Individual submission M. Kucherawy
Internet-Draft May 23, 2013
Obsoletes: 5451, 6577
(if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: November 24, 2013
Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status
draft-ietf-appsawg-rfc5451bis-05
Abstract
This document specifies a header field for use with electronic mail
messages to indicate the results of message authentication efforts.
Any receiver-side software, such as mail filters or Mail User Agents
(MUAs), can use this header field to relay that information in a
convenient and meaningful way to users, or make sorting and filtering
decisions.
This document is a candidate for Internet Standard status. [RFC
Editor: Please delete this notation, as I imagine it will be
indicated some other way.]
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Trust Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Processing Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5.3. Email Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6. Trust Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Definition and Format of the Header Field . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Authentication Identifier Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Version Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. Defined Methods and Result Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1. DKIM and DomainKeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.2. SPF and Sender-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.3. "iprev" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5.4. SMTP AUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.5. Other Registered Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.6. Extension Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.7. Extension Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. The "iprev" Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Adding the Header Field to A Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Header Field Position and Interpretation . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2. Local Policy Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Removing the Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. The Authentication-Results Header Field . . . . . . . . . 23
6.2. Email Authentication Method Name Registry . . . . . . . . 23
6.3. Email Authentication Result Name Registry . . . . . . . . 24
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Forged Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. Misleading Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3. Header Field Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4. Reverse IP Query Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . 26
7.5. Mitigation of Backscatter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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7.6. Internal MTA Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.7. Attacks against Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.8. Intentionally Malformed Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.9. Compromised Internal Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.10. Encapsulated Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.11. Reverse Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. Legacy MUAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix C. Authentication-Results Examples . . . . . . . . . . . 31
C.1. Trivial Case; Header Field Not Present . . . . . . . . . . 31
C.2. Nearly Trivial Case; Service Provided, But No
Authentication Done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C.3. Service Provided, Authentication Done . . . . . . . . . . 33
C.4. Service Provided, Several Authentications Done, Single
MTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C.5. Service Provided, Several Authentications Done,
Different MTAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C.6. Service Provided, Multi-Tiered Authentication Done . . . . 37
C.7. Comment-Heavy Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix D. Operational Considerations about Message
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix E. Known Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix F. Changes since RFC5451 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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1. Introduction
The first version of this document [RFC5451] defined a new header
field for electronic mail messages that presents the results of a
message authentication effort in a machine-readable format. This
document revises that definition based on current use of various
authentication protocols in use today and incorporates errata logged
since the publication of the original specification.
The intent of the header field is to create a place to collect such
data when message authentication mechanisms are in use so that a Mail
User Agent (MUA) and downstream filters can make filtering decisions
and/or provide a recommendation to the user as to the validity of the
message's origin and possibly the safety and integrity of its
content.
End users are not expected to be direct consumers of this header
field. This header field is intended for consumption by programs
that will then use or render such data in a human-usable form.
This document specifies both the format of this header field and
discusses the implications of its presence or absence. However, it
does not discuss how the data contained in the header field ought to
be used (i.e. what filtering decisions are appropriate, or how an MUA
might render those results) as these are local policy and/or user
interface design questions that are not appropriate for this
document.
At the time of publication of this document, Author Domain Signing
Practices ([ADSP]), SMTP Service Extension for Authentication
([AUTH]), DomainKeys Identified Mail Signatures ([DKIM]), Sender
Policy Framework ([SPF]), Vouch-By-Reference ([VBR]), and reverse IP
address name validation ("iprev", defined in [RFC5451]) are published
DNS domain-level email authentication methods in common use.
DomainKeys ([DOMAINKEYS]) and Sender ID ([SENDERID] are also
referenced here, though they respectively have "Historic" and
"Experimental" status, and are no longer common.
This specification is not intended to be restricted to domain-based
authentication, but this has proven to be a good starting point for
implementations. As various methods emerge, it is necessary to
prepare for their appearance and encourage convergence in the area of
interfacing verifiers to filters and MUAs.
Although SPF defined a header field called "Received-SPF" and
DomainKeys defined one called "DomainKey-Status" for this purpose,
those header fields are specific to the conveyance of their
respective results only and thus are insufficient to satisfy the
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requirements enumerated below. In addition, many SPF implementations
have adopted the header field specified below at least as an option,
and DomainKeys has been obsoleted by DKIM.
1.1. Purpose
The header field defined in this document is expected to serve
several purposes:
1. Convey the results of various message authentication checks being
applied by upstream filters and Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) to
MUAs and downstream filters within the same "trust domain", as
such agents may wish to render those results to end users or use
that data to apply more or less stringent content checks based on
authentication results;
2. Provide a common location within a message for this data;
3. Create an extensible framework for reporting new authentication
methods as they emerge.
In particular, the mere presence of this header field SHOULD NOT be
construed as meaning that its data is valid, but rather that it is
asserting some kind of validity based on one or more authentication
schemes applied somewhere upstream. For an MUA or downstream filter
to treat the assertions as actually valid, there must be an
assessment of the trust relationship between such agents and the
validating MTA.
1.2. Trust Boundary
This document makes several references to the "trust boundary" of an
administrative management domain (ADMD). Given the diversity among
existing mail environments, a precise definition of this term isn't
possible.
Simply put, a transfer from the creator of the header field to the
consumer must occur within a context of trust that the creator's
information is correct. How this trust is obtained is outside the
scope of this document. It is entirely a local matter.
Thus, this document defines a "trust boundary" as the delineation
between "external" and "internal" entities; "external" here includes
all hosts that do not deliberately provide some kind of messaging
service for the receiving ADMD's users, and "internal" includes those
hosts that do. By this definition, the hosts within a "trust
boundary" may lie entirely within a receiving ADMD's direct control,
or they can include hosts managed by another ADMD (such as an ISP or
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commercial filtering service) but that also provide services for the
former.
1.3. Processing Scope
This specification is intended to address the needs of authenticating
messages or properties of messages during their actual transport. It
is not meant to address the security of messages that might be
encapsulated within other messages, such as a message/rfc822 (see
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions [MIME]) part within a message.
1.4. Requirements
This document establishes no new requirements on existing protocols
or servers.
In particular, this document establishes no requirement on MTAs to
reject or filter arriving messages that do not pass authentication
checks. The data conveyed by the specified header field's contents
are for the information of MUAs and filters and are to be used at
their discretion.
1.5. Definitions
This section defines various terms used throughout this document.
1.5.1. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
1.5.2. Security
Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations
([SECURITY]) discusses authentication and authorization and the
conflation of the two concepts. The use of those terms within the
context of recent message security work has given rise to slightly
different definitions, and this document reflects those current
usages, as follows:
o "Authorization" is the establishment of permission to use a
resource or represent an identity. In this context, authorization
indicates that a message from a particular ADMD arrived via a
route the ADMD has explicitly approved.
o "Authentication" is the assertion of validity of a piece of data
about a message (such as the sender's identity) or the message in
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its entirety.
As examples: SPF and Sender-ID are authorization mechanisms in that
they express a result that shows whether or not the ADMD that
apparently sent the message has explicitly authorized the connecting
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ([SMTP]) client to relay messages on
its behalf, but do not actually validate any property of the message
itself. By contrast, DKIM is agnostic as to the routing of a message
but uses cryptographic signatures to authenticate agents claiming
responsibility for the message (which implies authorization) and
ensure it was not modified in transit. Since the signatures are not
tied to SMTP connections, they can be added by either the ADMD of
origin, intermediate ADMDs (such as a mailing list server), or both.
Rather than create a separate header field for each class of
solution, this proposal groups them both into a single header field.
1.5.3. Email Architecture
o A "border MTA" is an MTA that acts as a gateway between the
general Internet and the users within an organizational boundary.
(See also Section 1.2.)
o A "delivery MTA" (or Mail Delivery Agent or MDA) is an MTA that
actually enacts delivery of a message to a user's inbox or other
final delivery.
o An "intermediate MTA" is an MTA that handles messages after a
border MTA and before a delivery MTA.
The following diagram illustrates the flow of mail among these
defined components:
+-----+ +-----+ +------------+
| MUA |-->| MSA |-->| Border MTA |
+-----+ +-----+ +------------+
|
|
V
+----------+
| Internet |
+----------+
|
|
V
+-----+ +-----+ +------------------+ +------------+
| MUA |<--| MDA |<--| Intermediate MTA |<--| Border MTA |
+-----+ +-----+ +------------------+ +------------+
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Generally, it is assumed that the work of applying message
authentication schemes takes place at a border MTA or a delivery MTA.
This specification is written with that assumption in mind. However,
there are some sites at which the entire mail infrastructure consists
of a single host. In such cases, such terms as "border MTA" and
"delivery MTA" might well apply to the same machine or even the very
same agent. It is also possible that some message authentication
tests could take place on an intermediate MTA. Although this
document doesn't specifically describe such cases, they are not meant
to be excluded.
See Internet Mail Architecture ([EMAIL-ARCH]) for further discussion
on general email system architecture, and Appendix D of this document
for discussion about the common aspects of email authentication in
current environments.
1.6. Trust Environment
This header field permits one or more message validation mechanisms
to communicate output to one or more separate assessment mechanisms.
These mechanisms operate within a unified trust boundary that defines
an Administrative Management Domain (ADMD). An ADMD contains one or
more entities that perform validation and generate the header field,
and one or more that consume it for some type of assessment. The
field contains no integrity or validation mechanism of its own, so
its presence must be trusted implicitly. Hence, use of the header
field depends upon ensuring that mail entering the ADMD has instances
of the header field claiming to be valid within its boundaries
removed, so that occurrences of such header fields can be used safely
by consumers.
The "authserv-id" token defined in Section 2.2 can be used to label
an entire ADMD or a specific validation engine within an ADMD.
Although the labeling scheme is left as an operational choice, some
guidance for selecting a token is provided in later sections of this
document.
2. Definition and Format of the Header Field
This section gives a general overview of the format of the header
field being defined, and then provides more formal specification.
2.1. General Description
The header field specified here is called "Authentication-Results".
It is a Structured Header Field as defined in Internet Message Format
([MAIL]) and thus all of the related definitions in that document
apply.
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This header field is added at the top of the message as it transits
MTAs that do authentication checks so some idea of how far away the
checks were done can be inferred. It is therefore considered to be a
Trace Field as defined in [MAIL], and thus all of the related
definitions in that document apply.
The value of the header field (after removing comments) consists of
an authentication identifier, an optional version, and then a series
of "method=result" statements indicating which authentication
method(s) were applied and their respective results, and then, for
each applied method, an optional "reason" string, plus optional
"property=value" statements indicating which message properties were
evaluated to reach that conclusion.
The header field can appear more than once in a single message, or
more than one result MAY be represented in a single header field, or
a combination of these MAY be applied.
2.2. Formal Definition
Formally, the header field is specified as follows using Augmented
Backus-Naur Form ([ABNF]):
authres-header = "Authentication-Results:" [CFWS] authserv-id
[ CFWS authres-version ]
( [CFWS] ";" [CFWS] "none" / 1*resinfo ) [CFWS] CRLF
; the special case of "none" is used to indicate that no
; message authentication is performed
authserv-id = value
; see below for a description of this element
authres-version = 1*DIGIT [CFWS]
; indicates which version of this specification is in use;
; this specification is version "1", and the absence of a
; version implies this version of the specification
resinfo = [CFWS] ";" methodspec [ CFWS reasonspec ]
*( CFWS propspec )
methodspec = [CFWS] method [CFWS] "=" [CFWS] result
; indicates which authentication method was evaluated
; and what its output was
reasonspec = "reason" [CFWS] "=" [CFWS] value
; a free-form comment on the reason the given result
; was returned
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propspec = ptype [CFWS] "." [CFWS] property [CFWS] "=" pvalue
; an indication of which properties of the message
; were evaluated by the authentication scheme being
; applied to yield the reported result, and would be
; useful to reveal to end users as authenticated
method = Keyword [ [CFWS] "/" [CFWS] method-version ]
; a method indicates which method's result is
; represented by "result", and is one of the methods
; explicitly defined as valid in this document
; or is an extension method as defined below
method-version = 1*DIGIT [CFWS]
; indicates which version of the method specification is
; in use, corresponding to the matching entry in the IANA
; Email Authentication Methods registry; a value of "1"
; is assumed if this version string is absent
result = Keyword
; indicates the results of the attempt to authenticate
; the message; see below for details
ptype = "smtp" / "header" / "body" / "policy"
; indicates whether the property being evaluated was
; a parameter to an [SMTP] command, or was a value taken
; from a message header field, or was some property of
; the message body, or some other property evaluated by
; the receiving MTA
special-smtp-verb = "mailfrom" / "rcptto"
; special cases of [SMTP] commands that are made up
; of multiple words
property = special-smtp-verb / Keyword
; if "ptype" is "smtp", this indicates which [SMTP]
; command provided the value that was evaluated by the
; authentication scheme being applied; if "ptype" is
; "header", this indicates from which header field the
; value being evaluated was extracted; if "ptype" is
; "body", this indicates where in the message body
; a value being evaluated can be found (e.g., a specific
; offset into the message or a reference to a MIME part);
; if "ptype" is "policy" then this indicates the name
; of the policy that caused this header field to be
; added (see below)
pvalue = [CFWS] ( value / [ [ local-part ] "@" ] domain-name )
[CFWS]
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; the value extracted from the message property defined
; by the "ptype.property" construction; if the value
; identifies something intended to be an e-mail identity,
; then it MUST use the right hand portion of this ABNF
; definition
"local-part" is defined in Section 3.4.1, and "CFWS" is defined in
Section 3.2.2, of [MAIL].
"Keyword" is defined in Section 4.1.2 of [SMTP].
The "value" is as defined in Section 5.1 of [MIME].
The "domain-name" is as defined in Section 3.5 of [DKIM].
The "Keyword" used in "result" above is further constrained by the
necessity of being enumerated in Section 2.5 or an amendment to it.
See Section 2.3 for a description of the "authserv-id" element.
The list of commands eligible for use with the "smtp" ptype can be
found in [SMTP] and subsequent amendments.
The "propspec" may be omitted if, for example, the method was unable
to extract any properties to do its evaluation yet has a result to
report.
The "ptype" and "property" values used by each authentication method
MUST be defined in the specification for that method (or its
amendments).
Where an SMTP command is being reported as a "property", the MAIL
FROM command MUST be represented by "mailfrom" and the RCPT TO
command MUST be represented by "rcptto". All other SMTP commands
MUST be represented unchanged.
A "ptype" value of "policy" indicates a policy decision about the
message not specific to a property of the message that could be
extracted. For example, if a method would normally report a
"ptype.property" of "header.From" and no From: header field was
present, the method can use "policy" to indicate that no conclusion
about the authenticity of the message could be reached.
2.3. Authentication Identifier Field
Every Authentication-Results header field has an authentication
service identifier field ("authserv-id" above). Generally, this is
an arbitrary string intended to identify the authentication service
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within the ADMD that conducted authentication checks on the message.
This identifier is intended to be machine-readable and not
necessarily meaningful to users.
Since agents consuming this field will use this identifier to
determine whether its contents are of interest (and are safe to use),
the uniqueness of the identifier MUST be guaranteed by the ADMD that
generates it and MUST pertain to exactly that one ADMD. MUAs or
downstream filters SHOULD use this identifier to determine whether or
not the data contained in an Authentication-Results header field
ought to be used or ignored.
For simplicity and scalability, the authentication service identifier
SHOULD be a common token used throughout the ADMD. Common practice
is to use the DNS domain name used by or within that ADMD, but this
is not strictly necessary.
For tracing and debugging purposes, the authentication identifier MAY
instead be the hostname of the MTA performing the authentication
check whose result is being reported. This is also useful for
another purpose, as described in Section 4. Moreover, some
implementations have considered appending a delimiter such as "/" and
following it with useful transport tracing data such as the SMTP
queue ID or a timestamp.
Note, however, that using a local, relative identifier like a single
hostname, rather than a hierarchical and globally unique ADMD
identifier like a DNS domain name, makes configuration more difficult
for large sites. The hierarchical identifier permits aggregating
related, trusted systems together under a single, parent identifier,
which in turn permits assessing the trust relationship with a single
reference. The alternative is a flat namespace requiring
individually listing each trusted system. Since consumers will use
the identifier to determine whether to use the contents of the header
field:
o Changes to the identifier impose a large, centralized
administrative burden.
o Ongoing administrative changes require constantly updating this
centralized table, making it difficult to ensure that an MUA or
downstream filter will have access to accurate information for
assessing the usability of the header field's content. In
particular, consumers of the header field will need to know not
only the current identifier(s) in use, but previous ones as well
to account for delivery latency or later re-assessment of the
header field's contents.
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Examples of valid authentication identifiers are "example.com",
"mail.example.org", "ms1.newyork.example.com", and "example-auth".
2.4. Version Tokens
The grammar above provides for the optional inclusion of versions on
both the header field itself (attached to the authserv-id token) and
on each of the methods being reported. The method version refers to
the method itself, which is specified in the documents describing
those methods, while the authserv-id version refers to this document
and thus the syntax of this header field.
The purpose of including these is to avoid misinterpretation of the
results. That is, if a parser finds a version after an authserv-id
that it does not explicitly know, it can immediately discontinue
trying to parse since what follows might not be in an expected
format. For a method version, the parser SHOULD ignore a method
result if the version is not supported in case the semantics of the
result have a different meaning than what is expected. For example,
if a hypothetical DKIM version 2 yielded a "pass" result for
different reasons than version 1 does, a consumer of this field might
not want to use the altered semantics. Allowing versions in the
syntax is a way to indicate this and let the consumer of the header
field decide.
2.5. Defined Methods and Result Values
Each individual authentication method returns one of a set of
specific result values. The subsections below provide references to
the documents defining the authentication methods specifically
supported by this document, and their corresponding result values.
Verifiers SHOULD use these values as described below. New methods
not specified in this document intended to be supported by the header
field defined here MUST include a similar result table either in its
defining document or in a supplementary one.
2.5.1. DKIM and DomainKeys
DKIM is represented by the "dkim" method and is defined in [DKIM].
DomainKeys is defined in [DOMAINKEYS] and is represented by the
"domainkeys" method. They use the same result set as follows:
none: The message was not signed.
pass: The message was signed, the signature or signatures were
acceptable to the verifier, and the signature(s) passed
verification tests.
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fail: The message was signed and the signature or signatures were
acceptable to the verifier, but they failed the verification
test(s).
policy: The message was signed but the signature or signatures were
not acceptable to the verifier.
neutral: The message was signed but the signature or signatures
contained syntax errors or were not otherwise able to be
processed. This result SHOULD also be used for other failures not
covered elsewhere in this list.
temperror: The message could not be verified due to some error that
is likely transient in nature, such as a temporary inability to
retrieve a public key. A later attempt may produce a final
result.
permerror: The message could not be verified due to some error that
is unrecoverable, such as a required header field being absent. A
later attempt is unlikely to produce a final result.
A signature is "acceptable to the verifier" if it passes local policy
checks (or there are no specific local policy checks). For example,
a verifier might require that the signature(s) on the message be
added using the DNS domain present in the From: header field of the
message, thus making third-party signatures unacceptable.
[DKIM] advises that if a message fails verification, it is to be
treated as an unsigned message. A report of "fail" here permits the
receiver of the report to decide how to handle the failure. A report
of "neutral" or "none" preempts that choice, ensuring the message
will be treated as if it had not been signed.
2.5.2. SPF and Sender-ID
SPF and Sender ID use the "spf" and "sender-id" method names,
respectively. The result values for SPF are defined in [SPF], and
those definitions are included here by reference. They are used in
the context of this specification to reflect the result returned by
the component conducting SPF evaluation. Similarly, the results for
Sender-ID are listed and described in [SENDERID]. The values are
case-insensitive, but are typically used all-lowercase in this
context.
In both cases, an additional result of "policy" is defined, which
means the client is authorized to inject or relay mail on behalf of
the sender's DNS domain according to the authentication method's
algorithm, but local policy dictates that the result is unacceptable,
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such as, for example, SPF returned as "pass" result, but a local
policy check matches the sending DNS domain to one found in an
explicit list of unacceptable DNS domains (e.g., spammers).
If the retrieved sender policies used to evaluate SPF and Sender ID
do not contain explicit provisions for authenticating the local-part
(see Section 3.4.1 of [MAIL]) of an address, the "pvalue" reported
along with results for these mechanisms SHOULD NOT include the local-
part.
2.5.3. "iprev"
The result values are used by the "iprev" method, defined in
Section 3, are as follows:
pass: The DNS evaluation succeeded, i.e., the "reverse" and
"forward" lookup results were returned and were in agreement.
fail: The DNS evaluation failed. In particular, the "reverse" and
"forward" lookups each produced results but they were not in
agreement, or the "forward" query completed but produced no
result, e.g., a DNS RCODE of 3, commonly known as NXDOMAIN, or an
RCODE of 0 (NOERROR) in a reply containing no answers, was
returned.
temperror: The DNS evaluation could not be completed due to some
error that is likely transient in nature, such as a temporary DNS
error, e.g., a DNS RCODE of 2, commonly known as SERVFAIL, or
other error condition resulted. A later attempt may produce a
final result.
permerror: The DNS evaluation could not be completed because no PTR
data are published for the connecting IP address, e.g., a DNS
RCODE of 3, commonly known as NXDOMAIN, or an RCODE of 0 (NOERROR)
in a reply containing no answers, was returned. This prevented
completion of the evaluation. A later attempt is unlikely to
produce a final result.
There is no "none" for this method since any TCP connection
delivering email has an IP address associated with it, so some kind
of evaluation will always be possible.
For discussion of the format of DNS replies, see Domain Names -
Implementation And Specification ([DNS]).
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2.5.4. SMTP AUTH
SMTP AUTH (defined in [AUTH]) is represented by the "auth" method,
and its result values are as follows:
none: SMTP authentication was not attempted.
pass: The SMTP client had authenticated to the server reporting the
result using the protocol described in [AUTH].
fail: The SMTP client had attempted to authenticate to the server
using the protocol described in [AUTH] but was not successful, yet
continued to send the message about which a result is being
reported.
temperror: The SMTP client attempted to authenticate using the
protocol described in [AUTH] but was not able to complete the
attempt due to some error which is likely transient in nature,
such as a temporary directory service lookup error. A later
attempt may produce a final result.
permerror: The SMTP client attempted to authenticate using the
protocol described in [AUTH] but was not able to complete the
attempt due to some error that is likely not transient in nature,
such as a permanent directory service lookup error. A later
attempt is not likely produce a final result.
An agent making use of the data provided by this header field SHOULD
consider "fail" and "temperror" to be synonymous in terms of message
authentication, i.e., the client did not authenticate in either case.
2.5.5. Other Registered Codes
Result codes were also registered in other RFCs for Vouch By
Reference (in [AR-VBR], represented by "vbr"), Authorhized Third-
Party Signatures (in [ATPS], represented by "dkim-atps"), and DKIM
Author Domain Signing Practices (in [ADSP], represented by "dkim-
adsp").
2.5.6. Extension Methods
Additional authentication method identifiers (extension methods) may
be defined in the future by later revisions or extensions to this
specification. Method identifiers MUST be registered with the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and, preferably, published
in an RFC. See Section 6 for further details.
Extension methods can be defined for the following reasons:
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1. To allow additional information from new authentication systems
to be communicated to MUAs or downstream filters. The names of
such identifiers SHOULD reflect the name of the method being
defined, but ought not be needlessly long.
2. To allow the creation of "sub-identifiers" that indicate
different levels of authentication and differentiate between
their relative strengths, e.g., "auth1-weak" and "auth1-strong".
Authentication method implementers are encouraged to provide adequate
information, via message header field comments if necessary, to allow
an MUA developer to understand or relay ancillary details of
authentication results. For example, if it might be of interest to
relay what data was used to perform an evaluation, such information
could be relayed as a comment in the header field, such as:
Authentication-Results: example.com;
foo=pass bar.baz=blob (2 of 3 tests OK)
Experimental method identifiers MUST only be used within ADMDs that
have explicitly consented to use them. These method identifiers and
the parameters associated with them are not documented in RFCs.
Therefore, they are subject to change at any time and not suitable
for production use. Any MTA, MUA, or downstream filter intended for
production use SHOULD ignore or delete any Authentication-Results
header field that includes an experimental (unknown) method
identifier.
2.5.7. Extension Result Codes
Additional result codes (extension results) might be defined in the
future by later revisions or extensions to this specification.
Result codes MUST be registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) and preferably published in an RFC. See Section 6
for further details.
Extension results MUST only be used within ADMDs that have explicitly
consented to use them. These results and the parameters associated
with them are not formally documented. Therefore, they are subject
to change at any time and not suitable for production use. Any MTA,
MUA or downstream filter intended for production use SHOULD ignore or
delete any Authentication-Results header field that includes an
extension result.
3. The "iprev" Authentication Method
This section defines an additional authentication method called
"iprev".
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In general, "iprev" is an attempt to verify that a client appears to
be valid based on some DNS queries. Upon receiving a session
initiation of some kind from a client, the IP address of the client
peer is queried for matching names (i.e., a number-to-name
translation, also known as a "reverse lookup" or a "PTR" record
query). Once that result is acquired, a lookup of each of the names
(i.e., a name-to-number translation, or an "A" or "AAAA" record
query) thus retrieved is done. The response to this second check
will typically result in at least one mapping back to the client's IP
address.
Expressed as an algorithm: If the client peer's IP address is I, the
list of names to which I maps (after a "PTR" query) is the set N, and
the union of IP addresses to which each member of N maps (after
corresponding "A" and "AAAA" queries) is L, then this test is
successful if I is an element of L.
The response to a PTR query could contain multiple names. To prevent
heavy DNS loads, agents performing these queries MUST be implemented
such that the number of names evaluated by generation of
corresponding A or AAAA queries is finite, though it MAY be
configurable by an administrator. As an example, Section 5.5 of
[SPF] chose a limit of 10 for its implementation of this algorithm.
DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6 ([DNS-IP6]) discusses the
query formats for the IPv6 case.
A successful test using this algorithm constitutes a result of "pass"
since the ADMD in which the client's PTR claims it belongs has
confirmed that claim by including corresponding data in its DNS
domain. A failure to match constitutes a "fail". There is no case
in which a "neutral" result can be returned. The remaining
"temperror" and "permerror" cases refer, respectively, to temporary
and permanent DNS query errors.
There is some contention regarding the wisdom and reliability of this
test. For example, in some regions it can be difficult for this test
ever to pass because the practice of arranging to match the forward
and reverse DNS is infrequently observed. Therefore, the precise
implementation details of how a verifier performs an "iprev" test are
not specified here. The verifier MAY report a successful or failed
"iprev" test at its discretion having done some kind of check of the
validity of the connection's identity using DNS. It is incumbent
upon an agent making use of the reported "iprev" result to understand
what exactly that particular verifier is attempting to report.
Extensive discussion of reverse DNS mapping and its implications can
be found in Considerations for the use of DNS Reverse Mapping
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([DNSOP-REVERSE]). In particular, it recommends that applications
avoid using this test as a means of authentication or security. Its
presence in this document is not an endorsement, but is merely
acknowledgement that the method remains common and provides the means
to relay the results of that test.
4. Adding the Header Field to A Message
This specification makes no attempt to evaluate the relative
strengths of various message authentication methods that may become
available. As such, the order of the presented authentication
methods and results MUST NOT be used either to imply or infer the
importance or strength of any given method over another. Instead,
the MUA or downstream filter consuming this header field is to
interpret the result of each method based on its own knowledge of
what that method evaluates.
Each "method" MUST refer to an authentication method declared in the
IANA registry, or an extension method as described in Section 2.5.6,
and each "result" MUST refer to a result code declared in the IANA
registry, or an extension result code as defined in Section 2.5.7.
See Section 6 for further information about the registered methods
and result codes.
An MTA compliant with this specification MUST add this header field
(after performing one or more message authentication tests) to
indicate which MTA or ADMD performed the test, which test got applied
and what the result was. If an MTA applies more than one such test,
it MUST add this header field either once per test, or once
indicating all of the results. An MTA MUST NOT add a result to an
existing header field.
An MTA MAY add this header field containing only the authentication
identifier portion and the "none" token (see Section 2.2) to indicate
explicitly that no message authentication schemes were applied prior
to delivery of this message.
An MTA adding this header field MUST take steps to identify it as
legitimate to the MUAs or downstream filters that will ultimately
consume its content. One REQUIRED process to do so is described in
Section 5. Further measures may be necessary in some environments.
Some possible solutions are enumerated in Section 7.1. This document
does not mandate any specific solution to this issue as each
environment has its own facilities and limitations.
For MTAs that add this header field, adding header fields in order
(at the top), per Section 3.6 of [MAIL], is particularly important.
Moreover, this header field SHOULD be inserted above any other trace
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header fields such MTAs might prepend. This allows easy detection of
header fields that can be trusted.
The set of message properties registered for a given method, upon
which the reported result is based, can be numerous. However, the
ones included in the header field being generated SHOULD NOT include
any that were not included in the computation of the result. Doing
so can confound consumers of the field when the method includes
multiple evaluation methods. For example, SPF can base its
conclusion on the RFC5321.Helo parameter or on the RFC5321.MailFrom
domain; including both of those in the header field makes it
impossible for the consumer to determine which property of the
message envelope was actually used.
End users making direct use of this header field might inadvertently
trust information that has not been properly vetted. If, for
example, a basic SPF result were to be relayed that claims an
authenticated addr-spec, the local-part of that addr-spec has
actually not been authenticated. Thus, an MTA adding this header
field SHOULD NOT include any data that has not been authenticated by
the method(s) being applied. Moreover, MUAs SHOULD NOT render to
users such information if it is presented by a method known not to
authenticate it.
4.1. Header Field Position and Interpretation
In order to ensure non-ambiguous results and avoid the impact of
false header fields, MUAs and downstream filters SHOULD NOT interpret
this header field unless specifically instructed to do so by the user
or administrator. That is, this interpretation should not be "on by
default". Naturally then, users or administrators ought not activate
such a feature unless they are certain the header field will be added
by the border MTA that accepts the mail that is ultimately read by
the MUA, and instances of the header field appearing to originate
within the ADMD but are actually added by foreign MTAs will be
removed before delivery.
Furthermore, MUAs and downstream filters SHOULD NOT interpret this
header field unless the authentication service identifier it bears
appears to be one used within its own ADMD as configured by the user
or administrator.
MUAs and downstream filters MUST ignore any result reported using a
"result" not specified in the result code registry, or a "ptype" not
listed in the corresponding registry for such values as defined in
Section 6. Moreover, such agents MUST ignore a result indicated for
any "method" they do not specifically support.
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An MUA SHOULD NOT reveal these results to end users unless the
results are accompanied by, at a minimum, some associated reputation
data about the authenticated origin identifiers within the message.
For example, an attacker could register examp1e.com (note the digit
"one") and send signed mail to intended victims; a verifier would
detect that the signature was valid and report a "pass" even though
it's clear the DNS domain name was intended to mislead. See
Section 7.2 for further discussion.
As stated in Section 2.1, this header field SHOULD be treated as
though it were a trace header field as defined in Section 3.6.7 of
[MAIL], and hence MUST NOT be reordered and MUST be prepended to the
message, so that there is generally some indication upon delivery of
where in the chain of handling MTAs the message authentication was
done.
MUAs SHOULD ignore instances of this header field discovered within
message/rfc822 MIME attachments.
Further discussion of this can be found in Section 7 below.
4.2. Local Policy Enforcement
If a site's local policy is to consider a non-recoverable failure
result (typically "fail" or similar) for any particular
authentication method as justification to reject the message
completely, the border MTA SHOULD issue an [SMTP] rejection response
to the message rather than adding this header field with the failure
result and allowing it to proceed toward delivery. This is more
desirable than allowing the message to reach an internal host's MTA
or spam filter, thus possibly generating a local rejection such as a
[DSN] to a forged originator. Such generated rejections are
colloquially known as "backscatter".
The same MAY also be done for local policy decisions overriding the
results of the authentication methods (e.g., the "policy" result
codes described in Section 2.5).
Such rejections at the SMTP protocol level are not possible if local
policy is enforced at the MUA and not the MTA.
5. Removing the Header Field
For security reasons, any MTA conforming to this specification MUST
delete any discovered instance of this header field that claims, by
virtue of its authentication service identifier, to have been added
within its trust boundary and that did not come directly from another
trusted MTA. For example, an MTA for example.com receiving a message
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MUST delete or otherwise obscure any instance of this header field
bearing an authentication service identifier indicating the header
field was added within example.com prior to adding its own header
fields. This could mean each MTA will have to be equipped with a
list of internal MTAs known to be compliant (and hence trustworthy).
For simplicity and maximum security, a border MTA MAY remove all
instances of this header field on mail crossing into its trust
boundary. However, this may conflict with the desire to access
authentication results performed by trusted external service
providers. It may also invalidate signed messages whose signatures
cover external instances of this header field. A more robust border
MTA could allow a specific list of authenticating MTAs whose
information is to be admitted, removing all others.
As stated in Section 1.2, a formal definition of "trust boundary" is
deliberately not made here. It is entirely possible that a border
MTA for example.com will explicitly trust authentication results
asserted by upstream host example.net even though they exist in
completely disjoint administrative boundaries. In that case, the
border MTA MAY elect not to delete those results; moreover, the
upstream host doing some authentication work could apply a signing
technology such as [DKIM] on its own results to assure downstream
hosts of their authenticity. An example of this is provided in
Appendix C.
Similarly, in the case of messages signed using [DKIM] or other
message signing methods that sign header fields, this removal action
could invalidate one or more signatures on the message if they
covered the header field to be removed. This behavior can be
desirable since there's little value in validating the signature on a
message with forged header fields. However, signing agents MAY
therefore elect to omit these header fields from signing to avoid
this situation.
An MTA SHOULD remove any instance of this header field bearing a
version (express or implied) that it does not support. However, an
MTA MUST remove such a header field if the [SMTP] connection relaying
the message is not from a trusted internal MTA.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered the defined header field and created two tables
as described below. These registry actions were originally defined
by [RFC5451] and are repeated here to provide a single, current
reference.
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6.1. The Authentication-Results Header Field
[RFC5451] added the "Authentication-Results" header field to the IANA
Permanent Message Header Field Registry, per the procedure found in
[IANA-HEADERS]. That entry is to be updated to reference this
document. The following is the registration template:
Header field name: Authentication-Results
Applicable protocol: mail ([MAIL])
Status: Standard
Author/Change controller: IETF
Specification document(s): [this memo]
Related information:
Requesting review of any proposed changes and additions to
this field is recommended.
6.2. Email Authentication Method Name Registry
Names of message authentication methods supported by this
specification are to be registered with IANA, with the exception of
experimental names as described in Section 2.5.6. A registry was
created by [RFC5451] for this purpose. This document changes the
rules governing that registry.
New entries are assigned only for values that have received Expert
Review, per [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]. The Designated Expert shall be
appointed by the IESG. The Designated Expert has discretion to
request that a publication be referenced if a clear, concise
definition of the authentication method cannot be provided such that
interoperability is assured. Registrations should otherwise be
permitted. The Designated Expert can also handle requests to mark
any current registration as "deprecated".
Each method must register a name, the specification that defines it,
a version number associated with the method being registered
(preferably starting at "1"), and zero or more "ptype" values
appropriate for use with that method, which "property" value(s)
should be reported by that method, and a description of the "value"
to be used with each.
All existing registry entries that reference [RFC5451] are to be
updated to reference this document. [RFC Editor note: Section
numbers may have to change as well since they appear in the registry,
but numbering may change between now and publication. We can deal
with this during the IANA phase and/or AUTH48.].
IANA is also requested to add a "version" field to all existing
registry entries. All current methods are to be recorded as version
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"1".
6.3. Email Authentication Result Name Registry
Names of message authentication result codes supported by this
specification must be registered with IANA, with the exception of
experimental codes as described in Section 2.5.7. A registry was
created by [RFC5451] for this purpose. This document changes the
rules governing that registry.
New entries are assigned only for values that have received Expert
Review, per [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]. The Designated Expert shall be
appointed by the IESG. The Designated Expert has discretion to
request that a publication be referenced if a clear, concise
definition of the authentication result cannot be provided such that
interoperability is assured. Registrations should otherwise be
permitted. The Designated Expert can also handle requests to mark
any current registration as "deprecated".
All existing registry entries that reference [RFC5451] are to be
updated to reference this document.
7. Security Considerations
The following security considerations apply when adding or processing
the "Authentication-Results" header field:
7.1. Forged Header Fields
An MUA or filter that accesses a mailbox whose mail is handled by a
non-conformant MTA, and understands Authentication-Results header
fields, could potentially make false conclusions based on forged
header fields. A malicious user or agent could forge a header field
using the DNS domain of a receiving ADMD as the authserv-id token in
the value of the header field, and with the rest of the value claim
that the message was properly authenticated. The non-conformant MTA
would fail to strip the forged header field, and the MUA could
inappropriately trust it.
It is for this reason an MUA should not have processing of the
"Authentication-Results" header field enabled by default; instead it
should be ignored, at least for the purposes of enacting filtering
decisions, unless specifically enabled by the user or administrator
after verifying that the border MTA is compliant. It is acceptable
to have an MUA aware of this specification, but have an explicit list
of hostnames whose "Authentication-Results" header fields are
trustworthy; however, this list should initially be empty.
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Proposed alternate solutions to this problem are nascent:
1. Possibly the simplest is a digital signature protecting the
header field, such as using [DKIM], that can be verified by an
MUA by using a posted public key. Although one of the main
purposes of this document is to relieve the burden of doing
message authentication work at the MUA, this only requires that
the MUA learn a single authentication scheme even if a number of
them are in use at the border MTA. Note that [DKIM] requires
that the From header field be signed, although in this
application, the signing agent (a trusted MTA) likely cannot
authenticate that value, so the fact that it is signed should be
ignored.
2. Another would be a means to interrogate the MTA that added the
header field to see if it is actually providing any message
authentication services and saw the message in question, but this
isn't especially palatable given the work required to craft and
implement such a scheme.
3. Yet another might be a method to interrogate the internal MTAs
that apparently handled the message (based on Received: header
fields) to determine whether any of them conform to Section 5 of
this memo. This, too, has potentially high barriers to entry.
4. Extensions to [IMAP], [SMTP], and [POP3] could be defined to
allow an MUA or filtering agent to acquire the "authserv-id" in
use within an ADMD, thus allowing it to identify which
Authentication-Results header fields it can trust.
5. On the presumption that internal MTAs are fully compliant with
Section 3.6 of [MAIL], and the compliant internal MTAs are using
their own host names or the ADMD's DNS domain name as the
"authserv-id" token, the header field proposed here should always
appear above a Received: header added by a trusted MTA. This can
be used as a test for header field validity.
Support for some of these is being considered for future work.
In any case, a mechanism needs to exist for an MUA or filter to
verify that the host that appears to have added the header field (a)
actually did so, and (b) is legitimately adding that header field for
this delivery. Given the variety of messaging environments deployed
today, consensus appears to be that specifying a particular mechanism
for doing so is not appropriate for this document.
Mitigation of the forged header field attack can also be accomplished
by moving the authentication results data into meta-data associated
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with the message. In particular, an [SMTP] extension could be
established that is used to communicate authentication results from
the border MTA to intermediate and delivery MTAs; the latter of these
could arrange to store the authentication results as meta-data
retrieved and rendered along with the message by an [IMAP] client
aware of a similar extension in that protocol. The delivery MTA
would be told to trust data via this extension only from MTAs it
trusts, and border MTAs would not accept data via this extension from
any source. There is no vector in such an arrangement for forgery of
authentication data by an outside agent.
7.2. Misleading Results
Until some form of service for querying the reputation of a sending
agent is widely deployed, the existence of this header field
indicating a "pass" does not render the message trustworthy. It is
possible for an arriving piece of spam or other undesirable mail to
pass checks by several of the methods enumerated above (e.g., a piece
of spam signed using [DKIM] by the originator of the spam, which
might be a spammer or a compromised system). In particular, this
issue is not resolved by forged header field removal discussed above.
Hence, MUAs and downstream filters must take some care with use of
this header even after possibly malicious headers are scrubbed.
7.3. Header Field Position
Despite the requirements of [MAIL], header fields can sometimes be
reordered enroute by intermediate MTAs. The goal of requiring header
field addition only at the top of a message is an acknowledgement
that some MTAs do reorder header fields, but most do not. Thus, in
the general case, there will be some indication of which MTAs (if
any) handled the message after the addition of the header field
defined here.
7.4. Reverse IP Query Denial-of-Service Attacks
Section 5.5 of [SPF] describes a DNS-based denial-of-service attack
for verifiers that attempt DNS-based identity verification of
arriving client connections. A verifier wishing to do this check and
report this information need to take care not to go to unbounded
lengths to resolve "A" and "PTR" queries. MUAs or other filters
making use of an "iprev" result specified by this document need to be
aware of the algorithm used by the verifier reporting the result and,
especially, its limitations.
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7.5. Mitigation of Backscatter
Failing to follow the instructions of Section 4.2 can result in a
denial-of-service attack caused by the generation of [DSN] messages
(or equivalent) to addresses that did not send the messages being
rejected.
7.6. Internal MTA Lists
Section 5 describes a procedure for scrubbing header fields that may
contain forged authentication results about a message. A compliant
installation will have to include, at each MTA, a list of other MTAs
known to be compliant and trustworthy. Failing to keep this list
current as internal infrastructure changes may expose an ADMD to
attack.
7.7. Attacks against Authentication Methods
If an attack becomes known against an authentication method, clearly
then the agent verifying that method can be fooled into thinking an
inauthentic message is authentic, and thus the value of this header
field can be misleading. It follows that any attack against the
authentication methods supported by this document (and later
amendments to it) is also a security consideration here.
7.8. Intentionally Malformed Header Fields
It is possible for an attacker to add an Authentication-Results
header field that is extraordinarily large or otherwise malformed in
an attempt to discover or exploit weaknesses in header field parsing
code. Implementers must thoroughly verify all such header fields
received from MTAs and be robust against intentionally as well as
unintentionally malformed header fields.
7.9. Compromised Internal Hosts
An internal MUA or MTA that has been compromised could generate mail
with a forged From header field and a forged Authentication-Results
header field that endorses it. Although it is clearly a larger
concern to have compromised internal machines than it is to prove the
value of this header field, this risk can be mitigated by arranging
that internal MTAs will remove this header field if it claims to have
been added by a trusted border MTA (as described above), yet the
[SMTP] connection is not coming from an internal machine known to be
running an authorized MTA. However, in such a configuration,
legitimate MTAs will have to add this header field when legitimate
internal-only messages are generated. This is also covered in
Section 5.
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7.10. Encapsulated Instances
MIME messages can contain attachments of type "message/rfc822", which
contain other messages. Such an encapsulated message can also
contain an Authentication-Results header field. Although the
processing of these is outside of the intended scope of this document
(see Section 1.3), some early guidance to MUA developers is
appropriate here.
Since MTAs are unlikely to strip Authentication-Results header fields
after mailbox delivery, MUAs are advised in Section 4.1 to ignore
such instances within MIME attachments. Moreover, when extracting a
message digest to separate mail store messages or other media, such
header fields should be removed so that they will never be
interpreted improperly by MUAs that might later consume them.
7.11. Reverse Mapping
Although Section 3 of this memo includes explicit support for the
"iprev" method, its value as an authentication mechanism is limited.
Implementers of both this proposal and agents that use the data it
relays are encouraged to become familiar with the issues raised by
[DNSOP-REVERSE] when deciding whether or not to include support for
"iprev".
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68,
RFC 5234, January 2008.
[] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul,
"Registration Procedures for Message Header
Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864, September 2004.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MAIL] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format",
RFC 5322, October 2008.
[MIME] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One:
Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC 2045,
November 1996.
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[SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol",
RFC 5321, October 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[ADSP] Allman, E., Fenton, J., Delany, M., and J.
Levine, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP)",
RFC 5617, August 2009.
[AR-VBR] Kucherawy, M., "Authentication-Results
Registration for Vouch by Reference Results",
RFC 6212, April 2011.
[ATPS] Kucherawy, M., "DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM) Authorized Third-Party Signatures",
RFC 6541, February 2012.
[AUTH] Siemborski, R. and A. Melnikov, "SMTP Service
Extension for Authentication", RFC 4954,
July 2007.
[DKIM] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
Signatures", RFC 6376, September 2011.
[DNS] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names -
implementation and specification", STD 13,
RFC 1035, November 1987.
[DNS-IP6] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M.
Souissi, "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version
6", RFC 3596, October 2003.
[DNSOP-REVERSE] Senie, D. and A. Sullivan, "Considerations for
the use of DNS Reverse Mapping", Work
in Progress, March 2008.
[DOMAINKEYS] Delany, M., "Domain-Based Email Authentication
Using Public Keys Advertised in the DNS
(DomainKeys)", RFC 4870, May 2007.
[DSN] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible
Message Format for Delivery Status
Notifications", RFC 3464, January 2003.
[EMAIL-ARCH] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture",
RFC 5598, October 2008.
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[IANA-CONSIDERATIONS] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in
RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008.
[IMAP] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL
- VERSION 4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
[POP3] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol -
Version 3", STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.
[RFC5451] Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for
Indicating Message Authentication Status",
RFC 5451, April 2009.
[SECURITY] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for
Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations",
BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 2003.
[SENDERID] Lyon, J. and M. Wong, "Sender ID:
Authenticating E-Mail", RFC 4406, April 2006.
[SPF] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy
Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains
in E-Mail, Version 1", RFC 4408, April 2006.
[VBR] Hoffman, P., Levine, J., and A. Hathcock,
"Vouch By Reference", RFC 5518, April 2009.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the following for their review and
constructive criticism of this update: Dave Cridland, Scott
Kitterman, John Levine, Alexey Melnikov, S. Moonesamy, Alessandro
Vesely, [other names]
Appendix B. Legacy MUAs
Implementers of this protocol should be aware that many MUAs are
unlikely to be retrofitted to support the new header field and its
semantics. In the interests of convenience and quicker adoption, a
delivery MTA might want to consider adding things that are processed
by existing MUAs in addition to the Authentication-Results header
field. One suggestion is to include a Priority header field, on
messages that don't already have such a header field, containing a
value that reflects the strength of the authentication that was
accomplished, e.g., "low" for weak or no authentication, "normal" or
"high" for good or strong authentication.
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Some modern MUAs can already filter based on the content of this
header field. However, there is keen interest in having MUAs make
some kind of graphical representation of this header field's meaning
to end users. Until this capability is added, other interim means of
conveying authentication results may be necessary while this proposal
and its successors are adopted.
Appendix C. Authentication-Results Examples
This section presents some examples of the use of this header field
to indicate authentication results.
C.1. Trivial Case; Header Field Not Present
The trivial case:
Received: from mail-router.example.com
(mail-router.example.com [192.0.2.1])
by server.example.org (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
From: sender@example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Message-Id: <12345.abc@example.com>
Subject: here's a sample
Hello! Goodbye!
Example 1: Trivial case
The "Authentication-Results" header field is completely absent. The
MUA may make no conclusion about the validity of the message. This
could be the case because the message authentication services were
not available at the time of delivery, or no service is provided, or
the MTA is not in compliance with this specification.
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C.2. Nearly Trivial Case; Service Provided, But No Authentication Done
A message that was delivered by an MTA that conforms to this
specification but provides no actual message authentication service:
Authentication-Results: example.org 1; none
Received: from mail-router.example.com
(mail-router.example.com [192.0.2.1])
by server.example.org (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
From: sender@example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.org
Message-Id: <12345.abc@example.com>
Subject: here's a sample
Hello! Goodbye!
Example 2: Header present but no authentication done
The "Authentication-Results" header field is present, showing that
the delivering MTA conforms to this specification. It used its DNS
domain name as the authserv-id. The presence of "none" (and the
absence of any method and result tokens) indicates that no message
authentication was done. The version number of the specification to
which the field's content conforms is explicitly provided.
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C.3. Service Provided, Authentication Done
A message that was delivered by an MTA that conforms to this
specification and applied some message authentication:
Authentication-Results: example.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.net
Received: from dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net
(dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net [192.0.2.200])
by mail-router.example.com (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
From: sender@example.net
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.com
Message-Id: <12345.abc@example.net>
Subject: here's a sample
Hello! Goodbye!
Example 3: Header reporting results
The "Authentication-Results" header field is present, indicating that
the border MTA conforms to this specification. The authserv-id is
once again the DNS domain name. Furthermore, the message was
authenticated by that MTA via the method specified in [SPF]. Note
that since that method cannot authenticate the local-part, it has
been omitted from the result's value. The MUA could extract and
relay this extra information if desired.
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C.4. Service Provided, Several Authentications Done, Single MTA
A message that was relayed inbound via a single MTA that conforms to
this specification and applied three different message authentication
checks:
Authentication-Results: example.com;
auth=pass (cram-md5) smtp.auth=sender@example.com;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com
Authentication-Results: example.com;
sender-id=pass header.from=example.com
Received: from dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net (8.11.6/8.11.6)
(dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net [192.0.2.200])
by mail-router.example.com (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.net
From: sender@example.com
Message-Id: <12345.abc@example.com>
Subject: here's a sample
Hello! Goodbye!
Example 4: Headers reporting results from one MTA
The "Authentication-Results" header field is present, indicating the
delivering MTA conforms to this specification. Once again, the
receiving DNS domain name is used as the authserv-id. Furthermore,
the sender authenticated herself/himself to the MTA via a method
specified in [AUTH], and both SPF and Sender ID checks were done and
passed. The MUA could extract and relay this extra information if
desired.
Two "Authentication-Results" header fields are not required since the
same host did all of the checking. The authenticating agent could
have consolidated all the results into one header field.
This example illustrates a scenario in which a remote user on a
dialup connection (example.net) sends mail to a border MTA
(example.com) using SMTP authentication to prove identity. The
dialup provider has been explicitly authorized to relay mail as
"example.com" resulting in passes by the SPF and SenderID checks.
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C.5. Service Provided, Several Authentications Done, Different MTAs
A message that was relayed inbound by two different MTAs that conform
to this specification and applied multiple message authentication
checks:
Authentication-Results: example.com;
sender-id=fail header.from=example.com;
dkim=pass (good signature) header.d=example.com
Received: from mail-router.example.com
(mail-router.example.com [192.0.2.1])
by auth-checker.example.com (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id i7PK0sH7021929;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:22 -0800
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=gatsby; d=example.com;
t=1188964191; c=simple/simple; h=From:Date:To:Subject:
Message-Id:Authentication-Results;
bh=sEuZGD/pSr7ANysbY3jtdaQ3Xv9xPQtS0m70;
b=EToRSuvUfQVP3Bkz ... rTB0t0gYnBVCM=
Authentication-Results: example.com;
auth=pass (cram-md5) smtp.auth=sender@example.com;
spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=example.com
Received: from dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net
(dialup-1-2-3-4.example.net [192.0.2.200])
by mail-router.example.com (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
From: sender@example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: receiver@example.com
Message-Id: <12345.abc@example.com>
Subject: here's a sample
Hello! Goodbye!
Example 5: Headers reporting results from multiple MTAs
The "Authentication-Results" header field is present, indicating
conformance to this specification. Once again, the authserv-id used
is the recipient's DNS domain name. The header field is present
twice because two different MTAs in the chain of delivery did
authentication tests. The first, "mail-router.example.com" reports
that SMTP AUTH and SPF were both used, and the former passed while
the latter failed. In the SMTP AUTH case, additional information is
provided in the comment field, which the MUA can choose to render if
desired.
The second MTA, "auth-checker.example.com", reports that it did a
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Sender ID test (which failed) and a DKIM test (which passed). Again,
additional data about one of the tests is provided as a comment,
which the MUA may choose to render. Also noteworthy here is the fact
that there is a DKIM signature added by example.com that assured the
integrity of the lower Authentication-Results field.
Since different hosts did the two sets of authentication checks, the
header fields cannot be consolidated in this example.
This example illustrates more typical transmission of mail into
"example.com" from a user on a dialup connection "example.net". The
user appears to be legitimate as he/she had a valid password allowing
authentication at the border MTA using SMTP AUTH. The SPF and Sender
ID tests failed since "example.com" has not granted "example.net"
authority to relay mail on its behalf. However, the DKIM test passed
because the sending user had a private key matching one of
"example.com"'s published public keys and used it to sign the
message.
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C.6. Service Provided, Multi-Tiered Authentication Done
A message that had authentication done at various stages, one of
which was outside the receiving ADMD:
Authentication-Results: example.com;
dkim=pass reason="good signature"
header.i=@mail-router.example.net;
dkim=fail reason="bad signature"
header.i=@newyork.example.com
Received: from mail-router.example.net
(mail-router.example.net [192.0.2.250])
by chicago.example.com (8.11.6/8.11.6)
for <recipient@chicago.example.com>
with ESMTP id i7PK0sH7021929;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:22 -0800
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=furble;
d=mail-router.example.net; t=1188964198; c=relaxed/simple;
h=From:Date:To:Message-Id:Subject:Authentication-Results;
bh=ftA9J6GtX8OpwUECzHnCkRzKw1uk6FNiLfJl5Nmv49E=;
b=oINEO8hgn/gnunsg ... 9n9ODSNFSDij3=
Authentication-Results: example.net;
dkim=pass (good signature) header.i=@newyork.example.com
Received: from smtp.newyork.example.com
(smtp.newyork.example.com [192.0.2.220])
by mail-router.example.net (8.11.6/8.11.6)
with ESMTP id g1G0r1kA003489;
Fri, Feb 15 2002 17:19:07 -0800
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=gatsby;
d=newyork.example.com;
t=1188964191; c=simple/simple;
h=From:Date:To:Message-Id:Subject;
bh=sEu28nfs9fuZGD/pSr7ANysbY3jtdaQ3Xv9xPQtS0m7=;
b=EToRSuvUfQVP3Bkz ... rTB0t0gYnBVCM=
From: sender@newyork.example.com
Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
To: meetings@example.net
Message-Id: <12345.abc@newyork.example.com>
Subject: here's a sample
Example 6: Headers reporting results from multiple MTAs in different
ADMDs
In this example we see multi-tiered authentication with an extended
trust boundary.
The message was sent from someone at example.com's New York office
(newyork.example.com) to a mailing list managed at an intermediary.
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The message was signed at the origin using DKIM.
The message was sent to a mailing list service provider called
example.net, which is used by example.com. There,
meetings@example.net is expanded to a long list of recipients, one of
that is at the Chicago office. In this example, we will assume that
the trust boundary for chicago.example.com includes the mailing list
server at example.net.
The mailing list server there first authenticated the message and
affixed an Authentication-Results header field indicating such using
its DNS domain name for the authserv-id. It then altered the message
by affixing some footer text to the body, including some
administrivia such as unsubscription instructions. Finally, the
mailing list server affixes a second DKIM signature and begins
distribution of the message.
The border MTA for chicago.example.com explicitly trusts results from
mail-router.example.net so that header field is not removed. It
performs evaluation of both signatures and determines that the first
(most recent) is a "pass" but, because of the aforementioned
modifications, the second is a "fail". However, the first signature
included the Authentication-Results header added at mail-
router.example.net that validated the second signature. Thus,
indirectly, it can be determined that the authentications claimed by
both signatures are indeed valid.
Note that two styles of presenting meta-data about the result are in
use here. In one case, the "reason=" clause is present which is
intended for easy extraction by parsers; in the other case, the CFWS
production of the ABNF is used to include such data as a header field
comment. The latter can be harder for parsers to extract given the
varied supported syntaxes of mail header fields.
C.7. Comment-Heavy Example
The formal syntax permits comments within the content in a number of
places. For the sake of illustration, this example is also legal:
Authentication-Results: foo.example.net (foobar) 1 (baz);
dkim (Because I like it) / 1 (One yay) = (wait for it) fail
policy (A dot can go here) . (like that) expired
(this surprised me) = (as I wasn't expecting it) 1362471462
Example 7: A very comment-heavy but perfectly legal example
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Appendix D. Operational Considerations about Message Authentication
This protocol is predicated on the idea that authentication (and
presumably in the future, reputation) work is typically done by
border MTAs rather than MUAs or intermediate MTAs; the latter merely
make use of the results determined by the former. Certainly this is
not mandatory for participation in electronic mail or message
authentication, but this protocol and its deployment to date are
based on that model. The assumption satisfies several common ADMD
requirements:
1. Service operators prefer to resolve the handling of problem
messages as close to the border of the ADMD as possible. This
enables, for example, rejections of messages at the SMTP level
rather than generating a DSN internally. Thus, doing any of the
authentication or reputation work exclusively at the MUA or
intermediate MTA renders this desire unattainable.
2. Border MTAs are more likely to have direct access to external
sources of authentication or reputation information since modern
MUAs are more likely to be heavily firewalled. Thus, some MUAs
might not even be able to complete the task of performing
authentication or reputation evaluations without complex proxy
configurations or similar burdens.
3. MUAs rely upon the upstream MTAs within their trust boundaries to
make correct (as much as that is possible) evaluations about the
message's envelope, header and content. Thus, MUAs don't need to
know how to do the work that upstream MTAs do; they only need the
results of that work.
4. Evaluations about the quality of a message, from simple token
matching (e.g., a list of preferred DNS domains) to cryptanalysis
(e.g., public/private key work), are at least a little bit
expensive and thus need to be minimized. To that end, performing
those tests at the border MTA is far preferred to doing that work
at each MUA that handles a message. If an ADMD's environment
adheres to common messaging protocols, a reputation query or an
authentication check performed by a border MTA would return the
same result as the same query performed by an MUA. By contrast,
in an environment where the MUA does the work, a message arriving
for multiple recipients would thus cause authentication or
reputation evaluation to be done more than once for the same
message (i.e., at each MUA) causing needless amplification of
resource use and creating a possible denial-of-service attack
vector.
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5. Minimizing change is good. As new authentication and reputation
methods emerge, the list of methods supported by this header
field would presumably be extended. If MUAs simply consume the
contents of this header field rather than actually attempting to
do authentication and/or reputation work, then MUAs only need to
learn to parse this header field once; emergence of new methods
requires only a configuration change at the MUAs and software
changes at the MTAs (which are presumably fewer in number). When
choosing to implement these functions in MTAs vs MUAs, the issues
of individual flexibility, infrastructure inertia and scale of
effort must be considered. It is typically easier to change a
single MUA than an MTA because the modification affects fewer
users and can be pursued with less care. However, changing many
MUAs is more effort than changing a smaller number of MTAs.
6. For decisions affecting message delivery and display, assessment
based on authentication and reputation is best performed close to
the time of message transit, as a message makes its journey
toward a user's inbox, not afterwards. DKIM keys and IP address
reputations, etc., can change over time or even become invalid,
and users can take a long time to read a message once delivered.
The value of this work thus degrades, perhaps quickly, once the
delivery process has completed. This seriously diminishes the
value of this work when done other than at MTAs.
Many operational choices are possible within an ADMD, including the
venue for performing authentication and/or reputation assessment.
The current specification does not dictate any of those choices.
Rather, it facilitates those cases in which information produced by
one stage of analysis needs to be transported with the message to the
next stage.
Appendix E. Known Implementations
[Note to IESG: This can be dropped prior to publication unless it's
desirable to carry the information visibly in this way.]
o Google Mail (Gmail)
o Yahoo! Mail
o Hotmail
o Courier MTA (http://www.courier-mta.org)
o sid-milter (http://sourceforge.net/projects/sid-milter)
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o OpenDKIM (http://www.opendkim.org)
o OpenDMARC (http://www.trusteddomain.org/opendmarc.html)
o An open source Python module
(https://pypi.python.org/pypi/authres/0.402)
Appendix F. Changes since RFC5451
[Note to IESG: This can be dropped prior to publication unless it's
desirable to carry the changes visibly in this way.]
o Errata #2617 was addressed in RFC6577 and was incorporated here
o Request Internet Standard status
o Change IANA rules to Designated Expert from IETF Review
o Update existing IANA registries from the old RFC to this one
o Add references to ADSP, ATPS, VBR
o Remove all the "X-" stuff, per BCP178
o Adjust language to indicate that this header field was already
defined, and we're just refreshing and revising
o In a few places, RFC2119 language had been used in lowercase
terms; fixed here
o Errata #2818 addressed
o Errata #3195 addressed
o Some minor wordsmithing and removal of odd prose
o ABNF: change "dot-atom" to "Keyword" since "dot-atom" allows "=",
which leads to ambiguous productions
o ABNF: the authserv-id can be a "value", not a "dot-atom"
o ABNF: separate the spec version from the method version; they're
syntactically the same but semantically different; add a section
discussing them
o Call out the SMTP verb exceptions ("mailfrom" and "rcptto"); the
previous RFC didn't do this, leading to interoperability problems
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o Rather then deleting suspect header fields, they could also be
renamed to something harmless; there is at least one
implementation of this
o Update IANA method registry to include version numbers
o Rather than repeating what RFC4408[bis] says the SPF results are,
just refer to those documents
o Constrain inclusion of unnecessary properties to avoid confusing
consumers
o Review "should" vs. SHOULD
o Update prose around authserv-id (Section 2.3)
o Merge Sections 2.5 and 2.6 (defined methods and result codes)
Author's Address
Murray S. Kucherawy
270 Upland Drive
San Francisco, CA 94127
US
EMail: superuser@gmail.com
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