Network Working Group J. Abley
Internet-Draft Dyn, Inc.
Updates: 1035 (if approved) O. Gudmundsson
Intended status: Standards Track M. Majkowski
Expires: May 20, 2017 Cloudflare Inc.
November 16, 2016
Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to DNS Queries with QTYPE=ANY
draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03
Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY".
The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to
respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by
security, performance or other reasons.
The DNS specification does not include specific guidance for the
behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this situation. This document
aims to provide such guidance.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 20, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Behaviour of DNS Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. HINFO Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Updates to RFC 1035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Editorial Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.5. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1.6. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY".
The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to
respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by
security, performance or other reasons.
The DNS specification [RFC1034] [RFC1035] does not include specific
guidance for the behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this
situation. This document aims to provide such guidance.
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1.1. Terminology
This document uses terminology specific to the Domain Name System
(DNS), descriptions of which can be found in [RFC7719].
In this document, "ANY Query" refers to a DNS meta-query with
QTYPE=ANY. An "ANY Response" is a response to such a query.
In an exchange of DNS messages between two hosts, this document
refers to the host sending a DNS request as the initiator, and the
host sending a DNS response as the responder.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Motivations
ANY queries are legitimately used for debugging and checking the
state of a DNS server for a particular name. ANY queries are
sometimes used as a attempt to reduce the number of queries needed to
get information, e.g. to obtain MX, A and AAAA RRSets for a mail
domain in a single query. Although there is no documented guidance
available for this use case and some implementations have been
observed that appear not to function as perhaps their developers
expected. For any developer that assumes that ANY query will be sent
to authoritative server to fetch all RRSets, they need to include a
fallback when that does not happen.
ANY queries are also frequently used to exploit the amplification
potential of DNS servers/resolvers using spoofed source addresses and
UDP transport (see [RFC5358]). Having the ability to return small
responses to such queries makes DNS servers less attractive
amplifiers.
ANY queries are sometimes used to help mine authoritative-only DNS
servers for zone data, since they are expected to return all RRSets
for a particular query name. If a DNS operator prefers to reduce the
potential for information leaks, they MAY choose to not to send large
ANY responses.
Some authoritative-only DNS server implementations require additional
processing in order to send a conventional ANY response, and avoiding
that processing expense might be desirable.
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3. General Approach
This proposal provides a mechanism for an authority server to signal
that conventional ANY queries are not supported for a particular
QNAME, and to do so in such a way that is both compatible with and
triggers desirable behaviour by unmodified clients (e.g. DNS
resolvers).
Alternative proposals for dealing with ANY queries have been
discussed. One approach proposed using a new RCODE to signal that an
authoritative server did not answer ANY queries in the standard way.
This approach was found to have an undesirable effect on both
resolvers and authoritative-only servers; resolvers receiving an
unknown RCODE caused them to re-send the same query to all available
authoritative servers, rather than suppress future such ANY queries
for the same QNAME.
This proposal avoids that outcome by returning a non-empty RRSet in
the ANY response, providing resolvers with something to cache and
effectively suppressing repeat queries to the same or different
authority servers.
This proposal specifies two different modes of behaviour by DNS
responders for names that exists. Operators/Implementers are free to
choose whichever mechanism best suits their environment.
1. A DNS responder can choose to select one or subset of RRSets at
the QNAME.
2. A DNS responder can instead return a synthesised HINFO resource
record. See Section 6 for discussion of the use of HINFO.
4. Behaviour of DNS Responders
A DNS responder which receives an ANY query MAY decline to provide a
conventional response, or MAY instead send a response with a single
RRSet in the answer section.
The RRSet returned in the answer section of the response MAY be a
single RRSet owned by the name specified in the QNAME. Where
multiple RRSets exist, the responder SHOULD choose a small one(s) to
reduce its amplification potential.
If there is no CNAME present at the owner name matching the QNAME,
the resource record returned in the response MAY instead be
synthesised, in which case a single HINFO resource record SHOULD be
returned. The CPU field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to RFCXXXX
[note to RFC Editor, replace with RFC number assigned to this
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document]. The OS field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to the null
string to minimize the size of the response.
The TTL encoded for a synthesised RR SHOULD be chosen by the operator
of the DNS responder to be large enough to suppress frequent
subsequent ANY queries from the same initiator with the same QNAME,
understanding that a TTL that is too long might make policy changes
relating to ANY queries difficult to change in the future. The
specific value used is hence a familiar balance when choosing TTL for
any RR in any zone, and be specified according to local policy.
If the DNS query includes DO=1 and the QNAME corresponds to a zone
that is known by the responder to be signed, a valid RRSIG for the
RRSets in the answer (or authority if answer is empty) section MUST
be returned. In the case of DO=0, the RRSIG SHOULD be omitted.
Except as described in this section, the DNS responder MUST follow
the standard algorithms when constructing a response.
5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators
A DNS initiator which sends a query with QTYPE=ANY and receives a
response containing an HINFO resource record, as described in
Section 4, MAY cache the HINFO response in the normal way. Such
cached HINFO resource records SHOULD be retained in the cache
following normal caching semantics, as it would with any other
response received from a DNS responder.
A DNS initiator MAY suppress queries with QTYPE=ANY in the event that
the local cache contains a matching HINFO resource record with
RDATA.CPU field, as described in Section 4.
6. HINFO Considerations
In the case where a zone that contains HINFO RRSets is served from an
authority server that does not provide conventional ANY responses.
It is possible that the HINFO RRSet in an ANY response, once cached
by the initiator, might suppress subsequent queries from the same
initiator with QTYPE=HINFO. The use of HINFO in this proposal would
hence have effectively mask the HINFO RRSet present in the zone.
Authority-server operators who serve zones that rely upon
conventional use of the HINFO RRTYPE MAY sensibly choose not to
deploy the mechanism described in this document or select another
type.
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The HINFO RRTYPE is believed to be rarely used in the DNS at the time
of writing, based on observations made both at recursive servers and
authority servers.
7. Updates to RFC 1035
It is important to note that returning a subset of available RRSets
when processing an ANY query is legitimate and consistent with
[RFC1035]; ANY does not mean ALL.
This document describes optional behaviour for both DNS initiators
and responders, and implementation of the guidance provided by this
document is OPTIONAL.
RRSIG queries have the same potential as ANY queries of generating
large answers as well as extra work. DNS implementations are free to
not return all RRSIGS. In the wild there are implimentations that
return REFUSE, others return single RRSIG, etc.
8. Implementation Experience
In October 2015 Cloudflare Authoritative Nameserver implementation
implemented the HINFO response. Few minor problems have been
reported and worked out. NSD has for a while implemented a sub-set
response. A Bind user implemented this draft suggestion of returning
only single RRset during an attack.
9. Security Considerations
Queries with QTYPE=ANY are frequently observed as part of reflection
attacks, since a relatively small query can be used to elicit a large
response; this is a desirable characteristic if the goal is to
maximize the amplification potential of a DNS server as part of a
volumetric attack. The ability of a DNS operator to suppress such
responses on a particular server makes that server a less useful
amplifier.
The optional behaviour described in this document to reduce the size
of responses to queries with QTYPE=ANY is compatible with the use of
DNSSEC by both initiator and responder.
10. IANA Considerations
The IANA is requested to update the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs
Registry [1] entry as follows:
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+------+-------+-------------------------------+--------------------+
| Type | Value | Meaning | Reference |
+------+-------+-------------------------------+--------------------+
| * | 255 | A request for some or all | [RFC1035][RFC6895] |
| | | records the server has | [This Document] |
| | | available | |
+------+-------+-------------------------------+--------------------+
11. Acknowledgements
Evan Hunt and David Lawrence provided valuable observations and
concrete suggestions. Jeremy Laidman helped make the document
better. Tony Finch realized that this document was valuable and
implemented it while under attack. A large number of people have
provided comments and suggestions we thank them all for the feedback.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC5358] Damas, J. and F. Neves, "Preventing Use of Recursive
Nameservers in Reflector Attacks", BCP 140, RFC 5358, DOI
10.17487/RFC5358, October 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5358>.
[RFC6895] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA
Considerations", BCP 42, RFC 6895, DOI 10.17487/RFC6895,
April 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6895>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
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12.3. URIs
[1] http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-
parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-4
Appendix A. Editorial Notes
This section (and sub-sections) to be removed prior to publication.
A.1. Change History
A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03
Change section name to "Updates to RFC1034", few minor grammar
changes suggested by Matthew Pounsett and Tony Finch.
Text clarifications, reflecting experience, added implementation
experience.
A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02
Added suggestion to call out RRSIG is optional when DO=0.
Number of text suggestions from Jeremy Laidman
A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01
Add IANA Considerations
A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00
Re-submitted with a different name following adoption at the dnsop wg
meeting convened at IETF 94.
A.1.5. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01
Make signing of RRSets in answers from signed zones mandatory.
Document the option of returning an existing RRSet in place of a
synthesised one.
A.1.6. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00
Initial draft circulated for comment.
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Authors' Addresses
Joe Abley
Dyn, Inc.
103-186 Albert Street
London, ON N6A 1M1
Canada
Phone: +1 519 670 9327
Email: jabley@dyn.com
Olafur Gudmundsson
Cloudflare Inc.
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
Marek Majkowski
Cloudflare Inc.
Email: marek@cloudflare.com
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