MSEC WG D. Ignjatic
Internet-Draft Polycom
Expires: April 22, 2006 L. Dondeti
QUALCOMM
F. Audet
P. Lin
Nortel
October 19, 2005
An additional mode of key distribution in MIKEY: MIKEY-RSA-R
draft-ietf-msec-mikey-rsa-r-01
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Abstract
The MIKEY specification describes several modes of key distribution
to setup secure RTP sessions -- using pre-shared keys, public-keys,
and optionally a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In the public-key
mode, the Initiator encrypts a random key with the Responder's public
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key and sends it to the Responder. In many communication scenarios,
the Initiator may not know the Responder's public key or in some
cases the Responder's ID (e.g., call forwarding) in advance. We
propose a new MIKEY mode that works well in such scenarios. This
mode also enhances the group key management support in MIKEY.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Description of the MIKEY modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Use case motivating the proposed mode . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Case for multiple key download . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. A new MIKEY-RSA mode: MIKEY-RSA-R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Components of the I_MESSAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Components of the R_MESSAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Additions to RFC 3830 message types and other values . . . 8
3.4.1. Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830 . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.2. Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830 . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.3. Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830 . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Sending multiple TGKs in MIKEY messages . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Applicability of the RSA-R and RSA modes . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Impact of the Responder choosing the TGK . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The MIKEY protocol [RFC3830] has three different methods for key
transport or exchange: a pre-shared key mode (PSK), a public-key
(RSA) mode, and an optional Diffie-Hellman exchange (DHE) mode. In
addition, there is also an optional DH-HMAC mode [I-D.ietf-msec-
mikey-dhhmac], bringing the total number of modes to four. The
primary motivation in the protocol design is efficiency and thus all
the exchanges finish in one-half to 1 round-trip; this offers no room
for security parameter negotiation of the key management protocol
itself. In this document, we note that the MIKEY modes are
insufficient to address some deployment scenarious and common use
cases, and propose a new mode called MIKEY-RSA in Reverse mode, or
simply as MIKEY-RSA-R.
Next, MIKEY currently supports the delivery of a single TGK. In
group communication scenarios, the center or sender may need to
establish more than a single TGK. The multiple keys might be to
establish a unicast key and a group key simultaneously or to
establish more than a single group key. Running multiple instances
of MIKEY to receive multiple keys is the only alternative and that is
clearly inefficient.
1.1. Terminology used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
2. Motivation
As noted in the introduction, the MIKEY specification and other
proposals define four different modes of efficient key management for
real-time applications. The modes differ from each other in either
the authentication method of choice (public-key, or symmetric shared
key-based), or the key establishment method of choice (key download,
or key agreement using a Diffie-Hellman exchange). We summarize the
modes, their advantages, and shortcomings in the following and also
describe use cases where these modes might be insufficient or
inefficient.
2.1. Description of the MIKEY modes
In the PSK mode, the Initiator selects a TEK Generation Key (TGK),
encrypts and authenticates it with the PSK, and sends it to the
Responder as part of the first message, viz., I_MESSAGE. The PSK
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mode requires that the Initiator and the Responder have a common
secret key established offline. The PSK mode does not scale to use
cases where any user may want to communicate to any other user in an
Enterprise or the Internet at large. The RSA mode might be more
suitable for such applications.
In the RSA mode, the Initiator selects a TGK, encrypts and
authenticates it with an envelope key, and sends it to the Responder
as part of the first message, viz., I_MESSAGE. The Initiator
includes the envelope key, encrypted with the Responder's public key,
in I_MESSAGE. The I_MESSAGE is replay protected with timestamps, and
signed with the Initiator's public key. The Initiator's ID, CERT and
the Responder's ID that the Initiator intends to talk may be included
in I_MESSAGE. If the Initiator knows several public-keys of the
Responder, it can indicate the key used in a CHASH payload. The RSA
mode works as long as the Initiator knows the Responder's ID and CERT
(or can obtain the CERT independent of the MIKEY protocol). RFC 3830
suggests that an Initiator, in the event that it does not have the
Responder's CERT, may obtain the CERT from a directory agent using
one or more round trips. However, in some cases, the Initiator may
not even know the Responder's ID in advance, and because of that or
for other reasons cannot obtain the Responder's CERT.
In addition to the case where the Responder may have several IDs,
some applications may allow for the Responder's ID to change
unilaterally, as is typical in telephony (e.g., forwarding). In
those cases and in others, the Initiator might be willing to let the
other party establish identity and prove it via an Initiator-trusted
third party (e.g., a Certification Authority or CA).
The DH mode or the DH-HMAC mode of MIKEY might be useful in cases
where the Initiator does not have access to the Responder's exact
identity and/or CERT. In these modes, the two parties engage in an
authenticated DH exchange to derive the TGK. However, the DH modes
have higher computational and communication overhead compared to the
RSA and the PSK modes. More importantly, these modes are unsuitable
for group key distribution.
In summary, in some communication scenarios -- where the Initiator
might not have the correct ID and/or the CERT of the Responder --
none of the MIKEY modes described in [RFC3830] and [I-D.ietf-msec-
mikey-dhhmac] are suitable/efficient for SRTP [RFC3711] key
establishment.
2.2. Use case motivating the proposed mode
In addition to the issues listed above, there are some types of
applications that motivate the new MIKEY mode design proposed in this
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document.
Note that in the MIKEY-RSA mode (as in case of the PSK mode), the
Initiator proposes the RTP security policy, and chooses the TGK.
However, it is also possible that the Initiator wants to allow the
Responder to specify the security policy and send the TGK. This
would be the case in some multicast and group conferencing scenarios.
Consider for example the case of a conferencing scenario where the
convener sends an invitation to a group of people to attend a
meeting. The procedure then might be for the invitees to request the
convener for group key material by sending a MIKEY I_MESSAGE. Thus,
in the MIKEY definition of initiators and responders, the Initiator
is asking the Responder for keying material. Note that this mode of
operation is inline with the MSEC group key management architecture
[RFC4046].
2.3. Case for multiple key download
The MIKEY modes as specified today support the delivery of a single
TGK. In many applications it is necessary to deliver separate keys
for encryption of different streams or programs or in the simplest
case to establish a point-to-point key in addition to a group key.
Currently, to do that one has to run multiple MIKEY sessions, or
(more specifically) send multiple a=keymgmt MIKEY lines for different
streams. That is clearly inefficient. The recipients of MIKEY
messages would spend cycles evaluating the same credentials multiple
times. For that reason, it is necessary that MIKEY supports delivery
of multiple TGKs within a single MIKEY message. This document
includes a specification of how to include multiple TGKs in MIKEY-
RSA-R (it is definitely plausible to use this technique with MIKEY-
PSK and MIKEY-RSA, but that is for discussion).
3. A new MIKEY-RSA mode: MIKEY-RSA-R
3.1. Outline
The proposed solution requires 1 full round trip. The Initiator
sends a signed I_MESSAGE to the intended Responder requesting the
Responder to send the SRTP keying material. The I_MESSAGE MAY
contain the Initiator's CERT or a link to the CERT, and similarly the
Responder's reply, R_MESSAGE MAY contain the Responder's CERT or a
link to it. The Responder can use the Initiator's public key from
the CERT in the I_MESSAGE to send the encrypted TGK in the R_MESSAGE.
Upon receiving the R_MESSAGE, the Initiator can use the CERT in the
R_MESSAGE to verify whether the Responder is in fact the party that
it wants to communicate to, and accept the TGK. We refer to this
protocol as MIKEY-RSA in the reverse mode, or simply as MIKEY-RSA-R.
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The MIKEY-RSA-R mode exchange is defined as follows:
Initiator Responder
--------- ---------
I_MESSAGE = HDR, T, [IDi|CERTi], [IDr], {SP}, SIGNi
R_MESSAGE = HDR, [GenExt(CSB-ID)], T, RAND, [IDr|CERTr], [SP], KEMAC,
PKE, SIGNr
Figure 1: MIKEY-RSA-R mode
3.2. Components of the I_MESSAGE
This method requires a full round trip to download the TGKs. The
I_MESSAGE MUST have the MIKEY HDR and the timestamp payload for
replay protection. The HDR field contains a CSB_ID randomly selected
by the Initiator. The V bit MUST be set to '1' and ignored by the
Responder, as a response is MANDATORY in this mode. The Initiator
MAY indicate the number of CSs supported and fill in the CS map type
and information. The I_MESSAGE MUST be signed by the Initiator
following the procedure to sign MIKEY messages specified in RFC 3830.
The SIGNi payload contains this signature. Thus the I_MESSAGE is
integrity and replay protected.
IDi and CERTi SHOULD be included, but they MAY be left out when it
can be expected that the peer already knows the other party's ID (or
can obtain the certificate in some other manner). For example, this
could be the case if the ID is extracted from SIP. For certificate
handling, authorization, and policies, see Section 4.3. of RFC 3830.
If CERTi is included, it MUST correspond to the private key used to
sign the I_MESSAGE.
If the Responder has multiple Identities, the Initiator MAY also
include the specific ID, IDr, of the Responder that it wants to
communicate with.
The Initiator MAY also send SP payload(s) containing all the security
policies that it supports. If the Responder's does not support any
of the policies included, it should reply with an Error message of
type "Invalid SPpar" (Error no. 10).
The SIGNi is a signature covering the Initiator's MIKEY message,
I_MESSAGE, using the Initiator's signature key (see Section 5.2 of
RFC 3830 for the exact definition). I_MESSAGE is signed to protect
against DoS attacks.
A RAND payload MUST NOT be present in a MIKEY-RSA-R I_MESSAGE.
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3.3. Components of the R_MESSAGE
Upon receiving an I_MESSAGE of the RSA-R format, the Responder MUST
respond with one of the following messages:
o The Responder MUST send an Error message "Message type not
supported" (Error no. 13), if it cannot correctly parse the
received MIKEY message.
o The Responder MUST send an Error message "Invalid SPpar" (Error
no. 10), if it does not support any of the security policies
included in the SP payload.
o The Responder MUST send an R_MESSAGE if SIGNi can be correctly
verified, the timestamp is current, and if an SP payload is
present, one of the security policies proposed matches the
Responder's local policy.
The HDR payload in the R_MESSAGE is formed following the procedure
described in RFC 3830. Specifically, the CSB ID in the HDR payload
MUST be the same as the one in the HDR of the I_MESSAGE. The
Responder MUST fill in the number of CSs and the CS map type and
information fields of the HDR payload.
For group communication, all the members MUST use the same CSB ID in
computing the SRTP keying material. Therefore, for group key
establishment, the Responder MUST include a General Extension Payload
containing a new CSB ID in the R_MESSAGE. If a new CSB ID is present
in the R_MESSAGE, the Initiator and the Responder MUST use that value
in key material computation. This payload MUST not be present in
case of one-to-one communication.
When used in group scenarios with bi-directional media the Responder
SHOULD include two TGK's or TEK's in the KEMAC payload. The first
TGK or TEK SHOULD be used for receiving media on the Initiator's side
and the second one to encrypt/authenticate media originating on the
Initiator's side. This allows all the multicast traffic to be
encrypted/authenticated by the same group key while keys used for
unicast streams from all the group members can still be independent.
The T payload is exactly the same as that received in the I_MESSAGE.
A RAND payload containing a (pseudo-)random string of 128 or more
bits MUST be present in the R_MESSAGE.
IDr and CERTr SHOULD be included, but they MAY be left out when it
can be expected that the peer already knows the other party's ID (or
can obtain the certificate in some other manner). For example, this
could be the case if the ID is extracted from SIP. For certificate
handling, authorization, and policies, see Section 4.3. of RFC 3830.
If CERTr is included, it MUST correspond to the private key used to
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sign the R_MESSAGE.
An SP payload MAY be included in the R_MESSAGE. If an SP payload was
in the I_MESSAGE, then R_MESSAGE MUST contain an SP payload
specifying the security policies of the secure RTP session being
negotiated.
The KEMAC payload contains a set of encrypted sub-payloads and a MAC:
KEMAC = E(encr_key, IDr || {TGK}) || MAC The first payload (IDr) in
KEMAC is the identity of the Responder (not a certificate, but
generally the same ID as the one specified in the certificate). Each
of the following payloads (TGK) includes a TGK randomly and
independently chosen by the Responder (and possible other related
parameters, e.g., the key lifetime). The encrypted part is then
followed by a MAC, which is calculated over the KEMAC payload. The
encr_key and the auth_key are derived from the envelope key, env_key,
as specified in Section 4.1.4. of RFC 3830. The payload definitions
are specified in Section 6.2 of RFC 3830.
The Responder encrypts and integrity protects the TGK with keys
derived from a randomly/pseudo-randomly chosen envelope key, and
encrypts the envelope key itself with the public key of the
Initiator. The PKE payload contains the encrypted envelope key: PKE
= E(PKi, env_key). It is encrypted using the Initiator's public key
(PKi). Note that, as suggested in RFC 3830, the envelope key MAY be
cached and used as the PSK for re-keying.
To compute the signature that goes in the SIGNr payload, the
Responder MUST sign R_MESSAGE (excluding the SIGNr payload itself) ||
IDi || IDr || T. Note that the added identities and timestamp are
identical to those transported in the ID and T payloads.
3.4. Additions to RFC 3830 message types and other values
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3.4.1. Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830
Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830:
Data type | Value | Comment
------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre-shared | 0 | Initiator's pre-shared key message
PSK ver msg | 1 | Verification message of a Pre-shared key msg
Public key | 2 | Initiator's public-key transport message
PK ver msg | 3 | Verification message of a public-key message
D-H init | 4 | Initiator's DH exchange message
D-H resp | 5 | Responder's DH exchange message
Error | 6 | Error message
RSA-R I_MSG | 7 | Initiator's public-key message in RSA-R mode
RSA-R R_MSG | 8 | Responder's public-key message in RSA-R mode
Figure 2: Table 6.1a from RFC 3830 (Revised)
3.4.2. Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830
Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830:
Error no | Value | Comment
-------------------------------------------------------
Auth failure | 0 | Authentication failure
Invalid TS | 1 | Invalid timestamp
Invalid PRF | 2 | PRF function not supported
Invalid MAC | 3 | MAC algorithm not supported
Invalid EA | 4 | Encryption algorithm not supported
Invalid HA | 5 | Hash function not supported
Invalid DH | 6 | DH group not supported
Invalid ID | 7 | ID not supported
Invalid Cert | 8 | Certificate not supported
Invalid SP | 9 | SP type not supported
Invalid SPpar | 10 | SP parameters not supported
Invalid DT | 11 | not supported Data type
Unspecified error | 12 | an unspecified error occurred
Unsupported | |
message type | 13 | unparseable MIKEY message
Figure 3: Table 6.12 from RFC 3830 (Revised)
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3.4.3. Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830
Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830:
Type | Value | Comment
-------------------------------------------------------
Vendor ID | 0 | Vendor specific byte string
SDP IDs | 1 | List of SDP key mgmt IDs
| | (allocated for use in [KMASP])
CSB-ID | 2 | Responder's modified CSB-ID (group mode)
Figure 4: Table 6.15 from RFC 3830 (Revised)
4. Sending multiple TGKs in MIKEY messages
There are several possible ways to send multiple TGKs within a single
MIKEY message. First, as specified in the preceding section, a
sender can simply include multiple TGKs in the message in certain
cases. Referring to the preceding section again, we note that in
case of bi-directional media, the sender SHOULD send multiple TGKs.
That might open a chance for interoperability issues.
Another alternative is to use the General Extension payload specified
in RFC3830 and send an additional TGK, perhaps with additional
identification information as in case of the newtype-keyid proposal.
The correct way perhaps is to identify TGKs properly in all MIKEY
messages. This requires a chance in the TGK payload. We would need
to add a key identifier to bind the TGK with media lines or some
metadata thereof. The proposal is to use key naming techniques along
the lines of EAP specifications.
5. Applicability of the RSA-R and RSA modes
MIKEY-RSA-R mode and RSA mode are both very useful: deciding on which
mode to use depends on the application.
The RSA-R mode is useful when you have reasons to believe that the
Responder may be different from who you are sending the MIKEY message
to. This is quite common in telephony and multimedia applications
where the session/call can be retargetted/forwarded. When the
security policy allows it, it may be appropriate for the Initiator to
have some flexibility in who the Responder may turn out to be. In
such cases, the main objective of the Initiator's RSA-R message is to
present its public key/certificate to the Responder.
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The second scenario is when the Initiator already has Responder's
certificate but wants to allow the Responder to come up with all the
keying material. This is applicable in conferences where the
Responder is the key distributor and the Initiators contact the
Responder to initiate key dowloand. Notice that this is quite
similar to the group key download model as specified in GDOI
[RFC3547], GSAKMP, and GKDP protocols (also see [RFC4046]). The
catch however is that the participating entities must know that they
need to contact a well-known address as far as that conferencing
group is concerned. Note that they only need the Responder's
address, not necessarily its CERT. If the group members have the
Responder's CERT, there is no harm; they simply do not need the CERT
to compose I_MESSAGE.
The RSA mode is useful when the Initiator knows the Responder's
identity and CERT. This mode is also useful when the key exchange is
happening in an established session with a Responder (for example,
when switching from a non-secure mode to a secure mode), and when the
policy is such that it is only appropriate to establish a MIKEY
session with the Responder that is targeted by the Initiator.
5.1. Limitations
The RSA-R mode may not easily support 3-way calling, under the
assumptions that motivated the design. An extra message may be
required compared to the MIKEY-RSA mode specified in RFC 3830.
Consider that A wants to talk to B and C, but does not have B's or
C's CERT. A might contact B and request that B supply a key for a
3-way call. Now if B knows C's CERT, then B can simply use the
MIKEY-RSA mode (as defined in RFC 3830) to send the TGK to C. If not,
then the solution is not straightforward. For instance, A might ask
C to contact B or itself to get the TGK, in effect initiating a 3-way
exchange. It should be noted that 3-way calling is typically
implemented using a bridge, in which case there are no issues (it
looks like 3 point-to-point sessions, where one end of each session
is a bridge mixing the traffic into a single stream).
5.2. Impact of the Responder choosing the TGK
In the MIKEY-RSA or PSK modes, the Initiator chooses the TGK and the
Responder has the option to accept the key or not. The Responder
then has a chance to verify whether the key is a known weak key (Q:
Is this an issue with AES-CM or AES-f8 TBD). Other than that who
chooses the key has no impact on SRTP (verify this).
Thus, in case of one-to-one communication, there is no impact on the
functionality provided by the MIKEY-RSA mode and our modified mode
being outlined earlier. Whereas MIKEY-RSA mode allows R_MESSAGE to
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be optional, in the new mode, it is required. However, as noted
earlier, the new mode allows simpler provisioning at the VoIP entity.
6. Security Considerations
We offer a brief overview of the security properties of the exchange.
There are two messages, viz., I_MESSAGE and R_MESSAGE. I_MESSAGE is
a signed request by an Initiator requesting the Responder to select a
TGK to be used to protect SRTP and SRTCP sessions.
The message is signed, which assures the Responder that the claimed
Initiator has indeed generated the message. This automatically
provides message integrity as well.
There is a timestamp in I_MESSAGE, which when generated and
interpreted in the context of the MIKEY specification assures the
Responder that the request is live and not a replay. Indirectly,
this also provides protection against a DoS attack. The Responder
however would have to verify the Initiator's signature and the
timestamp, and thus would spend significant computing resources. It
is possible to mitigate this by caching recently received and
verified requests.
Note that the I_MESSAGE in this method basically equals DoS
protection properties of the DH method and not the public key method
as there are no payloads encrypted by the Responder's public key in
I_MESSAGE. If IDr is not included in the I_MESSAGE, the Responder
will accept the message and a response (and state) would be created
for the malicious request.
R_MESSAGE is quite similar to the I_MESSAGE in the MIKEY-RSA mode and
has all the same security properties.
When using the RSA-R mode, the Responder may turn out to be different
from who the Initiator sent the MIKEY message to. It is the
responsibility of the Initiator to verify that the identity of the
Responder is acceptable if it changes from the intended Responder,
based on its policy, and to take appropriate action based on the
outcome. In some cases, it could be appropriate to accept
Responder's identity if it can be strongly authenticated; in other
cases, a blacklist or a whitelist may be appropriate.
7. IANA Considerations
TBD
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8. Acknowledgments
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
August 2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC4046] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
"Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.
[RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[I-D.ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac]
Euchner, M., "HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for
MIKEY", draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-11 (work in
progress), April 2005.
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Authors' Addresses
Dragan Ignjatic
Polycom
1000 W. 14th Street
North Vancouver, BC V7P 3P3
Canada
Phone: +1 604 982 3424
Email: dignjatic@polycom.com
Lakshminath Dondeti
QUALCOMM
5775 Morehouse drive
San Diego, CA 92121
US
Phone: +1 858 845 1267
Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com
Francois Audet
Nortel
4655 Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, CA 95054
US
Phone: +1 408 495 3756
Email: audet@nortel.com
Ping Lin
Nortel
250 Sidney St.
Belleville, Ontario K8P3Z3
Canada
Phone:
Email: linping@nortel.com
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Internet-Draft MIKEY-RSA-R October 2005
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