IP Security Maintenance and Extensions T. Kivinen
(ipsecme) INSIDE Secure
Internet-Draft December 9, 2013
Updates: RFC 5996 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: June 12, 2014
Signature Authentication in IKEv2
draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-04.txt
Abstract
The Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) protocol has limited
support for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
The current version only includes support for three Elliptic Curve
groups, and there is fixed hash algorithm tied to each curve. This
document generalizes the IKEv2 signature support so it can support
any signature method supported by the PKIX and also adds signature
hash algorithm negotiation. This is generic mechanism, and is not
limited to ECDSA, but can also be used with other signature
algorithms.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 12, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Authentication Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Hash Algorithm Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Selecting Public Key Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Commonly used ASN.1 objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. PKCS#1 1.5 RSA Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1.1. sha1WithRSAEncryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1.2. sha256WithRSAEncryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1.3. sha384WithRSAEncryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1.4. sha512WithRSAEncryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2. DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2.1. dsa-with-sha1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2.2. dsa-with-sha256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3. ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3.1. ecdsa-with-sha1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3.2. ecdsa-with-sha256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.3.3. ecdsa-with-sha384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.3.4. ecdsa-with-sha512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.4. RSASSA-PSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.4.1. RSASSA-PSS with empty parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.4.2. RSASSA-PSS with default parameters . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
1. Introduction
This document adds new IKEv2 ([RFC5996]) authentication method to
support all kinds of signature methods. The current signature based
authentication methods in the IKEv2 are per algorithm, i.e. there is
one for RSA Digital signatures, one for DSS Digital Signatures (using
SHA-1) and three for different ECDSA curves each tied to exactly one
hash algorithm. This design starts to be cumbersome when more ECDSA
groups are added, as each of them would require new authentication
method and as with ECDSA there is no way to extract the hash
algorithm from the signature, each ECDSA algorithm would need to come
with fixed hash algorithm tied to it.
With the SHA-3 definitions coming out, it is seen that it might be
possible that in the future the signature methods are used with SHA-3
also, not only SHA-2. This means new mechanism for negotiating the
hash algorithm for the signature algorithms is needed.
The RSA Digital Signatures format in the IKEv2 is specified to use
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, but there has been some discussions that newer
padding methods should be preferred instead of PKCS #1 version 1.5
(See section 5 of [RFC4055]). The DSS Digital Signatures format in
the IKEv2 is specified to always use SHA-1, which limits the security
of that, meaning there is no point of using long keys with it.
This documents specifies two things, one is one new authentication
method, which includes the enough information inside the
Authentication payload data that the signature hash algorithm can be
extracted from there (see Section 3). The another thing is to add
indication of supported signature hash algorithms by the peer (see
Section 4). This allows peer to know which hash algorithms are
supported by the other end and use one of them (provided one is
allowed by policy). There is no need to actually negotiate one
common hash algorithm, as different hash algorithms can be used in
different directions if needed.
The new digital signature method needs to be flexible enough to
include all current signature methods (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, RSASSA-PSS,
etc), and also allow adding new things in the future (ECGDSA, ElGamal
etc). For this the signature algorithm is specified in the same way
as the PKIX ([RFC5280]) specifies the signature of the Certificate,
i.e. there is simple ASN.1 object before the actual signature data.
This ASN.1 object contains the OID specifying the algorithm, and
associated parameters to it. In normal case the IKEv2
implementations supports fixed amount of signature methods, with
commonly used parameters, so it is acceptable for the implementation
to just treat this ASN.1 object as binary blob which is compared
against the known values, or the implementation can parse the ASN.1
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
and extract information from there.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Authentication Payload
This document specifies new "Digital Signature" authentication
method. This method can be used with any types of signatures. As
the authentication methods are not negotiated in the IKEv2, the peer
is only allowed to use this authentication method if the
SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS Notify Payload has been sent and received.
In this newly defined authentication method, the Authentication Data
field inside the Authentication Payload does not include only the
signature value, but instead the signature value is prefixed with the
ASN.1 object containing the algorithm used to generate the signature.
The ASN.1 object contains the algorithm identification OID, and this
OID identifies both the signature algorithm and the hash used when
calculating the signature. In addition to the OID there is optional
parameters which might be needed for algorithms like RSASSA-PSS.
To make implementations easier, the ASN.1 object is prefixed by the
8-bit length field. This length field allows simple implementations
to be able to know the length of the ASN.1 without the need to parse
it, so they can use it as binary blob which is compared against the
known signature algorithm ASN.1 objects, i.e. they do not need to be
able to parse or generate ASN.1 objects. See Appendix A for commonly
used ASN.1 objects.
The ASN.1 used here are the same ASN.1 which is used in the
AlgorithmIdentifier of the PKIX (Section 4.1.1.2 of [RFC5280])
encoded using distinguished encoding rules (DER) [CCITT.X690.2002].
The algorithm OID inside the ASN.1 specifies the signature algorithm
and the hash function, which are needed for signature verification.
The EC curve is always known by the peer because it needs to have the
certificate or the public key of the other end before it can do
signature verification and public key specifies the curve.
Currently only the RSASSA-PSS uses the parameters, for all others the
parameters is either NULL or missing. Note, that for some algorithms
there is two possible ASN.1 encoding possible, one with parameters
being NULL and others where the whole parameters is omitted. This is
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
because some of those algorithms are specified that way. When
encoding the ASN.1 implementations should use the preferred way, i.e.
if the algorithm specification says "preferredPresent" then parameter
object needs to be there (i.e. it will be NULL if no parameters is
specified), and if it says "preferredAbsent", then the whole
parameters object is missing.
The Authentication payload is defined in IKEv2 as follows:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Method | RESERVED |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Authentication Data ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Authentication Payload Format.
o Auth Method (1 octet) - Specifies the method of authentication
used.
Mechanism Value
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Digital Signature <TBD>
Computed as specified in Section 2.15 of RFC5996 using a
private key associated with the public key sent in certificate
payload, and using one of the hash algorithms sent by the other
end in the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify payload. If both
ends send and receive SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS and signature
authentication is to be used, then this method MUST be used.
The Authentication Data field has bit different format than in
other Authentication methods (see below).
o Authentication Data (variable length) - see Section 2.15 of
RFC5996. For "Digital Signature" format the Authentication data
contains special format as follows:
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ASN.1 Length | AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object continuing ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Signature Value ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Authentication Data Format.
Where the ASN.1 Length is the length of the ASN.1 encoded
AlgorithmIdentifier object, and after that is the actual
AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object, followed by the actual signature
value. There is no padding between ASN.1 object and signature
value. For the hash truncation the method of X9.62 ([X9.62]) MUST
be used.
4. Hash Algorithm Notification
The supported hash algorithms that can be used for the signature
algorithms are now indicated with new SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS
Notification Payload sent inside the IKE_SA_INIT exchange. This
notification also indicates the support of the new signature
algorithm method, i.e. sending this notification tells that new
"Digital Signature" authentication method is supported and that
following hash functions are supported by sending peer. Both ends
sends their list of supported hash-algorithms and when calculating
signature a peer MUST pick one algorithm sent by the other peer.
Note, that different algorithms can be used in different directions.
The algorithm OID matching selected hash algorithm (and signature
algorithm) used when calculating the signature is sent inside the
Authentication Data field of the Authentication Payload.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol ID | SPI Size | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Security Parameter Index (SPI) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Notification Data ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Notify Payload Format.
Protocol ID is 0, SPI Size 0, and Notify Message Type <TBD from
status types>. The Notification Data value contains list of 16-bit
hash algorithm identifiers from the newly created Hash Algorithm
Identifiers for the IKEv2 IANA registry.
5. Selecting Public Key Algorithm
This specification does not provide a way for the peers to indicate
the public / private key pair types they have. I.e. how can the
responder select public / private key pair type that the initiator
supports. There is already several ways this information can be
found in common cases.
One of the ways to find out which key the initiator wants the
responder to use is to indicate that in the IDr payload of the
IKE_AUTH request of the initiator. I.e initiator indicates that it
wants the responder to use certain public / private key pair by
sending IDr which indicates that information. This means the
responder needs to have different identities configured and each of
those identities needs to be tied up to certain public / private key
(or key type).
Another way to get this information is from the Certificate Request
payload sent by the initiator. For example if the initiator
indicates in his Certificate Request payload that it trust CA which
is signed by the ECDSA key, that will also indicate it can be process
ECDSA signatures, thus responder can safely use ECDSA keys when
authenticating himself.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
Responder can also check the key type used by the initiator, and use
same key type than the initiator used. This does not work in case
the initiator is using shared secret or EAP authentication, as in
that case it is not using public key. If initiator is using public
key authentication himself this is most likely the best way for the
responder to find the type the initiator supports.
In case the initiator uses a public key type that the responder will
not support, the responder will reply with AUTHENTICATION_FAILED
error. If initiator has multiple different keys it can try different
key (and perhaps different key type) until it finds key that the
other end accepts. Initiator can also use the Certificate Request
payload sent by the responder to help deciding which public key
should be tried. In normal case if initiator has multiple public
keys, there is configuration that will select one of those for each
connection, so the proper key is know by configuration.
6. Security Considerations
The "Recommendations for Key Management" ([NIST800-57]) table 2
combined with table 3 gives recommendations for how to select
suitable hash functions for the signature.
This new digital signature method does not tie the EC curve to the
specific hash function, which was done in the old IKEv2 ECDSA
methods. This means it is possible to use 512-bit EC curve with
SHA1, i.e. this allows mixing different security levels. This means
that the security of the authentication method is the security of the
weakest of components (signature algorithm, hash algorithm, curve).
This might make the security analysis of the system bit more complex.
Note, that this kind of mixing of the security can be disallowed by
the policy.
The hash algorithm registry does not include MD5 as supported hash
algorithm, as it is not considered safe enough for signature use
([WY05]).
The current IKEv2 uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which do have some problems
([KA08], [ME01]) and does not allow using newer padding methods like
RSASSA-PSS. This new method allows using other padding methods.
The current IKEv2 only allows using normal DSA with SHA-1, which
means the security of the regular DSA is limited to the security of
SHA-1. This new methods allows using longer keys and longer hashes
with DSA.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
7. IANA Considerations
This document creates new IANA registry for IKEv2 Hash Algorithms.
Changes and additions to this registry is by expert review.
The initial values of this registry is:
Hash Algorithm Value
-------------- -----
RESERVED 0
SHA1 1
SHA2-256 2
SHA2-384 3
SHA2-512 4
MD5 is not included to the hash algorithm list as it is not
considered safe enough for signature hash uses.
Values 5-1023 are reserved to IANA. Values 1024-65535 are for
private use among mutually consenting parties.
This specification also allocates one new IKEv2 Notify Message Types
- Status Types value for the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS, and adds new
value "Digital Signature" to the IKEv2 Authentication Method
registry.
8. Acknowledgements
Most of this work was based on the work done in the IPsecME design
team for the ECDSA. The design team members were: Dan Harking,
Johannes Merkle, Tero Kivinen, David McGrew, and Yoav Nir.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
RFC 5996, September 2010.
9.2. Informative References
[CCITT.X690.2002]
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative
Committee, "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of basic
encoding Rules (BER), Canonical encoding rules (CER) and
Distinguished encoding rules (DER)", CCITT Recommendation
X.690, July 2002.
[KA08] Kuehn, U., Pyshkin, A., Tews, E., and R. Weinmann,
"Variants of Bleichenbacher's Low-Exponent Attack on
PKCS#1 RSA Signatures", Proc. Sicherheit 2008 pp.97-109.
[ME01] Menezes, A., "Evaluation of Security Level of
Cryptography: RSA-OAEP, RSA-PSS, RSA Signature",
December 2001.
[NIST800-57]
Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
"Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57,
March 2007.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[RFC5758] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
RFC 5758, January 2010.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
June 2010.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
[WY05] Wang, X. and H. Yu, "How to break MD5 and other hash
functions", Proceedings of EuroCrypt 2005, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science Vol. 3494, 2005.
[X9.62] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANSI X9.62, November 2005.
Appendix A. Commonly used ASN.1 objects
This section lists commonly used ASN.1 objects in binary form. This
section is not-normative, and these values should only be used as
examples, i.e. if this and the actual specification of the algorithm
ASN.1 object is different the actual format specified in the actual
specification needs to be used. These values are taken from the New
ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
([RFC5912]).
A.1. PKCS#1 1.5 RSA Encryption
These algorithm identifiers here include several different ASN.1
objects with different hash algorithms. In this document we only
include the commonly used ones i.e. the one using SHA-1, or SHA-2 as
hash function. Some of those other algorithms (MD2, MD5) specified
for this are not safe enough to be used as signature hash algorithm,
and some are omitted as there is no hash algorithm specified in the
our IANA registry for them. Note, that there is no parameters in any
of these, but all specified here needs to have NULL parameters
present in the ASN.1.
See Algorithms and Identifiers for PKIX Profile ([RFC3279]) and
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for PKIX
Profile ([RFC4055]) for more information.
A.1.1. sha1WithRSAEncryption
sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 }
Parameters are required, and they must be NULL.
Name = sha1WithRSAEncryption, oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
Length = 17
0000: 300f 300d 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0505
0010: 00
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
A.1.2. sha256WithRSAEncryption
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
Parameters are required, and they must be NULL.
Name = sha256WithRSAEncryption, oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
Length = 17
0000: 300f 300d 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0b05
0010: 00
A.1.3. sha384WithRSAEncryption
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
Parameters are required, and they must be NULL.
Name = sha384WithRSAEncryption, oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12
Length = 17
0000: 300f 300d 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0c05
0010: 00
A.1.4. sha512WithRSAEncryption
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
Parameters are required, and they must be NULL.
Name = sha512WithRSAEncryption, oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13
Length = 17
0000: 300f 300d 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0d05
0010: 00
A.2. DSA
With different DSA algorithms the parameters are always omitted.
Again we omit dsa-with-sha224 as there is no hash algorithm in our
IANA registry for it.
See Algorithms and Identifiers for PKIX Profile ([RFC3279]) and PKIX
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA ([RFC5758]
for more information.
A.2.1. dsa-with-sha1
dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 }
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
Parameters are absent.
Name = dsa-with-sha1, oid = 1.2.840.10040.4.3
Length = 13
0000: 300b 3009 0607 2a86 48ce 3804 03
A.2.2. dsa-with-sha256
dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)
id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2 }
Parameters are absent.
Name = dsa-with-sha256, oid = 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.2
Length = 15
0000: 300d 300b 0609 6086 4801 6503 0403 02
A.3. ECDSA
With different ECDSA algorithms the parameters are always omitted.
Again we omit ecdsa-with-sha224 as there is no hash algorithm in our
IANA registry for it.
See Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information
([RFC5480]), Algorithms and Identifiers for PKIX Profile ([RFC3279])
and PKIX Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA
([RFC5758] for more information.
A.3.1. ecdsa-with-sha1
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 }
Parameters are absent.
Name = ecdsa-with-sha1, oid = 1.2.840.10045.4.1
Length = 13
0000: 300b 3009 0607 2a86 48ce 3d04 01
A.3.2. ecdsa-with-sha256
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
Parameters are absent.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
Name = ecdsa-with-sha256, oid = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2
Length = 14
0000: 300c 300a 0608 2a86 48ce 3d04 0302
A.3.3. ecdsa-with-sha384
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
Parameters are absent.
Name = ecdsa-with-sha384, oid = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3
Length = 14
0000: 300c 300a 0608 2a86 48ce 3d04 0303
A.3.4. ecdsa-with-sha512
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
Parameters are absent.
Name = ecdsa-with-sha512, oid = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4
Length = 14
0000: 300c 300a 0608 2a86 48ce 3d04 0304
A.4. RSASSA-PSS
With the RSASSA-PSS the algorithm object identifier is always id-
RSASSA-PSS, but the hash function is taken from the parameters, and
it is required. See [RFC4055] for more information.
A.4.1. RSASSA-PSS with empty parameters
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
Parameters are empty, but the ASN.1 part of the sequence must be
there. This means default parameters are used (same as the next
example).
Name = RSASSA-PSS with empty parameters, oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10
Length = 17
0000: 300f 300d 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0a30
0010: 00
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
A.4.2. RSASSA-PSS with default parameters
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
Here the parameters are present, and contains the default parameters,
i.e. SHA-1, mgf1SHA1, saltlength of 20, trailerfield of 1.
0000 : SEQUENCE
0002 : SEQUENCE
0004 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER RSASSA-PSS (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)
000f : SEQUENCE
0011 : CONTEXT 0
0013 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER Sha-1 (1.3.14.3.2.26)
001a : NULL
001c : CONTEXT 1
001e : OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-mgf1 ( 1.2.840.113549.1.1.8)
0029 : SEQUENCE
002b : OBJECT IDENTIFIER Sha-1 (1.3.14.3.2.26)
0032 : NULL
0034 : CONTEXT 2 (1 bytes)
0036 : INTEGER 20 (0x14)
0037 : CONTEXT 3 (1 bytes)
0039 : INTEGER 01 (0x01)
Name = RSASSA-PSS with default parameters,
oid = 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10
Length = 58
0000: 3038 3036 0609 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0a30
0010: 29a0 0906 052b 0e03 021a 0500 a116 0609
0020: 2a86 4886 f70d 0101 0830 0906 052b 0e03
0030: 021a 0500 8201 1483 0101
Appendix B. Examples
XXX Examples missing
XXX Most likely include examples for sha1WithRSAEncryption and dsa-
with-sha256 or something like that. I do not think we need all
possible signature examples.
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Signature Authentication in IKEv2 December 2013
Author's Address
Tero Kivinen
INSIDE Secure
Eerikinkatu 28
HELSINKI FI-00180
FI
Email: kivinen@iki.fi
Kivinen Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 16]