Network Working Group J. Gould
Internet-Draft S. Hollenbeck
Obsoletes: 4310 (if approved) VeriSign, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track December 14, 2009
Expires: June 17, 2010
Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
draft-gould-rfc4310bis-01
Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name
System security extensions (DNSSEC) for domain names stored in a
shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends
the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required
for the provisioning of DNS security extensions.
This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the
PROVREG mail list and users.
This document is intended to obsolete RFC 4310.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2010.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Delegation Signer Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Public Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Booleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. DS Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . 6
4. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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1. Introduction
This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 5730 [1].
This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in
RFC 5731 [2], is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML)
1.0 [3] and XML Schema notation ([4], [5]).
The EPP core protocol specification [1] provides a complete
description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough
understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to
understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with
the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [11] and RFC 1035
[12] and with DNS security extensions described in RFC 4033 [13], RFC
4034 [6], and RFC 4035 [7] is required to understand the DNS security
concepts described in this document.
The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for
the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a
shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping
can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC
delegation signer (DS) resource records as described in RFC 4034 [6].
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [8].
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used
to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page
boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only
to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of
this protocol.
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented in order to develop a conforming
implementation.
2. Object Attributes
This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name
mapping [2]. Only new element descriptions are described here.
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2.1. Delegation Signer Information
Delegation signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to
indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent
zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child
zone. A DS resource record (RR) contains four fields: a key tag
field, a key algorithm number octet, an octet identifying a digest
algorithm, and a digest field. See RFC 4034 [6] for specific field
formats.
2.1.1. Public Key Information
Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR
presentation field formats described in section 2.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an
algorithm number octet, and a public key.
2.2. Booleans
Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described
in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5].
2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values
Maximum signature lifetime values MUST be represented in seconds
using an extended XML Schema "int" format. The base "int" format,
which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the W3C XML
Schema recommendation [5]. This format is further restricted to
enforce a minimum value of one.
3. DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can
create, add, remove, and replace delegation signer (DS) information
or key data information for a domain name. There are two different
interfaces that a server can support. The first is called the "DS
Data Interface," where the client is responsible for the creation of
the DS information and is required to pass DS information when
performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server is required to
pass DS information for info responses. The second is the "Key Data
Interface," where the client is responsible for passing the key data
information when performing adds, removes, and replaces. The server
is responsible to pass key data information for info responses. The
server MUST support use of one specification form consistently.
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3.1. DS Data Interface
The DS Data Interface relies uses the <secDNS:dsData> element for
creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info responses.
The key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by
the client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data. The
server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve
the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate
the received DS information. It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone
operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the
parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary. The key
data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in
RFC 3757 [9].
The <secDNS:dsData> element contains the following child elements:
A <secDNS:keyTag> element that contains a key tag value as
described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm value as
described in section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:digestType> element that contains a digest type value as
described in section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:digest> element that contains a digest value as
described in section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6].
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same <secDNS:
maxSigLife> value for all <secDNS:dsData> elements associated with
a domain. If the <secDNS:maxSigLife> is not present, or if
multiple <secDNS:maxSigLife> values are requested, the default
signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined
using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:keyData> element that describes the key data
used as input in the DS hash calculation for use in server
validation. The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following
child elements defined in Section 3.2. The use of the <secDNS:
maxSigLife> child element of <secDNS:keyData> MUST NOT be used for
servers supporting the DS Data Interface.
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3.2. Key Data Interface
The Key Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:keyData>
element for creates, adds, removes, and replaces, as well as for info
responses. The DS information is not provided by the client but is
generated by the server. The attributes used for DS generation is
based on server policy, where only key data is passed between the
client and the server.
The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following child elements:
A <secDNS:flags> element that contains a flags field value as
described in section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:protocol> element that contains a protocol field value
as described in section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm number field
value as described in sections 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6].
A <secDNS:pubKey> element that contains an encoded public key
field value as described in sections 2.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6].
An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
child will expire. A client SHOULD specify the same <secDNS:
maxSigLife> value for all <secDNS:dsData> elements associated with
a domain. If the <secDNS:maxSigLife> is not present, or if
multiple <secDNS:maxSigLife> values are requested, the default
signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined
using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.
3.3. Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface
Example use of DS Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:dsData>
<secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
<secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
<secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
</secDNS:dsData>
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Example use of DS Data Interface with option key data for a create:
<secDNS:dsData>
<secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
<secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
<secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
<secDNS:keyData>
<secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
<secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
<secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
</secDNS:keyData>
</secDNS:dsData>
Example use of Key Data Interface for a create:
<secDNS:keyData>
<secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
<secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
<secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
<secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
</secDNS:keyData>
4. EPP Command Mapping
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
in the EPP core protocol specification [1]. The command mappings
described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing
DNS security extensions via EPP.
4.1. EPP Query Commands
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
retrieve object transfer status information.
4.1.1. EPP <check> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <check> command
or <check> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].
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4.1.2. EPP <info> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <info> command
described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. However, additional
elements are defined for the <info> response.
When an <info> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
<resData> element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP
domain mapping [2]. In addition, the EPP <extension> element MUST
contain a child <secDNS:infData> element that identifies the
extension namespace. The <secDNS:infData> element contains the
following child elements:
One or more <secDNS:dsData> elements that describe the delegation
signer data provided by the client for the domain or one or more
<secDNS:keyData> elements that describe the key data provided by
the client for the domain. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData>
element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the
<secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2.
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
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S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
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S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:dsData>
S: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
S: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
S: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
S: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:dsData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
using the Key Data Interface:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
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S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <resData>
S: <domain:infData
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
S: <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
S: <domain:status s="ok"/>
S: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
S: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
S: <domain:ns>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
S: </domain:ns>
S: <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
S: <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
S: <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
S: <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
S: <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
S: <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
S: <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
S: <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
S: <domain:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
S: </domain:authInfo>
S: </domain:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <extension>
S: <secDNS:infData
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
S: <secDNS:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </secDNS:keyData>
S: </secDNS:infData>
S: </extension>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
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An EPP error response MUST be returned if an <info> command can not
be processed for any reason.
4.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
[2].
4.2. EPP Transform Commands
EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
change information associated with an object.
4.2.1. EPP <create> Command
This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <create>
command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional
elements are defined for the EPP <create> response.
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to create a domain object. In addition to the EPP command
elements described in the EPP domain mapping [2], the command MUST
contain an <extension> element. The <extension> element MUST contain
a child <secDNS:create> element that identifies the extension
namespace. The <secDNS:create> element MUST contain one or more
<secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData> elements. Child
elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1.
Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2.
The <secDNS:dsData> element and the <secDNS:keyData> element contains
an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element. The server MUST abort
command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the
values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or
policy reasons.
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Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL key data:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
using the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <domain:create
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
C: <domain:ns>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
C: </domain:ns>
C: <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
C: <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
C: <domain:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
C: </domain:authInfo>
C: </domain:create>
C: </create>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:create
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:create>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When a <create> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2].
4.2.2. EPP <delete> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <delete> command
or <delete> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].
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4.2.3. EPP <renew> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <renew> command
or <renew> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].
4.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command
This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
[2].
4.2.5. EPP <update> Command
This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <update>
command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional
elements are defined for the EPP <update> response.
The EPP <update> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to
the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the
command MUST contain an <extension> element. The <extension> element
MUST contain a child <secDNS:update> element that identifies the
extension namespace and the location of the extension schema. The
<secDNS:update> element contains a <secDNS:add> element to add
security information to a delegation, a <secDNS:rem> element to
remove security information from a delegation, or a <secDNS:chg>
element to replace all security information with new security
information. The <secDNS:add> and <secDNS:rem> can be used together
to add and remove security information at the same time. <secDNS:chg>
can not be used with either <secDNS:add> or <secDNS:rem>
The <secDNS:update> element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent"
attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to
complete and implement the update request with high priority. This
attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 2.2; the
default value is boolean false. "High priority" is relative to
standard server operator policies that are determined using an out-
of-band mechanism.
The <secDNS:add> element is used to add security information to an
existing set. The <secDNS:add> element MUST contain one or more
<secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData> elements. Child elements of the
<secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 3.1. Child elements
of the <secDNS:keyData> are described in Section 3.2.
The <secDNS:dsData> element and the <secDNS:keyData> element contains
an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element.
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The <secDNS:rem> element contains one or more <secDNS:keyTag>,
<secDNS:dsData>, or <secDNS:keyData> elements that are used to remove
security data from a delegation. <secDNS:keyTag> and <secDNS:dsData>
are part of the DS Data Interface and <secDNS:keyData> is part of the
Key Data Interface.
<secDNS:keyTag> element MUST contain a key tag value as described in
section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6]. Removing all DS information can
remove the ability of the parent to secure the delegation to the
child zone. The server SHOULD return an EPP error result code of
2305 if more then one DS record matches the <secDNS:keyTag>. <secDNS:
dsData> should be used by the client if there is more then one DS
record with the same <secDNS:keyTag>.
<secDNS:dsData> element is used to uniquely define the DS record to
remove by using all four elements <secDNS:keyTag>, <secDNS:alg>,
<secDNS:digestType>, and <secDNS:digest> that is guaranteed to be
unique.
<secDNS:keyData> element is used to uniquely define the key data to
remove along with the associated DS data. There can be more then one
DS record created for each key, so removing a key could remove more
then one DS record.
The <secDNS:chg> element is used to replace all existing security
information with new security information. The <secDNS:chg> element
MUST contain zero or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData>
elements. Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are
described in Section 3.1. Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> are
described in Section 3.2 The data in these elements is used to
replace whatever other data is currently archived for the delegation.
The <secDNS:update> element contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute.
The <secDNS:dsData> element contains OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> and
<secDNS:keyData> elements. In addition the <secDNS:keyData> element
contains an OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element. The server MUST
abort command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if
the values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or
policy reasons.
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Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing DS
Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing Key
Data using the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:add>
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>APPJ////1R==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
<secDNS:dsData> using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
<secDNS:keyTag> using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:rem>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
C: </secDNS:rem>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
Example <update> Command,
Removing all DS or Key Data using <secDNS:chg/>:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update urgent="1"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg/>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example Urgent <update> Command,
Changing DS Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update urgent="1"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <update> Command, Changing DS Data with
OPTIONAL Key Data using the DS Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:dsData>
C: <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
C: <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
C: <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:dsData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
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Example <update> Command, Changing Key Data using
the Key Data Interface:
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
C: <command>
C: <update>
C: <domain:update
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
C: </domain:update>
C: </update>
C: <extension>
C: <secDNS:update
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
C: <secDNS:chg>
C: <secDNS:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
C: <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
C: </secDNS:keyData>
C: </secDNS:chg>
C: </secDNS:update>
C: </extension>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When an extended <update> command has been processed successfully,
the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. A
server operator MUST return an EPP error result code of 2306 if an
urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute value of boolean
true) can not be completed with high priority.
5. Formal Syntax
An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The
formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of
the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML
instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they
are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI
registration purposes.
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
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of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
o Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
o Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor the
names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or promote
products derived from this software without specific prior written
permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
domain name extension schema
for provisioning DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<!-- Child elements found in EPP commands. -->
<element name="create" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
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<element name="update" type="secDNS:updateType"/>
<!-- Child elements supporting either
the dsData or the keyData interface. -->
<complexType name="dsOrKeyType">
<choice>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<!-- Child elements supporting the
chg element. -->
<complexType name="chgType">
<choice minOccurs="0">
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
<!-- Definition for the maximum
signature life (maxSigLife) -->
<simpleType name="maxSigLifeType">
<restriction base="int">
<minInclusive value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!-- Child elements of dsData used for
dsData interface -->
<complexType name="dsDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digestType" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="digest" type="hexBinary"/>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
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<!-- Child elements of keyData used for keyData interface
and optionally with dsData interface -->
<complexType name="keyDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="flags" type="unsignedShort"/>
<element name="protocol" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
<element name="pubKey" type="secDNS:keyType"/>
<element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<!-- Definition for the public key -->
<simpleType name="keyType">
<restriction base="base64Binary">
<minLength value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<!-- Child elements of the <update> command. -->
<complexType name="updateType">
<choice>
<element name="chg" type="secDNS:chgType"/>
<sequence>
<element name="add" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="rem" type="secDNS:remType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</sequence>
</choice>
<attribute name="urgent" type="boolean" default="false"/>
</complexType>
<!-- Child elements of the <rem> command. -->
<complexType name="remType">
<choice>
<element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</choice>
</complexType>
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<!-- Child response elements. -->
<element name="infData" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
<!--
End of schema.
-->
</schema>
END
6. Internationalization Considerations
EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding
information using the Unicode character set and its more compact
representations including UTF-8 [14]. Conformant XML processors
recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [15]. Though XML includes provisions
to identify and use other character encodings through use of an
"encoding" attribute in an <?xml?> declaration, use of UTF-8 is
RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support
incompatibility exists.
As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [2], the elements, element
content, attributes, and attribute values described in this document
MUST inherit the internationalization conventions used to represent
higher-layer domain and core protocol structures present in an XML
instance that includes this extension.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [10]. Two
URI assignments have been completed by the IANA.
Registration request for the extension namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the extension XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
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XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
8. Security Considerations
The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any
security services beyond those described by EPP [1], the EPP domain
name mapping [2], and protocol layers used by EPP. The security
considerations described in these other specifications apply to this
specification as well.
As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations
described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring
client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in sections
2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 5730 [1]. Any attempt to perform a transform
operation on a domain object by any client other than the sponsoring
client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP authorization error.
The provisioning service described in this document involves the
exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the
DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and
server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done
after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a
strong authentication mechanism.
An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator
who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published
by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible
as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data
manipulation.
Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce
significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones
MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly. In the absence
of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the
secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses. If a key
is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised
information or update the delegation information via EPP commands
using the "urgent" attribute.
Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain
delegation can be implemented using a two-step process. First,
security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just
described. The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by
changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold"
or "serverHold" domain status values. The domain can also be removed
from the zone using the EPP <delete> command, but this is a more
drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use.
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Data validity checking at the server requires computational
resources. A purposeful or inadvertent denial-of-service attack is
possible if a client requests some number of update operations that
exceed a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD
take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements
to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service attack.
The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that
can be rejected. Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an
adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities. Server
operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to
limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter
potential adverse situations.
9. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following people who have provided
significant contributions to the development of this document:
David Blacka, Howard Eland, Patrik Faltstrom, Ed Lewis, Klaus
Malorny, Patrick Mevzek, David Smith, Andrew Sullivan.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[1] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.
[2] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain
Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.
[3] Bray, T., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Paoli, J., and E. Maler,
"Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)", World
Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006,
October 2000, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006>.
[4] Mendelsohn, N., Thompson, H., Maloney, M., and D. Beech, "XML
Schema Part 1: Structures", World Wide Web Consortium
FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-1-20010502, May 2001,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-1-20010502>.
[5] Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes",
World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-2-
20010502, May 2001,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-2-20010502>.
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[6] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005.
[7] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005.
[8] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[9] Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, "Domain Name System
KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP)
Flag", RFC 3757, April 2004.
[10] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
10.2. Informative References
[11] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[12] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[13] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
[14] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[15] Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646",
RFC 2781, February 2000.
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 4310
1. Added "This document incorporates feedback from early
implementers on the PROVREG mail list and users." as well as
"This document is intended to obsolete RFC 4310" in the Abstract
2. Removed all references to xsi:schemaLocation to be consistent
with the other EPP RFCs.
3. Added "DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface" section.
4. Moved the "create, add, remove, and replace delegation signer
(DS) information" paragraph from the "Object Attributes" section
to the "DS Data Interface" section.
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5. Replaced the element descriptions in the "EPP <info> Command"
section with a reference to the <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:
keyData> elements described in the "DS Data Interface" and "Key
Data Interface" sections, respectively.
6. Updated the "EPP <info> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.
7. Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section to refer to both the
use of <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:keyData> described in the "DS
Data Interface" and "Key Data Interface" sections, respectively.
8. Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section to describe the use
of <secDNS:maxSigLife> for both <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:
keyData>.
9. Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.
10. Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section to describe the use
of <secDNS:add> and <secDNS:add> together but not with <secDNS:
chg>l;.
11. Changed "<secDNS:chg> element to replace security information
with new security information" to "<secDNS:chg> element to
replace all security information with new security information"
in the "EPP <update> Command" section.
12. Added that the server SHOULD return an EPP error result of 2305
if more than one DS record matches" when using the <secDNS:
keyTag> with a <secDNS:rem>.
13. Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section examples to include
both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface. Also
included additional examples of adding and removing DS data or
key data.
14. Updated the "Formal Syntax" section with the updated XML schema.
15. Updated the Acknowledgements section with a new list of
contributors.
16. Replaced references to RFC 3730 with references to RFC 5730.
17. Replaced references to RFC 3731 with references to RFC 5731.
18. Changed "The <secDNS:chg> element MUST contain one or more
<secDNS:dsData>" to ""The <secDNS:chg> element MUST contain zero
or more <secDNS:dsData>".
19. Added example of removing all DS or Key Data using <secDNS:
chg/>.
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Authors' Addresses
James Gould
VeriSign, Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
US
EMail: jgould@verisign.com
Scott Hollenbeck
VeriSign, Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
US
EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com
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