SIDR D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft Unaffiliated
Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma
Expires: February 14, 2017 ZDNS
August 13, 2016
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-02
Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document
provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
as needed.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SLURM Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Format of the SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is
described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].)
However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491]
recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
[RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
network operator might wish to make use of a local override
capability to protect routes from adverse actions [I-D.ietf-sidr-
adverse-actions], until the results of such actions have been
addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to
network operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber
Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an
assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
rtr version. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
respectively.)
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. RPKI RPs with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a
local, customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository
data if needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes
from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI
that are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
assertions.
In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
but that is outside the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
|
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
+------v-------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | |
| SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +--->BGP Speakers|
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
3. SLURM Mechanisms
3.1. Validation Output Filtering
To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally
reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly
empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally.
(In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from
reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP
prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are
removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin
Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a
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locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS
number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the
relying party's output.
3.2. Locally Adding Assertions
Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output.
3.3. Combining Mechanisms
In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
4. Format of the SLURM File
Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration
format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules <IPv4address>
and <IPv6address> from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for
an example SLURM file.
A SLURM file, <SLURMFile>, consists of a head and a body. The head
identifies the file as a SLURM file, specifies the version of SLURM
for which the file was written, and optionally contains other
information described below. The body contains the configuration for
Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
SLURMFile = head body
head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine)
body = *(commentLine / bodyLine)
firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0"
commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL
headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL
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bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL
comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP)
EOL = CRLF / LF
The head may specify a target. If present, the target string
identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be
used. The meaning of the target string, if present, is determined by
the user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that
the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if the
target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could be
configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a
target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a
target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present,
all targets must be acceptable to the RP.
headCommand = target
target =
%x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target"
1*VCHAR
The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation
Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each <del> command
specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each <add>
command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions.
bodyCommand = add / del
add =
%x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add"
addItem
del =
%x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del"
delItem
addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey
; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number.
addItemPrefixAS =
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP
ASnum
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; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key.
addItemASKey =
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec"
ASnum 1*WSP
RouterSKI 1*WSP
RouterPubKey
delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS
; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix
delItemPrefix =
%x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination"
IPprefix
; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS
delItemAS =
%x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec"
ASnum
IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix
IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen
IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT
IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT
; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component
is
; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length.
IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT]
IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT]
ASnum = 1*DIGIT
; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
certificate's
; Subject Key Identifer, as described in
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is
the
; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length
; fields.
RouterSKI = Base64
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; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public
key's
; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in
; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER
encoding
; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and
length
; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
RouterPubKey = Base64
Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"="
5. SLURM File Configuration
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of
the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for
multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the
INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these
SLURM files in question.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases:
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1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
<addItemPrefixAS> or <delItemPrefix> in file Y and X is
contained by any prefix in any <addItemPrefixAS> or
<delItemPrefix> in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Y and X
is used in any <addItemASKey> or <delItemAS> in file Z.
6. IANA Considerations
None
7. Security considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while
preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These
mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other
network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be
taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is
possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-
private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.
For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a
network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action.
Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use
extreme caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
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file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
reviews and Hui Zou for her editorial assistance.
9. References
9.1. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]
Bush, R., "Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-07 (work in progress),
July 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in
progress), March 2016.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/
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RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598,
April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153,
RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996,
July 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC7682] McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., Blunk, L., and
D. Mitchell, "Considerations for Internet Routing
Registries (IRRs) and Routing Policy Configuration",
RFC 7682, DOI 10.17487/RFC7682, December 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7682>.
9.2. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-15 (work in
progress), April 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
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BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18 (work in progress),
July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Authors' Addresses
David Mandelberg
Unaffiliated
Email: david@mandelberg.org
Di Ma
ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190
China
Email: madi@zdns.cn
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