Network Working Group L. Dunbar
Internet Draft Futurewei
Intended status: Informational A. Malis
Expires: January 26, 2021 Malis Consulting
C. Jacquenet
Orange
July 26, 2020
Networks Connecting to Hybrid Cloud DCs: Gap Analysis
draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-07
Abstract
This document analyzes the IETF routing area technical gaps that may
affect the dynamic connection to workloads and applications hosted
in hybrid Cloud Data Centers from enterprise premises.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Conventions used in this document..............................3
3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources.....................4
3.1. Multiple PEs connecting to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs......6
3.2. Access Control for workloads in the Cloud DCs.............6
3.3. NAT Traversal.............................................7
3.4. BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet..............7
3.5. Multicast traffic from/to the remote edges................8
4. Gap Analysis of Traffic over Multiple Underlay Networks........9
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths......................10
5.1. Control Plane for Cloud Access via Heterogeneous Networks11
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages................................12
5.2.1. Lack ways to differentiate traffic in Cloud DCs.....12
5.2.2. Miss attributes in Tunnel-Encap.....................12
5.3. SECURE-EVPN/BGP-EDGE-DISCOVERY...........................12
5.4. SECURE-L3VPN.............................................13
5.5. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports............14
6. Gap Summary...................................................14
7. Manageability Considerations..................................15
8. Security Considerations.......................................16
9. IANA Considerations...........................................16
10. References...................................................16
10.1. Normative References....................................16
10.2. Informative References..................................16
11. Acknowledgments..............................................17
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1. Introduction
[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the problems enterprises face today
when interconnecting their branch offices with dynamic workloads
hosted in third party data centers (a.k.a. Cloud DCs). In
particular, this document analyzes the available routing protocols
to identify whether there are any gaps that may impede such
interconnection which may for example justify additional
specification effort to define proper protocol extensions.
For the sake of readability, an edge, C-PE, or CPE are used
interchangeably throughout this document. More precisely:
. Edge: may include multiple devices (virtual or physical);
. C-PE: provider-owned edge, e.g. for SECURE-EVPN's PE-based
BGP/MPLS VPN, where PE is the edge node;
. CPE: device located in enterprise premises.
2. Conventions used in this document
Cloud DC: Third party Data Centers that usually host applications
and workload owned by different organizations or
tenants.
Controller: Used interchangeably with Overlay controller to manage
overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the path
conditions between sites.
CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Network designed and deployed from
CPEs. This is to differentiate from most commonly used
PE-based VPNs a la RFC 4364.
OnPrem: On Premises data centers and branch offices
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3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources
Because of the ephemeral property of the selected Cloud DCs for
specific workloads/Apps, an enterprise or its network service
provider may not have direct physical connections to the Cloud DCs
that are optimal for hosting the enterprise's specific
workloads/Apps. Under those circumstances, an overlay network design
can be an option to interconnect the enterprise's on-premises data
centers & branch offices to its desired Cloud DCs.
However, overlay paths established over the public Internet can have
unpredictable performance, especially over long distances.
Therefore, it is highly desirable to minimize the distance or the
number of segments that traffic had to be forwarded over the public
Internet.
The Metro Ethernet Forum's Cloud Service Architecture [MEF-Cloud]
also describes a use case of network operators using Overlay paths
over an LTE network or the public Internet for the last mile access
where the VPN service providers cannot always provide the required
physical infrastructure.
In some scenarios, some overlay edge nodes may not be directly
attached to the PEs that participate to the delivery and the
operation of the enterprise's VPN.
When using an overlay network to connect the enterprise's sites to
the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs, the existing C-PEs at
enterprise's sites have to be upgraded to connect to the said
overlay network. If the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs need to be
connected to many sites, the upgrade process can be very expensive.
[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes a hybrid network approach that extends
the existing MPLS-based VPNs to the Cloud DC Workloads over the
access paths that are not under the VPN provider's control. To make
it work properly, a small number of the PEs of the BGP/MPLS VPN can
be designated to connect to the remote workloads via secure IPsec
tunnels. Those designated PEs are shown as fPE (floating PE or
smart PE) in Figure 3. Once the secure IPsec tunnels are
established, the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs can be reached by the
enterprise's VPN without upgrading all of the enterprise's CPEs. The
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only CPE that needs to connect to the overlay network would be a
virtualized CPE instantiated within the cloud DC.
+--------+ +--------+
| Host-a +--+ +----| Host-b |
| | | (') | |
+--------+ | +-----------+ ( ) +--------+
| +-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +--+-+ (_)
| | CPE|--|PE| |PE+--+ CPE| |
+--| | | | | | | |---+
+-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +----+
/ | |
/ | MPLS +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+------+-+ | Network |fPE-1| |CPE || Host |
| Host | | | |- --| || d |
| c | +-----+ +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+--------+ |fPE-2|-----+
+---+-+ (|)
(|) (|) Overlay
(|) (|) over any access
+=\======+=========+
// \ | Cloud DC \\
// \ ++-----+ \\
+ |
| vCPE |
+-+----+
----+-------+-------+-----
| |
+---+----+ +---+----+
| Remote | | Remote |
| App-1 | | App-2 |
+--------+ +--------+
Figure 1: VPN Extension to Cloud DC
In Figure 1, the optimal Cloud DC to host the workloads (as a
function of the proximity, capacity, pricing, or any other criteria
chosen by the enterprises) does not have a direct connection to the
PEs of the NGP/MPLS VPN that interconnects the enterprise's sites.
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3.1. Multiple PEs connecting to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs
To extend BGP/MPLS VPNs to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs, it is
necessary to establish secure tunnels (such as IPsec tunnels)
between the PEs and the vCPEs.
Even though a set of PEs can be manually selected for a specific
cloud data center, there are no standard protocols for those PEs to
interact with the vCPEs instantiated in the third party cloud data
centers over unsecure networks. The interaction includes exchanging
performance, route information, etc..
When there is more than one PE available for use (as there should be
for resiliency purposes or because of the need to support multiple
cloud DCs geographically scattered), it is not straightforward to
designate an egress PE to remote vCPEs based on applications. It
might not be possible for PEs to recognize all applications because
too much traffic traversing the PEs.
When there are multiple floating PEs that have established IPsec
tunnels with a remote CPE, the remove CPE can forward outbound
traffic to the optimal PE, which in turn forwards traffic to egress
PEs to reach the final destinations. However, it is not
straightforward for the ingress PE to select which egress PEs to
send traffic. For example, in Figure 1:
- fPE-1 is the optimal PE for communication between App-1 <->
Host-a due to latency, pricing or other criteria.
- fPE-2 is the optimal PE for communication between App-1 <->
Host-b.
3.2. Access Control for workloads in the Cloud DCs
There is widespread diffusion of access policy for Cloud Resource,
some of which is not easy for verification and validation. Because
there are multiple parties involved in accessing Cloud Resources,
policy enforcement points are not easily visible for policy
refinement, monitoring, and testing.
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The current state of the art for specifying access policies for
Cloud Resources could be improved by having automated and reliable
tools to map the user-friendly (natural language) rules into machine
readable policies and to provide interfaces for enterprises to self-
manage policy enforcement points for their own workloads.
3.3. NAT Traversal
Cloud DCs that only assign private IPv4 addresses to the
instantiated workloads assume that traffic to/from the workload
usually needs to traverse NATs.
There is no automatic way for an enterprise's network controller to
be informed of the NAT properties for its workloads in Cloud DCs
One potential solution could be utilizing the messages sent during
initialization of an IKE VPN when NAT Traversal option is enabled.
There are some inherent problems while sending IPSec packets through
NAT devices. One way to overcome these problems is to encapsulate
IPSec packets in UDP. To do this effectively, there is a discovery
phase in IKE (Phase1) that tries to determine if either of the IPSec
gateways is behind a NAT device. If a NAT device is found, IPSec-
over-UDP is proposed during IPSec (Phase 2) negotiation. If there is
no NAT device detected, IPSec is used
Another potential solution could be allowing the virtual CPE in
Cloud DCs to solicit a STUN (Session Traversal of UDP Through
Network Address Translation, [RFC3489]) Server to get the
information about the NAT property, the public IP addresses and port
numbers so that such information can be communicated to the relevant
peers.
3.4. BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet
Even though an EBGP (external BGP) Multi-Hop design can be used to
connect peers that are not directly connected to each other, there
are still some issues about extending BGP from MPLS VPN PEs to
remote CPEs in cloud DCs via any access path (e.g., Internet).
The path between the remote CPEs and VPN PEs that maintain VPN
routes can traverse untrusted segments.
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EBGP Multi-hop design requires configuration on both peers, either
manually or via NETCONF from a controller. To use EBGP between a PE
and remote CPEs, the PE has to be manually configured with the
"next-hop" set to the IP address of the CPEs. When remote CPEs,
especially remote virtualized CPEs are dynamically instantiated or
removed, the configuration of Multi-Hop EBGP on the PE has to be
changed accordingly.
Egress peering engineering (EPE) is not sufficient. Running BGP on
virtualized CPEs in Cloud DCs requires GRE tunnels to be
established first, which requires the remote CPEs to support
address and key management capabilities. RFC 7024 (Virtual Hub &
Spoke) and Hierarchical VPN do not support the required
properties.
Also, there is a need for a mechanism to automatically trigger
configuration changes on PEs when remote CPEs' are instantiated or
moved (leading to an IP address change) or deleted.
EBGP Multi-hop design does not include a security mechanism by
default. The PE and remote CPEs need secure communication channels
when connecting via the public Internet.
Remote CPEs, if instantiated in Cloud DCs might have to traverse
NATs to reach PEs. It is not clear how BGP can be used between
devices located beyond the NAT and the devices located behind the
NAT. It is not clear how to configure the Next Hop on the PEs to
reach private IPv4 addresses.
3.5. Multicast traffic from/to the remote edges
Among the multiple floating PEs that are reachable from a remote CPE
in a Cloud DC, multicast traffic sent by the remote CPE towards the
MPLS VPN can be forwarded back to the remote CPE due to the PE
receiving the multicast packets forwarding the multicast/broadcast
frame to other PEs that in turn send to all attached CPEs. This
process may cause traffic loops.
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This problem can be solved by selecting one floating PE as the CPE's
Designated Forwarder, similar to TRILL's Appointed Forwarders
[RFC6325].
BGP/MPLS VPNs do not have features like TRILL's Appointed
Forwarders.
4. Gap Analysis of Traffic over Multiple Underlay Networks
Very often the Hybrid Cloud DCs are interconnected by multiple types
of underlay networks, such as VPN, public Internet, wireless and
wired infrastructures, etc. Sometimes the enterprises' VPN providers
do not have direct access to the Cloud DCs that host some specific
applications or workloads operated by the enterprise.
When reached by an untrusted network, all sensitive data to/from
this virtual CPE have to be encrypted, usually by means of IPsec
tunnels. When reached by a trusted direct connect paths, sensitive
data can be forwarded without encryption for better performance.
If a virtual CPE in Cloud DC can be reached by both trusted and
untrusted paths, better performance can be achieved to have a mixed
encrypted and unencrypted traffic depending which paths the traffic
is forwarded. However, there is no appropriate control plane
protocol to achieve this automatically.
Some networks achieve the IPsec tunnel automation by using the
modified NHRP protocol [RFC2332] to register network facing ports of
the edge nodes with their Controller (or NHRP server), which then
maps a private VPN address to a public IP address of the destination
node/port. DSVPN [DSVPN] or DMVPN [DMVPN] are used to establish
tunnels between WAN ports of SDWAN edge nodes.
NHRP was originally intended for ATM address resolution, and as a
result, it misses many attributes that are necessary for dynamic
virtual C-PE registration to the controller, such as:
- Interworking with the MPLS VPN control plane. An overlay edge can
have some ports facing the MPLS VPN network over which packets can
be forwarded without any encryption and some ports facing the
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public Internet over which sensitive traffic needs to be
encrypted.
- Scalability: NHRP/DSVPN/DMVPN work fine with small numbers of edge
nodes. When a network has more than 100 nodes, these protocols do
not scale well.
- NHRP does not have the IPsec attributes, which are needed for
peers to build Security Associations over the public Internet.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode the C-PE supported
encapsulation types, such as IPsec-GRE or IPsec-VxLAN.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode C-PE Location
identifiers, such as Site Identifier, System ID, and/or Port ID.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe the gateway(s) to
which the C-PE is attached. When a C-PE is instantiated in a Cloud
DC, it is desirable for the C-PE's owner to be informed about how
and where the C-PE is attached.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe C-PE's NAT
properties if the C-PE is using private IPv4 addresses, such as
the NAT type, Private address, Public address, Private port,
Public port, etc.
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths
Most likely, enterprises (especially the largest ones) already have
their C-PEs interconnected by VPNs, based upon VPN techniques like
EVPN, L2VPN, or L3VPN. Their VPN providers might have direct
paths/links to the Cloud DCs that host their workloads and
applications.
When there is short term high traffic volume that can't justify
increasing the VPNs capacity, enterprises can utilize public
internet to reach their Cloud vCPEs. Then it is necessary for the
vCPEs to communicate with the controller on how traffic is
distributed among multiple heterogeneous underlay networks and to
manage secure tunnels over untrusted networks.
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+---+
+--------------|RR |----------+
/ Untrusted +-+-+ \
/ +----------------------
/ | \ Cloud DC
+----+ +---------+ packets encrypted over | +------+ +----+
| TN3|--| A1-----+ Untrusted +-------+ |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE A2-\ | | vCPE | +----+
+----+ | A A3--+--+ +---+ | | B | +----+
| TN2|--| | |PE+--------------+PE |---+ |--| TN3|
+----+ +---------+ +--+ trusted +---+ | +------+ +----+
| WAN | |
+----+ +---------+ +--+ packets +---+ | +------+ +----+
| TN1|--| C1--|PE| go natively |PE |---+ |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE C2--+--+ without encry+---+ | | vCPE | +----+
| C | +--------------+ | | D |
| | | | |
+----+ | C3--| without encrypt over | | | +----+
| TN2|--| C4--+---- Untrusted --+------+ |--| TN2|
+----+ +---------+ | +------+ +----+
|
+------------------------
Figure 2: vCPEs reached by Hybrid Paths
5.1. Control Plane for Cloud Access via Heterogeneous Networks
The Control Plane for managing applications and workloads in cloud
DCs reachable by heterogeneous networks need to include the
following properties:
- vCPE in a cloud DCs needs to communicate with its controller of
the properties of the directly connected underlay networks.
- Need Controller-facilitated IPsec SA attributes and NAT
information distribution
o The controller facilitates and manages the peer
authentication for all IPsec tunnels terminated at the
vCPEs.
- Establishing and Managing the topology and reachability for
services attached to the vCPEs in Cloud DCs.
o This is for the overlay layer's route distribution, so
that a vCPE can populate its overlay routing table with
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entries that identify the next hop for reaching a specific
route/service attached to the vCPEs.
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages
5.2.1. Lack ways to differentiate traffic in Cloud DCs
One enterprise can have different types of applications in one Cloud
DC. Some can be production applications, some can be testing
applications, and some can belong to one specific departments. The
traffic to/from different applications might need to traverse
different network paths or need to be differentiated by Control
plane and data plane.
BGP already has built-in mechanisms, like Route Target, to
differentiate different VPNs. But Route Target (RT) is for MPLS
based VPNs, therefore RT is not appropriate to directly apply to
virtual paths laid over mixed VPNs, IPsec or public underlay
networks.
5.2.2. Miss attributes in Tunnel-Encap
[Tunnel-Encap] describes the BGP UPDATE Tunnel Path Attribute that
advertises endpoints' tunnel encapsulation capabilities for the
respective attached client routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path
Attribute. The receivers of the BGP UPDATE can use any of the
supported encapsulations encoded in the Tunnel Path Attribute for
the routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path Attribute.
Here are some of the issues raised by using [Tunnel-Encap] to
distribute the property of client routes be carried by mixed of
hybrid networks:
- [Tunnel-Encap] doesn't have encoding methods to advertise that a
route can be carried by mixed of IPsec tunnels and other already
supported tunnels.
- The mechanism defined in [Tunnel-Encap] does not facilitate the
exchange of IPsec SA-specific attributes.
5.3. SECURE-EVPN/BGP-EDGE-DISCOVERY
[SECURE-EVPN] describes a solution that utilize BGP as control plane
for the Scenario #1 described in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage]. It relies upon a
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BGP cluster design to facilitate the key and policy exchange among
PE devices to create private pair-wise IPsec Security Associations.
[Secure-EVPN] attaches all the IPsec SA information to the actual
client routes.
[BGP-Edge-DISCOVERY] proposes BGP UPDATEs from client routers only
include the IPsec SA identifiers (ID) to reference the IPsec SA
attributes being advertised by separate Underlay Property BGP UPDATE
messages. If a client route can be encrypted by multiple IPsec SAs,
then multiple IPsec SA IDs are included in the Tunnel-Encap Path
attribute for the client route.
[BGP-Edge-DISCOVERY] proposes detailed IPsec SA attributes are
advertised in a separate BGP UPDATE for the underlay networks.
[Secure-EVPN] and [BGP-Edge-Discovery] differs in the information
included in the client routes. [Secure-EVPN] attaches all the IPsec
SA information to the actual client routes, whereas the [BGP-Edge-
Discovery] only includes the IPsec SA IDs for the client routes. The
IPsec SA IDs used by [BGP-Edge-Discovery] is pointing to the SA-
Information which are advertised separately, with all the SA-
Information attached to routes which describe the SDWAN underlay,
such as WAN Ports or Node address.
5.4. SECURE-L3VPN
[SECURE-L3VPN] describes a method to enrich BGP/MPLS VPN [RFC4364]
capabilities to allow some PEs to connect to other PEs via public
networks. [SECURE-L3VPN] introduces the concept of Red Interface &
Black Interface used by PEs, where the RED interfaces are used to
forward traffic into the VPN, and the Black Interfaces are used
between WAN ports through which only IPsec-formatted packets are
forwarded to the Internet or to any other backbone network, thereby
eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the backbone.
[SECURE-L3VPN] assumes PEs use MPLS over IPsec when sending traffic
through the Black Interfaces.
[SECURE-L3VPN] is useful, but it misses the aspects of aggregating
VPN and Internet underlays. In addition:
- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that a CPE "registers" with the RR.
However, it does not say how. It assumes that the remote CPEs are
pre-configured with the IPsec SA manually. For overlay networks to
connect Hybrid Cloud DCs, Zero Touch Provisioning is expected.
Manual configuration is not an option.
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- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that C-PEs and RRs are connected via an
IPsec tunnel. For management channel, TLS/DTLS is more economical
than IPsec. The following assumption made by [SECURE-L3VPN] can be
difficult to meet in the environment where zero touch provisioning
is expected:
A CPE must also be provisioned with whatever additional
information is needed in order to set up an IPsec SA with
each of the red RRs
- IPsec requires periodic refreshment of the keys. The [SECURE-
L3VPN] does not provide any information about how to synchronize
the refreshment among multiple nodes.
- IPsec usually sends configuration parameters to two endpoints only
and lets these endpoints negotiate the key. The [SECURE-L3VPN]
assumes that the RR is responsible for creating/managing the key
for all endpoints. When one endpoint is compromised, all other
connections may be impacted.
5.5. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports
When C-PEs have Internet-facing ports, additional security risks are
raised.
To mitigate security risks, in addition to requiring Anti-DDoS
features on C-PEs, it is necessary for C-PEs to support means to
determine whether traffic sent by remote peers is legitimate to
prevent spoofing attacks, in particular.
6. Gap Summary
Here is the summary of the technical gaps discussed in this
document:
- For Accessing Cloud Resources
a) Traffic Path Management: when a remote vCPE can be reached by
multiple PEs of one provider VPN network, it is not
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straightforward to designate which egress PE to the remote
vCPE based on applications or performance.
b) NAT Traversal: There is no automatic way for an enterprise's
network controller to be informed of the NAT properties for
its workloads in Cloud DCs.
c) There is no loop prevention for the multicast traffic to/from
remote vCPE in Cloud DCs.
Needs a feature like Appointed Forwarder specified by TRILL to
prevent multicast data frames from looping around.
d) BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via untrusted networks.
- Missing control plane to manage the propagation of the property of
networks connected to the virtual nodes in Cloud DCs.
BGP UPDATE propagate client's routes information, but don't
distinguish underlay networks.
- Issues of aggregating traffic over private paths and Internet
paths
a) Control plane messages for different overlay segmentations
needs to be differentiated. User traffic belonging to
different segmentations need to be differentiated.
b) BGP Tunnel Encap doesn't have ways to indicate a route or
prefix that can be carried by both IPsec tunnels and VPN
tunnels
c) Missing clear methods in preventing attacks from Internet-
facing ports
7. Manageability Considerations
Zero touch provisioning of overlay networks to interconnect Hybrid
Clouds is highly desired. It is necessary for a newly powered up
edge node to establish a secure connection (by means of TLS, DTLS,
etc.) with its controller.
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8. Security Considerations
Cloud Services are built upon shared infrastructures, therefore
not secure by nature.
Secure user identity management, authentication, and access
control mechanisms are important. Developing appropriate security
measurements can enhance the confidence needed by enterprises to
fully take advantage of Cloud Services.
9. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove
this section before publication.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC8192] S. Hares, et al, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF) Problem Statement and Use Cases", July 2017
[RFC5521] P. Mohapatra, E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation Subsequent
Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP Tunnel
Encapsulation Attribute", April 2009.
[BGP-EDGE-DISCOVERY] L. Dunbar, et al, "BGP UPDATE for SDWAN Edge
Discovery ", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-edge-discovery-00,
Work-in-progress, July 2020.
[BGP-SDWAN-Usage] L. Dunbar, et al, "BGP Usage for SDWAN Overlay
Networks ", draft-dunbar-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-08, work-in-
progress, July 2020.
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[Tunnel-Encap] K. Patel, et al, "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation
Attribute", draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-17, July 2020.
[SECURE-EVPN] A. Sajassi, et al, draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01,
work in progress, March 2019.
[SECURE-L3VPN] E. Rosen, "Provide Secure Layer L3VPNs over Public
Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00, work-
in-progress, July 2018
[DMVPN] Dynamic Multi-point VPN:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/dynamic-
multipoint-vpn-dmvpn/index.html
[DSVPN] Dynamic Smart VPN:
http://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/en/thread-390771-1-
1.html
[ITU-T-X1036] ITU-T Recommendation X.1036, "Framework for creation,
storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for
network security", Nov 2007.
[Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect
Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement", draft-dm-
net2cloud-problem-statement-02, June 2018
11. Acknowledgments
Acknowledgements to John Drake for his review and contributions.
Many thanks to John Scudder for stimulating the clarification
discussion on the Tunnel-Encap draft so that our gap analysis can be
more accurate.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis July 2020
Authors' Addresses
Linda Dunbar
Futurewei
Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com
Andrew G. Malis
Malis Consulting
Email: agmalis@gmail.com
Christian Jacquenet
Orange
Rennes, 35000
France
Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com
Dunbar, et al. Expires January 26, 2021 [Page 18]
