OSPF Working Group J. Tantsura
Internet-Draft Nuage Networks
Intended status: Standards Track U. Chunduri
Expires: March 4, 2019 Huawei Technologies
S. Aldrin
Google, Inc
P. Psenak
Cisco Systems
August 31, 2018
Signaling MSD (Maximum SID Depth) using OSPF
draft-ietf-ospf-segment-routing-msd-20
Abstract
This document defines a way for an Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
Router to advertise multiple types of supported Maximum SID Depths
(MSDs) at node and/or link granularity. Such advertisements allow
entities (e.g., centralized controllers) to determine whether a
particular SID stack can be supported in a given network. This
document defines only one type of MSD, but defines an encoding that
can support other MSD types. Here the term OSPF means both OSPFv2
and OSPFv3.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Node MSD Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Link MSD sub-TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Using Node and Link MSD Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
When Segment Routing (SR) paths are computed by a centralized
controller, it is critical that the controller learns the Maximum SID
Depth (MSD) that can be imposed at each node/link on a given SR path
to insure that the SID stack depth of a computed path doesn't exceed
the number of SIDs the node is capable of imposing.
Path Computation Element Protocol(PCEP) SR draft
[I-D.ietf-pce-segment-routing] signals MSD in SR Path Computation
Element Capability TLV and METRIC Object. However, if PCEP is not
supported/configured on the head-end of an SR tunnel or a Binding-SID
anchor node and controller does not participate in IGP routing, it
has no way to learn the MSD of nodes and links. BGP-LS (Distribution
of Link-State and TE Information using Border Gateway Protocol)
[RFC7752] defines a way to expose topology and associated attributes
and capabilities of the nodes in that topology to a centralized
controller. MSD signaling by BGP-LS has been defined in
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-msd]. Typically, BGP-LS is
configured on a small number of nodes that do not necessarily act as
head-ends. In order for BGP-LS to signal MSD for all the nodes and
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links in the network where MSD is relevant, MSD capabilities should
be advertised by every OSPF router in the network.
Other types of MSD are known to be useful. For example,
[I-D.ietf-ospf-mpls-elc] defines Readable Label Depth Capability
(RLDC) that is used by a head-end to insert an Entropy Label (EL) at
a depth that can be read by transit nodes.
This document defines an extension to OSPF used to advertise one or
more types of MSD at node and/or link granularity. In the future it
is expected, that new MSD types will be defined to signal additional
capabilities e.g., entropy labels, SIDs that can be imposed through
recirculation, or SIDs associated with another dataplane e.g., IPv6.
Although MSD advertisements are associated with Segment Routing, the
advertisements MAY be present even if Segment Routing itself is not
enabled. Note that in a non-SR MPLS network, label depth is what is
defined by the MSD advertisements.
1.1. Terminology
This memo makes use of the terms defined in [RFC7770]
BGP-LS: Distribution of Link-State and TE Information using Border
Gateway Protocol
OSPF: Open Shortest Path First
MSD: Maximum SID Depth - the number of SIDs a node or one of its
links can support
PCC: Path Computation Client
PCE: Path Computation Element
PCEP: Path Computation Element Protocol
SR: Segment Routing
SID: Segment Identifier
LSA: Link state advertisement
RI: OSPF Router Information LSA
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1.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Node MSD Advertisement
The node MSD TLV within the body of the OSPF RI Opaque LSA [RFC7770]
is defined to carry the provisioned SID depth of the router
originating the RI LSA. Node MSD is the smallest MSD supported by
the node on the set of interfaces configured for use by the
advertising IGP instance. MSD values may be learned via a hardware
API or may be provisioned.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MSD-Type | MSD-Value | MSD-Type... | MSD-Value... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Node MSD TLV
Type: TBD1
Length: variable (multiple of 2 octets) and represents the total
length of value field in octets.
Value: consists of one or more pairs of a 1 octet MSD-type and 1
octet MSD-Value.
MSD-Type: one of the values defined in the IGP MSD Types registry
defined in [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-msd].
MSD-Value: a number in the range of 0-255. For all MSD-Types, 0
represents lack of the ability to impose MSD stack of any depth; any
other value represents that of the node. This value MUST represent
the lowest value supported by any link configured for use by the
advertising OSPF instance.
This TLV is applicable to OSPFv2 and to OSPFv3 and is optional. The
scope of the advertisement is specific to the deployment.
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When multiple Node MSD TLVs are received from a given router, the
receiver MUST use the first occurrence of the TLV in the Router
Information LSA. If the Node MSD TLV appears in multiple Router
Information LSAs that have different flooding scopes, the Node MSD
TLV in the Router Information LSA with the area-scoped flooding scope
MUST be used. If the Node MSD TLV appears in multiple Router
Information LSAs that have the same flooding scope, the Node MSD TLV
in the Router Information (RI) LSA with the numerically smallest
Instance ID MUST be used and subsequent instances of the Node MSD TLV
MUST be ignored. The RI LSA can be advertised at any of the defined
opaque flooding scopes (link, area, or Autonomous System (AS)). For
the purpose of Node MSD TLV advertisement, area-scoped flooding is
RECOMMENDED.
3. Link MSD sub-TLV
The link sub-TLV is defined to carry the MSD of the interface
associated with the link. MSD values may be learned via a hardware
API or may be provisioned.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MSD-Type | MSD-Value | MSD-Type... | MSD-Value... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Link MSD Sub-TLV
Type:
For OSPFv2, the Link level MSD-Value is advertised as an optional
Sub-TLV of the OSPFv2 Extended Link TLV as defined in [RFC7684], and
has a type of TBD2.
For OSPFv3, the Link level MSD-Value is advertised as an optional
Sub-TLV of the E-Router-LSA TLV as defined in [RFC8362], and has a
type of TBD3.
Length: variable and same as defined in Section 2.
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Value: consists of one or more pairs of a 1 octet MSD-type and 1
octet MSD-Value.
MSD-Type: one of the values defined in the MSD Types registry defined
in [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-msd].
MSD-Value field contains Link MSD of the router originating the
corresponding LSA as specified for OSPFv2 and OSPFv3. Link MSD is a
number in the range of 0-255. For all MSD-Types, 0 represents lack
of the ability to impose MSD stack of any depth; any other value
represents that of the particular link when used as an outgoing
interface.
If this sub-TLV is advertised multiple times in the same OSPFv2
Extended Link Opaque LSA/E-Router-LSA, only the first instance of the
TLV MUST be used by receiving OSPF routers. This situation SHOULD be
logged as an error.
If this sub-TLV is advertised multiple times for the same link in
different OSPF Extended Link Opaque LSAs/E-Router-LSAs originated by
the same OSPF router, the OSPFv2 Extended Link TLV in the OSPFv2
Extended Link Opaque LSA with the smallest Opaque ID or in the OSPFv3
E-Router-LSA with the smallest Link State ID MUST be used by
receiving OSPF routers. This situation MAY be logged as a warning.
4. Using Node and Link MSD Advertisements
When Link MSD is present for a given MSD type, the value of the Link
MSD MUST take preference over the Node MSD. When a Link MSD type is
not signalled but the Node MSD type is, then the value of that Node
MSD type MUST be considered as the corresponding Link MSD type value.
In order to increase flooding efficiency, it is RECOMMENDED, that
routers with homogenous Link MSD values advertise just the Node MSD
value.
Information received in an MSD advertisements is to to ensure that
the controller learns the Maximum SID Depth (MSD) that can be imposed
at each node/link on a given SR path so that the SID stack depth of a
computed path doesn't exceed the number of SIDs the node is capable
of imposing
The meaning of the absence of both Node and Link MSD advertisements
for a given MSD type is specific to the MSD type. Generally it can
only be inferred that the advertising node does not support
advertisement of that MSD type. However, in some cases the lack of
advertisement might imply that the functionality associated with the
MSD type is not supported. The correct interpretation MUST be
specified when an MSD type is defined.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to allocate TLV type (TBD1) from the OSPF
Router Information (RI) TLVs Registry as defined by [RFC7770]. IANA
has allocated the value 12 through the early assignment process.
Also, this document requests IANA to allocate a sub-TLV type (TBD2)
from the OSPFv2 Extended Link TLV Sub-TLVs registry. IANA has
allocated the value 6 through the early assignment process. Finally,
this document requests IANA to allocate a sub-TLV type (TBD3) from
the OSPFv3 Extended-LSA Sub-TLV registry.
6. Security Considerations
Security concerns for OSPF are addressed in [RFC7474], [RFC4552] and
[RFC7166]. Further security analysis for OSPF protocol is done in
[RFC6863]. Security considerations, as specified by [RFC7770],
[RFC7684] and [RFC8362] are applicable to this document.
Implementations MUST assure that malformed TLV and Sub-TLV defined in
this document are detected and do not provide a vulnerability for
attackers to crash the OSPF router or routing process. Reception of
malformed TLV or Sub-TLV SHOULD be counted and/or logged for further
analysis. Logging of malformed TLVs and Sub-TLVs SHOULD be rate-
limited to prevent a Denial of Service (DoS) attack (distributed or
otherwise) from overloading the OSPF control plane.
Advertisement of an incorrect MSD value may result:
If the value is smaller than supported - path computation failing to
compute a viable path.
If the value is larger than supported - instantiation of a path that
can't be supported by the head-end (the node performing the SID
imposition).
The MSD discloses capabilities of the nodes (how many SIDs it
supports), which could provide an indication of the abilities or even
types of the nodes being used. This information could be used to
gain intelligence about devices in the network.
There's no Denial of Service risk specific to this extension, and it
is not vulnerable to replay attacks.
7. Contributors
The following people contributed to this document:
Les Ginsberg
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Email: ginsberg@cisco.com
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Ketan Talaulikar, Tal
Mizrahi, Stephane Litkowski and Bruno Decraene for their reviews and
valuable comments.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-msd]
Tantsura, J., Chunduri, U., Aldrin, S., and L. Ginsberg,
"Signaling MSD (Maximum SID Depth) using IS-IS", draft-
ietf-isis-segment-routing-msd-13 (work in progress), July
2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7684] Psenak, P., Gredler, H., Shakir, R., Henderickx, W.,
Tantsura, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPFv2 Prefix/Link Attribute
Advertisement", RFC 7684, DOI 10.17487/RFC7684, November
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7684>.
[RFC7770] Lindem, A., Ed., Shen, N., Vasseur, JP., Aggarwal, R., and
S. Shaffer, "Extensions to OSPF for Advertising Optional
Router Capabilities", RFC 7770, DOI 10.17487/RFC7770,
February 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7770>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8362] Lindem, A., Roy, A., Goethals, D., Reddy Vallem, V., and
F. Baker, "OSPFv3 Link State Advertisement (LSA)
Extensibility", RFC 8362, DOI 10.17487/RFC8362, April
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8362>.
9.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-msd]
Tantsura, J., Chunduri, U., Mirsky, G., and S. Sivabalan,
"Signaling MSD (Maximum SID Depth) using Border Gateway
Protocol Link-State", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-
routing-msd-02 (work in progress), August 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ospf-mpls-elc]
Xu, X., Kini, S., Sivabalan, S., Filsfils, C., and S.
Litkowski, "Signaling Entropy Label Capability and Entropy
Readable Label-stack Depth Using OSPF", draft-ietf-ospf-
mpls-elc-06 (work in progress), August 2018.
[I-D.ietf-pce-segment-routing]
Sivabalan, S., Filsfils, C., Tantsura, J., Henderickx, W.,
and J. Hardwick, "PCEP Extensions for Segment Routing",
draft-ietf-pce-segment-routing-12 (work in progress), June
2018.
[RFC4552] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, DOI 10.17487/RFC4552, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4552>.
[RFC6863] Hartman, S. and D. Zhang, "Analysis of OSPF Security
According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing
Protocols (KARP) Design Guide", RFC 6863,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6863, March 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6863>.
[RFC7166] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7166, March 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7166>.
[RFC7474] Bhatia, M., Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and A. Lindem, Ed.,
"Security Extension for OSPFv2 When Using Manual Key
Management", RFC 7474, DOI 10.17487/RFC7474, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7474>.
[RFC7752] Gredler, H., Ed., Medved, J., Previdi, S., Farrel, A., and
S. Ray, "North-Bound Distribution of Link-State and
Traffic Engineering (TE) Information Using BGP", RFC 7752,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7752, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7752>.
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Authors' Addresses
Jeff Tantsura
Nuage Networks
Email: jefftant.ietf@gmail.com
Uma Chunduri
Huawei Technologies
Email: uma.chunduri@huawei.com
Sam Aldrin
Google, Inc
Email: aldrin.ietf@gmail.com
Peter Psenak
Cisco Systems
Email: ppsenak@cisco.com
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