Mboned J. Holland
Internet-Draft K. Rose
Intended status: Experimental Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Expires: October 28, 2019 April 26, 2019
Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-02
Abstract
This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
AMBI allows each receiver of a stream of multicast packets to check
the integrity of the contents of each packet in the data stream.
AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable manifests for
the data packets, over out-of-band communication channels.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Comparison with TESLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Packet Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. RTP Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. SRTP Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.4. UDP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Anchor Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2. DNS-based Anchor URI Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.3. Anchor Message YANG model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.4. Example Anchor Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3. Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2. Manifest Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. Packet Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.
The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
[RFC4082], and TESLA in SRTP [RFC4383], and TESLA with ALC and NORM
[RFC5776] present excellent overviews of the challenges unique to
multicast authentication, briefly summarized here:
o A MAC based on a symmetric shared secret cannot be used because
each packet has multiple receivers that do not trust each other.
o Asymmetric per-packet signatures can handle only very low bit-
rates because of the computational overhead.
o An asymmetric signature of a larger message comprising multiple
packets requires reliable receipt of all such packets, something
that cannot be guaranteed in a timely manner even for protocols
that do provide reliable delivery, and the retransmission of which
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may anyway exceed the useful lifetime for data formats that can
otherwise tolerate some degree of loss.
Aymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI) specifies a method for
receivers or middle boxes to cryptographically authenticate and
verify the integrity of a stream of packets, by communicating packet
"manifests" (described in Section 2.3) via an out-of-band
communication channel that provides authentication and verifiable
integrity.
Each manifest contains cryptographic hashes of packet payloads
corresponding to specific packets in the authenticated data stream.
Each manifest MUST be delivered in a manner that provides
cryptographic integrity of the manifest. For example, TLS or IPSec
may be used to deliver a stream of manifests with unicast from a
trusted sender to many receivers, or another mechanism that provides
authentication for a multicast stream, such as a protocol which signs
each packet, could be used to provide authentication for the
manifests.
Upon successful verification of the contents of a manifest and
receipt of any subset of the corresponding data packets, the receiver
has proof of the integrity of the contents of the data packets listed
in the manifest.
An "anchor message", described in Section 2.2, provides the link
between an authenticated data stream and the out-of-band channel of
manifests that authenticates it. This document defines a DNS-based
method for a sender to advertise a URI that can be used to retrieve
the anchor message over a secure transport. The anchor message MAY
also be provided by other out-of-band mechanisms that provide
integrity guarantees for the anchor message. Describing alternate
methods is out of scope for this document.
Authenticating the integrity of the data packets depends on:
o authentication of the anchor message that provides the linkage
between the manifest channel and the data stream; and
o the secrecy and cryptographic strength of private keys used for
signing manifests, or the authentication of the secure channels
used for transmitting manifests; and
o the difficulty of generating a collision for the packet hashes in
the manifest.
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1.1. Comparison with TESLA
AMBI and TESLA [RFC4082] and [RFC5776] attempt to achieve a similar
goal of authenticating the integrity of streams of multicast packets.
AMBI imposes a higher overhead, as measured in the amount of extra
data required, than TESLA imposes. In exchange, AMBI provides non-
repudiation (which TESLA does not), and relaxes the requirement for
establishing an upper bound on clock synchronization between sender
and receiver.
This tradeoff enables new capabilities for AMBI, relative to TESLA.
In particular, when receiving multicast traffic from an untrusted
transit network, AMBI can be used by a middle box to authenticate
packets from a trusted source before forwarding traffic through the
network, and the receiver also can separately authenticate the
packets. (This use case is not possible with TESLA because the data
packets can't be authenticated until a key is disclosed, so either
the middlebox has to forward data packets without first
authenticating so that the receiver has them prior to key disclosure,
or the middlebox has to hold packets until the key is disclosed, at
which point the receiver can no longer establish their authenticity.)
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Protocol Specification
2.1. Packet Identifiers
2.1.1. Overview
Packet identifiers are a sequence number contained within the
authenticated payload of the packet. This sequence number is used
inside a manifest to associate each packet hash with a specific
packet. Each authenticated packet MUST contain a packet identifier.
See Section 4.1 for a discussion of the security implications.
This document defines a new UDP option in Section 2.1.4 for use as a
packet identifier.
Some multicast-capable transport protocols have a sequence number
embedded in data packets in the protocol. The sequence numbers in
these protocols MAY be used instead of the new UDP option, to avoid
introducing extra overhead in the authenticated data packets.
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In Section 2.1.2, Section 2.1.3, and Section 2.1.4, this document
defines some sample ways to specify packet identifiers based on such
sequence numbers embedded in existing protocols.
Other appropriate sequence number systems may exist, such as the
anti-replay Sequence Number field in Section 3.1 of [RFC6584], when
NORM or FLUTE operates with an authentication profile that uses it
(however, since that example already provides authentication, it is
not added as an option in this document). The AMBI anchor message
format can be extended in future documents to support those or other
suitable schemes by adding values to the registry defined in
Section 3.
In some deployments, in contrast to using the new UDP option, the
approach of using an existing sequence number may carry a benefit
because it requires no change to the stream of packets being
authenticated, enabling interoperability with existing unmodified
sending and receiving applications.
2.1.2. RTP Sequence Number
Sequence number from Section 5.1 of [RFC3550].
TBD: discussion of security consequences of using 16 bits-recommend a
bigger hash in manifests for this case?
2.1.3. SRTP Sequence Number
Packet Index from Section 3.3.1 of [RFC3711].
2.1.4. UDP Option
Define a new UDP option [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options] (TBD2).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| UDP Kind=TBD2 | Length=6 | 32-bit sequence number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.2. Anchor Message
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2.2.1. Overview
An anchor message provides the information that makes it possible to
associate the manifests with the data packets they authenticate. ID
values that appear as text integers in the anchor message also appear
in the manifest binary data, with the anchor message providing
context on how to interpret the values.
An anchor message MAY be discovered and transmitted by any means
which provides adequate source authentication and data integrity to
meet the security needs of the receiver.
In order to support middle-box authentication, it is RECOMMENDED that
senders arrange to distribute anchor messages according to the method
outlined in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.2. DNS-based Anchor URI Bootstrap
This document defines a new DNS resource record (RR) to communicate a
URI for an AMBI anchor message to remote receivers of the sender's
traffic, so they can use it to authenticate traffic from the sender.
The sender is the owner of the RR, and configures the zone so that it
contains an RR that provides a URI that can provide secure delivery
of the an anchor message appropriate to authenticate all the sender's
multicast traffic.
This mechanism only works for source-specific multicast (SSM)
channels. The source address of the (S,G) is reversed and used as an
index into one of the reverse mapping trees (in-addr.arpa for IPv4,
as described in Section 3.5 of [RFC1035], or ip6.arpa for IPv6, as
described in Section 2.5 of [RFC3596]).
When a middle box or receiver processes a join for a new source, if
it is configured to perform authentication on SSM multicast channels
it can forward, the middle box can discover a URI to obtain the
anchor message by issuing a DNS request for the AMBI record of the
reverse IP of the source of the (S,G), then fetch the contents of the
resulting URI, validate it, and use it to authenticate traffic from
the source.
TBD: consider breaking up anchor message to avoid large, frequently
changing anchors for sources with many groups.
TBD: consider graceful rollover for anchors, instead of synchronized
update of anchor hash.
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2.2.3. Anchor Message YANG model
The anchor message is composed of a YANG instance object that
validates against the YANG model below.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ambi-anchor.yang"
module ietf-ambi-anchor {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ambi-anchor";
prefix "ambi";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix "yang";
reference "RFC6991 Section 3";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
reference "RFC6991 Section 4";
}
import ietf-routing-types {
prefix "rt-types";
reference "RFC8294";
}
organization "IETF";
contact
"Author: Jake Holland
<mailto:jholland@akamai.com>
Author: Kyle Rose
<mailto:krose@akamai.com>
";
description
"This module contains the definition for the AMBI anchor
message data type.
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi, [TBD: change]
see the internet draft itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2018-06-27 {
description "Initial revision.";
reference
"";
}
/* TBD: copied some from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8177,
but the model doesn't seem to match what I want. is there another
I can import instead of making these here? Or a registry
to reference? */
identity crypto-hash {
description
"Base identity of cryptographic hash options. ";
}
identity sha-256 {
base crypto-hash;
description
"The SHA-256 algorithm.";
}
identity blake2b {
base crypto-hash;
description
"The BLAKE2b algorithm.";
}
identity crypto-signature {
description
"Base identity of cryptographic asymmetric signature
options.";
}
identity ed25519 {
base crypto-signature;
description
"The Ed25519 algorithm.";
}
identity rsa {
base crypto-signature;
description
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"The RSA algorithm.";
}
identity sequence-type {
description
"Base identity for sequence number type options.";
}
identity rtp {
base sequence-type;
description
"The sequence number from RTP.";
}
identity srtp {
base sequence-type;
description
"The sequence number from SRTP.";
}
identity udp {
base sequence-type;
description
"The sequence number from UDP.";
}
typedef key-identifier {
type uint16 {
range 1..65535;
}
description "Key identifier within a manifest";
}
typedef bitrate {
type string {
pattern '[1-9][0-9]*[GMK]?bps';
}
description "Bit-rate of a data stream";
}
typedef packetrate {
type string {
pattern '[1-9][0-9]*[GMK]?pps';
}
description "Packet rate of a data stream";
}
typedef manifest-transport {
type union {
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type leafref {
path "/anchor/data_stream/id";
}
type inet:uri;
}
description "Transport method for a manifest stream";
}
container anchor {
container self {
presence "An anchor message exists";
description
"Self-referential properties about the anchor message";
leaf uri {
type inet:uri;
mandatory true;
description
"The canonical URI for this anchor message.";
}
leaf version {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The version number for this anchor message.";
}
leaf hash_algorithm {
type identityref {
base crypto-hash;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm for the anchor message hash provided
in a manifest.";
}
leaf hash_bits {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The number of bits for the anchor's hash provided
in a manifest.";
}
leaf expires {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"The expiration time for this anchor message.";
}
}
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description "Anchor message for AMBI";
list public_key {
key id;
description "Public key for ALTI signatures.";
leaf id {
type key-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"The key identifier referenced in a manifest.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base crypto-signature;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The signature algorithm for use with this key.";
}
leaf signature_bits {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The length of the signature provided in manifests
signed with this key.";
}
leaf value {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The base64-encoded value of the public key.";
}
}
list data_stream {
key id;
unique "source destination port";
description "Stream of data packets to be authenticated";
leaf id {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The datastream_id referenced by a
manifest_stream.";
}
leaf source {
type inet:ip-address;
mandatory true;
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description
"The source IP address of the authenticated data
stream.";
}
leaf destination {
type rt-types:ip-multicast-group-address;
mandatory true;
description
"The destination group IP address of the
authenticated data stream.";
}
leaf port {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The destination UDP port of the authenticated data
stream.";
}
leaf max_bitrate {
type bitrate;
mandatory true;
description
"The maximum bitrate expected for this data
stream.";
}
leaf max_packetrate {
type packetrate;
mandatory true;
description
"The maximum packetrate expected for this data
stream.";
}
list authenticator {
key manifest_id;
description
"A manifest stream that authenticates this data";
leaf manifest_id {
type leafref {
path "/anchor/manifest_stream/id";
}
mandatory true;
description
"The ID of a manifest stream that provides
authentication for this data stream.";
}
}
}
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list manifest_stream {
key id;
description "Stream of manifests";
leaf id {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description "The Manifest ID referenced in a manifest.";
}
leaf transport {
type manifest-transport;
mandatory true;
description
"The ID of the data stream that carries this
manifest stream or a uri that provides a websocket
with the stream of manifests.";
}
leaf hash_algorithm {
type identityref {
base crypto-hash;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The hash algorithm for the packet hashes within
manifests in this stream.";
}
leaf hash_bits {
type uint16;
mandatory true;
description
"The number of bits of hash provided for packet
hashes.";
}
leaf sequence_type {
type identityref {
base sequence-type;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The linkage to the data packet sequence numbers in
the manifest.";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 1: Anchor Message YANG model
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2.2.4. Example Anchor Message
{
"ietf-ambi-anchor:anchor": {
"self": {
"uri": "https://example.com/ambi/anchor/example_1.json",
"version": 1,
"hash_algorithm": "blake2b",
"hash_bits": 256,
"expires": "2018-03-05T23:59:59Z"
},
"public_key": [
{
"id": 1,
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"signature_bits": 256,
"value": "VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSBnb29kIGtleSB0byB1c2UuLi4NCg=="
}
],
"data_stream": [
{
"id": 10,
"source": "192.0.2.10",
"destination": "232.10.10.1",
"port": 18001,
"max_bitrate": "10Mbps",
"max_packetrate": "1Kpps",
"authenticator": [
{
"manifest_id": 1
}
]
},
{
"id": 20,
"source": "192.0.2.10",
"destination": "232.10.10.1",
"port": 18002,
"max_bitrate": "400Kbps",
"max_packetrate": "40pps",
"authenticator": [
{
"manifest_id": 2
}
]
}
],
"manifest_stream": [
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{
"id": 1,
"transport": 20,
"hash_algorithm": "blake2b",
"hash_bits": 80,
"sequence_type": "udp"
},
{
"id": 2,
"transport": "https://example.com/ambi/manifest_stream/3",
"hash_algorithm": "blake2b",
"hash_bits": 80,
"sequence_type": "udp"
}
]
}
}
Figure 2: Example Anchor Message
2.3. Manifests
2.3.1. Overview
A manifest cannot be interpreted except in context of a known anchor
message.
In order for a manifest to be considered as potentially
authenticating a set of packets, the Anchor Version MUST match the
value in a known unexpired anchor message, and the Anchor Hash MUST
match the hash of the contents of that anchor message, according to
the /anchor/self/hash_algorithm and /anchor/self/hash_bits fields, in
order for a manifest to be accepted for use as evidence of
authenticity and integrity.
A manifest also MUST NOT be accepted unless it has verified
authenticity and integrity, either because it contains a
cryptographic signature, or because it appeared in a secured unicast
stream, or because another verified manifest has provided the packet
hash for a packet containing this manifest.
2.3.2. Manifest Layout
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ver=0 | Reserved=0 |P|S| Anchor Version |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Anchor Hash (variable length, 4-octet aligned, 0-padded) |
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Manifest ID | Packet Hash Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| First Packet Hash Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Identifier Step (if S-bit set) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| ... Packet Hashes ... |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.3.2.1. Ver (Protocol Version)
MUST be set to 0 by senders, and if a nonzero value is received this
message MUST NOT be accepted or processed as a manifest.
For manifests streams which were authenticated by a means other than
cryptographic signature, it is RECOMMENDED that authenticators stop
following this manifest stream and refresh the anchor if they receive
an invalid version.
For manifest streams authenticated by signature, it is RECOMMENDED
that authenticators remain joined to this stream and ignore this
packet, as the manifest MAY have been sent maliciously.
An authenticator MAY implement a rate limit on invalid manifests and
drop the stream if the rate is exceeded.
2.3.2.2. Reserved
MUST be set to 0 by senders and MUST be ignored by receivers.
2.3.2.3. P ("Purge" bit)
If this bit is 1, the anchor message this manifest specifies MUST be
purged by authenticators who accept this manifest, so that it cannot
be used to authenticate future manifests unless it was re-fetched.
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2.3.2.4. S ("Step" bit)
If this bit is 1, the "Packet Identifier Step" field is present in
this manifest, else it is not.
2.3.2.5. Anchor Version
The value from the "/anchor/self/version" field in the anchor
message. If no unexpired anchor message with this version is known
to the authenticator, this manifest MUST NOT be accepted.
2.3.2.6. Anchor Hash
The hash of the anchor message, using the algorithm indicated by the
"/anchor/self/hash_algorithm" field, using the first bits from the
hash up to the number of bits indicated by the "/anchor/self/
hash_bits" field in the anchor message.
If the hash of an anchor message with this version does not match the
bits in this field, this manifest MUST NOT be accepted.
This field is padded at the end with 0-bits until the end is 4-octet
aligned.
2.3.2.7. Manifest ID
The value from "/anchor/manifest_stream/id" in the anchor message
corresponding to the manifest stream this manifest is a part of.
2.3.2.8. First Packet Hash Identifier
The packet number corresponding to the first packet hash that's
contained in this manifest. This refers to a value in a data packet
described by the "/anchor/manifest_stream/sequence_type" field for
this manifest stream.
2.3.2.9. Packet Identifier Step
If the "S bit" is 0, this field is not present in the manifest.
If the "S bit" is 1, this field is repeatedly added to the First
Packet Hash Identifier using 32-bit signed arithmetic to determine
the packet number of subsequent hashes.
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2.3.2.10. Packet Hash Count
The number of hashes contained in the Packet Hashes section.
2.3.2.11. Packet Hashes
Concatenated Hashes of the data packets authenticated by this
manifest. The hash covers the IP payload of the packet, it is
calculated with the algorithm indicated by the "/anchor/
manifest_stream" object from the anchor message, with an "id" field
matching the "Manifest ID" field, with the algorithm and number of
bits equal to the "hash_algorithm" and "hash_bits"field from that
object. The hashes are concatenated without padding, except the last
octet is padded with 0 if necessary.
3. IANA Considerations
TBD1: Request a "Specification Required" registry for Packet
identifier methods, from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226#section-
4.1 . Reserve anything beginning with "experimental:"?
TBD2: Add a new entry to the "UDP Option Kind" numbers registry:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-
02#section-14
TBD: check guidelines in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226 and
remove this paragraph
Example from: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5226#section-5.1
TBD: new Resource Record type with a URI in the RRData? Or should
this be done as a NAPTR + URI chain?
[TO BE REMOVED: Please add the yang model in Section 2.2.3 to:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang-
parameters.xhtml
Name:ietf-ambi-anchor Maintained by IANA: N Namespace:
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ambi-anchor Prefix: anchor
Reference: I-D.draft-jholland-mboned-ambi Notes: ]
4. Security Considerations
4.1. Packet Identifiers
TBD: explain attack from generating malicious packets and then
looking for collisions, as opposed to having to generate a collision
including a sequence number and then hitting a match
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TBD: DNSSEC vis-a-vis anchor url discovery. (we need a diagram about
for middle-box handling of a revers-path propagated join?) Explain
why malicious DNS could deny service, but cannot cause accepting
attack packets.
TBD: Is the purge bit sufficient to cover when a key is found to be
leaked?
TBD: follow the rest of the guidelines: https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3552
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]
Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", draft-ietf-tsvwg-
udp-options-07 (work in progress), March 2019.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.
[RFC3596] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
"DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", STD 88,
RFC 3596, DOI 10.17487/RFC3596, October 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3596>.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.
5.2. Informative References
[DIGSIGN] Rohatgi, P., "How to Sign Digital Streams", 1997,
<https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/
BFb0052235.pdf>.
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Published in CRYPTO '97 "Proceedings of the 17th Annual
International Cryptology Conference on Advances in
Cryptology", Pages 180-197
[RFC4082] Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, DOI 10.17487/RFC4082,
June 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4082>.
[RFC4383] Baugher, M. and E. Carrara, "The Use of Timed Efficient
Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) in the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 4383,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4383, February 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4383>.
[RFC5776] Roca, V., Francillon, A., and S. Faurite, "Use of Timed
Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) in
the Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) and NACK-Oriented
Reliable Multicast (NORM) Protocols", RFC 5776,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5776, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5776>.
[RFC6584] Roca, V., "Simple Authentication Schemes for the
Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) and NACK-Oriented
Reliable Multicast (NORM) Protocols", RFC 6584,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6584, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6584>.
Authors' Addresses
Jake Holland
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
150 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02144
United States of America
Email: jakeholland.net@gmail.com
Kyle Rose
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
150 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02144
United States of America
Email: krose@krose.org
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