I2RS working group S. Hares
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track S. Brim
Expires: December 19, 2014 Consultant
N. Cam-Winget
Cisco
J. Halpern
Ericcson
D. Zhang
Q. Wu
Huawei
A. Abro
S. Asadullah
Cisco
J. Halpern
Ericcson
E. Yu
Cisco
June 17, 2014
I2RS Security Considerations
draft-hares-i2rs-security-01
Abstract
This presents an expansion of the security architecture found in the
i2rs architecture.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2014.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Security roles and Identities for the I2RS client and
I2RS Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. I2RS Role-Based Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. I2RS Data Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Data Confidentiality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Message Integrity Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. End-to-End Data Integrity: Data or Transport . . . . 10
3.3. Role-Based Access Control of I2RS data . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Impact of Data Confidentiality inclusion/exclusion in the
I2RS Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5. Transport requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Audit-able Data streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Impact of Traceability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Deployment issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Stacked I2RS Agent-Clients in Broker topologies . . . . . 15
7. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) provides read and write
access to the information and state within the routing process and
configuration process (as illustrated in the diagram in the
architecture document within routing elements. The I2RS client
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[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] interacts with one or more I2RS agents
to collect information from network routing systems. This security
architecture expands on the security issues involved in the I2RS
protocol's message exchange between the I2RS client and the I2RS
agent which are described in [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture].
2. Definitions
This document utilizes the definitions found in the following drafts:
[RFC4949], and [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture].
Specifically, this document utilizes the following definitions:
Access control
[RFC4949] describes access control as: a) protection of system
resources against unauthorized access, b) process controlled by a
security policy that permits access only by authorized entities
(users, programs, process, or others) according to that policy, c)
preventing unauthorized use of resource, d) using human controls
to identify or admit properly authorized people to a SCIF, and e)
limitations on between subjects and objections in a system. I2RS
focuses on role-based access control (RBAC).
Authentication
[RFC4949] describes authentication as the process of verifying
(i.e., establishing the truth of) an attribute value claimed by or
for a system entity or system resource. Authentication has two
steps: identify and verify.
Data Confidentiality
[RFC4949] describes data confidentiality has having two
properties: a) data is not disclosed to system entities unless
they have been authorized to know, and b) data is not disclosed to
unauthorized individuals, entities or processes. The key point is
that confidentiality implies that the originator has the ability
to authorize where the information goes. Confidentiality is
important for both read and write scope of the data.
Data confidentiality service
[RFC4949] also describes data confidentiality service as a
security service that protects data against unauthorized
disclosure. Please note that an operator can designate all people
are authorized to view a piece of data which would mean a data
confidentiality service would be essentially a null function.
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Data Privacy
[RFC4949] describes data privacy as a synonym for data
confidentiality. This I2RS document will utilize data privacy as
a synonym for data confidentiality.
Mutual Authentication
[RFC4949] implies that mutual authentication exists between two
interacting system entities. Mutual authentication in I2RS
implies that both sides move from a state of mutual suspicion to
mutually authenticated communication after having been identified
and validated.
Mutual Suspicion
[RFC4949] defines mutual suspicion as a state that exists between
two interacting system entities in which neither entity can trust
the other to function correctly with regard to some security
requirement.
Role
[RFC4949] describes role as a job function or employment position
to which people or other system entities may be assigned in a
system. In the I2RS interface, the I2RS agent roles relate to the
roles that the I2RS client is utilizing. In the I2RS interface,
the I2RS client negotiation is over the client's ability to access
resources made available through the agent's particular role.
Please refer to Figure 2 below. Existing work includes IETF work
in ABFAB and HTTP related SAML work.
Role-based Access control
[RFC4949] describes role-based access control as an identity-based
access control wherein the system entities that are identified and
controlled are functional positions in an organization or process.
Within [RFC4949] five relationships are discussed: 1)
administrators to assign identities to roles, 2) administrators to
assign permissions to roles, 3) administrators to assign roles to
roles, 4) users to select identities in sessions, and 5) users to
select roles in sessions. This document discusses I2RS use of
Roles as Identities+Scope+Access where scope is the portion of the
routing tree, and access is permissions to read or write (or
both). Figure 1 below provides [RFC4949] the security view roles
and assignments (page 254). Figure 2 provides the same conceptual
view of role-based access control applied to I2RS's Combination of
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roles and identities that allow read, write, or read-write access
to I2RS agent functions.
Role hierarchy or Permissions inheritance
[RFC4949] describes the hierarchy of roles and identities in role-
based access control shown in Figure 1 and described above. I2RS
will used role-based access control as defined above, and shown in
Figure 2.
Role certificate
[RFC4949] describes a role certificate as an organizational
certificate that is issued to a system entity that is a member of
the set of users that have identities that are assigned to the
same role.
Security audit trail
[RFC4949] (page 254) describes a security audit trail as a
chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to
enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final results. To apply this to the I2RS
system, this implies that the processes on the I2RS client-I2RS
Agent protocol and related actions on the I2RS-Agent can record a
set of activity that will allow the reconstruction and examination
of the sequence of environments and activities around actions
caused by the I2RS protocol data streams.
I2RS integrity
The data transfer as it is transmitted between client and agent
cannot be modified by unauthorized parties without detection.
The following diagram is a variation of the [RFC4949] diagram on
role-based security, and provides the context for the assumptions of
security on the role-based work.
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(c) Permission Inheritance Assignments (i.e., Role Hierarchy)
[Constraints]
+=====+
| |
(a) Identity v v (b) Permission
+----------+ Assignments +-------+ Assignments +----------+
|Identities|<=============>| Roles |<=============>|Permissions|
+----------+ [Constraints] +-------+ [Constraints] +----------+
| | ^ ^
| | +-----------+ | | +---------------------+
| | | +-------+ | | | | Legend |
| +====>|Session|=====+ | | |
| | +-------+ | | | One-to-One |
| | ... | | | =================== |
| | +-------+ | | | |
+========>|Session|=========+ | One-to-Many |
(d) Identity | +-------+ | (e) Role | ==================> |
Selections | | Selections | |
[Constraints]| Access |[Constraints] | Many-to-Many |
| Sessions | | <================> |
+-----------+ +---------------------+
Figure 1 - Security definition of Role inheritance
3. Security Issues
The security for the I2RS protocol utilizes the role based access
security for the I2RS clients access to the I2RS agent's data (read/
write). The I2RS [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] treats the agent's
notification stream or publication stream as a pre-authorized read.
This security consideration document examines the major points:
I2RS roles and identities
This section looks at how I2RS roles and identities created by
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture], how I2RS model derived from the
security model of role-based access control matches the
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture], and how Identities and roles get
distributed?
Data Security
The data security section looks at incidents when the I2RS data
stream will need confidentiality and message integrity, transport
security, how role-based access control of I2RS data impacts the
I2RS Information Model and Data Model design, and light weight
clients who work without confidentiality.
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Transport Requirements for Multiple data stream connections in I2RS
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] allows multiple data streams across
one or more transports. This section examines the security issues
surrounding those streams.
Subsequent sections will look how auditing, tracing and deployment
scenarios impact the I2RS protocol.
3.1. Security roles and Identities for the I2RS client and I2RS Agent
All I2RS clients and I2RS agents MUST have at least one unique
identifier that uniquely identifies each party. The I2RS protocol
MUST utilize these identifiers for mutual identification of the
client and agent. An I2RS agent, upon receiving an I2RS message from
a client, must confirm that the client has a valid identity. The
client, upon receiving an I2RS message from an agent, must confirm
the I2RS identity.
The distribution of security identity is taken up in the section
below. To provide context for that discussion let us look at how
I2RS roles are linked to that identity/identifier.
Role = identity + routing tree + Read/Write/R-W
Role security for an agent combines agent identity plus the potential
read scope plus the potential write scope. The potential read scope
is the routing attributes/variables within a data model (for example
BGP peer information) or a set of data models (RIB Data Mode and the
BGP peer information) that an agent may potential read. A
notification or an event stream is considered a set of read scope
data sent via different methodology. A write scope is something the
client may write.
Role security exists even if multiple transport connections are being
used between the I2RS client and I2RS agent (per
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]). These transport message streams may
start/stop without affecting the existence of the client/agent data
exchange. TCP supports a single stream of data. SCTP [RFC4960]
provides security for multiple streams plus end-to-end transport of
data.
(Editor: Additional WG discussion will need to focus on how different
deployments impact the transport layers, and the messages sizes (E.g.
UDP's limited size). Use case descriptions will guide this
discussion.)
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3.1.1. I2RS Role-Based Access Control
Figure 2 show a model of the I2RS role-based access control
environment. This model is a variation of the [RFC4949] diagram on
role-based security shown in Figure 1. Portions of this model are
outside the scope of the I2RS protocol, but are part of the
deployment environment of the I2RS protocol. For example, the I2RS
identity repository is a logical construct of an entity that keeps
all the identities. This logical entity may be implemented in
deployments of I2RS in many ways. One simple way is the
administrator securely transferring a file with identities and Roles
to the client and agent. An automated way may be seen within the
security identity distribution protcools in the IETF (AAA, ABFAB,
etc). The important point is the Roles (Identity + Rib-portion +
Scope (Read, Write, R/W) is passed within the I2RS environment in an
manner consistent to the logical constrains in this model.
identity + Role
------- assignments (global)------
| Role assignments |
V V
+-----------+ +--------------------------+
| I2RS | identity |I2RS Agent Roles |
| Agent | assignments |= Potential Read Scope |
|identities | (or policy | + Potential Write Scope |
+--V--------+ constraints) +--------------------------+
| ^
I2RS | | (not in the I2RS protocol)
protocol | +==========+
| | |identity |
| ============|repository|
| |selection |
| +----------+
| Mutual |
| authorization |
| |
| V
| +-------------------+
|--| i2rs client |
| identities |
+-------------------+
Figure 2 - I2RS Role Based Access Model
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3.1.2. Identities
This document suggests that identity distribution and the loading of
these identities into I2RS agent and I2RS Client occur outside the
I2RS protocol. The I2RS protocol SHOULD assume some mechanism (IETF
or private) will distribute identities and that the I2RS client/agent
will load the identities prior to the I2RS protocol establishing a
connection between I2RS client and I2RS agent.
Each Identity will be linked (via internal policy) to one or more
roles. The context of the I2RS client-agent communication is based
on an role which may/may not require message confidentiality, message
integrity protection, or replay attack protection.
I2RS clients may be used by multiple applications to configure
routing via I2RS agents, receive status reports, turn on the I2RS
audit stream, or turn on I2RS traceability. An I2RS client software
could arrange to store multiple secure identities and use the
identity to insure that the "Status-only" application process only
uses the client identity for status notification no matter what role
that identity takes on. Multiple identities provide some secondary
level support for the application-client, but may grow the number of
identities. The multiple identities per client could also be used
for multiple levels of security for the data passed between an I2RS
client and agent as either: a) confidential, b) authorized with
message integrity protection, c) authorized without message integrity
protection, and or d) no protection. See the section below for
additional discussions on these options.
Editor's note: The WG needs to discuss the scaling properties of the
out of band establishment of identities (that is outside the I2RS
protocol).
3.2. I2RS Data Security
I2RS data security involves determining of the I2RS client to I2RS
agent data transfer needs to be confidential, or have message
integrity, or support an end-to-end integrity (in the case of stacked
clients). This section discuss the consideration of I2RS data
security.
It is assumed that all I2RS data security mechanisms used for
protecting the I2RS packets needs to be associated with proper key
management solutions. A key management solution needs to guarantee
that only the entities having sufficient privileges can get the keys
to encrypt/decrypt the sensitive data. In addition, the key
management mechanisms need to be able to update the keys before they
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have lost sufficient security strengths, without breaking the
connection between the agents and clients.
3.2.1. Data Confidentiality Requirements
In a critical infrastructure, certain data within routing elements is
sensitive and R/W operations on such data must be controlled in order
to protect its confidentiality. For example, most carriers do not
want a router's configuration and data flow statistics known by
hackers or their competitors. While carriers may share peering
information, most carriers do not share configuration and traffic
statistics. To achieve this, access control to sensitive data needs
to be provided, and the confidentiality protection on such data
during transportation needs to be enforced.
It is normal to protect the confidentiality of the sensitive data
during transportation by encrypting them. Encryption obscures the
data transported on the wire and protects them against eavesdropping
attacks. Because the encryption itself cannot guarantee the
integrity or fresh of data being transported, in practice,
confidentiality protection is normally provided with integrity
protection.
3.2.2. Message Integrity Requirements
An integrity protection mechanism for I2RS should be able to ensure
1) the data being protected are not modified without detection during
its transportation and 2) the data is actually from where it is
expected t come from 3) the data is not repeated from some earlier
interaction of the protocol. That is, when both confidentiality and
integrity of data is properly protected, it is possible to ensure
that encrypted data are not modified or replayed without detection.
As a part of integrity protection, the replay protection approaches
provided for I2RS must consider both online and offline attackers,
and have sufficient capability to deal with intra connection and
inter-connection attacks. For instance, when using symmetric keys,
sequence numbers which increase monotonically could be useful to help
in distinguishing the replayed messages, under the assistance of
signatures or MACs (dependent on what types of keys are applied). In
addition, in the cases where only offline attacker is considered,
random nonce could be effective.
3.2.3. End-to-End Data Integrity: Data or Transport
The I2RS protocol is concerned with I2RS client-agent exchange. End-
to-end confidentiality requires at least transport layer security.
In a simple case of a I2RS Client to a single I2RS agent transfer,
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the I2RS client puts the data in to the secure transport message and
the I2RS agent takes it out of the transport message.
In the case of a stacked client where the I2RS-client1 talks to a
I2RS-agent1-I2RS-client2, the data that transfers between the I2RS-
agent-1 and I2RS-client-2 is outside the scope of the I2RS protocol.
However, it is critical if this mechanism is used for fan-out of
read/write commands to agents that the end-to-end data has data
integrity.
Editor question: Should I2RS have the optional capability to support
end-to-end data integrity?
3.3. Role-Based Access Control of I2RS data
I2RS protocol uses the I2RS Role (Identity + Access (Read, Write, or
Read/Write) to control access to the I2RS data. The impact of I2RS
role-based security on I2RS data models is that certain portions of
an I2RS data models may require:
o confidentiality - which requires a) mutual authentication, b)
encryption, and c) message integrity protection with its
associated replay protection,
o Message integrity protection - which requires mutual
authentication, message integrity with replay protection,
o mutual authentication only, or
o no authentication.
Therefore, creators of I2RS Information Models (IM) and I2RS Data
Models (DM) may want to consider the following factors:
o Does the client using this data model care if the agent is valid?
o Does the agent responding to this data model care if the client is
valid?
o Does the client-agent exchange require mutual authentication for
all of the data model or some?
o Does the client/agent care what operations are done? (secure
communications)
o Does the client and agent care about protection - either 1)
confidentiality or 2) replay with integrity?
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o Are there other security issues unique to this Informational Model
(IM) or Data Model (DM)
3.4. Impact of Data Confidentiality inclusion/exclusion in the I2RS
Protocol
Confidentiality of role implies the following:
o a requirement for confidentiality of I2RS routing tree scope
(portion) in I2RS client-agent communication;
o I2RS client and I2RS agent mutually validate identities; and
o encryption is supported in the I2RS protocol.
Mutual validation of client and agent's identities means that both:
o The I2RS client knows the I2RS agent has a valid identity, and
that the I2RS agent has agreed that the I2RS client has a valid
identity; and
o The I2RS agent knows that the I2RS client has a valid Identity,
and the the I2RS client has agreed that the I2RS agent has a valid
identity.
I2RS WG has indicated some I2RS client-agent message exchanges will
not need encrypt data to obscure the data. If this is so, then the
I2RS designers must understand if their data will be encrypted or
sent without encryption. Information Model (IM) and Data Model (DM)
creators must discuss determine the following:
o I2RS Client to Agent: Is encryption a recommendation or
requirement?
o If it is a recommendation, must the I2RS agent/client support
encryption but only use it for certain roles (portions of the tree
with read/write scope)? If there are multiple channels for
transporting data, one role could be operating without encryption
on one part of the tree, and another role could be operating with
encryption on another part of the tree.
o Does the Informational Model (IM) and Data Model (DM) make
assumptions that would allow security attacks using the
unencrypted data?
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3.5. Transport requirements
The architecture provides the ability to have multiple transport
sessions providing protocol and data communication between the I2RS
Agent and the I2RS client. The document does not try to specify the
protocols for securing I2RS packets, but provides considersations in
choosing a transport protocol. These transports can be TCP or secure
(SCTP) or a TLS based. If we use TLS based transports, we can use
TLS over UDP (DTLS) or SSL with with TLS plus extensions.
The following are questions to address regarding the transport:
o Do we have mandatory-to-implement transport protocols?
o Will the association of I2RS Roles with transport protocols need
to be configured in the I2RS client and I2RS agent?
o Do we allow the I2RS agent/client to automatically establish
transport sessions to publish statistics for notifications/
subscriptions?
o Is a publishing broker feasible or does that cause security
issues?
4. Audit-able Data streams
This section discusses data streams which have a security audit trail
(see definitions) for the I2RS Client to I2RS Agent interactions.
The I2RS Discussion group suggested that audit data streams are:
o a tracing of changes sent to a separate streams, and
o a portion of the data selected by policy
o turned on/off via I2RS protocol
I2RS is not inventing a new audit protocol as many protocols (syslog)
are available to be used. Verifying audit stream data is outside the
I2RS protocol, but those designing the IM and DMs with audit stream
capability need to provide the appropriate hooks such as: on/off
action, data selection, and protocol (for example syslog) that the
I2RS Agent (or I2RS routing system) sends the audit data upon.
Agent audit trail could be the logging of what variables written by
which client (identified by client ID) on behalf of a reported
application (identified by the ID of the application). The audit
stream turned on by the I2RS Agent may need to pass both the client
ID and the application ID to the audit stream.
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Out of scope for this work is the ability to audit the application to
I2RS-Client interfaces, or the I2RS Agent to I2RS routing system.
Editor: Questions still to be answered:
o Is support for audit stream a requirement for all I2RS agents or
an option dependent on the role which is dependent on the IM/DM
(info and data models)?
o How does the filtering of event data impact the audit process?
For example if BGP event changes are only taken from 50 out of 300
BGP peers, does this stop any ability to audit the session? Or if
the read filters only watch for key prefixes to be received on a
specific set of interfaces, does this stop the ability to audit?
o How do you handle filtering of reads/notifications by I2RS policy
and auditing? If the I2RS client asks to read a IM/DM tree
portion via a Role but the that read data requested of I2RS Agent
is filtered before sending to client, how is this handled in the
auditing protocols?
5. Impact of Traceability
The draft [I-D.clarke-i2rs-traceability] provides an IM for the
following use cases:
o Automated event correlations, trend analysis, and anomaly
detection
o trace log storage
o improved accounting of routing system transactions
o Standardized structure data format for writing common tools
o real-time monitoring and troubleshooting
o enhanced network audit, management and forensic analysis
capabilities
The operational guidance in the traceability IM includes creation of
an I2RS log that is stored in a temporary storage, rotated, and
retrieved via syslog, I2RS "snap-shot" available as one bulk snapshot
or subscription, and in a I2RS publish-subscribe stream.
The security issues of the traceability log data sent to syslog are
equivalent to the auditable data stream security issues covered in
the previous section. The one-bulk snapshot data model and publish/
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subscription model contain the same issues considered in the basic
read functions described above. The traceability log issues beyond
this are implementation or transport protocol issues regarding scale.
6. Deployment issues
This section provides consideration for the deployment issues around
stacked I2RS clients. This section only has questions for now, and
will be added to in future drafts.
6.1. Stacked I2RS Agent-Clients in Broker topologies
The [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] describes a broker function that can
be used in the topology server use case. The general concept for
such a deployment would allows the following hierarchical scenario:
Broker
I 2RSclient1----I2RSagent1=I2RSclient2---I2RSagent2
|-----I2RSagent3
|-----I2RSagent4
|-----I2RSagent5
Figure 3
Editor: The implications of this deployment scenario will be added to
this draft. For now we have the following questions:
o Does Stacked I2rs agent/client require end-to-end security?
o Does this scenario bring unique security issues?
o Is this scenario outside the I2RS venue? If
o If it is scope, do we need to alter the diagrams within the
architecture document? If so, how would we re-write the diagrams.
7. Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Wes George, Ahmed Abro, Qin Wu, Eric
Yu, Alia Atlas, and Jeff Haas for their wonderful contributions to
our discussion discussion.
8. IANA Considerations
This draft includes no request to IANA.
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9. Security Considerations
This is a document about security architecture beyond the
consideration for I2RS. Additional security definitions will be
added in this section.
10. Informative References
[I-D.clarke-i2rs-traceability]
Clarke, J., Salgueiro, G., and C. Pignataro, "Interface to
the Routing System (I2RS) Traceability: Framework and
Information Model", draft-clarke-i2rs-traceability-02
(work in progress), June 2014.
[I-D.hares-i2rs-info-model-policy]
Hares, S. and W. Wu, "An Information Model for Network
policy", draft-hares-i2rs-info-model-policy-02 (work in
progress), March 2014.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
Atlas, A., Halpern, J., Hares, S., Ward, D., and T.
Nadeau, "An Architecture for the Interface to the Routing
System", draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-03 (work in
progress), May 2014.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem-statement]
Atlas, A., Nadeau, T., and D. Ward, "Interface to the
Routing System Problem Statement", draft-ietf-i2rs-
problem-statement-03 (work in progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model]
Bahadur, N., Folkes, R., Kini, S., and J. Medved, "Routing
Information Base Info Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-rib-info-
model-03 (work in progress), May 2014.
[I-D.ji-i2rs-usecases-ccne-service]
Ji, X., Zhuang, S., Huang, T., and S. Hares, "I2RS Use
Cases for Control of Forwarding Path by Central Control
Network Element (CCNE)", draft-ji-i2rs-usecases-ccne-
service-01 (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.keyupate-i2rs-bgp-usecases]
Patel, K., Fernando, R., Gredler, H., Amante, S., White,
R., and S. Hares, "Use Cases for an Interface to BGP
Protocol", draft-keyupate-i2rs-bgp-usecases-02 (work in
progress), June 2014.
Hares, et al. Expires December 19, 2014 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft I2RS Security June 2014
[I-D.white-i2rs-use-case]
White, R., Hares, S., and A. Retana, "Protocol Independent
Use Cases for an Interface to the Routing System", draft-
white-i2rs-use-case-05 (work in progress), June 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC
4960, September 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Email: shares@ndzh.com
Scott Brim
Consultant
Email: scott.brim@gmail.com
Nancy Cam-Winget
Cisco
Email: ncamwing@cisco.com
Joel Halpern
Ericcson
Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com
Hares, et al. Expires December 19, 2014 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft I2RS Security June 2014
DaCheng Zhang
Huawei
Email: zhangdacheng@huawei.com
Qin Wu
Huawei
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Ahmed Abro
Cisco
Email: aabro@cisco.com
Salman Asadullah
Cisco
Email: sasad@cisco.com
Joel Halpern
Ericcson
Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com
Eric Yu
Cisco
Email: eyu@cisco.com
Hares, et al. Expires December 19, 2014 [Page 18]