Camellia Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
draft-kanno-tls-camellia-gcm-00

Abstract

This document describes the use of the Camellia in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) authenticated encryption operation. This document defines TLS cipher suites that use Camellia-GCM with RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).

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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Terminology
2.  Camellia-GCM Cipher Suites
3.  Security Considerations
4.  IANA Considerations
5.  Acknowledgements
6.  References
    6.1.  Normative References
    6.2.  Informative References
§  Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

This document describes the use of Camellia in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [5] (Dworkin, M., “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication,” April 2006.) (Camellia-GCM) with various key exchange mechanisms as a cipher suite for TLS 1.2 [4] (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.) or greater. Camellia-GCM is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher ( as defined in TLS 1.2 ) providing both confidentiality and data origin authentication. The following sections define cipher suites based on RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchanges. Also, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based cipher suites are defined in this document.

The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [2] (Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, “A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm,” April 2004.).

1.1.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).

2.  Camellia-GCM Cipher Suites

The following cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2 with Camellia in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) :

      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD}

Camellia-GCM cipher suites are defined in Section 3 of RFC5288 [3] (Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, “AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS,” August 2008.) and Section 3.2 of RFC5289 [6] (Rescorla, E., “TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM),” August 2008.) as well.

3.  Security Considerations

At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for Camellia. And no security problem has been found on Camellia (see [7] (, “The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption),” .), [8] (Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), “Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees,” .), and [9] (Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, “New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128,” November 2009.)).

For security considerations of Camellia-GCM for TLS, this document refers to Section 6 of RFC5288 [3] (Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, “AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS,” August 2008.) and Section 4 of RFC5289 [6] (Rescorla, E., “TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM),” August 2008.).

4.  IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate (has allocated) the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry:

      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIAy_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD}

5.  Acknowledgements

This document unabashedly referred to RFC5288 [3] (Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, “AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS,” August 2008.) and RFC5289 [6] (Rescorla, E., “TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM),” August 2008.).

6.  References

6.1. Normative References

6.2. Informative References

Authors' Addresses