Internet Engineering Task Force                                    Y. Fu
Internet-Draft                                                     CNNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Jiang
Expires: May 19, 2018                                             B. Liu
                                            Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
                                                                 J. Dong
                                                                 Y. Chen
                                                     Tsinghua University
                                                       November 15, 2017


                Definitions of Managed Objects for MAP-E
                     draft-ietf-softwire-map-mib-12

Abstract

   This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
   for Mapping Address and Port with encapsulation (MAP-E) for use with
   network management protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework  . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  The mapMIBObjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       4.1.1.  The mapRule Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       4.1.2.  The mapSecurityCheck Subtree  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.2.  The mapMIBConformance Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   Mapping of Address and Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E) [RFC7597] is a
   stateless, automatic tunnelling mechanism for providing an IPv4
   connectivity service to end-users over a service provider's IPv6
   network.

   This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base
   (MIB) for use with monitoring MAP-E devices.

2.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework

   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
   [RFC3410].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally
   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB
   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in
   [RFC2578], [RFC2579] and [RFC2580].





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3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

4.  Structure of the MIB Module

   The Interfaces MIB [RFC2863] defines generic managed objects for
   managing interfaces.  Each logical interface (physical or virtual)
   has an ifEntry.  Tunnels are handled by creating a logical interface
   (ifEntry) for each tunnel.  Each MAP-E tunnel endpoint also acts as a
   virtual interface that has a corresponding entry in the Interface
   MIB.  Those corresponding entries are indexed by ifIndex.  MAP-E MIB
   is configurable on a per-interface basis, so it depends on several
   parts of the IF-MIB[RFC2863].

4.1.  The mapMIBObjects

4.1.1.  The mapRule Subtree

   The mapRule subtree describes managed objects used for managing the
   multiple mapping rules in MAP-E.

   According to the [RFC7597], the mapping rules are divided into two
   categories, which are Basic Mapping Rule (BMR), and Forwarding
   Mapping Rule (FMR).

4.1.2.  The mapSecurityCheck Subtree

   The mapSecurityCheck subtree provides statistics for the number of
   invalid packets that have been identified.  There are two kind of
   invalid packets which are defined in the [RFC7597] as below.

   - The Border Relay (BR) will validates the received packet's source
   IPv6 address against the configured MAP domain rule and the
   destination IPv6 address against the configured BR IPv6 address.

   - The MAP node (CE and BR) will check that the received packets'
   source IPv4 address and port is in the range derived from the
   matching MAP Rule.

4.2.  The mapMIBConformance Subtree

   The mapMIBConformance subtree provides conformance information of MIB
   objects.




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5.  Definitions

   The following MIB module imports definitions from [RFC2578],
   [RFC2579], [RFC2580], [RFC2863], and [RFC4001].


    MAP-E-MIB DEFINITIONS  ::=  BEGIN

    IMPORTS
       MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, mib-2,
       Unsigned32, Counter64
          FROM SNMPv2-SMI                 --RFC2578
       TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
          FROM SNMPv2-TC                  --RFC2579
       ifIndex
          FROM IF-MIB                     --RFC2863
       InetAddressIPv6, InetAddressIPv4,
       InetAddressPrefixLength
          FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB           --RFC4001
       OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE
          FROM SNMPv2-CONF;               --RFC2580

    mapMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
    LAST-UPDATED "201711150000Z"
    ORGANIZATION
       "IETF Softwire Working Group"
    CONTACT-INFO
       "Yu Fu
        CNNIC
        No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
        Beijing, P.R. China 100190
        EMail: fuyu@cnnic.cn

        Sheng Jiang
        Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
        Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
        Beijing, P.R. China 100095
        EMail: jiangsheng@huawei.com

        Bing Liu
        Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
        Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
        Beijing, P.R. China 100095
        EMail: leo.liubing@huawei.com

        Jiang Dong
        Tsinghua University
        Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University



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        Beijing  100084
        P.R. China
        Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com

        Yuchi Chen
        Tsinghua University
        Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
        Beijing  100084
        P.R. China
        Email: chenycmx@gmail.com"

    DESCRIPTION
       "The MIB module is defined for management of objects for
        MAP-E BRs or CEs."
    REVISION    "201711150000Z"
    DESCRIPTION
      "Initial version. Published as RFC xxxx."
    --RFC Ed.: RFC-edtitor pls fill in xxxx
     ::=  {  mib-2 xxx  }
    --xxx to be replaced withIANA-assigned value

    mapMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 1}

    mapRule   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
       ::=  { mapMIBObjects 1 }

    mapSecurityCheck   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
       ::=  { mapMIBObjects 2 }

    -- ==============================================================
    -- Textual Conventions used in this MIB module
    -- ==============================================================

    RulePSID ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
       DISPLAY-HINT "0x:"
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
           "Indicates that the PSID is represented as hexidecimal for
            clarity."
       SYNTAX       OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))

    RuleType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
       STATUS       current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Enumerates the type of the mapping rule. It
           defines three types of mapping rules here:
           bmr: Basic Mapping Rule (Not Forwarding Mapping Rule),
           fmr: Forwarding Mapping Rule (Not Basic Mapping Rule),



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           bmrAndfmr: Basic and Forwarding Mapping Rule. The Basic
           Mapping Rule may also be a Forwarding Mapping Rule for
           mesh mode."
       REFERENCE   "bmr, fmr: section 5 of RFC 7597.
                    bmrAndfmr: section 5 of RFC 7597, section 4.1
                    of RFC 7598."
       SYNTAX       INTEGER {
           bmr(1),
           fmr(2),
           bmrAndfmr(3)
           }


    mapRuleTable OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX     SEQUENCE OF MapRuleEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS     current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The (conceptual) table containing rule information for
           a specific mapping rule. It can also be used for row
           creation."
       ::=  { mapRule 1 }

    mapRuleEntry OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX     MapRuleEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS     current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Each entry in this table contains the information on a
           particular mapping rule."
           INDEX   {  ifIndex,
                      mapRuleID }
       ::=  { mapRuleTable 1 }

    MapRuleEntry  ::=
       SEQUENCE {
        mapRuleID                   Unsigned32,
        mapRuleIPv6Prefix           InetAddressIPv6,
        mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen        InetAddressPrefixLength,
        mapRuleIPv4Prefix           InetAddressIPv4,
        mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen        InetAddressPrefixLength,
        mapRuleBRIPv6Address        InetAddressIPv6,
        mapRulePSID                 RulePSID,
        mapRulePSIDLen              Unsigned32,
        mapRuleOffset               Unsigned32,
        mapRuleEALen                Unsigned32,
        mapRuleType                 RuleType
    }



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    mapRuleID OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
        MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
        STATUS current
        DESCRIPTION
           "A unique identifier used to distinguish mapping
            rules."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 1 }

   -- The object mapRuleIPv6Prefix is IPv6 specific and hence it does
   -- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.

   mapRuleIPv6Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     InetAddressIPv6
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule which will be
            assigned to CE."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 2 }

    mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     InetAddressPrefixLength
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The length of the IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule
            which will be assigned to CE."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 3 }

   -- The object mapRuleIPv4Prefix is IPv4 specific and hence it does
   -- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.

    mapRuleIPv4Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     InetAddressIPv4
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           " The IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping rule which will be
             assigned to CE."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 4 }

    mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     InetAddressPrefixLength
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The length of the IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping



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            rule which will be assigned to CE."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 5 }

   -- The object mapRuleBRIPv6Address is IPv6 specific and hence it does
   -- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.

    mapRuleBRIPv6Address OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     InetAddressIPv6
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The IPv6 address of the BR which will be conveyed to CE.
            If the BR IPv6 address is anycast, the relay must use
            this anycast IPv6 address as the source address in
            packets relayed to CEs."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 6 }

     mapRulePSID  OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     RulePSID
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The PSID value algorithmically identifies a set of
            ports assigned to a CE."
        REFERENCE
             "PSID: section 5.1 of RFC 7597."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 7 }

    mapRulePSIDLen  OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     Unsigned32(0..16)
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The bit length value of the number of significant bits in
            the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
            field is to be ignored."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 8 }

    mapRuleOffset OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     Unsigned32(0..15)
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The number of the mapRuleOffset is 6 by default as to
            exclude the System ports (0-1023). It is provided via
            the Rule Port Mapping Parameters in the Basic Mapping
            Rule."
        DEFVAL {6}



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        ::= { mapRuleEntry 9 }


    mapRuleEALen OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     Unsigned32(0..48)
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "The length of the Embedded-Address (EA) defined in
            mapping rule which will be assigned to CE."
       REFERENCE
             "EA: section 3 of RFC 7597."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 10 }

   mapRuleType OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     RuleType
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "Indicates the type of mapping rule.
            '1' represents a BMR.
            '2' represents a FMR and '3' is for a BMR which
             is also an FMR for mesh mode."
         REFERENCE
             "bmr, fmr: section 5 of RFC 7597.
              bmrAndfmr: section 5 of RFC 7597, section 4.1 of
              RFC 7598."
        ::= { mapRuleEntry 11 }


    mapSecurityCheckTable OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX     SEQUENCE OF MapSecurityCheckEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS     current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The (conceptual) table containing information on
           MAP security checks. This table can be used for
           statistics on the number of invalid packets that
           have been identified."
       ::=  { mapSecurityCheck 1 }

    mapSecurityCheckEntry OBJECT-TYPE
       SYNTAX     MapSecurityCheckEntry
       MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible
       STATUS     current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Each entry in this table contains information on a
           particular MAP SecurityCheck."



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           INDEX   { ifIndex }
       ::=  { mapSecurityCheckTable 1 }

    MapSecurityCheckEntry  ::=
       SEQUENCE {
        mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4       Counter64,
        mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6       Counter64
    }

    mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     Counter64
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "Indicates the number of received IPv4 packets
            which do not have a payload source IPv4 address or
            port within the range defined in the matching MAP
            rule."
        ::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 1 }

    mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 OBJECT-TYPE
        SYNTAX     Counter64
        MAX-ACCESS read-only
        STATUS     current
        DESCRIPTION
           "Indicates the number of received IPv6 packets which
            do not have a source or destination IPv6 address
            matching a Basic Mapping Rule."
        ::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 2 }

    -- Conformance Information
    mapMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 2}
    mapMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 1 }
    mapMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 2 }

    -- compliance statements
    mapMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION
          "Describes the minimal requirements for conformance
           to the MAP-E MIB."
       MODULE -- this module
           MANDATORY-GROUPS { mapMIBRuleGroup , mapMIBSecurityGroup }
      ::= { mapMIBCompliances 1 }

    -- Units of Conformance
    mapMIBRuleGroup OBJECT-GROUP
       OBJECTS {



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               mapRuleIPv6Prefix,
               mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen,
               mapRuleIPv4Prefix,
               mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen,
               mapRuleBRIPv6Address,
               mapRulePSID,
               mapRulePSIDLen,
               mapRuleOffset,
               mapRuleEALen,
               mapRuleType  }
       STATUS current
       DESCRIPTION
          "The group of objects used to describe the MAP-E mapping
           rule."
       ::= { mapMIBGroups 1 }

   mapMIBSecurityGroup OBJECT-GROUP
      OBJECTS {
         mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4,
         mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 }
     STATUS current
     DESCRIPTION
        "The group of objects used to provide information on the
         MAP-E security checks."
     ::= { mapMIBGroups 2 }

     END


6.  IANA Considerations

   The MIB module in this document uses the following IANA-assigned
   OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers registry:

         Descriptor        OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
         ----------        -----------------------
         MAP-E-MIB          { mib-2 XXX }

7.  Security Considerations

   There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
   a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create.  So, if this
   MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an
   intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
   module via direct SNMP SET operations.

   Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
   MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or



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   vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus important to
   control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
   to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
   the network via SNMP.

   Some of the MIB model's objects are vulnerable as the information
   which they hold may be used for targeting an attack against a MAP
   node (CE or BR).  E.g., an intruder could use the information to help
   deduce the customer IPv4 and IPv6 topologies and address-sharing
   ratios in use by the ISP.

   The following is a list of the objects that have this vulnerability:

      mapRuleIPv6Prefix

      mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen

      mapRuleIPv4Prefix

      mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen

      mapRuleBRIPv6Address

      mapRulePSID

      mapRulePSIDLen

      mapRuleOffset

      mapRuleEALen

      mapRuleType

   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
   Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
   there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to
   access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this
   MIB module.

   Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the
   SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations claiming
   compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
   authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM)
   [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826].  Implementations
   MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM)
   [RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH
   [RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353].




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   Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
   enable cryptographic security.  It is then a customer/operator
   responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
   instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
   the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
   rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for valuable comments from David
   Harrington, Mark Townsley, Shishio Tsuchiya, Yong Cui, Suresh
   Krishnan, Bert Wijnen, Ian Farrer and Juergen Schoenwaelder.

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC7991].

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2578]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
              Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2578, April 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.

   [RFC2579]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.

   [RFC2580]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
              STD 58, RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.

   [RFC2863]  McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
              MIB", RFC 2863, DOI 10.17487/RFC2863, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2863>.







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   [RFC4001]  Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
              Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
              Addresses", RFC 4001, DOI 10.17487/RFC4001, February 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4001>.

   [RFC7597]  Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
              Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
              Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7597>.

   [RFC7598]  Mrugalski, T., Troan, O., Farrer, I., Perreault, S., Dec,
              W., Bao, C., Yeh, L., and X. Deng, "DHCPv6 Options for
              Configuration of Softwire Address and Port-Mapped
              Clients", RFC 7598, DOI 10.17487/RFC7598, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7598>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3410]  Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
              "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
              Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.

   [RFC3414]  Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
              (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3414, December 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.

   [RFC3826]  Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. McCloghrie, "The
              Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the
              SNMP User-based Security Model", RFC 3826,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3826, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3826>.

   [RFC5591]  Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
              for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 5591, DOI 10.17487/RFC5591, June 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5591>.

   [RFC5592]  Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
              Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
              Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, DOI 10.17487/RFC5592, June
              2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5592>.





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   [RFC6353]  Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
              Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
              STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.

   [RFC7991]  Hoffman, P., "The "xml2rfc" Version 3 Vocabulary",
              RFC 7991, DOI 10.17487/RFC7991, December 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7991>.

Authors' Addresses

   Yu Fu
   CNNIC
   No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
   Beijing 100190
   P.R. China

   Email: fuyu@cnnic.cn


   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
   P.R. China

   Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com


   Bing Liu
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
   Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
   P.R. China

   Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com


   Jiang Dong
   Tsinghua University
   Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   P.R. China

   Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com






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Internet-Draft       draft-ietf-softwire-map-mib-12        November 2017


   Yuchi Chen
   Tsinghua University
   Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   P.R. China

   Email: flashfoxmx@gmail.com












































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