Internet Engineering Task Force Y. Fu
Internet-Draft CNNIC
Intended status: Standards Track S. Jiang
Expires: November 28, 2017 B. Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
J. Dong
Y. Chen
Tsinghua University
May 27, 2017
Definitions of Managed Objects for MAP-E
draft-ietf-softwire-map-mib-09
Abstract
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for using with network management protocols in the Internet
community. In particular, it defines managed objects for MAP
encapsulation (MAP-E) mode.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 28, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. The mapMIBObjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.1. The mapRule Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.2. The mapSecurityCheck Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. The mapMIBConformance Subtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Mapping of Address and Port (MAP) [RFC7597] is a stateless mechanism
for running IPv4 over IPv6-only infrastructure. In particular, it
includes two mode, translation mode or encapsulation mode. For the
encapsulation mode, it provides an automatic tunnelling mechanism for
providing IPv4 connectivity service to end users over a service
provider's IPv6 network
This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base
(MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet
community. This MIB module would be used for monitoring the devices
in the MAP scenario, especially, for the encapsulation mode.
2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework
For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
[RFC3410].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
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Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in
[RFC2578], [RFC2579] and [RFC2580].
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
4. Structure of the MIB Module
The MAP-E MIB provides a way to manage and monitor the MAP devices in
MAP encapsulation mode through SNMP.
MAP-E MIB is configurable on a per-interface basis. It depends on
several parts of the IF-MIB[RFC2863].
4.1. The mapMIBObjects
4.1.1. The mapRule Subtree
The mapRule subtree describes managed objects used for managing the
multiple mapping rules in the MAP encapsulation mode.
According to the MAP specification[RFC7597], the mapping rules are
divided into two categories, which are Basic Mapping Rule (BMR), and
Forwarding Mapping Rule (FMR).
4.1.2. The mapSecurityCheck Subtree
The mapSecurityCheck subtree is to statistic the number of invalid
packets that have been identified. There are two kind of invalid
packets which are defined in the MAP specification [RFC7597]as below.
- The Border Relay (BR) will perform a validation of the consistency
of the source IPv6 address and source port number for the packet
using Basic Mapping Rule (BMR).
- The Customer Edge (CE) will check that MAP received packets'
transport-layer destination port number is in the range configured by
MAP for the CE.
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4.2. The mapMIBConformance Subtree
The mapMIBConformance subtree provides conformance information of MIB
objects.
5. Definitions
The following MIB module imports definitions from [RFC2578],
[RFC2579],[RFC2580],[RFC2863], and [RFC4001].
MAP-E-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, mib-2,
Unsigned32, Counter64
FROM SNMPv2-SMI --RFC2578
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
FROM SNMPv2-TC --RFC2579
ifIndex
FROM IF-MIB --RFC2863
InetAddressIPv6, InetAddressIPv4,
InetAddressPrefixLength
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB --RFC4001
OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE
FROM SNMPv2-CONF; --RFC2580
mapMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "201705270000Z"
ORGANIZATION
"IETF Softwire Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO
"Yu Fu
CNNIC
No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing, P.R. China 100190
EMail: fuyu@cnnic.cn
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
Beijing, P.R. China 100095
EMail: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Bing Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Huawei Building, 156 Beiqing Rd., Hai-Dian District
Beijing, P.R. China 100095
EMail: leo.liubing@huawei.com
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Jiang Dong
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
P.R. China
Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com
Yuchi Chen
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
P.R. China
Email: chenycmx@gmail.com"
DESCRIPTION
"The MIB module is defined for management of objects in the
MAP-E BRs or CEs."
REVISION "201705270000Z"
DESCRIPTION
"Initial version. Published as RFC xxxx."
--RFC Ed.: RFC-edtitor pls fill in xxxx
::= { mib-2 xxx }
--xxx to be replaced withIANA-assigned value
mapMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 1}
mapRule OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 1 }
mapSecurityCheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 2 }
-- ==============================================================
-- Textual Conventions used in this MIB module
-- ==============================================================
RulePSID ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "0x:"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"It represents the PSID represented in the hexadecimal version
so as to display it more clearly."
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (4))
RuleType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This enumeration provides the type of the mapping rule. There
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are two types of mapping rules: Basic Mapping Rule (BMR) and
Forwarding Mapping Rule (FMR)."
REFERENCE "bmr, fmr: section 5 of RFC 7597"
SYNTAX INTEGER {
bmr(1),
fmr(2)
}
mapRuleTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapRuleEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table containing rule Information of
specific mapping rule. It can also be used for row
creation."
::= { mapRule 1 }
mapRuleEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapRuleEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Each entry in this table contains the information on a
particular mapping rule."
INDEX { mapRuleID }
::= { mapRuleTable 1 }
MapRuleEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
mapRuleID Unsigned32,
mapRuleIPv6Prefix InetAddressIPv6,
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleIPv4Prefix InetAddressIPv4,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleBRIPv6Address InetAddressIPv6,
mapRulePSID RulePSID,
mapRulePSIDLen Unsigned32,
mapRuleOffset Unsigned32,
mapRuleEALen Unsigned32,
mapRuleType RuleType
}
mapRuleID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"An identifier used to distinguish the multiple mapping
rule which is unique with each CE in the same BR."
::= { mapRuleEntry 1 }
-- The object mapRuleIPv6Prefix is IPv6 specific and hence it does
-- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.
mapRuleIPv6Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv6
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IPv6 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be
assigned to CE. The address type is given by
mapRuleIPv6PrefixType."
::= { mapRuleEntry 2 }
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressPrefixLength
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule.
As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also assigned
to CE."
::= { mapRuleEntry 3 }
-- The object mapRuleIPv4Prefix is IPv4 specific and hence it does
-- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.
mapRuleIPv4Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv4
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The IPv4 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be
assigned to CE. The address type is given by
mapRuleIPv4PrefixType."
::= { mapRuleEntry 4 }
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressPrefixLength
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping
rule. As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also
assigned to CE."
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::= { mapRuleEntry 5 }
-- The object mapRuleBRIPv6Address is IPv6 specific and hence it does
-- not use the version agnostic InetAddress.
mapRuleBRIPv6Address OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv6
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IPv6 address of the BR which will be
conveyed to CE."
::= { mapRuleEntry 6 }
mapRulePSID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RulePSID
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The PSID value algorithmically identifies a set of
ports assigned to a CE."
REFERENCE
"PSID: section 5.1 of RFC 7597."
::= { mapRuleEntry 7 }
mapRulePSIDLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32(0..16)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The bit length value of the number of significant bits in
the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
field is to be ignored."
::= { mapRuleEntry 8 }
mapRuleOffset OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32(0..15)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Bit length value of the number of significant bits in
the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
field is to be ignored."
::= { mapRuleEntry 9 }
mapRuleEALen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the Embedded-Address (EA) defined in
mapping rule which will be assigned to CE."
REFERENCE
"EA: section 3 of RFC 7597."
::= { mapRuleEntry 10 }
mapRuleType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RuleType
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"It represents the type of the mapping rule. the value of
1 means it is a bmr; the value 2 means it is a fmr."
REFERENCE
"bmr, fmr: section 5 of RFC 7597"
::= { mapRuleEntry 11 }
mapSecurityCheckTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapSecurityCheckEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table containing information on
MAP security checks. This table can be used to statistic
the number of invalid packets that been identified."
::= { mapSecurityCheck 1 }
mapSecurityCheckEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapSecurityCheckEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Each entry in this table contains the information on a
particular MAP SecurityCheck."
INDEX { ifIndex }
::= { mapSecurityCheckTable 1 }
MapSecurityCheckEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 Counter64,
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 Counter64
}
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The CE SHOULD check that MAP received packets'
transport-layer destination port number is in the range
configured by MAP for the CE. So this object indicate
the number of the invalid IPv4 packets received by the
MAP."
::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 1 }
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The BR MUST perform a validation of the consistency of
the source IPv6 address and source port number for the
packet using BMR. So this object indicate the number of
the invalid IPv6 packets received by the BR."
::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 2 }
-- Conformance Information
mapMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 2}
mapMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 1 }
mapMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 2 }
-- compliance statements
mapMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" Describes the minimal requirements for conformance
to the MAP-E MIB."
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { mapMIBRuleGroup , mapMIBSecurityGroup }
::= { mapMIBCompliances 1 }
-- Units of Conformance
mapMIBRuleGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
mapRuleIPv6Prefix,
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen,
mapRuleIPv4Prefix,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen,
mapRuleBRIPv6Address,
mapRulePSID,
mapRulePSIDLen,
mapRuleOffset,
mapRuleEALen,
mapRuleType }
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The collection of this objects are used to give the
information of mapping rules in MAP-E."
::= { mapMIBGroups 1 }
mapMIBSecurityGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4,
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The collection of this objects are used to give the
information on MAP security checks."
::= { mapMIBGroups 2 }
END
6. IANA Considerations
The MIB module in this document uses the following IANA-assigned
OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers registry:
Descriptor OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
---------- -----------------------
MAP-E-MIB { mib-2 XXX }
7. Security Considerations
There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this
MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an
intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
module via direct SNMP SET operations.
Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to
control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
the network via SNMP.
The following objects are vulnerable in the sense that when an
intruder sees the information in this MIB module, then it might help
him/her to set up an attack on the MAP node. Objects that reveal
rule information of the MAP Domain: Various objects can reveal the
rule information of the map domain. A curious outsider could monitor
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these to assess the number of rules and the IPv6 prefix performed in
this domain. Futher, an intruder could use the information to guess
the address-sharing ratios of the ISPs. These are the objects and
their sensitivity/ vulnerability:
mapRuleIPv6Prefix
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen
mapRuleIPv4Prefix
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen
mapRuleBRIPv6Address
mapRulePSID
mapRulePSIDLen
mapRuleOffset
mapRuleEALen
mapRuleType
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
in this MIB module.
Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the
SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations claiming
compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM)
[RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826]. Implementations
MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM)
[RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH
[RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353].
Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
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8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for valuable comments from David
Harrington, Mark Townsley, Shishio Tsuchiya, Yong Cui, Suresh
Krishnan, Bert Wijnen and Juergen Schoenwaelder.
This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2578, April 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
MIB", RFC 2863, DOI 10.17487/RFC2863, June 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2863>.
[RFC4001] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
Addresses", RFC 4001, DOI 10.17487/RFC4001, February 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4001>.
[RFC7597] Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7597>.
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9.2. Informative References
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3414, December 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.
[RFC3826] Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. McCloghrie, "The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the
SNMP User-based Security Model", RFC 3826,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3826, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3826>.
[RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 5591, DOI 10.17487/RFC5591, June 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5591>.
[RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, DOI 10.17487/RFC5592, June
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5592>.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.
Authors' Addresses
Yu Fu
CNNIC
No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
P.R. China
Email: fuyu@cnnic.cn
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Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
P.R. China
Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Bing Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No.156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing, 100095
P.R. China
Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com
Jiang Dong
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
P.R. China
Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com
Yuchi Chen
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
P.R. China
Email: flashfoxmx@gmail.com
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