Prepend the string "_report._dmarc".
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3. Prepend the domain name from which the policy was retrieved,
after conversion to an A-label if needed.
4. Query the DNS for a TXT record at the constructed name. If the
result of this request is a temporary DNS error of some kind
(e.g., a timeout), the Mail Receiver MAY elect to temporarily
fail the delivery so the verification test can be repeated later.
5. For each record returned, parse the result as a series of
"tag=value" pairs, i.e., the same overall format as the policy
record (see Section 5.3). In particular, the "v=DMARC1" tag is
mandatory and MUST appear first in the list. Discard any that do
not pass this test.
6. If the result includes no TXT resource records that pass basic
parsing, a positive determination of the external reporting
relationship cannot be made; stop.
7. If at least one TXT resource record remains in the set after
parsing, then the external reporting arrangement was authorized
by the destination Domain Owner.
8. If a "rua" or "ruf" tag is thus discovered, replace the
corresponding value extracted from the domain's DMARC policy
record with the one found in this record. This permits the
report receiver to override the report destination. However, to
prevent loops or indirect abuse, the overriding URI MUST use the
same destination host from the first step.
For example, if a DMARC policy query for "blue.example.com" contained
"rua=mailto:reports@red.example.net", the host extracted from the
latter ("red.example.net") does not match "blue.example.com", so this
procedure is enacted. A TXT query for
"blue.example.com._report._dmarc.red.example.net" is issued. If a
single reply comes back containing a tag of "v=DMARC1", then the
relationship between the two is confirmed. Moreover, red.example.net
has the opportunity to override the report destination requested by
"blue.example.com" if needed.
Where the above algorithm fails to confirm that the external
reporting was authorized by the destination domain, the URI MUST be
ignored by the Mail Receiver generating the report. Further, if the
confirming record includes a URI whose host is again different than
the domain publishing that override, the Mail Receiver generating the
report MUST NOT generate a report to either the original or the
override URI.
A report receiver publishes such a record in its DNS if it wishes to
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receive reports for other domains.
The Domain Owner confirming via the DNS that it wishes to receive
reports can use a wildcard DNS record to confirm that it is willing
to receive reports for any domain. For example, a TXT resource
record at "*._report._dmarc.example.com" containing at least
"v=DMARC1" confirms that example.com is willing to receive DMARC
reports for any child domain.
If the destination of the reports is overcome by volume, it can
simply remove the confirming DNS record. However, due to positive
caching, the result could take as long as the time-to-live on the
record to go into effect.
A Mail Receiver might decide not to enact this procedure if, for
example, it relies on a local list of domains for which external
reporting addresses are permitted.
7.2. Aggregate Reports
Visibility comes in the form of daily (or more frequent) Mail
Receiver-originated feedback reports that contain aggregate data on
message streams relevant to the Domain Owner. This information
includes data about messages that passed DMARC authentication as well
as those that did not.
The format for these reports is defined in Appendix C.
The report SHOULD include the following data:
o The DMARC policy discovered and applied, if any
o The selected message disposition
o The identifier evaluated by SPF and the SPF result, if any
o The identifier evaluated by DKIM and the DKIM result, if any
o For both DKIM and SPF, in indication of whether the identifier was
in alignment
o Data for each sender subdomain separately from mail from the
sender's organizational domain, even if there is no explicit
subdomain policy.
o Sending and receiving domains
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o The policy requested by the Domain Owner and the policy actually
applied (if different)
o The number of successful authentications
o The counts of messages based on all messages received even if
their delivery is ultimately blocked by other filtering agents
Note that Domain Owners or their agents may change the published
DMARC policy for a domain or subdomain at any time. From a Mail
Receiver's perspective this will occur during a reporting period and
may be noticed during that period, at the end of that period when
reports are generated, or during a subsequent reporting period, all
depending on the Mail Receiver's implementation. Under these
conditions it is possible that a Mail Receiver could do any of the
following:
o generate a single aggregate report for such a reporting period
that includes message dispositions based on the old policy, or a
mix of the two policies, even though the report only contains a
single "policy_published" element;
o generate multiple reports for the same period, one for each
published policy occurring during the reporting period;
o generate a report whose end time occurs when the updated policy
was detected, regardless of any requested report interval.
Such policy changes are expected to be infrequent for any given
domain, whereas more stringent policy monitoring requirements on the
Mail Receiver would produce a very large burden at Internet scale.
Therefore it is the responsibility of report consumers and Domain
Owners to be aware of this situation and allow for such mixed reports
during the propagation of the new policy to Mail Receivers.
Aggregate reports are most useful when they all cover a common time
period. By contrast, correlation of these reports from multiple
generators when they cover incongruent time periods is difficult or
impossible. Report generators SHOULD, wherever possible, adhere to
hour boundaries for the reporting period they are using. For
example, starting a per-day report at 00:00; starting per-hour
reports at 00:00, 01:00, 02:00; et cetera. Report Generators using a
24-hour report period are strongly encouraged to begin that period at
00:00 UTC, regardless of local timezone or time of report production,
in order to facilitate correlation.
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7.3. Failure Reports
When a Domain Owner requests failure reports for the purpose of
forensic analysis, and the Mail Receiver is willing to provide such
reports, the Mail Receiver generates and sends a message using the
format described in [AFRF]. This document updates the AFRF format as
described in Section 7.3.1.
The destination(s) and nature of the reports are defined by the "fo"
and "ruf" tags as defined in Section 5.2.
Where multiple URIs are selected to receive failure reports the
report generator MUST make an attempt to deliver to each of them.
An obvious consideration is the denial of service attack that can be
perpetrated by an attacker who sends numerous messages purporting to
be from the intended victim Domain Owner but which fail both SPF and
DKIM; this would cause participating Mail Receivers to send failure
reports to the Domain Owner or its delegate in potentially huge
volumes. Accordingly, participating Mail Receivers are encouraged to
aggregate these reports as much as is practical, using the Incidents
field of the Abuse Reporting Format ([ARF]). Various aggregation
techniques are possible, including:
o only send a report to the first recipient of multi-recipient
messages;
o store reports for a period of time before sending them, allowing
detection, collection, and reporting of like incidents;
o apply rate limiting, such as a maximum number of reports per
minute that will be generated (and the remainder discarded).
7.3.1. Reporting Format Update
[AFRF] is updated to include the following changes:
1. Section 3.2 is updated to indicate that a DMARC failure report
includes the following ARF header fields, with the indicated
normative requirement levels:
* Identity-Alignment (REQUIRED; defined below)
* Delivery-Result (OPTIONAL)
* DKIM-Domain, DKIM-Identity, DKIM-Selector (REQUIRED if the
message was signed by DKIM)
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* DKIM-Canonicalized-Header, DKIM-Canonicalized-Body (OPTIONAL
if the message was signed by DKIM)
* SPF-DNS (REQUIRED)
2. Section 3.2 is updated to define the "Identity-Alignment" field
as containing a comma-separated list of authentication mechanism
names that produced an aligned identity, or the keyword "none" if
none did. ABNF:
id-align = "Identity-Alignment:" [CFWS]
( "none" /
dmarc-method *( [CFWS] "," [CFWS] dmarc-method ) )
[CFWS]
dmarc-method = ( "dkim" / "spf" )
; each may appear at most once in an id-align
3. Section 3.3 is updated to add Authentication Failure Type
"dmarc", which is to be used when a failure report is generated
because some or all of the authentication mechanisms failed to
produce aligned identifiers. Note that a failure report
generator MAY also independently produce an AFRF message for any
or all of the underlying authentication methods.
7.4. Failure Reports
Message-specific authentication-failure-related reporting can be used
to identify problems with Domain-Owner-controlled infrastructure and
to investigate the sources and causes of failing messages. They
might also be used to aid investigations into the sources and
objectives of fraudulent messages.
The format for these reports is defined in either [AFRF] or [IODEF]
depending on the value found in the "ruf" tag of the DMARC record (or
its default).
These reports SHOULD include the "call-to-action" URI(s) from inside
messages that failed to authenticate.
8. Policy Discovery
As stated above, the DMARC mechanism uses DNS TXT records to
advertise policy. Policy discovery is accomplished via a method
similar to the method used for SPF records. This method and the
important differences between DMARC and SPF mechanisms are discussed
below.
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To balance the conflicting requirements of supporting wildcarding,
allowing subdomain policy overrides, and limiting DNS query load, the
following DNS lookup scheme is employed:
1. Mail Receivers MUST query the DNS for a DMARC TXT record at the
DNS domain matching the one found in the RFC5322.From domain in
the message. A possibly empty set of records is returned.
2. Records that do not start with a "v=" tag that identifies the the
current version of DMARC are discarded.
3. If the set is now empty, the Mail Receiver MUST query the DNS for
a DMARC TXT record at the DNS domain matching the Organizational
Domain in place of the RFC5322.From domain in the message (if
different). This record can contain policy to be asserted for
subdomains of the Organizational Domain. A possibly empty set of
records is returned.
4. Records that do not start with a "v=" tag that identifies the
current version of DMARC are discarded.
5. If the remaining set contains multiple records or no records,
processing terminates and the Mail Receiver takes no action.
6. If a retrieved policy record does not contain a valid "p" tag, or
contains an "sp" tag that is not valid, then:
1. if an "rua" tag is present and contains at least one
syntactically valid reporting URI, the Mail Receiver SHOULD
act as if a record containing a valid "v" tag and "p=none"
was retrieved, and continue processing;
2. otherwise, the Mail Receiver SHOULD take no action.
If the set produced by the mechanism above contains no DMARC policy
record (i.e., any indication that there is no such record as opposed
to a transient DNS error), Mail Receivers SHOULD NOT apply the DMARC
mechanism to the message.
If the RFC5322.From domain does not exist in the DNS, Mail Receivers
SHOULD direct the receiving SMTP server to reject the message. The
choice of mechanism for such rejection and the implications of those
choices are discussed in Section 10 and Section 15.4.
Handling of DNS errors when querying for the DMARC policy record is
left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. For example, to ensure
minimal disruption of mail flow, transient errors could result in
delivery of the message ("fail open"), or they could result in the
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message being temporarily rejected (i.e., an SMTP 4yx reply) which
invites the sending MTA to try again after the condition has possibly
cleared, allowing a definite DMARC conclusion to be reached ("fail
closed").
9. Domain Owner Actions
To implement the DMARC mechanism, the only action required of a
Domain Owner is the creation of the DMARC policy record in the DNS.
However, in order to make meaningful use of DMARC, a Domain Owner
must at minimum either set up an address to receive reports, or
deploy authentication technologies and ensure identifier alignment.
Most Domain Owners will want to do both.
DMARC reports will be of significant size and the addresses that
receive them are publicly visible, so we encourage Domain Owners to
set up dedicated email addresses to receive and process reports, and
to protect those email addresses appropriately.
Authentication technologies are discussed in [DKIM] (see also
[DKIM-OVERVIEW] and [DKIM-DEPLOYMENT]) and [SPF].
Many URI schemes involve direct connections to the specified service
(e.g., http, ftp), but some involve the possibility of intermediate
handling (e.g. mailto). A report generator will therefore be able to
tell right away if submission of a report to the former type of
service has succeeded or whether an alternate (if available) needs to
be attempted, but this will not be immediately obvious for the latter
type of service. For example, a report submitted by mail may succeed
at least as far as the local MTA, but could bounce later; however, a
DMARC report generator will not immediately know about this
downstream error.
Therefore, Domain Owners SHOULD include "mailto" URIs at the end of
the lists of URIs they publish.
10. Mail Receiver Actions
This section describes receiver actions in the DMARC environment.
10.1. Extract Author Domain
The domain in the RFC5322.From field is extracted as the domain to be
evaluated by DMARC. If the domain is encoded with UTF-8, the domain
name must be converted to an A-label for further processing.
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In order to be processed by DMARC, a message must contain exactly one
RFC5322 From: domain (a single From: field with a single domain in
it). Not all messages meet this requirement. They may
o Have multiple RFC5322.From fields (which is also forbidden under
RFC 5322 [MAIL])
o Have a single RFC5322.From field containing multiple entities
o Have no RFC5322.From field (which is also forbidden under RFC 5322
[MAIL])
o Have a RFC5322.From field that contains no meaningful values, such
as RFC 5322 [MAIL]'s "group" syntax.
Such messages SHOULD be rejected. If they are not, the Mail Receiver
can either ignore the message entirely with respect to DMARC
processing, or (if there are multiple identifiers) evaluate DMARC
against all identifiers.
If multiple identifiers are evaluated, the Mail Receiver should
prioritize identifiers visible to the end user. This requires an
understanding of the end user environment, the specification of which
is outside of the scope of this document.
10.2. Determine Handling Policy
To arrive at a policy disposition for an individual message, Mail
Receivers MUST perform the following actions or their semantic
equivalents. Steps 2-4 MAY be done in parallel, whereas steps 5 and
6 require input from previous steps.
The steps are as follows:
1. Extract the RFC5322.From domain from the message (as above).
2. Query the DNS for a DMARC policy record. Continue if one is
found, or abort DMARC evaluation otherwise. See Section 8 for
details.
3. Perform DKIM signature verification checks. A single email may
contain multiple DKIM signatures. The results of this step are
passed to the remainder of the algorithm and MUST include the
value of the "d=" tag from all DKIM signatures that successfully
validated.
4. Perform SPF validation checks. The results of this step are
passed to the remainder of the algorithm and MUST include the
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domain name used to complete the SPF check if evaluation returned
a "pass" result.
5. Conduct identifier alignment checks. With authentication checks
and policy discovery performed, the Mail Receiver checks if
Authenticated Identifiers fall into alignment as decribed in
Section 3. If one or more of the Authenticated Identifiers align
with the RFC5322.From domain, the message is considered to pass
the DMARC mechanism check. All other conditions (authentication
failures, identifier mismatches) are considered to be DMARC
mechanism check failures.
6. Apply policy. Emails that fail the DMARC mechanism check are
disposed of in accordance with the discovered DMARC policy of the
Domain Owner. See Section 5.2 for details.
Heuristics applied in the absence of use by a Domain Owner of either
SPF or DKIM (e.g., [Best-Guess-SPF]) SHOULD NOT be used, as it may be
the case that the Domain Owner wishes a Message Receiver not to
consider the results of that underlying authentication protocol at
all.
Handling of messages for which SPF and/or DKIM evaluation encounters
a DNS error is left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. Further
discussion is available in Section 8.
10.3. Message Sampling
If the "pct" tag is present in the policy record, the Mail Receiver
MUST NOT enact the requested policy ("p" tag or "sp" tag") on more
than the stated percent of the totality of affected messages.
However, regardless of whether or not the "pct" tag is present, the
Mail Receiver MUST include all relevant message data in any reports
produced.
If email is subject to the DMARC policy of "quarantine", the Mail
Receiver SHOULD quarantine the message. If the email is not subject
to the "quarantine" policy (due to the "pct" tag), the Mail Receiver
SHOULD apply local message classification as normal.
If email is subject to the DMARC policy of "reject", the Mail
Receiver SHOULD reject the message (see Section 15.4). If the email
is not subject to the "reject" policy (due to the "pct" tag), the
Mail Receiver SHOULD treat the email as though the "quarantine"
policy applies. This behavior allows senders to experiment with
progressively stronger policies without relaxing existing policy.
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10.4. Store Results of DMARC Processing
The results of Mail Receiver-based DMARC processing should be stored
for eventual presentation back to the Domain Owner in the form of
aggregate feedback reports. Section 5 and Section 11 discuss
aggregate feedback.
See Section 12 for a discussion of matters regarding aggregation of
such data.
11. Feedback Mechanism
The DMARC aggregate feedback report is designed to provide Domain
Owners with precise insight into
o authentication results
o corrective action that needs to be taken by Domain Owners, and
o the effect of Domain Owner DMARC policy on email streams processed
by Mail Receivers.
The format of the original payload comprising the report can be found
in Appendix C.
Aggregate DMARC feedback provides visibility into real-world email
streams that Domain Owners need to make informed decisions regarding
the publication of DMARC policy. When Domain Owners know what
legitimate mail they are sending, what the authentication results are
on that mail, and what forged mail receivers are getting, they can
make better decisions about the policies they need and the steps they
need to take to enable those policies. When Domain Owners set
policies appropriately and understand their effects, Mail Receivers
can act on them confidently.
11.1. Discovery
A Mail Receiver discovers reporting requests when it looks up a DMARC
policy record that corresponds to a RFC5322 From: domain on received
mail. The presence of the "rua" tag specifies where to send
feedback.
For more on the considerations given to DMARC discovery, see
Section 7.1.
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11.2. Transport
Where the URI specified in an "rua" tag does not specify otherwise, a
Mail Receiver generating a feedback report SHOULD apply a secure
transport mechanism.
The Mail Receiver, after preparing a report, MUST evaluate the
provided reporting URIs in the order given. Any reporting URI that
includes a size limitation exceeded by the generated report (after
compression and after any encoding required by the particular
transport mechanism) MUST NOT be used. An attempt MUST be made to
deliver an aggregate report to every remaining URI, up to the
receiver's limits on supported URIs.
If transport is not possible because the services advertised by the
published URIs are not able to accept reports (e.g., the URI refers
to a service that is unreachable, or all provided URIs specify size
limits exceeded by the generated record), the Mail Receiver SHOULD
send a short report (see Section 11.2.4) indicating that a report is
available but could not be sent. The Mail Receiver MAY cache that
data and try again later, or MAY discard data that could not be sent.
11.2.1. Email
In the case of a "mailto" URI, the Mail Receiver SHOULD communicate
reports using the method described in [STARTTLS].
The message generated by the Mail Receiver must be a [MIME] formatted
[MAIL] message. The aggregate report itself MUST be included in one
of the parts of the message. A human-readable portion MAY be
included as a MIME part (such as a text/plain part).
The aggregate data MUST be an XML file that SHOULD be subjected to
GZIP compression. Declining to apply compression can cause the
report to be too large for a receiver to process (a commonly-observed
receiver limit is ten megabytes); doing the compression increases the
chances of acceptance of the report at some compute cost. The
aggregate data MUST be present using the media type "application/
gzip", if compressed, and "text/xml" otherwise. The filename SHOULD
be constructed using the following ABNF:
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filename = receiver "!" policy-domain "!" begin-timestamp
"!" end-timestamp [ "!" unique-id ] "." extension
unique-id = token
; "token" is imported from [MIME]
receiver = domain
; imported from [MAIL]
policy-domain = domain
begin-timestamp = 1*DIGIT
; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970
; indicating start of the time range contained
; in the report
end-timestamp = 1*DIGIT
; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970
; indicating end of the time range contained
; in the report
extension = "xml" / "gzip"
For the GZIP file itself, the filename extension MUST be "gz"; for
the XML report, the extension MUST be "xml".
"unique-id" allows an optional unique ID generated by the Mail
Receiver to distinguish among multiple reports generated
simultaneously by different sources within the same Domain Owner.
For example, this is a possible filename for the gzip file of a
report to the Domain Owner "example.com" from the Mail Receiver
"mail.receiver.example".
mail.receiver.example!example.com!1013662812!1013749130.gz
No specific MIME message structure is required. It is presumed that
the aggregate reporting address will be equipped to extract MIME
parts with the prescribed media type and filename and ignore the
rest.
Email streams carrying DMARC feedback data MUST conform to the DMARC
mechanism, thereby resulting in an aligned "pass" (see Section 3.4).
This practice minimizes the risk of report consumers processing
fraudulent reports.
The RFC5322.Subject field for individual report submissions SHOULD
conform to the following ABNF:
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dmarc-subject = %x52.65.70.6f.72.74 1*FWS ; "Report"
%x44.6f.6d.61.69.6e.3a 1*FWS ; "Domain:"
domain-name 1*FWS ; from RFC6376
%x53.75.62.6d.69.74.74.65.72.3a ; "Submitter:"
1*FWS domain-name 1*FWS
%x52.65.70.6f.72.74.2d.49.44.3a ; "Report-ID:"
msg-id ; from RFC5322
The first domain-name indicates the DNS domain name about which the
report was generated. The second domain-name indicates the DNS
domain name representing the Mail Receiver generating the report.
The purpose of the Report-ID: portion of the field is to enable the
Domain Owner to identify and ignore duplicate reports that might be
sent by a Mail Receiver.
For instance, this is a possible Subject field for a report to the
Domain Owner "example.com" from the Mail Receiver
"mail.receiver.example". It is line-wrapped as allowed by [MAIL].
Subject: Report Domain: example.com
Submitter: mail.receiver.example
Report-ID: <2002.02.15.1>
This transport mechanism potentially encounters a problem when
feedback data size exceeds maximum allowable attachment sizes for
either the generator or the consumer. See Section 11.2.4 for further
discussion.
11.2.2. HTTP
Where an "http" or "https" method is requested in a Domain Owner's
URI list, the Mail Receiver MAY encode the data using the
"application/gzip" media type ([GZIP]) or MAY send the Appendix C
data uncompressed or unencoded.
The header portion of the POST or PUT request SHOULD contain a
Subject field as described in Section 11.2.1.
HTTP permits the use of Content-Transfer-Encoding to upload gzip
content using the POST or PUT instruction after translating the
content to 7-bit ASCII.
11.2.3. Other Methods
Other registered URI schemes may be explicitly supported in later
versions.
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11.2.4. Error Reports
When a Mail Receiver is unable to complete delivery of a report via
any of the URIs listed by the Domain Owner, the Mail Receiver SHOULD
generate an error message. An attempt MUST be made to send this
report to all listed "mailto" URIs and it MAY also be sent to any or
all other listed URIs.
The error report MUST be formatted per [MIME]. A text/plain part
MUST be included that contains field-value pairs such as those found
in Section 2 of [DSN]. The fields required, which may appear in any
order, are:
Report-Date: A [MAIL]-formatted date expression indicating when the
transport failure occurred.
Report-Domain: The domain-name about which the failed report was
generated.
Report-ID: The Report-ID: that the report tried to use.
Report-Size: The size, in bytes, of the report that was unable to be
sent. This MUST represent the number of bytes that the Mail
Receiver attempted to send. Where more than one transport system
was attempted, the sizes may be different; in such cases, separate
error reports MUST be generated so that this value matches the
actual attempt that was made. For example, a "mailto" error
report would be sent to the "mailto" URIs with one size, while the
"https" reports might be POSTed to those URIs with a different
size, as they have different transport and encoding requirements.
Submitter: The domain-name representing the Mail Receiver that
generated, but was unable to submit, the report.
Submitting-URI: The URI(s) to which the Mail Receiver tried, but
failed, to submit the report.
An additional text/plain part MAY be included that gives a human-
readable explanation of the above, and MAY also include a URI that
can be used to seek assistance.
[NOTE: A more rigorous syntax specification, including ABNF and
possible registration of a new media type, will be added here when
more operational experience is acquired.]
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12. Capacity Planning
DMARC participants will need to perform capacity planning to support
their implementations. Some factors to consider include:
Storage: As Mail Receivers process increasing numbers of messages --
from increasingly disparate sources -- claiming to be from DMARC-
enabled domains, additional storage of information will be
required to support the generation of feedback reports.
Similarly, Domain Owners will need to plan based on how long they
wish to store the data found in received reports. When Domain
Owners enter exceptional situations and are unable to accept
reports, Mail Receivers, as a matter of policy, might discard
undelivered reports.
Frequency: Sending reports more frequently increases processing
costs at both the Mail Receiver and the Domain Owner, but can
decrease Mail Receiver storage requirements as data are consumed
and storage is freed through report generation and transmission.
At the same time, less frequent report generation may lead to
somewhat stale feedback. An appropriate balance should be sought.
DNS: DMARC imposes up to two additional DNS queries per arriving
message, namely the TXT queries to try to locate a policy
statement. For Mail Receivers, these are queries sent; for Domain
Owners, these are queries that must be handled. Both sides will
need to plan for the additional DNS load.
13. Minimum Implementations
A minimum implementation of DMARC has the following characteristics:
o Is able to send and/or receive reports at least daily;
o Is able to send and/or receive reports using "mailto" URIs;
o Other than in exceptional circumstances such as resource
exhaustion, can generate or accept a report up to ten megabytes in
size;
o If acting as a Mail Receiver, fully implements the provisions of
Section 10.
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14. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses security issues specific to private data that
may be included in the interactions that are part of DMARC.
14.1. Data Exposure Considerations
Aggregate reports are limited in scope to DMARC policy and
disposition results, to information pertaining to the underlying
authentication mechanisms, and to the identifiers involved in DMARC
validation.
Failed message reporting provides message-specific details pertaining
to authentication failures. Individual reports can contain message
content as well as trace header fields. Domain Owners are able to
analyze individual reports and attempt to determine root causes of
authentication mechanism failures, gain insight into
misconfigurations or other problems with email and network
infrastructure, or inspect messages for insight into abusive
practices.
Both report types may expose sender and recipient identifiers (e.g.,
RFC5322.From addresses), and although the [AFRF] format used for
failed message reporting supports redaction, failed message reporting
is capable of exposing the entire message to the report recipient.
Domain Owners requesting reports will receive information about mail
claiming to be from them, which includes mail that was not, in fact,
from them. Information about the final destination of mail where it
might otherwise be obscured by intermediate systems will therefore be
exposed.
14.2. Report Recipients
A DMARC record can specify that reports should be sent to an
intermediary operating on behalf of the Domain Owner. This is done
when the Domain Owner contracts with an entity to monitor mail-
streams for abuse and performance issues. Receipt by third parties
of such data may or may not be permitted by the Mail Receiver's
privacy policy, terms of use, or other similar governing document.
Domain Owners and Mail Receivers should both review and understand if
their own internal policies constrain the use and transmission of
DMARC reporting.
14.3. Report Generators
The entity (e.g., mailbox provider, Internet service provider)
receiving emails is typically responsible for generating DMARC
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reports. Such entities are typically charged with protecting
accidental disclosure of their users' data. In this case, disclosure
is being requested by the entity generating the email in the first
place, i.e., the Domain Owner, so this may not fit squarely within
existing privacy policy provisions. For some providers, aggregate
and failed message reporting are viewed as a function similar to
complaint reporting about spamming or phishing, and treated similarly
under the privacy policy. Report generators (i.e., Mail Receivers)
are encouraged to review their reporting limitations under such
policies before enabling DMARC reporting.
14.4. Secure Protocols
This document encourages use of secure transport mechanisms to
prevent loss of private data to third parties that may be able to
monitor such transmissions. Unencrypted mechanisms should be
avoided.
15. Other Topics
This section discusses some topics regarding choices made in the
development of DMARC, largely to commit the history to record.
15.1. Use of RFC5322.From
One of the most obvious points of security scrutiny for DMARC is the
choice to focus on an identifier, namely the RFC5322.From address,
which is part of a body of data trivially forged throughout the
history of email.
Several points suggest it is the most correct and safest thing to do
in this context:
o Of all the identifiers that are part of the message itself, this
is the only one guaranteed to be present.
o It seems the best choice of an identifier on which to focus as
most MUAs display some or all of the contents of that field in a
manner strongly suggesting those data as reflective of the true
originator of the message.
o The focus of email authentication efforts has been to create
mechanisms by which this field, or at least some field in the
message, can be deemed genuine. Thus, this field is not easily
forged within the context of its use with DMARC.
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o The DMARC mechanism confers no additional privilege to the message
without successful authentication of this identifier.
The absence of a single, properly-formed RFC5322.From field renders
the message invalid. This document prescribes no specific action in
that case, other than to suggest that the message ought to be
disposed of by the Mail Receiver's infrastructure in a safe manner
that recognizes and possibly even highlights the malformation.
15.2. Issues Specific to SPF
Though DMARC does not inherently change the semantics of an SPF
policy record, historically lax enforcement of such policies has led
many to publish extremely broad records containing many large network
ranges. Domain Owners are strongly encouraged to carefully review
their SPF records to understand which networks are authorized to send
on behalf of the Domain Owner before publishing a DMARC record.
Some receiver architectures might implement SPF in advance of any
DMARC operations. This means a "-" prefix on a Sender's SPF
mechanism, such as "-all", could cause that rejection go into effect
early in handling, causing message rejection, before any DMARC
processing takes place. Operators choosing to use "-all" should be
aware of this.
15.3. DNS Load and Caching
DMARC policies are communicated using the DNS, and therefore inherit
a number of considerations related to DNS caching. The inherent
conflict between freshness and the impact of caching on the reduction
of DNS-lookup overhead should be considered from the Mail Receiver's
point of view. Should Domain Owners publish a DNS record with a very
short TTL, Mail Receivers can be provoked through the injection of
large volumes of messages to overwhelm the Domain Owner's DNS.
Although this is not a concern specific to DMARC, the implications of
a very short TTL should be considered when publishing DMARC policies.
Conversely, long TTLs will cause records to be cached for long
periods of time. This can cause a critical change to DMARC
parameters advertised by a Domain Owner to go unnoticed for the
length of the TTL (while waiting for DNS caches to expire). Avoiding
this problem can mean shorter TTLs, with the potential problems
described above. A balance should be sought to maintain
responsiveness of DMARC preference changes while preserving the
benefits of DNS caching.
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15.4. Rejecting Messages
This proposal calls for rejection of a message during the SMTP
session under certain circumstances. This is typically done in one
of two ways:
o Full rejection, wherein the SMTP server issues a 5xy reply code as
an indication to the SMTP client that the transaction failed; the
SMTP client is then responsible for generating notification that
delivery failed (see Section 4.2.5 of [SMTP]).
o A "silent discard", wherein the SMTP server returns a 2xy reply
code implying to the client that delivery (or, at least, relay)
was successfully completed, but then simply discarding the message
with no further action.
Each of these has a cost. For instance, a silent discard may prevent
"backscatter" (the annoying generation of delivery failure reports,
which go back to the RFC5321.MailFrom address, about messages that
were fraudulently generated), but effectively means the SMTP server
has to be programmed to give a false result, which can confound
external debugging efforts.
Similarly, the text portion of the SMTP reply may be important to
consider. For example, when rejecting a message, revealing the
reason for the rejection might give an attacker enough information to
bypass those efforts on a later attempt, though it might also assist
a legitimate client to determine the source of some local issue that
caused the rejection.
In the latter case, when doing an SMTP rejection, providing a clear
hint can be useful in resolving issues. A receiver might indicate in
plain text the reason for the rejection by using the word "DMARC"
somewhere in the reply text. Many systems are able to scan the SMTP
reply text to determine the nature of the rejection, thus providing a
machine-detectable reason for rejection allows automated sorting of
rejection causes so they can be properly addressed. For example:
550 5.7.1 Email rejected per DMARC policy for example.com
If a Mail Receiver elects to defer delivery due to inability to
retrieve or apply DMARC policy, this is best done with a 4xy SMTP
reply code.
15.5. Identifier Alignment Considerations
The DMARC mechanism allows both DKIM and SPF-authenticated
identifiers to authenticate email on behalf of a Domain Owner, and,
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in the case of SPF, on behalf of different subdomains. If malicious
or unaware users can gain control of the SPF record or signing
practices for a sub-domain, the sub-domain can be used to generate
DMARC-passing email on behalf of the Organizational Domain.
For example, an attacker who controls the SPF record for
"evil.example.com" can send mail with an RFC5322.From field
containing "foo@example.com" that can pass both authentication and
the DMARC check against "example.com".
The Organizational Domain administrator should be careful not to cede
control of sub-domains if this is an issue, and to consider using the
"strict" Identifier Alignment option if appropriate.
16. IANA Considerations
This section describes actions requested of IANA.
16.1. Authentication-Results Method Registry Update
IANA is requested to add the following to the Email Authentication
Method Name Registry:
Method: dmarc
Defined In: [this memo]
ptype: header
property: from
value: the domain portion of the RFC5322.From field
16.2. Authentication-Results Result Registry Update
IANA has added the following in the Email Authentication Result Name
Registry:
Code: none
Existing/New Code: existing
Defined In: [AUTH-RESULTS]
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Auth Method: dmarc (added)
Meaning: No DMARC policy record was published for the aligned
identifier, or no aligned identifier could be extracted.
Code: pass
Existing/New Code: existing
Defined In: [AUTH-RESULTS]
Auth Method: dmarc (added)
Meaning: A DMARC policy record was published for the aligned
identifier, and at least one of the authentication mechanisms
passed.
Code: fail
Existing/New Code: existing
Defined In: [AUTH-RESULTS]
Auth Method: dmarc (added)
Meaning: A DMARC policy record was published for the aligned
identifier, and none of the authentication mechanisms passed.
Code: temperror
Existing/New Code: existing
Defined In: [AUTH-RESULTS]
Auth Method: dmarc (added)
Meaning: A temporary error occurred during DMARC evaluation. A
later attempt might produce a final result.
Code: permerror
Existing/New Code: existing
Defined In: [AUTH-RESULTS]
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Auth Method: dmarc (added)
Meaning: A permanent error occurred during DMARC evaluation, such as
encountering a syntactically incorrect DMARC record. A later
attempt is unlikely to produce a final result.
16.3. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry
The following is added to the Feedback Report Header FIelds Registry:
Field Name: Identity-Alignment
Description: indicates whether the message about which a report is
being generated had any identifiers in alignment as defined in
[this RFC]
Multiple Appearances: no
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published In: [this RFC]
Status: current
16.4. DMARC Tag Registry
Names of DMARC tags must be registered with IANA. New entries are
assigned only for values that have been documented in a published RFC
that has had IETF Review, per [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]. Each
registration must include the tag name, the specification that
defines it, a brief description, and its status which must be one of
"current", "experimental" or "historic".
The initial set of entries in this registry is as follows:
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+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| Tag Name | Defined | Status | Description |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| adkim | [THIS MEMO] | current | DKIM alignment mode |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| aspf | [THIS MEMO] | current | SPF alignment mode |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| fo | [THIS MEMO] | current | Failure reporting options |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| pct | [THIS MEMO] | current | Sampling rate |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| p | [THIS MEMO] | current | Requested handling policy |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| rf | [THIS MEMO] | current | Failure reporting format(s) |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| ri | [THIS MEMO] | current | Aggregate Reporting interval |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| rua | [THIS MEMO] | current | Reporting URI(s) for |
| | | | aggregate data |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| ruf | [THIS MEMO] | current | Reporting URI(s) for |
| | | | failure data |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| sp | [THIS MEMO] | current | Requested handling policy |
| | | | for subdomains |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
| v | [THIS MEMO] | current | Specification version |
+----------+-------------+---------+------------------------------+
16.5. DMARC Report Format Registry
Names of DMARC failure reporting formats must be registered with
IANA. New entries are assigned only for values that have been
documented in a published RFC that has had IETF Review, per
[IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]. Each registration must include the tag name,
the specification that defines it, a brief description, and its
status which must be one of "current", "experimental" or "historic".
The initial set of entries in this registry is as follows:
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+--------+-------------+---------+-----------------------------+
| Format | Defined | Status | Description |
| Name | | | |
+--------+-------------+---------+-----------------------------+
| afrf | [THIS MEMO] | current | Authentication Failure |
| | | | Reporting Format (see |
| | | | [AFRF]) |
+--------+-------------+---------+-----------------------------+
| iodef | [THIS MEMO] | current | Incident Object Description |
| | | | Exchange Format (see |
| | | | [IODEF]) |
+--------+-------------+---------+-----------------------------+
17. Security Considerations
This section discusses security issues and possible remediations
(where available) for DMARC.
17.1. Attacks on Reporting URIs
URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible
targets for attack. Specifications such as [DNS] and [ROLES] either
expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that could be flooded
by an attacker, for example; MX, NS and other records found in the
DNS advertise potential attack destinations; common DNS names such as
"www" plainly identify the locations at which particular services can
be found, providing destinations for targeted denial-of-service or
penetration attacks.
Thus, Domain Owners will need to harden these addresses against
various attacks, including but not limited to:
o high-volume denial-of-service attacks;
o deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify
or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities;
o deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the
Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of
false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers.
17.2. DNS Security
The DMARC mechanism and its underlying technologies (SPF, DKIM)
depend on the security of the DNS. To reduce the risk of subversion
of the DMARC mechanism due to DNS-based exploits, serious
consideration should be given to the deployment of DNSSEC in parallel
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to the deployment of DMARC.
17.3. Display Name Attacks
A common attack in messaging abuse is the presentation of false
information in the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From field.
For example, it is possible for the email address in that field to be
an arbitrary address or domain name, while containing a well-known
name (a person, brand, role, etc.) in the display name, intending to
fool the end user into believing that the name is used legitimately.
The attack is predicated on the notion that most common MUAs will
show the display name and not the email address when both are
available.
Generally, display name attacks are out of scope for DMARC as further
exploration of possible defenses against these attacks needs to be
undertaken.
There are a few possible mechanisms that attempt mitigation of these
attacks, such as:
o If the display name is found to include an email address (as
specified in [MAIL]), execute the DMARC mechanism on the domain
name found there rather than the domain name discovered
originally. However, this addresses only a very specific attack
space and is easily circumvented by spoofers simply by not using
an email address in the display name. There are also known cases
of legitimate uses of an email address in the display name with a
domain different from the one in the address portion, e.g.:
From: "user@example.org via Bug Tracker" <support@example.com>
o In the MUA, only show the display name if the DMARC mechanism
succeeds. This too is easily defeated, as an attacker could
arrange to pass the DMARC tests while fraudulently using another
domain name in the display name.
o In the MUA, only show the display name if the DMARC mechanism
passes and the email address thus validated matches one found in
the receiving user's list of known addresses.
17.4. External Reporting Addresses
To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to
be inside the domains about which reports are requested. In order to
accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains
that cannot actually receive mail, Section 7.1 describes a DNS-based
mechanism for verifying approved external reporting.
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The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against
domains that are claimed as external recipients. Negative caching
will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly
dependent on the default time-to-live in the domain's SOA record.
Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the
report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having
it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination.
Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more
information that might be considered private data, since it is
possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports.
The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for
intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag. Moreover,
attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be
routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive
prospect. Deployment of [DNSSEC] is advisable if this is a concern.
The verification mechanism presented in Section 7.1 is currently not
mandatory ("MUST") but strongly recommended ("SHOULD"). It is
possible that it would be elevated to a "MUST" by later security
review.
18. References
18.1. Normative References
[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.
[AFRF] Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting using the
Abuse Report Format", RFC 6591, April 2012.
[AFRF-DKIM]
Kucherawy, M., "Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM) for Failure Reporting", RFC 6651, June 2012.
[AFRF-SPF]
Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting
Format", RFC 6652, June 2012.
[DKIM] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376,
September 2011.
[DNS] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
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specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[DNS-CASE]
Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity
Clarification", RFC 4343, January 2006.
[GZIP] Levine, J., "The 'application/zlib' and 'application/gzip'
Media Types", RFC 6713, August 2012.
[IDNA] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, August 2000.
[KEYWORDS]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MAIL] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
[MIME] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[SPF] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
RFC 4408, April 2006.
[STARTTLS]
Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, February 2002.
[URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 3986,
January 2005.
18.2. Informative References
[ADSP] Allman, E., Fenton, J., Delany, M., and J. Levine,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Author Domain Signing
Practices (ADSP)", RFC 5617, August 2009.
[ARF] Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
August 2010.
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[AUTH-RESULTS]
Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
Message Authentication Status", RFC 5451, April 2009.
[Best-Guess-SPF]
Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework: Best guess record
(FAQ entry)", May 2010,
<http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/Best_guess_record>.
[DKIM-DEPLOYMENT]
Hansen, T., Siegel, E., Crocker, D., and P. Hallam-Baker,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Development,
Deployment, and Operations", RFC 5863, May 2010.
[DKIM-OVERVIEW]
Hansen, T., Crocker, D., and P. Hallam-Baker, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview", RFC 5585,
July 2009.
[DKIM-THREATS]
Fenton, J., "Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM)", RFC 4686, September 2006.
[DNSSEC] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[DSN] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
January 2003.
[EMAIL-ARCH]
Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009.
[IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]
Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[IODEF] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
December 2007.
[ROLES] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
Functions", RFC 2142, May 1997.
URIs
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[1] <http://dmarc.org>
Appendix A. Technology Considerations
This section documents some design decisions that were made in the
development of DMARC. Specifically, addressed here are some
suggestions that were considered but not included in the design.
This text is included to explain why they were considered and not
included in this version.
A.1. S/MIME
S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, is a
standard for encryption and signing of MIME data in a message. This
was suggested and considered as a third security protocol for
authenticating the source of a message.
DMARC is focused on authentication at the domain level (i.e., the
Domain Owner taking responsibility for the message), while S/MIME is
really intended for user-to-user authentication and encryption. This
alone appears to make it a bad fit for DMARC's goals.
S/MIME also suffers from the heavyweight problem of Public Key
Infrastructure, which means distribution of keys used to verify
signatures needs to be incorporated. In many instances, this alone
is a showstopper. There have been consistent promises that PKI
usability and deployment will improve, but these have yet to
materialize. DMARC can revisit this choice after those barriers are
addressed.
S/MIME has extensive deployment in specific market segments
(government, for example), but does not enjoy similar widespread
deployment over the general Internet, and this shows no signs of
changing. DKIM and SPF both are deployed widely over the general
Internet and their adoption rates continue to be positive.
Finally, experiments have shown that including S/MIME support in the
initial version of DMARC would neither cause nor enable a substantial
increase in the accuracy of the overall mechanism.
A.2. Method Exclusion
It was suggested that DMARC include a mechanism by which a Domain
Owner could tell Message Receivers not to attempt validation by one
of the supported methods (e.g., "check DKIM, but not SPF").
Specifically, consider a Domain Owner that has deployed one of the
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technologies, and that technology fails for some messages, but such
failures don't cause enforcement action. Deploying DMARC would cause
enforcement action for policies other than "none", which would appear
to exclude participation by that Domain Owner.
The DMARC development team evaluated the idea of policy exception
mechanisms on several occasions and invariably concluded that there
was not a strong enough use case to include them. The specific
target audience for DMARC does not appear to have concerns about the
failure modes of one or the other being a barrier to DMARC's
adoption.
In the scenario described above, the Domain Owner has a few options:
1. Tighten up its infrastructure to minimize the failure modes of
the single deployed technology.
2. Deploy the other supported authentication mechanism, to offset
the failure modes of the first.
3. Deploy DMARC in a reporting-only mode.
A.3. Sender Header Field
It has been suggested in several message authentication efforts that
the Sender header field be checked for an identifier of interest, as
the standards indicate this as the proper way to indicate a re-
mailing of content such as through a mailing list. Most recently, it
was a protocol-level option for DomainKeys, but on evolution to DKIM,
this property was removed.
The DMARC development team considered this and decided not to include
support for doing so, for two primary reasons:
1. The main user protection approach is to be concerned with what
the user sees when a message is rendered. There is no consistent
behaviour among MUAs regarding what to do with the content of the
Sender field, if present. Accordingly, supporting checking of
the Sender identifier would mean applying policy to an identifier
the end user might never actually see, which can create a vector
for attack against end users by simply forging a Sender field
containing some identifier that DMARC will like.
2. Although it is certainly true that this is what Sender is for,
its use in this way is also unreliable, making it a poor
candidate for inclusion in the DMARC evaluation algorithm.
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3. Allowing multiple ways to discover policy introduces unacceptable
ambiguity into the DMARC evaluation algorithm in terms of which
policy is to be applied and when.
A.4. Domain Existence Test
A common practice among MTA operators, and indeed one documented in
[ADSP], is a test to determine domain existence prior to any more
expensive processing. This is typically done by querying the DNS for
MX, A or AAAA resource records for the name being evaluated, and
assuming the domain is non-existent if it could be determined that no
such records were published for that domain name.
The original pre-standardization version of this protocol included a
mandatory check of this nature. It was ultimately removed, as the
method's error rate was too high without substantial manual tuning
and heuristic work. There are indeed use cases this work needs to
address where such a method would return a negative result about a
domain for which reporting is desired, such as a registered domain
name that never sends legitimate mail and thus has none of these
records present in the DNS.
A.5. Issues With ADSP In Operation
DMARC has been characterized as a "super-ADSP" of sorts.
Contributors to DMARC have compiled a list of issues associated with
ADSP, gained from operational experience, that have influenced the
direction of DMARC:
1. ADSP has no support for subdomains, i.e., the ADSP record for
example.com does not explicitly or implicitly apply to
subdomain.example.com. If wildcarding is not applied, then
spammers can trivially bypass ADSP by sending from a subdomain
with no ADSP record.
2. Non-existent subdomains are explicitly out of scope in ADSP.
There is nothing in ADSP that states receivers should simply
reject mail from NXDOMAINs regardless of ADSP policy (which of
course allows spammers to trivially bypass ADSP by sending email
from non-existent subdomains).
3. ADSP has no operational advice on when to look up the ADSP
record.
4. ADSP has no support for using SPF as an auxiliary mechanism to
DKIM.
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5. ADSP has no support for a slow roll-out, i.e., no way to
configure a percentage of email on which the receiver should
apply the policy. This is important for large-volume senders.
6. ADSP has no explicit support for an intermediate phase where the
receiver quarantines (e.g., sends to the recipient's "spam"
folder) rather than rejects the email.
7. The binding between the "From" header domain and DKIM is too
tight for ADSP; they must match exactly.
A.6. Organizational Domain Discovery Issues
Although protocols like ADSP are useful for "protecting" a specific
domain name, they are not helpful at protecting subdomains. If one
wished to protect "example.com" by requiring via ADSP that all mail
bearing an RFC5322.From domain of "example.com" be signed, this would
"protect" that domain; however, one could then craft an email whose
RFC5322.From domain is "security.example.com", and ADSP would not
provide any protection. One could use a DNS wildcard, but this can
undesirably interfere with other DNS activity; one could add ADSP
records as fraudulent domains are discovered, but this solution does
not scale and is a purely reactive measure against abuse.
The DNS does not provide a method by which the "domain of record", or
the domain that was actually registered with a domain registrar, can
be determined given an arbitrary domain name. Suggestions have been
made that attempt to glean such information from SOA or NS resource
records, but these too are not fully reliable as the partitioning of
the DNS is not always done at administrative boundaries.
When seeking domain-specific policy based on an arbitrary domain
name, one could "climb the tree", dropping labels off the left end of
the name until the root is reached or a policy is discovered, but
then one could craft a name that has a large number of nonsense
labels; this would cause a Mail Receiver to attempt a large number of
queries in search of a policy record. Sending many such messages
constitutes an amplified denial-of-service attack.
The Organizational Domain mechanism is a necessary component to the
goals of DMARC. The method described in Section 3 is far from
perfect, but serves this purpose reasonably well without adding undue
burden or semantics to the DNS. If a method is created to do so that
is more reliable and secure than the use of a public suffix list,
DMARC should be amended to use that method as soon as it is generally
available.
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A.6.1. Public Suffix Lists
A public suffix list for the purposes of determining the
Organizational Domain can be obtained from various sources. The most
common one is maintained by the Mozilla Foundation and made public at
http://publicsuffix.org. License terms governing the use of that
list are available at that URI.
Appendix B. Examples
This section illustrates both the Domain Owner side and the Mail
Receiver side of a DMARC exchange.
B.1. Identifier Alignment examples
The following examples illustrate the DMARC mechanism's use of
Identifier Alignment. For brevity's sake, only message headers are
shown as message bodies are not considered when conducting DMARC
checks.
B.1.1. SPF
The following SPF examples assume that SPF produces a passing result.
Example 1: SPF in alignment:
MAIL FROM: <sender@example.com>
From: sender@example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
SPF In Alignment
In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom parameter and the RFC5322.From
field have identical DNS domains. Thus, the identifiers are in
alignment.
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Example 2: SPF in alignment (parent):
MAIL FROM: <sender@example.com>
From: sender@child.example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
SPF In Alignment (Parent)
In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom parameter includes a DNS domain
that is a parent of the RFC5322.From domain. Thus, the identifiers
are in alignment if "relaxed" SPF mode is requested by the Domain
Owner, and not in alignment if "strict" SPF mode is requested.
Example 3: SPF not in alignment:
MAIL FROM: <sender@sample.net>
From: sender@child.example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
SPF Not In Alignment
In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom parameter includes a DNS domain
that is neither the same as nor a parent of the RFC5322.From domain.
Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment.
B.1.2. DKIM
The examples below assume the DKIM signatures pass verification.
Alignment cannot exist with a DKIM signature that does not verify.
Example 1: DKIM in alignment:
DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
From: sender@example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
DKIM In Alignment
In this case, the DKIM "d=" parameter and the RFC5322.From field have
identical DNS domains. Thus, the identifiers are in alignment.
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Example 2: DKIM in alignment (parent):
DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
From: sender@child.example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
DKIM In Alignment (Parent)
In this case, the DKIM signature's "d=" parameter includes a DNS
domain that is a parent of the RFC5322.From domain. Thus, the
identifiers are in alignment.
Example 3: DKIM not in alignment:
DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=sample.net; ...
From: sender@child.example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Subject: here's a sample
DKIM Not In Alignment
In this case, the DKIM signature's "d=" parameter includes a DNS
domain that is neither the same as nor a parent of the RFC5322.From
domain. Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment.
B.2. Domain Owner example
A Domain Owner that wants to use DMARC should have already deployed
and tested SPF and DKIM. The next step is to publish a DNS record
that advertises a DMARC policy for the Domain Owner's organizational
domain.
B.2.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Only
The owner of the domain "example.com" has deployed SPF and DKIM on
its messaging infrastructure. The owner wishes to begin using DMARC
with a policy that will solicit aggregate feedback from receivers
without affecting how the messages are processed, in order to:
o Confirm that its legitimate messages are authenticating correctly
o Verify that all authorized message sources have implemented
authentication measures
o Determine how many messages from other sources would be affected
by a blocking policy
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The Domain Owner accomplishes this by constructing a policy record
indicating that:
o The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1")
o Receivers should not alter how they treat these messages because
of this DMARC policy record ("p=none")
o Aggregate feedback reports should be sent via email to the address
"dmarc-feedback@example.com"
("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com")
o All messages from this organizational domain are subject to this
policy (no "pct" tag present, so the default of 100% applies)
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool:
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
creates an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" )
B.2.2. Entire Domain, Monitoring Only, Per-Message Reports
The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate
reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet
implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic
authentication failures. In order to diagnose these intermittent
problems they wish to request per-message failure reports when
authentication failures occur.
Not all Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain Owner
feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough to
justify publishing this record. The default per-message report
format ([AFRF]) meets the Domain Owner's needs in this scenario.
The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its
policy record from Appendix B.2):
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o Per-message failure reports should be sent via email to the
address "auth-reports@example.com"
("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com")
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
"ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" )
B.2.3. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party
The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same
policy, but now wishes to have a third party receive and process the
per-message failure reports. Again, not all Receivers will honor
this request, but those that do may implement additional checks to
validate that the third party wishes to receive the failure reports
for this domain.
The Domain Owner needs to alter its policy record from Appendix B.2.2
as follows:
o Per message failure reports should be send via email to the
address "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net"
("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net")
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
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(following the conventional zone file format):
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
"ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )
Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the
Organizational Domain in which this record is published, conforming
Receivers will implement additional checks as described in
Section 7.1 of this document. In order to pass these additional
checks, the third party will need to publish an additional DNS record
as follows:
o Given the DMARC record published by the Domain Owner at
"_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the third party
will need to publish a TXT resource record at
"example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value
"v=DMARC1".
The resulting DNS record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net
"v=DMARC1"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might
create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
; zone file for thirdparty.example.net
; Accept DMARC failure reports on behalf of example.com
example.com._report._dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1"
Intermediaries and other third parties should refer to Section 7.1
for the full details of this mechanism.
B.2.4. Sub-Domain, Sampling, and Multiple Aggregate Report URIs
The Domain Owner has implemented SPF and DKIM in a sub-domain used
for pre-production testing of messaging services. It now wishes to
request that participating receivers act to reject messages from this
sub-domain that fail to authenticate.
As a first step it will ask that a portion (1/4 in this example) of
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failing messages be quarantined, enabling examination of messages
sent to mailboxes hosted by participating receivers. Aggregate
feedback reports will be sent to a mailbox within the Organizational
Domain, and to a mailbox at a third party selected and authorized to
receive same by the Domain Owner. Aggregate reports sent to the
third party are limited to a maximum size of ten megabytes.
The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a policy record
indicating that:
o The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1")
o It is applied only to this sub-domain (record is published at
"_dmarc.test.example.com" and not "_dmarc.example.com")
o Receivers should quarantine messages from this organizational
domain that fail to authenticate ("p=quarantine")
o Aggregate feedback reports should be sent via email to the
addresses "dmarc-feedback@example.com" and
"example-tld-test@thirdparty.example.net", with the latter
subjected to a maximum size limit ("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@
example.com,mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net!10m")
o 25% of messages from this Organizational Domain are subject to
action based on this policy ("pct=25")
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.test.example.com
"v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,
mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net!10m; pct=25"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone
file:
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
"mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net!10m; "
"pct=25" )
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B.2.5. Third Party Sender and Identifier Alignment
The Domain Owner only uses the top-level domain for email, and uses a
third-party sender for some marketing message traffic. It has
implemented SPF and DKIM across its in-house infrastructure and
required the third-party to do the same. A monitoring period has
shown that the Domain Owner and the third-party sender are both
executing well with respect to email authentication measures.
The third-party has access to the appropriate DKIM private or signing
keys for the selectors it will use. However the third-party uses
sub-domains like "id1234.bounces.example.com" in the RFC5321.Mailfrom
address for campaign tracking and troubleshooting purposes. The sub-
domain "bounces.example.com" has been delegated to the third-party so
that it can publish appropriate MX records in the DNS.
Therefore the Domain Owner wishes to publish a policy that requests
rejection of messages which fail to authenticate, strict identifier
alignment for DKIM authentication, and relaxed identifier alignment
for SPF checks. Aggregate reports will only be sent to the Domain
Owner in this example.
The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a policy record
indicating that:
o The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1")
o Receivers should reject messages that fail to authenticate
("p=reject")
o Strict identifier alignment should be applied to DKIM checks
("adkim=s")
o Relaxed identifier alignment should be applied to SPF checks
("aspf=r")
o Aggregate feedback reports should be sent via email to the address
"dmarc-feedback@example.com"
("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com")
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
"v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=r;
rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"
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To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone
file:
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=r; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" )
B.2.6. Sub-Domain Policy, Reporting Interval
In this example the Domain Owner only uses addresses in the
Organizational Domain itself ("user@example.com" versus
"user@sub.example.com"). A business decision has been made that
messages incorrectly being rejected as false positives during, for
example, a transient outage are unacceptable. Therefore, the desired
policy is that:
o Messages from the Organizational Domain that fail authentication
should be quarantined
o Messages from any sub-domain should be rejected
Furthermore the Domain Owner would like to request that aggregate
data be sent at four hour intervals to themselves and a third-party
service for analysis and action. It recognizes that not all
Receivers will honor this request, but feels that faster intra-day
analysis of failures and threats make this worthwhile.
The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a policy record
indicating that:
o The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1")
o Receivers should quarantine messages from this domain that fail to
authenticate ("p=quarantine")
o Receivers should reject messages from any sub-domains that fail to
authenticate ("sp=reject")
o Aggregate reports should be generated every four hours
("ri=14400")
o Aggregate reports should be sent via email to the addresses
"dmarc-feedback@example.com" and
"customer-analysis@thirdparty.example.net" ("rua=mailto:dmarc-
feedback@example.com,mailto:customer-data@thirdparty.example.net")
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
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common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line, but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
"v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; ri=14400;
rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,
mailto:customer-data@thirdparty.example.net"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone
file:
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
"mailto:customer-data@thirdparty.example.net" )
B.3. Mail Receiver Example
A Mail Receiver that wants to use DMARC should already be checking
SPF and DKIM, and possess the ability to collect relevant information
from various email processing stages to provide feedback to Domain
Owners.
B.3.1. SMTP-time Processing
An optimal DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver performs authentication and
identifier alignment checking during the [SMTP] conversation.
Prior to returning a reply to the DATA command, the Mail Receiver's
MTA has performed:
1. An SPF check to determine an SPF-authenticated Identifier.
2. DKIM checks that yield one or more DKIM-authenticated
Identifiers.
3. A DMARC policy lookup.
The presence of an Author Domain DMARC record indicates that the Mail
Receiver should continue with DMARC-specific processing before
returning a reply to the DATA command.
Given a DMARC record and the set of Authenticated Identifiers, the
Mail Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifiers align
with the Author Domain (taking into consideration any "strict" vs
"relaxed" options found in the DMARC record).
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For example, the following sample data is considered to be from a
piece of email originating from the Domain Owner of "example.com":
Author Domain: example.com
SPF-authenticated Identifier: mail.example.com
DKIM-authenticated Identifier: example.com
DMARC record:
"v=DMARC1; p=reject; aspf=r;
rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"
In the above sample, both the SPF and the DKIM-authenticated
Identifiers align with the Author Domain. The Mail Receiver
considers the above email to pass the DMARC check, avoiding the
"reject" policy that is to be applied to email that fails to pass the
DMARC check.
If no Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, then
the Mail Receiver applies the DMARC-record-specified policy.
However, before this action is taken, the Mail Receiver can consult
external information to override the Domain Owner's policy. For
example, if the Mail Receiver knows that this particular email came
from a known and trusted forwarder (that happens to break both SPF
and DKIM), then the Mail Receiver may choose to ignore the Domain
Owner's policy.
The Mail Receiver is now ready to reply to the DATA command. If the
DMARC check yields that the message is to be rejected, then the Mail
Receiver replies with a 5xy code to inform the sender of failure. If
the DMARC check cannot be resolved due to transient network errors,
then the Mail Receiver replies with a 4xy code to inform the sender
as to the need to reattempt delivery later. If the DMARC check
yields a passing message, then the Mail Receiver continues on with
email processing, perhaps using the result of the DMARC check as an
input to additional processing modules such as a domain reputation
query.
Before exiting DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver checks to
see if the Author Domain DMARC record requests AFRF-based reporting.
If so, then the Mail Receiver can emit an AFRF to the reporting
address supplied in the DMARC record.
At the exit of DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver captures
(through logging or direct insertion into a data store) the result of
DMARC processing. Captured information is used to build feedback for
Domain Owner consumption. This is not necessary if the Domain Owner
has not requested aggregate reports, i.e., no "rua" tag was found in
the policy record.
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B.3.2. Real-time Feedback Processing
If the DMARC record for the Author Domain of the message under
processing requests [AFRF]-based reporting, then the Mail Receiver
can supply an AFRF report for a message that does not pass all
underlying DMARC authentication checks. In other words, if any
DMARC-supporting authentication checks fail, an AFRF report should be
generated and sent to the reporting address found in the Author
Domain's DMARC record.
B.4. Utilization of Aggregate Feedback example
Aggregate feedback is consumed by Domain Owners to verify the Domain
Owners understanding of how the Domain Owner's Domain is being
processed by the Mail Receiver. Aggregate reporting data on emails
that pass all DMARC-supporting authentication checks is used by
Domain Owners to verify that authentication practices remain
accurate. For example, if a third party is sending on behalf of a
Domain Owner, the Domain Owner can use aggregate report data to
verify ongoing authentication practices of the third party.
Data on email that only partially passes underlying authentication
checks provides visibility into problems that need to be addressed by
the Domain Owner. For example, if either SPF or DKIM fail to pass,
the Domain Owner is provided with enough information to either
directly correct the problem or to understand where authentication-
breaking changes are being introduced in the email transmission path.
If authentication-breaking changes due to email transmission path
cannot be directly corrected, then the Domain Owner at least
maintains an understanding of the effect of DMARC-based policies upon
the Domain Owner's email.
Data on email that fails all underlying authentication checks
provides baseline visibility on how the Domain Owner's Domain is
being received at the Mail Receiver. Based on this visibility, the
Domain Owner can begin deployment of authentication technologies
across uncovered email sources. Additionally, the Domain Owner may
come to an understanding of how its Domain is being misused.
B.5. mailto Transport example
A DMARC record can contain a "mailto" reporting address, such as:
mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com
A sample aggregate report from the Mail Receiver at
mail.receiver.example follows:
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DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=mail.receiver.example; ...
From: dmarc-reporting@mail.receiver.example
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: dmarc-feedback@example.com
Subject: Report Domain: example.com
Submitter: mail.receiver.example
Report-ID: <2002.02.15.1>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00"
Content-Language: en-us
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
This is an aggregate report from mail.receiver.example.
------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00
Content-Type: application/gzip
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="mail.receiver.example!example.com!
1013662812!1013749130.gz"
<gzipped content of report>
------=_NextPart_000_024E_01CC9B0A.AFE54C00--
Not shown in the above example is that the Mail Receiver's feedback
should be authenticated using SPF. Also, the value of the "filename"
MIME parameter is wrapped for printing in this specification but
would normally appear as one continuous string.
B.6. https Transport example
A DMARC record can contain an "https" reporting address, such as:
https://feedback.example.com/dmarc-feedback-submissions
A sample aggregate report from the Mail Receiver at
mail.receiver.example, being posted per the above URL via an
established secure HTTP (https) connection, might look like this:
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POST /dmarc-feedback-submissions HTTP/1.1
Host: feedback.example.com
Subject: Report Domain: example.com
Submitter: mail.receiver.example
Report-ID: <2002.02.15.1>
Content-Type: application/gzip
Content-Length: 19191
<gzipped content of report here>
Appendix C. DMARC XML Schema
The following is the proposed initial schema for producing XML
formatted aggregate reports as described in this memo.
NOTE: Per the definition of XML, unless otherwise specified in the
schema below, the minOccurs and maxOccurs values for each element is
set to 1.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="http://dmarc.org/dmarc-xml/0.1">
<!-- The time range in UTC covered by messages in this report,
specified in seconds since epoch. -->
<xs:complexType name="DateRangeType">
<xs:all>
<xs:element name="begin" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="end" type="xs:integer"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Report generator metadata -->
<xs:complexType name="ReportMetadataType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="org_name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="email" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="extra_contact_info" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="report_id" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="date_range" type="DateRangeType"/>
<xs:element name="error" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Alignment mode (relaxed or strict) for DKIM and
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SPF. -->
<xs:simpleType name="AlignmentType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="r"/>
<xs:enumeration value="s"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- The policy actions specified by p and sp in the
DMARC record. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DispositionType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="none"/>
<xs:enumeration value="quarantine"/>
<xs:enumeration value="reject"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- The DMARC policy that applied to the messages in
this report. -->
<xs:complexType name="PolicyPublishedType">
<xs:all>
<!-- The domain at which the DMARC record was found. -->
<xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string"/>
<!-- The DKIM alignment mode. -->
<xs:element name="adkim" type="AlignmentType"/>
<!-- The SPF alignment mode. -->
<xs:element name="aspf" type="AlignmentType"/>
<!-- The policy to apply to messages from the domain. -->
<xs:element name="p" type="DispositionType"/>
<!-- The policy to apply to messages from subdomains. -->
<xs:element name="sp" type="DispositionType"/>
<!-- The percent of messages to which policy applies. -->
<xs:element name="pct" type="xs:integer"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- The DMARC-aligned authentication result. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DMARCResultType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
<xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- Reasons that may affect DMARC disposition or execution
thereof. -->
<xs:simpleType name="PolicyOverrideType">
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<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="forwarded"/>
<xs:enumeration value="sampled_out"/>
<xs:enumeration value="trusted_forwarder"/>
<xs:enumeration value="mailing_list"/>
<xs:enumeration value="local_policy"/>
<xs:enumeration value="other"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- How do we allow report generators to include new
classes of override reasons if they want to be more
specific than "other"? -->
<xs:complexType name="PolicyOverrideReason">
<xs:all>
<xs:element name="type" type="PolicyOverrideType"/>
<xs:element name="comment" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Taking into account everything else in the record,
the results of applying DMARC. -->
<xs:complexType name="PolicyEvaluatedType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="disposition" type="DispositionType"/>
<xs:element name="dkim" type="DMARCResultType"/>
<xs:element name="spf" type="DMARCResultType"/>
<xs:element name="reason" type="PolicyOverrideReason"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Credit to Roger L. Costello for IPv4 regex
http://mailman.ic.ac.uk/pipermail/xml-dev/1999-December/
018018.html -->
<!-- Credit to java2s.com for IPv6 regex
http://www.java2s.com/Code/XML/XML-Schema/
IPv6addressesareeasiertodescribeusingasimpleregex.htm -->
<xs:simpleType name="IPAddress">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:pattern value="((1?[0-9]?[0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5]).){3}
(1?[0-9]?[0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])|
([A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}:){7}[A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="RowType">
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<xs:all>
<!-- The connecting IP. -->
<xs:element name="source_ip" type="IPAddress"/>
<!-- The number of matching messages -->
<xs:element name="count" type="xs:integer"/>
<!-- The DMARC disposition applying to matching
messages. -->
<xs:element name="policy_evaluated"
type="PolicyEvaluatedType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="IdentifierType">
<xs:all>
<!-- The envelope recipient domain. -->
<xs:element name="envelope_to" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="0"/>
<!-- The envelope from domain. -->
<xs:element name="envelope_from" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The payload From domain. -->
<xs:element name="header_from" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- DKIM verification result, according to RFC 5451
Section 2.4.1. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DKIMResultType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="none"/>
<xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
<xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
<xs:enumeration value="policy"/>
<xs:enumeration value="neutral"/>
<xs:enumeration value="temperror"/>
<xs:enumeration value="permerror"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="DKIMAuthResultType">
<xs:all>
<!-- The d= parameter in the signature -->
<xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The s= parameter in the signature -->
<xs:element name="selector" type="xs:string"
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minOccurs="0"/>
<!-- The DKIM verification result -->
<xs:element name="result" type="DKIMResultType"
minOccurs="1"/>
<!-- Any extra information (e.g., from
Authentication-Results -->
<xs:element name="human_result" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- SPF domain scope -->
<xs:simpleType name="SPFDomainScope">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="helo"/>
<xs:enumeration value="mfrom"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- SPF result -->
<xs:simpleType name="SPFResultType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="none"/>
<xs:enumeration value="neutral"/>
<xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
<xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
<xs:enumeration value="softfail"/>
<!-- "TempError" commonly implemented as "unknown" -->
<xs:enumeration value="temperror"/>
<!-- "PermError" commonly implemented as "error" -->
<xs:enumeration value="permerror"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="SPFAuthResultType">
<xs:all>
<!-- The checked domain. -->
<xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string" minOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The scope of the checked domain. -->
<xs:element name="scope" type="SPFDomainScope" minOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The SPF verification result -->
<xs:element name="result" type="SPFResultType"
minOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- This element contains DKIM and SPF results, uninterpreted
with respect to DMARC. -->
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<xs:complexType name="AuthResultType">
<xs:sequence>
<!-- There may be no DKIM signatures, or multiple DKIM
signatures. -->
<xs:element name="dkim" type="DKIMAuthResultType"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<!-- There will always be at least one SPF result. -->
<xs:element name="spf" type="SPFAuthResultType" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- This element contains all the authentication results used
to evaluate the DMARC disposition for the given set of
messages. -->
<xs:complexType name="RecordType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="row" type="RowType"/>
<xs:element name="identifiers" type="IdentifierType"/>
<xs:element name="auth_results" type="AuthResultType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Parent -->
<xs:element name="feedback">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="version"
type="xs:decimal"/>
<xs:element name="report_metadata"
type="ReportMetadataType"/>
<xs:element name="policy_published"
type="PolicyPublishedType"/>
<xs:element name="record" type="RecordType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
Descriptions of the PolicyOverrideTypes:
forwarded: Message was relayed via a known forwarder, or local
heuristics identified the message as likely having been forwarded.
There is no expectation that authentication would pass.
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local_policy: The Mail Receiver's local policy exempted the message
from being subjected to the Domain Owner's requested policy
action.
mailing_list: Local heuristics determined that the message arrived
via a mailing list, and thus authentication of the original
message was not expected to succeed.
other: Some policy exception not covered by the other entries in
this list occurred. Additional detail can be found in the
PolicyOverrideReason's "comment" field.
sampled_out: Message was exempted from application of policy by the
"pct" setting in the DMARC policy record.
trusted_forwarder: Message authentication failure was anticipated by
other evidence linking the message to a locally-maintained list of
known and trusted forwarders.
The "version" for reports generated per this specification MUST be
the value 1.0.
Appendix D. Public Discussion
Public discussion of the DMARC proposal documents is taking place on
the dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org mailing list. Subscription is available
at http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss.
Appendix E. Acknowledgements
DMARC and the version of this document submitted to the IETF were the
result of lengthy efforts by an informal industry consortium:
DMARC.org [1]. Participating companies included: Agari, American
Greetings, AOL, Bank of America, Cloudmark, Comcast, Facebook,
Fidelity Investments, Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company, LinkedIn,
Microsoft, Netease, Paypal, ReturnPath, Trusted Domain Project, and
Yahoo!. Although the number of contributors and supporters are too
numerous to mention, notable individual contributions were made by J.
Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim Draegen,
Murray Kucherawy, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, Brett McDowell, and
Paul Midgen. The contributors would also like to recognize the
invaluable input and guidance that was provided by J.D. Falk.
Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by J.
Gomez, Eliot Lear, S. Moonesamy, Henry Timmes, (other names)
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Authors' Addresses
Murray S. Kucherawy (editor)
Email: superuser@gmail.com
Elizabeth Zwicky (editor)
Yahoo!
Email: zwicky@yahoo-inc.com
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