IP Flow Information Export WG G. Sadasivan
(ipfix) Cisco Systems, Inc.
Internet-Draft N. Brownlee
Expires: March 10, 2007 CAIDA | The University of Auckland
B. Claise
Cisco Systems, Inc.
J. Quittek
NEC Europe Ltd.
September 6, 2006
Architecture for IP Flow Information Export
draft-ietf-ipfix-architecture-12
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This memo defines the IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) architecture
for the selective monitoring of IP flows, and for the export of
measured IP flow information from an IPFIX device to a collector.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 IPFIX Documents Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Examples of Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IPFIX Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IPFIX Functional and Logical Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1 Metering Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.1 Flow Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.2 Flow Export . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 Observation Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3 Selection Criteria for Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.1 Sampling Functions, Si . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.2 Filter Functions, Fi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4 Observation Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5 Exporting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6 Collecting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Overview of the IPFIX Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1 Information Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2 Flow Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3 Control Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.4 Reporting Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. IPFIX Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1 The IPFIX Basis Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2 IPFIX Protocol on the Collecting Process . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3 Support for Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Export Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1 Export with Reliable Control Connection . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2 Collector Failure Detection and Recovery . . . . . . . . . 23
8.3 Collector Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. IPFIX Flow Collection in Special Situations . . . . . . . . 24
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1 Data Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.1 Host-Based Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.2 Authentication-only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1.3 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2 IPFIX End-point Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.3 IPFIX Overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack Prevention . . . . . 27
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.1 Numbers used in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.2 Numbers used in the Information Model . . . . . . . . . 28
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. Changes/Issues from the -11 Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 32
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
1. Introduction
There are several applications e.g., usage-based accounting, traffic
profiling, traffic engineering, attack/intrusion detection, QoS
monitoring, that require flow-based IP traffic measurements. It is
therefore important to have a standard way of exporting information
related to IP flows. This document defines an architecture for IP
traffic flow monitoring, measuring and exporting. It provides a
high-level description of an IPFIX device's key components and their
functions.
1.1 Document Scope
This document defines the architecture for IPFIX. Its main
objectives are to:
o Describe the key IPFIX architectural components, consisting of (at
least) IPFIX devices and collectors communicating using the IPFIX
protocol.
o Define the IPFIX architectural requirements, e.g., recovery,
security, etc.
o Describe the characteristics of the IPFIX protocol.
1.2 IPFIX Documents Overview
The IPFIX protocol provides network administrators with access to IP
flow information. This document specifies the architecture for the
export of measured IP flow information from an IPFIX exporting
process to a collecting process, per the requirements defined in
IPFIX-REQS [1]. The IPFIX protocol document IPFIX-PROTO [3]
specifies how IPFIX data records and templates are carried via a
congestion-aware transport protocol from IPFIX exporting process to
IPFIX collecting process. IPFIX has a formal description of IPFIX
information elements (fields), their name, type and additional
semantic information, as specified in IPFIX-INFO [2]. Finally
IPFIX-AS [4] describes what type of applications can use the IPFIX
protocol and how they can use the information provided. It
furthermore shows how the IPFIX framework relates to other
architectures and frameworks.
Note that the IPFIX system does not provide for remote configuration
of an IPFIX device. Instead, implementors must provide an effective
way to configure their IPFIX devices.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
2. Terminology
The definitions of basic IPFIX terms such as IP Traffic Flow,
Exporting Process, Collecting Process, Observation Point, etc. are
semantically identical with those found in the IPFIX requirements
document IPFIX-REQS [1]. Some of the terms have been expanded for
more clarity when defining the protocol. Additional definitions
required for the architecture have also been defined. For the same
terms defined here and in IPFIX-PROTO [3] the definitions are
equivalent in both documents.
* Observation Point
An Observation Point is a location in the network where IP packets
can be observed. Examples include: a line to which a probe is
attached, a shared medium, such as an Ethernet-based LAN, a single
port of a router, or a set of interfaces (physical or logical) of
a router.
Note that every Observation Point is associated with an
Observation Domain (defined below), and that one Observation Point
may be a superset of several other Observation Points. For
example one Observation Point can be an entire line card. That
would be the superset of the individual Observation Points at the
line card's interfaces.
* Observation Domain
An Observation Domain is the largest set of Observation Points for
which Flow information can be aggregated by a Metering Process.
For example, a router line card may be an observation domain if it
is composed of several interfaces, each of which is an Observation
Point. Each Observation Domain presents itself to the Collecting
Process using an Observation Domain ID to identify the IPFIX
Messages it generates. Every Observation Point is associated with
an Observation Domain. It is recommended that Observation Domain
IDs are also unique per IPFIX Device.
* IP Traffic Flow or Flow
There are several definitions of the term 'flow' being used by the
Internet community. Within the context of IPFIX we use the
following definition:
A Flow is defined as a set of IP packets passing an Observation
Point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets
belonging to a particular Flow have a set of common properties.
Each property is defined as the result of applying a function to
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
the values of:
1. One or more packet header fields (e.g. destination IP
address), transport header fields (e.g. destination port
number), or application header field (e.g. RTP header fields)
RTP-HDRF [5].
2. One or more characteristics of the packet itself (e.g. number
of MPLS labels)
3. One or more fields derived from packet treatment (e.g. next
hop IP address, output interface)
A packet is said to belong to a Flow if it completely satisfies
all the defined properties of the Flow.
This definition covers the range from a Flow containing all
packets observed at a network interface to a Flow consisting of
just a single packet between two applications. It includes
packets selected by a sampling mechanism.
* Flow Key
Each of the fields which
1. Belong to the packet header (e.g. destination IP address)
2. Are a property of the packet itself (e.g. packet length)
3. Are derived from packet treatment (e.g. AS number)
and which are used to define a Flow are termed Flow Keys.
* Flow Record
A Flow Record contains information about a specific Flow that was
observed at an Observation Point. A Flow Record contains measured
properties of the Flow (e.g. the total number of bytes for all the
Flow's packets) and usually characteristic properties of the Flow
(e.g. source IP address).
* Metering Process
The Metering Process generates Flow Records. Inputs to the
process are packet headers and characteristics observed at an
Observation Point, and packet treatment at the Observation Point
(for example the selected output interface).
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
The Metering Process consists of a set of functions that includes
packet header capturing, timestamping, sampling, classifying, and
maintaining Flow Records.
The maintenance of Flow Records may include creating new records,
updating existing ones, computing Flow statistics, deriving
further Flow properties, detecting Flow expiration, passing Flow
Records to the Exporting Process, and deleting Flow Records.
* Exporting Process
An Exporting Process sends Flow Records to one or more Collecting
Processes. The Flow Records are generated by one or more Metering
Processes.
* Exporter
A device which hosts one or more Exporting Processes is termed an
Exporter.
* IPFIX Device
An IPFIX Device hosts at least one Exporting Process. It may host
further Exporting processes and arbitrary numbers of Observation
Points and Metering Process.
* Collecting Process
A Collecting Process receives Flow Records from one or more
Exporting Processes. The Collecting Process might process or
store received Flow Records, but such actions are out of scope for
this document.
* Collector
A device which hosts one or more Collecting Processes is termed a
Collector.
* Template
A Template is an ordered sequence of <type, length> pairs, used to
completely specify the structure and semantics of a particular set
of information that needs to be communicated from an IPFIX Device
to a Collector. Each Template is uniquely identifiable by means
of a Template ID.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
* Control Information, Data Stream
The information that needs to be exported from the IPFIX Device
can be classified into the following categories:
Control Information
This includes the Flow definition, selection criteria for
packets within the Flow sent by the Exporting Process, and
templates describing the data to be exported. Control
Information carries all the information needed for the end-
points to understand the IPFIX protocol, and specifically for
the Collector to understand and interpret the data sent by the
sending Exporter.
Data Stream
This includes Flow Records carrying the field values for the
various observed Flows at each of the Observation Points.
IPFIX Message
An IPFIX Message is a message originating at the Exporting Process
that carries the IPFIX records of this Exporting Process and whose
destination is a Collecting Process. An IPFIX Message is
encapsulated at the transport layer.
Information Element
An Information Element is a protocol and encoding independent
description of an attribute which may appear in an IPFIX Record.
The IPFIX information model IPFIX-INFO [2] defines the base set of
Information Elements for IPFIX. The type associated with an
Information Element indicates constraints on what it may contain
and also determines the valid encoding mechanisms for use in
IPFIX.
3. Examples of Flows
Some examples of Flows are listed below. In the IPv4 examples we use
interface addresses in three different 26-bit (/26) subnets. In the
IPv6 examples we use 'mac addr-nn' in the low-order 64 bits to
indicate the IEEE MAC address of host interface nn.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Example 1: Flow Keys define the different fields by which Flows are
distinguished. The different combination of their field values
creates unique Flows. If {source IP address, destination IP address,
DSCP} are flow keys, then all of these are different Flows:
1. {192.0.2.1, 192.0.2.65, 4}
2. {192.0.2.23, 192.0.2.67, 4}
3. {192.0.2.23, 192.0.2.67, 2}
4. {192.0.2.129, 192.0.2.67, 4}
5. {2001:DB8::0:mac-addr-01, 2001:DB8::1:mac-addr-11, 4}
6. {2001:DB8::0:mac-addr-02, 2001:DB8::1:mac-addr-13, 4}
7. {2001:DB8::0:mac-addr-02, 2001:DB8::1:mac-addr-13, 2}
8. {2001:DB8::2:mac-addr-21, 2001:DB8::1:mac-addr-13, 4}
Example 2: A mask function can be applied to all the packets that
pass through an Observation Point, in order to aggregate some values.
This could be done by defining the set of Flow Keys as {source IP
address, destination IP address, DSCP} as in example 1 above, and
applying functions which mask out the source and destination IP
addresses (least significant 6 bits for IPv4, 64 bits for IPv6). The
eight Flows from example 1 would now be aggregated into six Flows by
merging the Flows 1+2 and 5+6 into single Flows:
1. {192.0.2.0/26, 192.0.2.64/26, 4}
2. {192.0.2.0/26, 192.0.2.64/26, 2}
3. {192.0.2.128/26, 192.0.2.64/26, 4}
4. {2001:DB8::0/64, 2001:DB8::1/64, 4}
5. {2001:DB8::0/64, 2001:DB8::1/64, 2}
6. {2001:DB8::2/64, 2001:DB8::1/64, 4}
Example 3: A filter defined by some Flow Key values can be applied on
all packets that pass the Observation Point, in order to select only
certain Flows. The filter is defined by choosing fixed values for
specific Keys from the packet.
All the packets that go from a customer network 192.0.2.0/26 to
another customer network 192.0.2.64/26 with DSCP value of 4 define a
Flow. All other combinations don't define a Flow and are not taken
into account. The three Flows from example 2 would now be reduced to
one Flow by filtering out Flows 2 and 3, leaving only Flow 1,
{192.0.2.0/26, 192.0.2.64/26, 4}.
Similarly, for the IPv6 packets in the examples above, one could
filter out Flows 5 and 6 to leave Flow 4.
The above examples can be thought of as a function F() taking as
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
input {source IP address, destination IP address, DSCP}. The
function selects only the packets which satisfy all three of the
following conditions:
1. Mask out the least significant 6 bits of source IP address, match
against 192.0.2.0.
2. Mask out the least significant 6 bits of destination IP address,
match against 192.0.2.64.
3. Only accept DSCP value equal to 4.
Depending on the values of {source IP address, destination IP
address, DSCP} of the different observed packets, the Metering
Process function F() would choose/filter/aggregate different sets of
packets, which would create different Flows. For example, for
various combinations of values of {source IP address, destination IP
address, DSCP}, F(source IP address, destination IP address, DSCP)
would result in the definition of one or more Flows.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
4. IPFIX Reference Model
The figure below shows the reference model for IPFIX. This figure
covers the various possible scenarios that can exist in an IPFIX
system.
+----------------+ +----------------+
|[*Application 1]| ... |[*Application n]|
+--------+-------+ +-------+--------+
^ ^
| |
+ = = = = -+- = = = = +
^
|
+------------------------+ +-------+------------------+
|IPFIX Exporter | | Collector(1) |
|[Exporting Process(es)] |<---------->| [Collecting Process(es)] |
+------------------------+ +--------------------------+
.... ....
+------------------------+ +---------------------------+
|IPFIX Device(i) | | Collector(j) |
|[Observation Point(s)] |<--------->| [Collecting Process(es)] |
|[Metering Process(es)] | +---->| [*Application(s)] |
|[Exporting Process(es)] | | +---------------------------+
+------------------------+ .
.... . ....
+------------------------+ | +--------------------------+
|IPFIX Device(m) | | | Collector(n) |
|[Observation Point(s)] |<----+---->| [Collecting Process(es)] |
|[Metering Process(es)] | | [*Application(s)] |
|[Exporting Process(es)] | +--------------------------+
+------------------------+
The various functional components are indicated within brackets [].
The functional components within [*] are not part of the IPFIX
architecture. The interfaces shown by "<----->" are defined by the
IPFIX architecture but those shown by "<= = = =>" are not.
Figure 3
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
The figure below shows a typical IPFIX Device where the IPFIX
components are shown in rectangular boxes.
+--------------------------------------------------+
| IPFIX Device |
| +-----+ |
| +------- ... ------------+---------> | |
| | | | | |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ | | |
| |Metering | |Metering | | E | |
| |Process 1| |Process N| | x | |
| +---------+ +---------+ | p | |
| ^ ^ | o | |
| +------+--------+ +---------+------+ | r | |
| | Obsv Domain 1 | | Obsv Domain N | | t | |
| |+-----+-------+| |+-------+------+| | i | |
| ||Obsv Pt 1..j || ... ||Obsv Pt j+1..M|| | n | |
| |+-------------+| |+--------------+| | g | | Export
Packets | +------^--------+ +---------^------+ | | | packets
--->----+--------+---------- ... ---------+ | | | to
In | | +--------->
| . . . . . | | |Collector
| | | |
| +------ ... -------------+---------> | |
| | | | | |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ | P | |
| |Metering | |Metering | | r | |
| |Process 1| |Process N| | o | |
| +---------+ +---------+ | c | |
| ^ ^ | e | |
| +------+--------+ +---------+------+ | s | |
| | Obsv Domain 1 | | Obsv Domain N | | s | |
| |+-----+-------+| |+-------+------+| | | |
| ||Obsv Pt 1..k || ... ||Obsv Pt k+1..M|| | | |
| |+-------------+| |+--------------+| | | |
Packets | +------^--------+ +---------^------+ +-----+ |
--->----+--------+---------- ... ---------+ |
In | |
+--------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4
5. IPFIX Functional and Logical Blocks
5.1 Metering Process
Every Observation Point in an IPFIX Device, participating in Flow
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
measurements, must be associated with at least one Metering Process.
Every packet coming into an Observation Point goes into each of the
Metering Processes associated with the Observation Point. Broadly,
each Metering Process observes the packets that pass an Observation
Point, does timestamping and classifies the packets into Flow(s)
based on the selection criteria.
The Metering Process is a functional block which manages all the
Flows generated from an Observation Domain. The typical functions of
a Metering Process may include:
o Maintain database(s) of all the Flow Records from an Observation
Domain. This includes creating new Flow Records, updating
existing ones, computing Flow Records statistics, deriving further
Flow properties, adding non-flow-specific information based on the
packet treatment (in some cases fields like AS numbers, router
state, etc.)
o Maintain statistics about the Metering Process itself, such as
Flow Records generated, packets observed, etc.
5.1.1 Flow Expiration
A Flow is considered to have expired under the following conditions:
1. If no packets belonging to the Flow have been observed for a
certain period of time. This time period should be configurable
at the Metering Process, with a minimum value of 0 seconds for
immediate expiration. Note that a zero timeout would report a
Flow as a sequence of single-packet Flows.
2. If the IPFIX Device experiences resource constraints, a Flow may
be prematurely expired (e.g. lack of memory to store Flow
Records)
3. For long-running Flows, the Metering Process should expire the
Flow on a regular basis or based on some expiration policy. This
periodicity or expiration policy should be configurable at the
Metering Process. When a long-running Flow is expired, its Flow
Record may still be maintained by the Metering Process so that
the Metering Process does not need to create a new Flow Record
for further observed packets of the same Flow.
5.1.2 Flow Export
The Exporting Process decides when and whether to export an expired
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Flow. A Flow can be exported because it expired for any of the
reasons mentioned in Flow Expiration section. For example: the
Exporting Process exports a portion of the expired Flows every 'x'
seconds.
For long-lasting Flows, the Exporting Process should export the Flow
Records on a regular basis or based on some export policy. This
periodicity or export policy should be configurable at the Exporting
Process.
5.2 Observation Point
A Flow Record can be better analysed if the Observation Point from
which it was measured is known. As such it is recommended that IPFIX
Devices send this information to Collectors. In cases where there is
a single Observation Point or where the Observation Point information
is not relevant, the Metering Process may choose not to add the
Observation Point information to the Flow Records.
5.3 Selection Criteria for Packets
A Metering Process may define rules so that only certain packets
within an incoming stream of packets are chosen for measurement at an
Observation Point. This may be done by one of the two methods
defined below or a combination of them, in either order. A
combination of each of these methods can be adopted to select the
packets, i.e. one can define a set of methods {F1, S1, F2, S2, S3}
executed in a specified sequence at an Observation Point to select
particular Flows.
The figure below shows the operations which may be applied as part of
a typical Metering Process.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
packet header capturing
|
timestamping
|
v
+----->+
| |
| sampling Si (1:1 in case of no sampling)
| |
| filtering Fi (select all when no criteria)
| |
+------+
|
v
Flows
Figure 5
Note that packets could be selected before or after any IP
processing, i.e., before there is any IP checksum validation, IP
filtering, etc, or after one or more of these steps. This has an
impact on what kinds of traffic (or erroneous conditions) IPFIX can
observe. It is recommended that packets are selected after their
checksums have been verified.
5.3.1 Sampling Functions, Si
A sampling function determines which packets within a stream of
incoming packets are selected for measurement, i.e. packets that
satisfy the sampling criteria for this Metering Process.
Example: sample every 100th packet that was received at an
Observation Point.
Choosing all the packets is a special case where the sampling rate is
1:1.
5.3.2 Filter Functions, Fi
A Filter Function selects only those incoming packets that satisfy a
function on fields defined by the packet header fields, fields
obtained while doing the packet processing, or properties of the
packet itself.
Example: Mask/Match of the fields that define a filter. A filter
might be defined as {Protocol == TCP, Destination Port < 1024}.
Several such filters could be used in any sequence to select packets.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Note that packets selected by a (sequence of) filter functions may be
further classified by other filter functions, i.e. the selected
packets may belong to several Flows, any or all of which are
exported.
5.4 Observation Domain
The Observation Domain is a logical block that presents a single
identity for a group of Observation Points within an IPFIX Device.
Each {Observation Point, Metering Process} pair belongs to a single
Observation Domain. An IPFIX Device could have multiple Observation
Domains, each of which has a subset of the total set of Observation
Points in it. Each Observation Domain must carry a unique ID within
the context of an IPFIX Device. Note that in case of multiple
Observation Domains, a unique ID per Observation Domain must be
transmitted as a parameter to the Exporting Function. That unique ID
is referred to as the IPFIX Observation Domain ID.
5.5 Exporting Process
The Exporting Process is the functional block that sends data to one
or more IPFIX Collectors using the IPFIX protocol. On one side the
Exporting Process interfaces with Metering Process(es) to get Flow
Records, while on the other side it talks to a Collecting Process on
the Collector(s).
There may be additional rules defined within an Observation Domain so
that only certain Flow Records are exported. This may be done by
either one or a combination of Si, Fi, as described in the section on
"Selection Criteria for Packets".
Example: Only the Flow Records which meet the following selection
criteria are exported:
1. All Flow Records whose destination IP address matches
{192.0.33.5}.
2. Every other (i.e. sampling rate 1 in 2) Flow Record whose
destination IP address matches {192.0.11.30}.
5.6 Collecting Process
Collecting Processes use a Flow Record's Template ID to interpret
that Flow Record's Information Elements. To allow this, an IPFIX
Exporter must ensure that an IPFIX Collector knows the Template ID
for each incoming Flow Record. To interpret incoming Flow Records,
an IPFIX Collector may also need to know the function F() that was
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
used by the Metering Process for each Flow.
The functions of the Collecting Process must include:
o Identifying, accepting and decoding the IPFIX Messages from
different <Exporting Process, Observation Domain> pairs.
o Storing the Control Information and Flow Records received from an
IPFIX Device.
At a high level, the Collecting Process:
1. Receives and stores the Control Information.
2. Decodes and stores the Flow Records using the Control
Information.
5.7 Summary
The figure below shows the functions performed in sequence by the
various functional blocks in an IPFIX Device.
Packet(s) coming in to Observation Point(s)
| |
v v
+----------------+-------------------------+ +-----+-------+
| Metering Process on an | | |
| Observation Point | | |
| | | |
| packet header capturing | | |
| | |...| Metering |
| timestamping | | Process N |
| | | | |
| +----->+ | | |
| | | | | |
| | sampling Si (1:1 in case of no | | |
| | | sampling) | | |
| | filtering Fi (select all when | | |
| | | no criteria) | | |
| +------+ | | |
| | | | |
| | Timing out Flows | | |
| | Handle resource overloads | | |
+--------|---------------------------------+ +-----|-------+
| |
Flow Records (identified by Observation Domain) Flow Records
| |
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
+---------+---------------------------------+
|
+--------------------|----------------------------------------------+
| | Exporting Process |
|+-------------------|-------------------------------------------+ |
|| v IPFIX Protocol | |
||+-----------------------------+ +----------------------------+| |
|||Rules for | |Functions || |
||| Picking/sending Templates | |-Packetise selected Control || |
||| Picking/sending Flow Records|->| & data Information into || |
||| Encoding Template & data | | IPFIX export packets. || |
||| Selecting Flows to export(*)| |-Handle export errors || |
||+-----------------------------+ +----------------------------+| |
|+----------------------------+----------------------------------+ |
| | |
| exported IPFIX Messages |
| | |
| +------------+-----------------+ |
| | Anonymise export packet(*) | |
| +------------+-----------------+ |
| | |
| +------------+-----------------+ |
| | Transport Protocol | |
| +------------+-----------------+ |
| | |
+-----------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|
v
IPFIX export packet to Collector
(*) indicates that the block is optional.
Figure 6
6. Overview of the IPFIX Protocol
An IPFIX Device consists of a set of co-operating processes that
implement the functional blocks described in the previous section.
Alternatively, an IPFIX Device can be viewed simply as a network
entity which implements the IPFIX protocol. At the IPFIX Device, the
protocol functionality resides in the Exporting Process. The IPFIX
Exporting Process gets Flow Records from a Metering Process, and
sends them to the Collector(s).
At a high level, an IPFIX Device performs the following tasks:
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
1. Encode Control Information into Templates.
2. Encode packets observed at the Observation Points into Flow
Records.
3. Packetise the selected Templates and Flow Records into IPFIX
Messages.
4. Send IPFIX Messages to the Collector.
The IPFIX protocol communicates information from an IPFIX Exporter to
an IPFIX Collector. That information includes not only Flow Records,
but also information about the Metering Process. Such information
(referred to as Control Information) includes details of the data
fields in Flow Records. It may also include statistics from the
Metering Process, such as the number of packets lost (i.e. not
metered).
For details of the IPFIX protocol please refer to IPFIX-PROTO [3].
6.1 Information Model Overview
The IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) protocol serves for
transmitting information related to measured IP traffic over the
Internet. The protocol specification in IPFIX-PROTO [3] defines how
Information Elements are transmitted. For Information Elements, it
specifies the encoding of a set of basic data types. However, the
list of fields that can be transmitted by the protocol, such as Flow
attributes (source IP address, number of packets, etc.) and
information about the Metering and Exporting Process (packet
Observation Point, sampling rate, Flow timeout interval, etc.), is
not specified in IPFIX-PROTO [3]. Instead, it is defined in the
IPFIX Information Model document IPFIX-INFO [2].
The Information Model provides a complete description of the
properties of every IPFIX Information Element. It does this by
specifying each element's name, Field Type, data type, etc., and
providing a description of each element. Element descriptions give
the semantics of the element, i.e. say how it is derived from a Flow
or other information available within an IPFIX Device.
6.2 Flow Records
The following rules provide guidelines to be followed while encoding
the Flow Records information:
A Flow Record contains enough information so that the Collecting
Process can identify the corresponding <Per-Flow Control Information,
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Configuration Control Information>.
The Exporting Process encodes a given Information Element (as
specified in IPFIX-INFO [2]), based on the encoding standards
prescribed by IPFIX-PROTO [3].
6.3 Control Information
The following rules provide guidelines to be followed while encoding
the Control Information:
o Per-Flow Control Information should be encoded such that the
Collecting Process can capture the structure and semantics of the
corresponding Flow data for each of the Flow Records exported by
the IPFIX Device.
o Configuration Control Information is conveyed to a Collector so
that its Collecting Process can capture the structure and
semantics of the corresponding configuration data. The
configuration data which is also Control Information should carry
additional information on the Observation Domain within which the
configuration takes effect.
For example, sampling using the same sampling algorithm, say 1 in 100
packets, is configured on two Observation Points O1 and O2. The
configuration in this case may be encoded as {ID, configuration
domain (O1,O2), sampling algorithm, interval (1 in 100)}, where ID is
the Observation Domain ID for the domain containing O1 and O2. The
Observation Domain ID uniquely identifies this configuration, and
must be sent within the Flow Records in order to be able to match the
right configuration control information.
The Control Information is used by the Collecting Process to:
o Decode and interpret Flow Records.
o Understand the state of the Exporting Process.
Sending Control Information from the Exporting Process in a timely
and reliable manner is critical to the proper functioning of the
IPFIX Collecting Process. The following approaches may be taken for
the export of Control Information:
1. Send all the Control Information pertaining to Flow Records prior
to sending the Flow Records themselves. This includes any
incremental changes to the definition of the Flow Records.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
2. Notify on a near real time basis the state of the IPFIX Device to
the Collecting Process. This includes all changes such as a
configuration change that affects the Flow behaviour, changes to
Exporting Process resources that alter export rates, etc., which
the Collector needs to be aware of.
3. Since it is vital that a Collecting Process maintains accurate
knowledge of the Exporter's state, the export of the Control
Information should be done such that it reaches the Collector
reliably. One way to achieve this is to send the Control
Information over a reliable transport.
6.4 Reporting Responsibilities
From time to time an IPFIX Device may not be able to observe all the
packets reaching one of its Observation Points. This could occur if
a Metering Process finds itself temporarily short of resources. For
example it might run out of packet buffers for IPFIX export.
In such situations, the IPFIX Device should attempt to count the
number of packet losses that have occurred, and report them to its
Collector(s). If it is not possible to count losses accurately, e.g.
when transport layer (i.e. non-IPFIX) errors are detected, the IPFIX
device should report this fact, and perhaps indicate the time period
during which some packets might not have been observed.
7. IPFIX Protocol Details
When the IPFIX Working Group was chartered there were existing common
practices in the area of Flow export, for example NetFlow, CRANE,
LFAP, RTFM, etc. IPFIX's charter required the Working Group to
consider those existing practices, and select the one that was the
closest fit to the IPFIX requirements IPFIX-REQS [1]. Additions or
modifications would then be made to the selected protocol to fit it
exactly into the IPFIX architecture.
7.1 The IPFIX Basis Protocol
The Working Group went through an extensive evaluation of the various
existing protocols that were available, weighing the level of
compliance with the requirements, and selected one of the candidates
as the basis for the IPFIX protocol. For more details of the
evaluation process please see IPFIX-EVAL [6].
In the basis protocol Flow Records are defined by Templates, where a
Template is an ordered set of the Information Elements appearing in a
Flow Record, together with their field sizes within those records.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
This approach provides the following advantages:
o Using the Template mechanism, new fields can be added to IPFIX
Flow Records without changing the structure of the export record
format.
o Templates that are sent to the Collecting Process carry structural
information about the exported Flow Record fields. Therefore, if
the Collector does not understand the semantics of new fields it
can ignore them, but still interpret the Flow Record.
o Because the template mechanism is flexible, it allows the export
of only the required fields from the Flows to the Collecting
Process. This helps to reduce the exported Flow data volume and
possibly provide memory savings at the Exporting Process and
Collecting Process. Sending only the required information can
also reduce network load.
7.2 IPFIX Protocol on the Collecting Process
The Collecting Process is responsible for:
1. Receiving and decoding Flow Records from the IPFIX Devices.
2. Reporting on the loss of Flow Records sent to the Collecting
Process by an IPFIX Exporting Process.
Complete details of the IPFIX protocol are given in IPFIX-PROTO [3].
7.3 Support for Applications
Applications that use the information collected by IPFIX may be
Billing or Intrusion Detection sub-systems, etc. These applications
may be an integral part of the Collecting Process or they may be co-
located with the Collecting Process. The way by which these
applications interface with IPFIX systems to get the desired
information is out of scope for this document.
8. Export Models
8.1 Export with Reliable Control Connection
As mentioned in the IPFIX-REQS [1] document, an IPFIX Device must be
able to transport its Control Information and Data Stream over a
congestion-aware transport protocol.
If the network in which the IPFIX Device and Collecting Process are
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
located does not guarantee reliability, at least the Control
Information should be exported over a reliable transport. The Data
Stream may be exported over a reliable or unreliable transport
protocol.
Possible transport protocols include:
o SCTP: Supports reliable and unreliable transport.
o TCP: Provides reliable transport only.
o UDP: Provides unreliable transport only. Network operators would
need to avoid congestion by keeping traffic within their own
administrative domains. For example, one could use a dedicated
network (or Ethernet link) to carry IPFIX traffic from Exporter to
Collector.
8.2 Collector Failure Detection and Recovery
The transport connection (in the case of a connection oriented
protocol) is pre-configured between the IPFIX Device and the
Collector. The IPFIX protocol does not provide any mechanism for
configuring the Exporting and Collecting Processes.
Once connected, an IPFIX Collector receives Control Information and
uses that information to interpret Flow Records. The IPFIX Device
should set a keepalive (e.g. the keepalive timeout in the case of
TCP, the HEARTBEAT interval in the case of SCTP) to a sufficiently
low value so that it can quickly detect a Collector failure. Note,
however, that extremely short keepalive intervals can incorrectly
abort the connection during transient periods of congestion. They
can also cause some level of additional network load during otherwise
idle periods.
Collector failure refers to the crash or restart of the Collecting
Process, or of the Collector itself. A Collector failure is detected
at the IPFIX Device by the break in the connection oriented transport
protocol session, depending on the transport protocol - the
connection timeout mechanisms differ. On detecting a keepalive
timeout in a single Collector scenario, the IPFIX Device should stop
sending Flow Records to the Collector and try to reestablish the
transport connection. If Collecting Process failover is supported by
the Exporting Process, backup session(s) may be opened in advance,
and Control Information sent to it.
There could be one or more secondary Collectors with priority
assigned to them. The primary Collector crash is detected at the
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
IPFIX Device. On detecting loss of connectivity, the IPFIX Device
opens a Data Stream with the secondary Collector of the next highest
priority. If that secondary was not opened in advance, both the
Control Information and Data Stream must be sent to it. That
Collector might then become the primary, or the Exporting Process
might try to reestablish the original session.
8.3 Collector Redundancy
Configuring redundant Collectors is an alternative to configuring
backup Collectors. In this model, all Collectors simultaneously
receive the Control Information and Data Streams. Multiple {Control
Information, Data Stream} pairs could be sent, each to a different
Collector from the same IPFIX Device. Since the IPFIX protocol
requires a congestion-aware transport, achieving redundancy using
multicast is not an option.
9. IPFIX Flow Collection in Special Situations
An IPFIX Device could be doing one or more of generating, receiving,
altering special types of traffic which are listed below.
Tunnel traffic:
The IPFIX Device could be the head, midpoint or endpoint of a
tunnel. In such cases the IPFIX Device could be handling GRE,
IPinIP or UTI traffic.
VPN traffic:
The IPFIX Device could be a provider edge device which receives
traffic from customer sites belonging to different Virtual Private
Networks.
Similarly, IPFIX could be implemented on devices which perform one or
more of the following special services:
o Explicitly drop packets. For example a device which provides
firewall service drops packets based on some administrative
policy.
o Alter the values of fields used as IPFIX Flow Keys of interest.
For example a device which provides NAT service can change source
and/or destination IP address.
In cases such as those listed above, there should be clear guidelines
as to:
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
o How and when to classify the packets as Flows in the IPFIX Device.
o If multiple encapsulations are used to define Flows, how to convey
the same fields (e.g. IP address) in different layers.
o How to differentiate Flows based on different private domains.
For example, overlapping IP addresses in Layer-3 VPNs.
o What extra information needs be exported so that the Collector can
make a clear interpretation of the received Flow Records.
10. Security Considerations
Flow information can be used for various purposes, such as usage
accounting, traffic profiling, traffic engineering, and intrusion
detection. The security requirement may differ significantly for
such applications. To be able to satisfy the security needs of
various IPFIX users, an IPFIX system must provide different levels of
security protection.
10.1 Data Security
IPFIX data comprises Control Information and Data Stream generated by
the IPFIX Device.
The IPFIX data may exist in both the IPFIX Device and the Collector.
In addition, the data is also transferred on the wire from the IPFIX
Device to the Collector when it is exported. To provide security,
the data should be protected from common network attacks.
The protection of IPFIX data within the end system (IPFIX Device and
Collector) is out of scope for this document. It is assumed that the
end system operator will provide adequate security for the IPFIX
data.
The IPFIX architecture must allow different levels of protection to
the IPFIX data on the wire. Wherever security functions are required
it is recommended that users should leverage lower layers using
either IPsec or TLS, if these can successfully satisfy the security
requirement of IPFIX data protection.
To protect the data on the wire, three levels of granularity should
be supported; these are described in the following subsections.
10.1.1 Host-Based Security
Security may not be required when the transport between the IPFIX
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Device and the Collector is perceived as safe. This option allows
the protocol to run most efficiently without extra overhead and an
IPFIX system must support it.
10.1.2 Authentication-only
Authentication-only protection provides IPFIX users with the
assurance of data integrity and authenticity. The data exchanged
between the IPFIX Device and the Collector is protected by an
authentication signature. Any modification of the IPFIX data will be
detected by the recipient, resulting in discarding of the received
data. However, the authentication-only option doesn't offer data
confidentiality.
The IPFIX user should not use authentication-only when sensitive or
confidential information is being exchanged. An IPFIX solution
should support this option. The authentication-only option should
provide replay attack protection. One way to achieve this level of
security would be:
o IP Authentication Header
10.1.3 Encryption
Data encryption provides the best protection for IPFIX data. The
IPFIX data is encrypted at the sender and only the intended recipient
can decrypt and have access to the data. This option must be used
when the transport between the IPFIX Device and the Collector are
unsafe and the IPFIX data needs to be protected. It is recommended
that the underlying transport layer's security functions be used for
this purpose. Some means to achieve this level of security are:
o Encapsulating Security Payload.
o Transport Layer Security Protocol
The data encryption option adds overhead to the IPFIX data transfer.
It may limit the rate that an Exporter can report its Flow Records to
the Collector due to the resource requirement for running encryption.
10.2 IPFIX End-point Authentication
It is important to make sure that the IPFIX Device is talking to the
"right" Collector rather than to a masquerading Collector. The same
logic also holds true from the Collector point of view, i.e. it may
want to make sure it is collecting the Flow Records from the "right"
IPFIX Device. An IPFIX system should allow the end point
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
authentication capability so that either one-way or mutual
authentication can be performed between the IPFIX Device and
Collector.
The IPFIX architecture should use any existing transport protection
protocols such as TLS or IPsec to fulfil the authentication
requirement.
10.3 IPFIX Overload
An IPFIX Device could become overloaded under various conditions.
This may be because of exhaustion of internal resources used for Flow
generation and/or export. Such overloading may cause loss of data
from the Exporting Process, either from lack of export bandwidth
(possibly caused by an unusually high number of observed Flows) or
from network congestion in the path from Exporter to Collector.
IPFIX Collectors should be able to detect the loss of exported Flow
Records, and should at least record the number of lost Flow Records.
10.3.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack Prevention
Since one of the potential usages for IPFIX is for intrusion
detection, it is important for the IPFIX architecture to support some
kind of DoS resistance.
10.3.1.1 Network Under Attack
The Network itself may be under attack, resulting in an overwhelming
number of IPFIX Messages. An IPFIX system should try to capture as
much information as possible. However, when a large number of IPFIX
Messages are generated in a short period of time, the IPFIX system
may become overloaded.
10.3.1.2 Generic DoS Attack on the IPFIX Device and Collector
The IPFIX Device and Collector may be subject to generic DoS attacks,
just as any system on any open network. These types of attacks are
not IPFIX specific. Preventing and responding to such types of
attacks are out of the scope of this document.
10.3.1.3 IPFIX Specific DoS Attack
There are some specific attacks on the IPFIX portion of the IPFIX
Device or Collector:
o The attacker could overwhelm the Collector with spoofed IPFIX
export packets. One way to solve this problem is to periodically
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
synchronise the sequence numbers of the Flow Records between the
Exporting and Collecting Processes.
o The attacker could provide false reports to the Collector by
sending spoofed packets.
The problems mentioned above can be solved to a large extent if the
control packets are encrypted both ways, thereby providing more
information that the Collector could use to identify and ignore
spoofed data packets.
11. IANA Considerations
The IPFIX Architecture, as set out in this document, has two sets of
assigned numbers, as outlined in the following subsections.
11.1 Numbers used in the Protocol
IPFIX Messages, as described in IPFIX-PROTO [3], use two fields with
assigned values. These are the IPFIX Version Number, indicating
which version of the IPFIX Protocol was used to export an IPFIX
Message, and the IPFIX Set ID, indicating the type for each set of
information within an IPFIX message.
Values for the IPFIX Version Number and the IPFIX Set ID, together
with the considerations for assigning them, are defined in IPFIX-
PROTO [3]
11.2 Numbers used in the Information Model
Fields of the IPFIX protocol carry information about traffic
measurement. They are modelled as elements of the IPFIX information
model IPFIX-INFO [2]. Each Information Element describes a field
which may appear in an IPFIX Message. Within an IPFIX message the
field type is indicated by its Field Type.
Values for the IPFIX Information Element IDs, together with the
considerations for assigning them, are defined in IPFIX-INFO [2].
12. Acknowledgements
The document editors wish to thank all the people contributing to the
discussion of this document on the mailing list, and the design teams
for many valuable comments. In particular, the following made
significant contributions:
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Tanja Zseby
Paul Calato
Dave Plonka
Jeffrey Meyer
K.C.Norseth
Vamsi Valluri
Cliff Wang
Ram Gopal
Jc Martin
Carter Bullard
Reinaldo Penno
Simon Leinen
Kevin Zhang
Paul Aitken
Brian Trammell
Special thanks to Dave Plonka for the multiple thorough reviews.
13. References
13.1 Normative References
[1] Quittek, J., Zseby, T., Claise, B., and S. Zander, "Requirements
for IP Flow Information Export", RFC RFC 3917, October 2004.
[2] Meyer, J., Quittek, J., and S. Bryant, "IPFIX: Information
Model", (work in progress), Internet Draft,
draft-ietf-ipfix-info-08.txt, October 2004.
[3] Claise, B., Bryant, S., Sadasivan, G., and M. Fullmer, "IPFIX:
Protocol", (work in progress), Internet Draft,
draft-ietf-ipfix-protocol-10.txt, December 2004.
[4] Zseby, T., Boschi, E., Penno, R., Brownlee, N., and B. Claise,
"IPFIX: Protocol", (work in progress), Internet Draft,
draft-ietf-ipfix-as-05.txt, October 2004.
13.2 Informative References
[5] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson,
"RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications",
RFC 3550, Julyy 2003.
[6] Leinen, S., "Evaluation of Candidate Protocols for IP Flow
Information Export", RFC 3955, October 2004.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Authors' Addresses
Ganesh Sadasivan
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 408 527-0251
Email: gsadasiv@cisco.com
Nevil Brownlee
CAIDA | The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland
New Zealand
Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x88941
Email: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz
Benoit Claise
Cisco Systems, Inc.
De Kleetlaan 6a b1
1831 Diegem
Belgium
Phone: +32 2 704 5622
Email: bclaise@cisco.com
Juergen Quittek
NEC Europe Ltd.
Adenauerplatz 6
69225 Heidelberg
Germany
Phone: +49 6221 90511-15
Email: quittek@ccrle.nec.de
Appendix A. Changes/Issues from the -11 Draft
Flow Examples
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
This section has been extended to include IPv6 examples as well as
IPv4.
Editorial Improvements:
Mask/Match example 'Destination Port between 80 and 120' changed
to 'Destination Port < 1024'
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft IPFIX Architecture September 2006
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Sadasivan, et al. Expires March 10, 2007 [Page 32]
