Network Working Group                                         R. Gellens
Internet-Draft                                Core Technology Consulting
Updates: 5222 (if approved)                                     B. Rosen
Intended status: Standards Track                            July 1, 2020
Expires: January 2, 2021


          The LoST-Validation S-NAPTR Application Service Tag
                    draft-gellens-lost-validation-09

Abstract

   This document adds the "LoST-Validation" service tag to the
   Straightforward Naming Authority PoinTeR (S-NAPTR) Application
   Service Tag IANA registry.  This tag can appear in a Naming Authority
   Pointer (NAPTR) Domain Name System (DNS) record to assist clients of
   the Location-to-Service Translation Protocol (LoST) in identifying
   LoST servers explicitly willing to perform location validation.  This
   tag and the information on its use is an update to RFC5222 that
   enables the explicit discovery of a server that supports location
   validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Document Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  The LoST-Validation Application Service Tag . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Backwards Compatability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  S-NAPTR Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Changes from Previous Versions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Changes from -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Changes from -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.3.  Changes from -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.4.  Changes from -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.5.  Changes from -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.6.  Changes from -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.7.  Changes from -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.8.  Changes from -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.9.  Changes from -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Document Scope

   This document adds 'LoST-Validation' to the S-NAPTR Application
   Service Tag IANA registry, and describes how this tag fits in the
   LoST server discovery procedure described in [RFC5222].  This tag is
   used with Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) Domain Name System (DNS)
   records so that clients of the Location-to-Service Translation
   Protocol (LoST) [RFC5222] can identify servers explicitly willing to
   perform location validation.  This tag and the information on its use
   is an update to [RFC5222] that enables the explicit discovery of a
   server that supports location validation.

2.  Introduction

   The Location-to-Service Translation Protocol, LoST [RFC5222] defines
   a mapping service with the additional ability for a client to request
   that a civic address be validated.  The LoST protocol allows servers



Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


   to ignore a request to perform location validation.  The National
   Emergency Number Association (NENA) has defined an architecture for
   all-IP emergency services (known as "i3" [NENA-i3]), which defines
   the mapping (routing) and validation functions as two distinct
   functional elements, defined as an Emergency Call Routing Function
   (ECRF) and a Location Validation Function (LVF).  NENA i3 requires
   that the mapping (ECRF) and validation (LVF) functions be separable,
   so that an entity responsible for a LoST server cluster can decide to
   provide mapping and validation services using consolidated or
   separate server clusters (i.e., using the same or separate boxes).
   The rationale is that the mapping service is used in real-time during
   emergency call routing, while the validation service is used in
   advance, typically when data is provisioned, and therefore the
   mapping service has much higher availability and response time
   requirements than the validation service.  An organization might
   choose to deploy these services using different server clusters to
   make it easier to provide higher levels of service for the mapping
   function while shielding it from the potentially bursty load of
   validation, while another organization might choose to use the same
   sets of servers for both, configured and deployed to offer the high
   service level demanded of the mapping service.

   In order to permit this separability, any entity querying a LoST
   server needs to be able to resolve an Application Unique String (AUS)
   into a URL for a LoST server that offers the required service
   (mapping or validation).  This separability needs to be maintained
   throughout the LoST tree structure, from forest guide to leaf node
   (LoST architecture is described in [RFC5582]).  Because LoST
   referrals return an AUS rather than a URL, either a different Service
   Tag or a DNS name convention (e.g., "ecrf.example.org" and
   "lvf.example.org") is needed to differentiate the different services.
   DNS name conventions are inflexible and fragile, making a different
   service tag the preferred approach.

   Because a server discovered using the "LoST" application service tag
   may ignore a request to perform location validation, a service tag
   explicitly for location validation also reduces the likelihood (which
   has existed since [RFC5582]) of a client requiring location
   validation reaching servers unwilling to do so.

3.  The LoST-Validation Application Service Tag

   This document adds 'LoST-Validation' to the S-NAPTR Application
   Service Tag registry created by [RFC3958].  The 'LoST-Validation' tag
   serves as a counterpart to the 'LoST' tag added by [RFC5222]: The
   'LoST' tag identifies servers able to perform the core mapping
   function, while 'LoST-Validation' identifies servers explicitly
   willing to perform the validation function.



Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


   Because some servers might be configured to provide both mapping and
   validation functions, a server identified using the 'LoST' service
   tag might also perform the validation function (and resolving the two
   tags might result in the same URL).  Because the two functions might
   be separate, clients seeking a LoST server for location validation
   can first try U-NAPTR resolution using the 'Lost-Validation' service
   tag, and fallback to the 'LoST' service tag if this does not resolve
   to a usable LoST server.

   LoST [RFC5222] specifies that LoST servers are located by resolving
   an application Unique String (AUS) using U-NAPTR/DDDS (URI-Enabled
   NAPTR/Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service) [RFC4848], and defines
   the 'LoST' Application service tag.  In order to permit separability
   of the mapping and validation services performed using LoST, and to
   reduce the likelihood of a client requiring location validation
   reaching servers unwilling to do so, this document defines the 'LoST-
   Validation' service tag.  NAPTR records for LoST servers available
   for location validation contain the 'LoST-Validation' service tag.
   An entity needing to perform location validation using LoST performs
   the discovery procedure as described in [RFC5222], except that the
   'LoST-Validation' service tag is used in preference to the 'LoST'
   service tag.  For both service tags, the HTTP and HTTPS URL schemes
   are used.  In the absense of any NAPTR records containing the 'LoST-
   Validation' service tag, the 'LoST' service tag is used.  Fallback to
   the 'LoST' service tag may follow if the 'Lost-Validation' service
   tag fails to result in a usable LoST server.  The discovery procedure
   with the 'LoST-Validation' service tag might result in the same URL
   as the 'LoST' service tag, or it may result in a different URL.  When
   the URLs are different, they could lead to the same physical servers,
   or different servers.

4.  Backwards Compatability

   The primary use of LoST in general, and the location validation
   functionality in particular, is within the emergency services area.
   Within North America, the NENA i3 [NENA-i3] document specifies how
   protocols including LoST are used.  The i3 document is expected to
   reference the 'LoST-Validation' service tag, and specify its use in
   both server NAPTR DNS records and client resolution of Application
   Unique Strings (AUS).

   LoST allows a server to refuse to perform location validation, and
   defines the 'locationValidationUnavailable' warning.  LoST also
   allows a server to refer to another server rather than answering
   itself.  So, in a deployment where a LoST tree has separate server
   clusters for mapping and for validation, mapping servers receiving a
   request for validation could either perform the validation as
   requested, or return the 'locationValidationUnavailable' warning, and



Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


   potentially also include a <redirect> element to redirect to a
   validation server.  However, the <redirect> element contains an
   Application Unique String, so unless the AUSs for validation and
   mapping are different (e.g., 'ecrf.example.org' and
   'lvf.example.org'), we still need a different service tag to allow
   for flexible deployment choices (i.e., not requiring a DNS name
   convention).

   LoST clients performing emergency services operations are expected to
   comply with the latest NENA i3 specification, and hence support the
   'LoST-Validation' service tag when defined.  A LoST client
   implemented prior to the addition of the 'LoST-Validation' tag would
   use the 'LoST' tag to resolve an AUS.  Such a client might not be
   performing location validation, but if it is, the LoST server it
   contacts may perform the service.  Even in a deployment where mapping
   and validation are split, the data is identical; the split is a load
   and deployment optimization strategy.  The server designated for
   mapping is likely to perform validation when requested, potentially
   unless it is under load.  If an older client attempts validation
   using a designated mapping server that refuses the request, the
   client will retry later, at which point the server may no longer be
   under load and may provide the function.  Even in the (unlikely) case
   of a designated mapping server that refuses to perform validation at
   any time, the server could return a redirect with a different AUS
   (e.g., "lvf.example.com") that resolves to a designated validation
   server.  In the (unlikely) worst case, the client will be unable to
   reach a server willing to perform validation, and will submit a
   discrepancy report, as specified in NENA i3.  The discrepancy report
   resolution would be to update the client with the 'LoST-Validation'
   service tag, update the AUS returned in a redirect and DNS to use a
   different DNS host name, or permit the server to perform validation
   when not under stress (or a combination).  Note that, because LoST
   does not require servers to perform validation, the situation
   described can exist regardless of the addition of the 'LoST-
   Validation' service tag.  The addition of the tag improves the
   likelihood of a client needing validation being able to do so.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations described in [RFC3958], [RFC4848], and
   [RFC5222] apply here.  No additional security aspects are foreseen by
   the addition of an extra tag.  Separation of services might be
   desired, for example, to be able to allocate different levels of
   resources (such as server capacity, attack mitigation, bandwidth,
   etc.) to the mapping and validation services, in which case separate
   tags are needed to allow LoST clients (which may include other LoST
   servers) to identify the correct server cluster.




Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


   [RFC5222] descriptively discusses the use of DNS Security [RFC4033]
   to mitigate the risk of DNS-based attacks.  Because DNS Security has
   become more widely deployed since the publication of [RFC5222], such
   measures SHOULD be used when performing NAPTR resolution.  Note that,
   while there are valid reasons to proceed with a LoST mapping query
   despite security failures while initiating or processing an emergency
   call, these concerns generally do not apply to a loST validation
   query done in advance of an emergency call.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to add 'LoST-Validation' to the S-NAPTR Application
   Service Tag registry created by [RFC3958]  This tag serves as a
   counterpart to the 'LoST' tag added by [RFC5222].

   (Note that IANA and [RFC3958] call this registry "S-NAPTR Application
   Service Tags" while [RFC5222] calls it "U-NAPTR application service
   tag".)

6.1.  S-NAPTR Registration

   This document registers an S-NAPTR application service tag:

      Application Service Tag: LoST-Validation

      Defining Publication: This document.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Ted Hardie, Ben Campbell, Dan Banks, Pete Resnick,
   Shawn Emery, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, and Benjamin Kaduk for
   their helpful reviews and suggestions, and to Barry Leiba for
   shepherding the document.

8.  Changes from Previous Versions

8.1.  Changes from -00 to -01

   o  Fixed incorrect tag in Section 6

   o  Clarified background and explanation in Section 2

   o  Clarified text in Section 3

   o  Expanded text in Section 5






Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


8.2.  Changes from -01 to -02

   o  Fixed bug in .xml file

8.3.  Changes from -02 to -03

   o  Reworded fallback text in Section 2

8.4.  Changes from -03 to -04

   o  Fixed some references to [RFC4848] that should be to [RFC5222] in
      sections Section 2 and Section 3

   o  Added clarifying text in Abstract

   o  Copied text from Abstract to Section 1

   o  Added clarifying text in Section 2

8.5.  Changes from -04 to -05

   o  Added reference to [RFC5222] in Section 5

   o  Added clarifying text to Section 2

   o  Moved some text from Section 2 to Section 3

   o  Added new section Section 4

8.6.  Changes from -05 to -06

   o  Changed intended status from Informational to Standards Track

   o  Added indication that the document (if approved) updates RFC 5222

   o  Added text to Abstract, Document Scope (Section 1), and
      Introduction (Section 2) to better explain document purpose.

   o  Added Informational reference to [RFC5582]

   o  Minor wording improvements in multiple sections

8.7.  Changes from -06 to -07

   o  Minor editorial changes to Introduction (Section 2)






Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


8.8.  Changes from -07 to -08

   o  Added text in Abstract and Document Scope (Section 1) clarifying
      the updates to [RFC5582]

8.9.  Changes from -08 to -09

   o  Added text in Security Considerations (Section 5) making the use
      of DNS Security [RFC4033] a SHOULD

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3958]  Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based Application
              Service Location Using SRV RRs and the Dynamic Delegation
              Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, DOI 10.17487/RFC3958,
              January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3958>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4848]  Daigle, L., "Domain-Based Application Service Location
              Using URIs and the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service
              (DDDS)", RFC 4848, DOI 10.17487/RFC4848, April 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4848>.

   [RFC5222]  Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H.
              Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation
              Protocol", RFC 5222, DOI 10.17487/RFC5222, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5222>.

9.2.  Informative references

   [NENA-i3]  National Emergency Number Association (NENA)
              Interconnection and Security Committee, i3 Architecture
              Working Group, , "Detailed Functional and Interface
              Standards for the NENA i3 Solution", 2016,
              <https://www.nena.org/page/i3_Stage3>.

   [RFC5582]  Schulzrinne, H., "Location-to-URL Mapping Architecture and
              Framework", RFC 5582, DOI 10.17487/RFC5582, September
              2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5582>.






Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft               LoST-Validation                   July 2020


Authors' Addresses

   Randall Gellens
   Core Technology Consulting
   US

   Email: rg+ietf@coretechnologyconsulting.com
   URI:   http://www.coretechnologyconsulting.com


   Brian Rosen
   470 Conrad Dr
   Mars, PA   16046
   US

   Email: br@brianrosen.net



































Gellens & Rosen          Expires January 2, 2021                [Page 9]