SFC M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: December 20, 2020 McAfee
D. Wing
Citrix
June 18, 2020
Integrity Protection for the Network Service Header (NSH) and Encryption
of Sensitive Context Headers
draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-integrity-00
Abstract
This specification adds integrity protection and optional encryption
of sensitive metadata directly to the Network Service Header (NSH)
used for Service Function Chaining (SFC).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 20, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Assumptions and Basic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1. Encrypt All or a Subset of Context Headers . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. One Secret Key, Two Security Services . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Mandatory-to-Implement Authenticated Encryption and HMAC
Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6. Encapsulation of NSH within NSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. MAC#1 Context Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. MAC#2 Context Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Timestamp Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Generic Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. MAC NSH Data Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. Encrypted NSH Metadata Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.4. Timestamp for Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.5. NSH Data Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.6. Decryption of NSH Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. MAC#1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. MAC#2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
Many advanced Service Functions (SFs) are invoked for the delivery of
value-added services. Typically, SFs are used to meet various
service objectives such as IP address sharing, avoiding covert
channels, detecting Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and protecting
network infrastructures against them, network slicing, etc. Because
of the proliferation of such advanced SFs together with complex
service deployment constraints that demand more agile service
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
delivery procedures, operators need to rationalize their service
delivery logics and master their complexity while optimising service
activation time cycles. The overall problem space is described in
[RFC7498].
[RFC7665] presents a data plane architecture addressing the
problematic aspects of existing service deployments, including
topological dependence and configuration complexity. It also
describes an architecture for the specification, creation, and
maintenance of Service Function Chains (SFCs) within a network. That
is, how to define an ordered set of SFs and ordering constraints that
must be applied to packets/flows selected as a result of traffic
classification. [RFC8300] specifies the SFC encapsulation: Network
Service Header (NSH).
The NSH data is unauthenticated and unencrypted [RFC8300], forcing a
service topology that requires security and privacy to use a
transport encapsulation that supports such features. Note that some
transport encapsulation (e.g., IPsec) only provide hop-by-hop
security between two SFC data plane elements (e.g., two Service
Function Forwarders (SFFs), SFF to SF) and do not provide SF-to-SF
security of NSH metadata. For example, if IPsec is used, SFFs or SFs
within a Service Function Path (SFP) not authorized to access the
privacy-sensitive metadata will have access to the metadata. As a
reminder, the metadata referred to is an information that is inserted
by Classifiers or intermediate SFs and shared with downstream SFs;
such information is not visible to the communication endpoints
(Section 4.9 of [RFC7665]).
The lack of such capability was reported during the development of
[RFC8300] and [RFC8459]. The reader may refer to Section 3.2.1 of
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t] for a discussion on the need for
more awareness about attacks from within closed domains.
This specification fills that gap. Concretely, this document adds
integrity protection and optional encryption of sensitive metadata
directly to the NSH (Section 4); integrity protects the packet
payload, and provides replay protection (Section 7.4). Thus, the NSH
does not have to rely upon an underlying transport encapsulation for
security and confidentiality.
This specification introduces new Variable-Length Context Headers to
carry fields necessary for integrity protected NSH headers and
encrypted Context Headers (Section 5), and is therefore only
applicable to NSH MD Type 0x02 (Section 2.5 of [RFC8300]).
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
This specification limits thus access to an information within an SFP
to entities that have a need to interpret it. Particularly, SFFs
should not act or process the Context Headers.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC7665] and
[RFC8300].
The document defines the following terms:
o SFC data plane element: Refers to SFC-aware SF, SFF, SFC Proxy, or
Classifier as defined in the SFC data plane architecture [RFC7665]
and further refined in [RFC8300].
o SFC control element: A logical entity that instructs one or more
SFC data plane elements on how to process NSH packets within an
SFC-enabled domain.
o Key Identifier: A key identifier used to identify and deliver keys
to authorized entities. See for example, 'kid' usage in
[RFC7635].
o NSH data: The NSH is composed of a Base Header, a Service Path
Header, and optional Context Headers. NSH data refers to all the
above headers and the packet or frame on which the NSH is imposed
to realize an SFP.
o NSH imposer: Refers to the SFC data plane element that is entitled
to impose the NSH with the Context Headers defined in this
document.
3. Assumptions and Basic Requirements
Section 2 of [RFC8300] specifies that the NSH data can be spread over
three headers:
o Base Header: Provides information about the service header and the
payload protocol.
o Service Path Header: Provides path identification and location
within an SFP.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
o Context Header(s): Carries metadata (i.e., context data) along a
service path.
The NSH allows to share context information (a.k.a., metadata) with
downstream SFC-aware data elements on a per SFC/SFP basis. To that
aim:
The control plane is used to instruct the Classifier about the set
of context information to be supplied for a given service function
chain.
The control plane is also used to instruct an SFC-aware SF about
any metadata it needs to attach to packets for a given service
function chain. This instruction may occur any time during the
validity lifetime of an SFC/SFP. The control plane may indicate,
for a given service function chain, an order for consuming a set
of contexts supplied in a packet.
An SFC-aware SF can also be instructed about the behavior it
should adopt after consuming a context information that was
supplied in the NSH. For example, the context can be maintained,
updated, or stripped.
An SFC Proxy may be instructed about the behavior it should adopt
to process the context information that was supplied in the NSH on
behalf of an SFC-unaware SF (e.g., the context can be maintained
or stripped). The SFC Proxy may also be instructed to add some
new context information into the NSH on behalf of an SFC-unaware
SF.
In reference to Figure 1,
o Classifiers, SFC-aware SFs, and SFC proxies are entitled to update
the Context Header(s).
o Only SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies are entitled to update the
Service Path Header.
o SFFs are entitled to modify the Base Path header (TTL value, for
example). Nevertheless, SFFs are not supposed to act on the
Context Headers or look into the content of the Context Headers.
Thus, the following requirements:
o Only Classifiers, SFC-aware SFs, and SFC proxies MUST be able to
encrypt and decrypt a given Context Header.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
o Both encrypted and unecrypted Context Headers MAY be included in
the same NSH. That is, some Context Headers (TLVs) may be
protected while others do not.
o The solution MUST provide integrity protection for the Service
Path Header.
o The solution MAY provide integrity protection for the Base Header.
The implications of disabling such checks are discussed in
Section 8.1.
+----------------+-----------------------------+-------------------+
| | Insert, remove, or replace | Update the NSH |
| | the NSH | |
| | | |
| SFC Data Plane +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| Element | | | |Decrement| Update |
| | Insert | Remove | Replace | Service | Context |
| | | | | Index |Header(s)|
+================+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+
| | + | | + | | + |
| Classifier | | | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
|Service Function| | + | | | |
|Forwarder (SFF) | | | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
|Service Function| | | | + | + |
| (SF) | | | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| | + | + | | + | + |
| SFC Proxy | | | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
Figure 1: Summary of NSH Actions
4. Design Overview
4.1. Supported Security Services
This specification provides the functions described in the following
subsections:
4.1.1. Encrypt All or a Subset of Context Headers
The solution allows to encrypt all or a subset of NSH Context Headers
by Classifiers, SFC-aware SFs, and SFC proxies.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
As depicted in Table 1, SFFs are not involved in data encryption.
This document enforces this design approach by encrypting Context
Headers with keys that are not supplied to SFFs, thus enforcing this
limitation by protocol (rather than requirements language).
+-----------------+------------------------------+------------------+
| Data Plane | Base and Service Headers | Metadata |
| Element | Encryption | Encryption |
+-----------------+------------------------------+------------------+
| Classifier | No | Yes |
| SFF | No | No |
| SFC-aware SF | No | Yes |
| SFC Proxy | No | Yes |
| SFC-unaware SF | No | No |
+-----------------+------------------------------+------------------+
Table 1: Encryption Function Supported by SFC Data Plane Elements
The SFC control plane is assumed to instruct the Classifier(s), SFC-
aware SFs, and SFC proxies with the set of Context Headers (privacy-
sensitive metadata, typically) that must be encrypted. Encryption
keying material is only provided to these SFC data elements.
The control plane may also indicate the set of SFC data plane
elements that are entitled to supply a given context header (e.g., in
reference to their identifiers as assigned within the SFC-enabled
domain). It is out of the scope of this document to elaborate on how
such instructions are provided to the appropriate SFC data plane
elements, nor to detail the structure used to store the instructions.
The Service Path Header (Section 2 of [RFC8300]) is not encrypted
because SFFs use Service Index (SI) in conjunction with Service Path
Identifier (SPI) for determining the next SF in the path.
4.1.2. Integrity Protection
The solution provides integrity protection for the NSH data. Two
levels of assurance (LoAs) are supported.
A first level of assurance where all NSH data except the Base Header
are integrity protected (Figure 2). In this case, the NSH imposer
may be a Classifier, an SFC-aware SF, or an SFC Proxy. SFFs are not
thus provided with authentication material. Further details are
discussed in Section 5.1.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transport Encapsulation |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+...
| Base Header | |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ N
| | Service Path Header | S
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ H
| | Context Header(s) | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+...
| | Original Packet |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
+------Scope of integrity protected data
Figure 2: First Level of Assurance
A second level of assurance where all NSH data, including the Base
Header, are integrity protected (Figure 3). In this case, the NSH
imposer may be a Classifier, an SFC-aware SF, an SFF, or an SFC
Proxy. Further details are provided in Section 5.2.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transport Encapsulation |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+...
| | Base Header | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ N
| | Service Path Header | S
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ H
| | Context Header(s) | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+...
| | Original Packet |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
+----Scope of integrity protected data
Figure 3: Second Level of Assurance
The integrity protection scope is explicitly signaled to SFC-aware
SFs and SFC proxies in the NSH by means of a dedicated MD Type
(Section 5).
In both levels of assurance, the unencrypted Context Headers and the
packet on which the NSH is imposed are subject to integrity
protection.
Table 2 lists the roles of SFC data plane elements in providing
integrity protection for the NSH.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
+--------------------+----------------------------------+
| Data Plane Element | Integrity Protection |
+--------------------+----------------------------------+
| Classifier | Yes |
| SFF | No (first LoA); Yes (second LoA) |
| SFC-aware SF | Yes |
| SFC Proxy | Yes |
| SFC-unaware SF | No |
+--------------------+----------------------------------+
Table 2: Integrity Protection Supported by SFC Data Plane Elements
4.2. One Secret Key, Two Security Services
The authenticated encryption algorithm defined in [RFC7518] is used
to provide NSH data integrity and to encrypt the Context Headers that
carry privacy-sensitive metadata.
The authenticated encryption algorithm provides a unified encryption
and authentication operation which turns plaintext into authenticated
ciphertext and vice versa. The generation of secondary keys MAC_KEY
and ENC_KEY from the secret key (K) is discussed in Section 5.2.2.1
of [RFC7518]:
o The ENC_KEY is used for encrypting the Context Headers and the
message integrity of the NSH data is calculated using the MAC_KEY.
o If the Context Headers are not encrypted, the Hashed Message
Authentication Mode (HMAC) algorithm discussed in [RFC4868] is
used to integrity protect the NSH data.
The advantage of using the authenticated encryption algorithm is that
SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies only need to re-compute the message
integrity of the NSH data after decrementing the Service Index (SI)
and do not have to re-compute the ciphertext. The other advantage is
that SFFs do not have access to the ENC_KEY and cannot act on the
encrypted Context Headers and, only in case of the second level of
assurance, SFFs do have access to the MAC_KEY. Similarly, an SFC-
aware SF or SFC Proxy not allowed to decrypt the Context Headers will
not have access to the ENC_KEY.
The authenticated encryption algorithm or HMAC algorithm to be used
by SFC data plane elements is typically controlled using the SFC
control plane. Mandatory to implement authenticated encryption and
HMAC algorithms are listed in Section 4.3.
The authenticated encryption process takes as input four octet
strings: a secret key (K), a plaintext (P), Additional Authenticated
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
Data (A) (which contains the data to be authenticated, but not
encrypted), and an Initialization Vector (IV). The ciphertext value
(E) and the Authentication Tag value (T) are provided as outputs.
In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input K, IV, A,
T, and E. The output is either the plaintext or an error indicating
that the decryption failed as described in Section 5.2.2.2 of
[RFC7518].
4.3. Mandatory-to-Implement Authenticated Encryption and HMAC
Algorithms
Classifiers, SFC-aware SFs, and SFC proxies MUST implement the
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm and SHOULD implement the
AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 and AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 algorithms.
Classifiers, SFC-aware SFs, and SFC proxies MUST implement the HMAC-
SHA-256-128 algorithm and SHOULD implement the HMAC-SHA-384-192 and
HMAC-SHA-512-256 algorithms.
SFFs MAY implement the aforementioned cipher suites and HMAC
algorithms.
o Note: The use of AES-GCM + HMAC may have CPU and packet size
implications (need for a second 128-bit authentication tag).
4.4. Key Management
The procedure for the allocation/provisioning of secret keys (K) and
authenticated encryption algorithm or MAC_KEY and HMAC algorithm is
outside the scope of this specification. As such, this specification
does not mandate the support of any specific mechanism.
The documents does not assume nor preclude the following:
o The same keying material is used for all the service functions
used within an SFC-enabled domain.
o Distinct keying material is used per SFP by all involved SFC data
path elements.
o Per-tenant keys are used.
In order to accommodate deployments relying upon keying material per
SFC/SFP and also the need to update keys after encrypting NSH data
for certain amount of time, this document uses key identifier (kid)
to unambiguously identify the appropriate keying material. Doing so
allows to address the problem of synchronization of keying material.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
Additional information on manual vs. automated key management and
when one should be used over the other can be found in [RFC4107].
4.5. New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers
New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers are defined in Section 5 for
NSH data integrity protection and, optionally, encryption of Context
Headers carrying privacy-sensitive metadata. Concretely, an NSH
imposer includes (1) the key identifier to identify the keying
material, (2) the timestamp to protect against replay attacks
(Section 7.4), and (3) the Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the
target NSH data (depending on the integrity protection scope)
calculated using the MAC_KEY and optionally Context Headers encrypted
using ENC_KEY.
An SFC data plane element that needs to check the integrity of the
NSH data uses MAC_KEY and the HMAC algorithm for the key identifier
being carried in the NSH.
An SFC-aware SF or SFC Proxy that needs to decrypt some Context
Headers uses ENC_Key and the decryption algorithm for the key
identifier being carried in the NSH.
Section 7 specifies the detailed procedure.
4.6. Encapsulation of NSH within NSH
As discussed in [RFC8459], an SFC-enabled domain (called, upper-level
domain) may be decomposed into many sub-domains (called, lower-level
domains). In order to avoid maintaining state to restore back upper-
lower NSH information at the boundaries of lower-level domains, two
NSH levels are used: an Upper-NSH which is imposed at the boundaries
of the upper-level domain and a Lower-NSH that is pushed by the
Classifier of a lower-level domain in front of the original NSH
(Figure 4). As such, the Upper-NSH information is carried along the
lower-level chain without modification. The packet is forwarded in
the top-level domain according to the Upper-NSH, while it is
forwarded according to the Lower-NSH in a lower-level domain.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
+---------------------------------+
| Transport Encapsulation |
+->+---------------------------------+
| | Lower-NSH Header |
| +---------------------------------+
| | Upper-NSH Header |
| +---------------------------------+
| | Original Packet |
+->+---------------------------------+
|
|
+----Scope of NSH security protection
provided by a lower-level domain
Figure 4: Encapsulation of NSH within NSH
SFC data plane elements of a lower-level domain includes the Upper-
NSH when computing the MAC.
Keying material used at the upper-level domain SHOULD NOT be the same
as the one used by a lower-level domain.
5. New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers
This section specifies the format of new Variable-Length Context
headers that are used for NSH integrity protection and, optionally,
Context Headers encryption.
In particular, this section defines two "MAC and Encrypted Metadata"
Context Headers; each having specific deployment constraints. Unlike
Section 5.1, the level of assurance provided in Section 5.2 requires
sharing MAC_KEY with SFFs. Both Context headers have the same format
as shown in Section 5.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Metadata Class | Type |U| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Length | Key Identifier (Variable) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Timestamp (8 bytes) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV Length | Initialization Vector (Variable) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Message Authentication Code and optional Encrypted |
~ Context Headers ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: MAC and Encrypted Metadata Context Header
5.1. MAC#1 Context Header
MAC#1 Context Header is a variable-length TLV that carries the
Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the Service Path Header,
Context Headers, and the inner packet on which NSH is imposed,
calculated using MAC_KEY and optionally Context Headers encrypted
using ENC_KEY. The scope of the integrity protection provided by
this TLV is depicted in Figure 6.
This MAC scheme does not require sharing MAC_KEY with SFFs. It does
not require to re-compute the MAC by each SFF because of TTL
processing. Section 8.1 discusses the possible threat associated
with this level of assurance.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ver|O|U| TTL | Length |U|U|U|U|MD Type| Next Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<--+
| Service Path Identifier | Service Index | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | |
~ Variable-Length Unencrypted Context Headers (opt.) ~ |
| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Metadata Class | Type |U| Length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Key Length | Key Identifier ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
~ Timestamp (8 bytes) ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| IV Length | Initialization Vector ~ |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ Context Header TLVs to encrypt (opt.) ~ |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
| ~ Inner Packet on which NSH is imposed ~ |
| | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<--|
| |
| |
| |
| Integrity Protection Scope ----+
+----Encrypted Data
Figure 6: Scope of MAC#1
In reference to Figure 5, the description of the fields is as
follows:
o Metadata Class: MUST be set to 0x0 (Section 2.5.1 of [RFC8300]).
o Type: TBD1 (See Section 9)
o U: Unassigned bit (Section 2.5.1 of [RFC8300]).
o Length: Variable.
o Key Length: Variable. Carries the length of the key identifier.
o Key Identifier: Carries a variable length Key Identifier object
used to identify and deliver keys to SFC data plane elements.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
This identifier is helpful to accommodate deployments relying upon
keying material per SFC/SFP. The key identifier helps in
resolving the problem of synchronization of keying material.
o Timestamp: Carries an unsigned 64-bit integer value that is
expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time.
See Section 6 for more details.
o IV Length: Carries the length of the IV (Section 5.2 of
[RFC7518]). If HMAC algorithm is used, IV length is set to zero.
o Initialization Vector: Carries the IV for authenticated encryption
algorithm as discussed in Section 5.2 of [RFC7518].
o The Additional Authenticated Data (defined in [RFC7518]) MUST be
the Service Path header, the unencrypted Context headers, and the
inner packet on which the NSH is imposed .
o Message Authentication Code covering the entire NSH data excluding
the Base header.
5.2. MAC#2 Context Header
MAC#2 Context Header is a variable-length TLV that carries the MAC
for the entire NSH data calculated using MAC_KEY and optionally
Context Headers encrypted using ENC_KEY. The scope of the integrity
protection provided by this TLV is depicted in Figure 7.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<--+
|Ver|O|U| TTL | Length |U|U|U|U|MD Type| Next Protocol | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Service Path Identifier | Service Index | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | |
~ Variable-Length Unencrypted Context Headers (opt.) ~ |
| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Metadata Class | Type |U| Length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Key Length | Key Identifier ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
~ Timestamp (8 bytes) ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| IV Length | Initialization Vector | |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ Context Header TLVs to encrypt (opt.) ~ |
+->+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
| ~ Inner Packet on which NSH is imposed ~ |
| | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<--|
| |
| |
| |
| Integrity Protection Scope ----+
+----Encrypted Data
Figure 7: Scope of MAC#2
In reference to Figure 5, the description of the fields is as
follows:
o Metadata Class: MUST be set to 0x0 (Section 2.5.1 of [RFC8300]).
o Type: TBD2 (See Section 9)
o U: Unassigned bit (Section 2.5.1 of [RFC8300]).
o Length: Variable.
o Key Length: See Section 5.1.
o Key Identifier: See Section 5.1.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
o Timestamp: See Section 6.
o IV Length: See Section 5.1.
o Initialization Vector: See Section 5.1.
o The Additional Authenticated Data (defined in [RFC7518]) MUST be
the entire NSH data (i.e., including the Base Header) excluding
the Context Headers to be encrypted.
o Message Authentication Code covering the entire NSH data and
optional encrypted Context Headers.
6. Timestamp Format
This section follows the template provided in
[I-D.ietf-ntp-packet-timestamps].
The format of the Timestamp field introduced in Section 5 is depicted
in Figure 8.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Seconds |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Fraction |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Timestamp Field Format
Timestamp field format:
Seconds: specifies the integer portion of the number of seconds
since the epoch.
+ Size: 32 bits.
+ Units: seconds.
Fraction: specifies the fractional portion of the number of
seconds since the epoch.
+ Size: 32 bits.
+ Units: the unit is 2^(-32) seconds, which is roughly equal to
233 picoseconds.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
Epoch:
The epoch is 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time.
Leap seconds:
This timestamp format is affected by leap seconds. The timestamp
represents the number of seconds elapsed since the epoch minus the
number of leap seconds.
Resolution:
The resolution is 2^(-32) seconds.
Wraparound:
This time format wraps around every 2^32 seconds, which is roughly
136 years. The next wraparound will occur in the year 2106.
Synchronization aspects:
It is assumed that SFC data plane elements are synchronized to UTC
using a synchronization mechanism that is outside the scope of
this document. In typical deployments SFC data plane elements use
NTP [RFC5905] for synchronization. Thus, the timestamp may be
derived from the NTP-synchronized clock, allowing the timestamp to
be measured with respect to the clock of an NTP server. Since the
NTP time format is affected by leap seconds, the current timestamp
format is similarly affected. Therefore, the value of a timestamp
during or slightly after a leap second may be temporarily
inaccurate.
7. Processing Rules
The following subsections describe the processing rules for integrity
protected NSH and optionally encrypted Context Headers.
7.1. Generic Behavior
This document adheres to the recommendations in [RFC8300] for
handling the Context Headers at both ingress and egress SFC boundary
nodes. That is, to strip such context headers.
Failures to inject or validate the Context Headers defined in this
document SHOULD be logged locally while a notification alarm MAY be
sent to an SFC control element. Similarly, failure to validate the
integrity of the NSH data MUST cause that packet to be discarded
while a notification alarm MAY be sent to an SFC control element.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
The details of sending notification alarms (i.e., the parameters
affecting the transmission of the notification alarms depend on the
information in the context header such as frequency, thresholds, and
content in the alarm) SHOULD be configurable by the SFC control
plane.
SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies MAY be instructed to strip some
encrypted Context Headers from the packet or to pass the data to the
next SF in the service function chain after processing the content of
the Context Headers. If no instruction is provided, the default
behavior for intermediary SFC-aware nodes is to maintain such Context
Headers so that the information can be passed to next SFC-aware hops.
SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies MUST re-apply the integrity protection
if any modification is made to the Context Headers (strip a Context
Header, update the content of an existing Context Header, insert a
new Context Header).
An SFC-aware SF or SFC Proxy that is not allowed to decrypt any
Context Headers MUST NOT be given access to the ENC_KEY.
Otherwise, an SFC-aware SF or SFC Proxy that receives encrypted
Context Headers, for which it is not allowed to consume a specific
Context Header it decrypts (but consumes others), MUST keep that
Context Header unaltered when forwarding the packet upstream.
Only one instance of "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context Header
(Section 5) is allowed. If multiple instances of "MAC and Encrypted
Metadata" Context Header are included in an NSH packet, the SFC data
element MUST process the first instance and ignore subsequent
instances, and MAY log or increase a counter for this event as per
Section 2.5.1 of [RFC8300].
MTU and fragmentation considerations are discussed in Section 5 of
[RFC8300]. Those considerations are not reiterated here.
7.2. MAC NSH Data Generation
If the Context Headers are not encrypted, the HMAC algorithm
discussed in [RFC4868] is used to integrity protect the target NSH
data. An NSH imposer inserts a "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context
Header for integrity protection (Section 5).
The NSH imposer computes the message integrity for the target NSH
data (depending on the integrity protection scope discussed in
Section 5) using MAC_KEY and HMAC algorithm. It inserts the MAC in
the "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context Header. The length of the
MAC is decided by the HMAC algorithm adopted for the particular key
identifier.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
The Message Authentication Code (T) computation process can be
illustrated as follows:
T = HMAC-SHA-256-128(MAC_KEY, A)
An entity in the SFP that intends to update the NSH MUST follow the
above behavior to maintain message integrity of the NSH for
subsequent validations.
7.3. Encrypted NSH Metadata Generation
An NSH imposer can encrypt Context Headers carrying privacy-sensitive
metadata, i.e., encrypted and unencrypted metadata may be carried
simultaneously in the same NSH packet (Figure 9).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ver|O|U| TTL | Length |U|U|U|U|MD Type| Next Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Service Path Identifier | Service Index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Variable-Length Unencrypted Context Headers (opt.) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Key Identifier ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Timestamp ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ MAC and Encrypted Context Headers ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: NSH with Encrypted and Unencrypted Metadata
In an SFC-enabled domain where pervasive monitoring [RFC7258] is
possible, all Context Headers carrying privacy-sensitive metadata
MUST be encrypted; doing so privacy-sensitive metadata is not
revealed to attackers. Privacy specific threats are discussed in
Section 5.2 of [RFC6973].
Using K and authenticated encryption algorithm, the NSH imposer
encrypts the Context Headers (as set by the control plane Section 3),
computes the message integrity for the target NSH data, and inserts
the resulting payload in the "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context
Header (Section 5). The entire TLV carrying a privacy-sensitive
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
metadata is encrypted (that is, including the MD Class, Type, Length,
and associated metadata of each Context Header).
The message Authentication Tag (T) and ciphertext (E) computation
process can be illustrated as follows:
MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K,
ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K,
E = CBC-PKCS7-ENC(ENC_KEY, P),
M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL),
T = initial T_LEN octets of M.
MAC and Encrypted Metadata = E || T
As specified in [RFC7518], the octet string (AL) is equal to the
number of bits in the Additional Authenticated Data (A) expressed as
a 64-bit unsigned big-endian integer.
An authorized entity in the SFP that intends to update the content of
an encrypted Context Header or needs to add a new encrypted Context
Header MUST also follow the aforementioned behavior.
An SFF or SFC-aware SF or SFC Proxy that only has access to the
MAC_KEY, but not the ENC_KEY, computes the message Authentication Tag
(T) after decrementing the TTL (by the SFF) or SI (by an SF or SFC
Proxy) and replaces the Authentication Tag in the NSH with the
computed Authentication Tag. Similarly, an SFC-aware SF (or SFC
Proxy) that does not modify the encrypted Context headers also
follows the aforementioned behavior.
The message Authentication Tag (T) computation process can be
illustrated as follows:
M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL),
T = initial T_LEN octets of M.
7.4. Timestamp for Replay Attack
The received NSH is accepted if the Timestamp (TS) in the NSH is
recent enough to the reception time of the NSH (TSrt). The following
formula is used for this check:
-Delta < (TSrt ? TS) < +Delta
The RECOMMENDED value for the allowed Delta is 2 seconds. If the
timestamp is not within the boundaries, then the SFC data plane
element receiving such packet MUST discard the NSH message.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
All SFC data plane elements must be synchronized among themselves.
These elements may be synchronized to a global reference time.
7.5. NSH Data Validation
When an SFC data plane element receives an NSH packet, it MUST first
ensure that a "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context Header is
included. It MUST silently discard the message if the timestamp is
invalid (Section 7.4). It MUST log an error at least once per the
SPI for which the "MAC and Encrypted Metadata" Context Header is
missing.
If the timestamp check is successfuly passed, the SFC data plane
element proceeds then with NSH data integrity validation. The SFC
data plane element computes the message integrity for the target NSH
data (depending on the integrity protection scope discussed in
Section 5) using the MAC_KEY and HMAC algorithm for the key
identifier. If the value of the newly generated digest is identical
to the one enclosed in the NSH, the SFC data plane element is certain
that the NSH data has not been tampered and validation is therefore
successful. Otherwise, the NSH packet MUST be discarded.
7.6. Decryption of NSH Metadata
If entitled to consume a supplied encrypted Context Header, an SFC-
aware SF or SFC Proxy decrypts metadata using (K) and decryption
algorithm for the key identifier in the NSH.
Authenticated encryption algorithm has only a single output, either a
plaintext or a special symbol (FAIL) that indicates that the inputs
are not authentic (Section 5.2.2.2 of [RFC7518]).
8. Security Considerations
NSH security considerations are discussed in Section 8 of [RFC8300].
The guidelines for cryptographic key management are discussed in
[RFC4107].
The interaction between the SFC-aware data plane elements and a key
management system MUST NOT be transmitted in clear since this would
completely destroy the security benefits of the integrity protection
solution defined in this document. The secret key (K) must have an
expiration time assigned as the latest point in time before which the
key may be used for integrity protection of NSH data and encryption
of Context Headers. Prior to the expiration of the secret key, all
participating service function nodes SHOULD have the control plane
distribute an new key identifier and associated keying material, so
that when the secret key is expired those nodes are prepared with the
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
new secret key. This allows the NSH Imposer to switch to the new key
identifier as soon as necessary. It is RECOMMENDED that the next key
identifier be distributed by the control plane well prior to the
secret key expiration time.
NSH data are exposed to several threats:
o A man-in-the-middle attacker modifying NSH data.
o Attacker spoofing NSH data.
o Attacker capturing and replaying NSH data.
o Metadata in Context Headers revealing privacy-sensitive
information to attackers.
o Attacker replacing the packet on which NSH is imposed with a bogus
or malicious packet.
In an SFC-enabled domain where the above attacks are possible, NSH
data MUST be integrity-protected and replay-protected, and privacy-
sensitive NSH metadata MUST be encrypted for confidentiality
preservation purposes. The Base and Service Path headers are not
encrypted.
MACs with two levels of assurance are defined in Section 5.
Considerations specific to each level of assurance are discussed in
the following subsections.
The attacks discussed in [I-D.nguyen-sfc-security-architecture] are
handled owing to the solution specified in this document, except for
attacks dropping packets. Such attacks can be detected relying upon
statistical analysis; such analysis is out of scope of this document.
Also, if SFFs are not involved in the integrity checks, a misbehaving
SFF which decrements SI while this should be done by an SF (SF bypass
attack) will be detected by an upstream SF because the integrity
check will fail.
8.1. MAC#1
An active attacker can potentially modify the Base header (e.g.,
decrement the TTL so the next SFF in the SFP discards the NSH
packet). In the meantime, an active attacker can also drop NSH
packets. As such, this attack is not considered an attack against
the security mechanism specified in the document.
No device other than the SFC-aware SFs in the SFC-enabled domain
should be able to update the integrity protected NSH data.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
Similarly, no device other than the SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies in
the SFC-enabled domain be able to decrypt and update the Context
Headers carrying privacy-sensitive metadata. In other words, if the
SFC-aware SFs and SFC proxies in the SFC-enabled domain are
considered fully trusted to act on the NSH data, only they can have
access to privacy-sensitive NSH metadata and the keying material used
to integrity protect NSH data and encrypt Context Headers.
8.2. MAC#2
SFFs can detect whether an illegitimate node has altered the content
of the Base header. Such messages MUST be discarded with appropriate
logs and alarms generated.
9. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to assign the following types from the
"NSH IETF-Assigned Optional Variable-Length Metadata Types" (0x0000
IETF Base NSH MD Class) registry available at:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/nsh/nsh.xhtml#optional-variable-
length-metadata-types.
+-------+-------------------------------+----------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+===============================+================+
| TBD1 | MAC and Encrypted Metadata #1 | [ThisDocument] |
| TBD2 | MAC and Encrypted Metadata #2 | [ThisDocument] |
+-------+-------------------------------+----------------+
10. Acknowledgements
This document was edited as a follow up to the discussion in
IETF#104: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/104/materials/slides-
104-sfc-sfc-chair-slides-01 (slide 7).
Thanks to Joel Halpern, Christian Jacquenet, Dirk von Hugo, Tal
Mizrahi, Daniel Migault, and Diego Lopez for the comments.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, DOI 10.17487/RFC4107,
June 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4107>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7665] Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Ed., Elzur, U., Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed.,
"Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8300>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Challenges and Changes in the
Internet Threat Model", draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-
t-03 (work in progress), March 2020.
[I-D.ietf-ntp-packet-timestamps]
Mizrahi, T., Fabini, J., and A. Morton, "Guidelines for
Defining Packet Timestamps", draft-ietf-ntp-packet-
timestamps-09 (work in progress), March 2020.
[I-D.nguyen-sfc-security-architecture]
Nguyen, T. and M. Park, "A Security Architecture Against
Service Function Chaining Threats", draft-nguyen-sfc-
security-architecture-00 (work in progress), November
2019.
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7498] Quinn, P., Ed. and T. Nadeau, Ed., "Problem Statement for
Service Function Chaining", RFC 7498,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7498, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7498>.
[RFC7635] Reddy, T., Patil, P., Ravindranath, R., and J. Uberti,
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Extension for
Third-Party Authorization", RFC 7635,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7635, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7635>.
[RFC8459] Dolson, D., Homma, S., Lopez, D., and M. Boucadair,
"Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC)", RFC 8459,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8459, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8459>.
Authors' Addresses
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for the NSH June 2020
Dan Wing
Citrix Systems, Inc.
USA
Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
Boucadair, et al. Expires December 20, 2020 [Page 27]
