ADD M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: November 18, 2021 McAfee
D. Wing
Citrix
V. Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
May 17, 2021
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for
Encrypted DNS
draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike-03
Abstract
This document specifies a new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version
2 (IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types for encrypted DNS
protocols such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and DNS-
over-QUIC (DoQ).
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2021.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types for Encrypted DNS 3
3.1. ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes . . . . . . . 3
3.2. ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute . . . 5
4. IKEv2 Protocol Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Configuration Payload Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Sample Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. Roaming Enterprise Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. VPN Service Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. DNS Offload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
This document specifies encrypted DNS configuration for an Internet
Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296] initiator,
particularly the Authentication Domain Name (ADN) of encrypted DNS
protocols such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS-over-TLS (DoT)
[RFC7858], or DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) [I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic].
This document introduces new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute
Types (Section 3) for the support of encrypted DNS servers. These
attributes can be used to provision authentication domain names, a
list of IP addresses, and a set of service parameters.
Sample use cases are discussed in Appendix A. The Configuration
Payload Attribute Types defined in this document are not specific to
these deployments, but can also be used in other deployment contexts.
It is out of the scope of this document to provide a comprehensive
list of deployment contexts.
The encrypted DNS server hosted by the VPN provider can get a domain-
validate certificate from a public CA. The VPN client does not need
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to be provisioned with the root certificate of a private CA to
authenticate the certificate of the encrypted DNS server. The
encrypted DNS server can run on private IP addresses and its access
can be restricted to clients connected to the VPN.
Note that, for many years, typical designs have often considered that
the DNS server was usually located inside the protected domain, but
could be located outside of it. With encrypted DNS, the latter
option becomes plausible.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses of the terms defined in [RFC8499].
Also, this document uses of the terms defined in [RFC7296]. In
particular, readers should be familiar with "initiator" and
"responder" terms used in that document.
This document makes use of the following terms:
'Do53': refers to unencrypted DNS.
'Encrypted DNS': refers to a scheme where DNS messages are sent over
an encrypted channel. Examples of encrypted DNS are DoT, DoH, and
DoQ.
'ENCDNS_IP*: refers to any IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute
Types defined in Section 3.1.
3. IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types for Encrypted DNS
3.1. ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes
The ENCDNS_IP* IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types are used
to configure encrypted DNS servers. All these attributes share the
format shown in Figure 1.
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+
| RESERVED | Num Addresses | ADN Length |
+-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
~ IP Addresses ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Authentication Domain Name ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Service Parameters (SvcParams) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Attributes Format
The fields of the attribute shown in Figure 1 are as follows:
o R (Reserved, 1 bit) - This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt (see Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296] for details).
o Attribute Type (15 bits) - Identifier for Configuration Attribute
Type; is set to TBA1 or TBA2 values listed in Section 6.1.
o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
octets. In particular, this field is set to:
* 0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST or
CFG_ACK.
* (4 + Length of the ADN + N * 4 + Length of SvcParams) for
ENCDNS_IP4 attributes if the Configuration payload has types
CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET; N being the number of included IPv4
addresses ('Num addresses').
* (4 + Length of the ADN + N * 16 + Length of SvcParams) for
ENCDNS_IP6 attributes if the Configuration payload has types
CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET; N being the number of included IPv6
addresses ('Num addresses').
o RESERVED (2 octets) - These bits are reserved for future use.
These bits MUST be set to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored
by the receiver.
o Num Addresses (1 octet) - Indicates the number of enclosed IPv4
(for ENCDNS_IP4 attribute type) or IPv6 (for ENCDNS_IP6 attribute
type) addresses. It MUST NOT be set to 0.
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o ADN Length (1 octet) - Indicates the length of the authentication-
domain-name field in octets.
o IP Address(es) (variable) - One or more IPv4 or IPv6 addresses to
be used to reach the encrypted DNS server that is identified by
the name in the Authentication Domain Name.
o Authentication Domain Name (variable) - A fully qualified domain
name of the encrypted DNS server following the syntax defined in
[RFC5890]. The name MUST NOT contain any terminators (e.g., NULL,
CR).
An example of a valid ADN for DoH server is "doh1.example.com".
o Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable) - Specifies a set of
service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]. Service parameters
may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
alternate port numbers. The service parameters MUST NOT include
"ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as they are superseded by the
included IP addresses.
If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
default port numbers should be used. As a reminder, the default
port number is 853 for DoT and 443 for DoH.
The service parameters apply to all IP addresses in the ENCDNS_IP*
Configuration Payload Attribute.
3.2. ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute
The format of ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO configuration payload attribute is
shown in Figure 2.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R| Attribute Type | Length |
+-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+
| RESERVED | ADN Length |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
~ Authentication Domain Name ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Hash Algorithm Identifiers ~
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
~ Certificate Digest ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Attribute Format
o R (Reserved, 1 bit) - This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt (see Section 3.15.1 of [RFC7296] for details).
o Attribute Type (15 bits) - Identifier for Configuration Attribute
Type; is set to TBA3 value listed in Section 6.1.
o Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the data in
octets.
o RESERVED (2 octets) - These bits are reserved for future use.
These bits MUST be set to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored
by the receiver.
o ADN Length (1 octet) - Indicates the length of the authentication-
domain-name field in octets. When set to '0', this means that the
digest applies on the ADN conveyed in the ENCDNS_IP* Configuration
Payload Attribute(s).
o Authentication Domain Name (variable) - A fully qualified domain
name of the encrypted DNS server following the syntax defined in
[RFC5890]. The name MUST NOT contain any terminators (e.g., NULL,
CR). A name is included only when multiple ADNs are included in
the ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes.
o Hash Algorithm Identifiers (variable) - In a request, this field
specifies a list of 16-bit hash algorithm identifiers that are
supported by the Encrypted DNS client. In a response, this field
specified the 16-bit hash algorithm identifier selected by the
server to generate the digest of its certificate. The values of
this field are taken from the Hash Algorithm Identifiers of IANA's
"Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" registry
[Hash].
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There is no padding between the hash algorithm identifiers.
Note that SHA2-256 is mandatory to implement.
o Certificate Digest (variable) - MUST only be present in a
response. This field includes the digest of the Encrypted DNS
server certificate using the algorthm identified in the 'Hash
Algorithm Identifiers' field.
4. IKEv2 Protocol Exchange
This section describes how an initiator can be configured with an
encrypted DNS server (e.g., DoH, DoT) using IKEv2.
Initiators indicate the support of an encrypted DNS in the
CFG_REQUEST payloads by including one or two ENCDNS_IP* attributes,
while responders supply the encrypted DNS configuration in the
CFG_REPLY payloads. Concretely:
If the initiator supports encrypted DNS, it includes one or two
ENCDNS_IP* attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. For each IP address
family the initiator MUST include exactly one attribute with the
Length field set to 0, so that no data is included for these
attributes. The initiator MAY include the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
attribute with a list of hash algorithms that are supported by the
Encrypted DNS client.
For each ENCDNS_IP* attribute from the CFG_REQUEST, if the
responder supports the corresponding address family, and absent
any policy, the responder sends back ENCDNS_IP* attribute(s) in
the CFG_REPLY with an appropriate list of IP addresses, service
parameters, and an ADN. The list of IP addresses MUST include at
least one IP address. Multiple instances of the same ENCDNS_IP*
attribute MAY be returned if distinct ADNs or service parameters
are to be returned by the responder. The same or distinct IP
addresses can be returned in such instances. In addition, the
responder MAY return the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute to convey a
digest of the certificate of the Encrypted DNS and the identifier
of the hash algorithm that is used to generate the digest.
The behavior of the responder if it receives both ENCDNS_IP* and
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS) attributes is policy-based
and deployment-specific. However, it is RECOMMENDED that if the
responder includes at least one ENCDNS_IP* attribute in the reply,
it should not include any of INTERNAL_IP4_DNS/INTERNAL_IP6_DNS
attributes.
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If the CFG_REQUEST includes an ENCDNS_IP* attribute but the
CFG_REPLY does not include an ENCDNS_IP* matching the requested
address family, this is an indication that requested address
family is not supported by the responder or the responder is not
configured to provide corresponding server addresses.
The DNS client establishes an encrypted DNS session (e.g., DoT, DoH,
DoQ) with the address(es) conveyed in ENCDNS_IP* and uses the
mechanism discussed in Section 8 of [RFC8310] to authenticate the DNS
server certificate using the authentication domain name conveyed in
ENCDNS_IP*.
If the CFG_REPLY includes an ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute, the DNS
client has to create a digest of the DNS server certificate received
in the TLS handshake using the negotiated hash algorithm in the
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute. If the computed digest for an ADN
matches the one sent in the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO attribute, the
encrypted DNS server certificate is successfully validated. If so,
the client continues with the TLS connection as normal. Otherwise,
the client MUST treat the server certificate validation failure as a
non-recoverable error. This approach is similar to certificate usage
PKIX-EE(1) defined in [RFC7671].
If the IPsec connection is a split-tunnel configuration and the
initiator negotiated INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN as per [RFC8598], the DNS
client MUST resolve the internal names using ENCDNS_IP* DNS servers.
Note: [RFC8598] requires INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS)
attribute to be mandatory present when INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is
included. This specification relaxes that constraint in the
presence of ENCDNS_IP* attributes.
5. Security Considerations
This document adheres to the security considerations defined in
[RFC7296]. In particular, this document does not alter the trust on
the DNS configuration provided by a responder.
Networks are susceptible to internal attacks as discussed in
Section 3.2 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]. Hosting encrypted
DNS server even in case of split-VPN configuration minimizes the
attack vector (e.g., a compromised network device cannot monitor/
modify DNS traffic). This specification describes a mechanism to
restrict access to the DNS messages to only the parties that need to
know.
The initiator may trust the encrypted DNS servers supplied by means
of IKEv2 from a trusted responder more than the locally provided DNS
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servers, especially in the case of connecting to unknown or untrusted
networks (e.g., coffee shops or hotel networks).
If IKEv2 responder has used NULL Authentication method [RFC7619] to
authenticate itself, the initiator MUST NOT use returned ENCDNS_IP*
servers configuration unless it is pre-configured in the OS or the
browser.
This specification does not extend the scope of accepting DNSSEC
trust anchors beyond the usage guidelines defined in Section 6 of
[RFC8598].
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Configuration Payload Attribute Types
This document requests IANA to assign the following new IKEv2
Configuration Payload Attribute Types from the "IKEv2 Configuration
Payload Attribute Types" namespace available at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/
ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ikev2-parameters-21.
Multi-
Value Attribute Type Valued Length Reference
------ ------------------ ----- --------- ---------
TBA1 ENCDNS_IP4 YES 0 or more RFC XXXX
TBA2 ENCDNS_IP6 YES 0 or more RFC XXXX
TBA3 ENCDNS_ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO YES 0 or more RFC XXXX
7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Yoav Nir, Christian Jacquenet, Paul Wouters, and Tommy
Pauly for the review and comments.
Yoav and Paul suggested the use of one single attribute carrying both
the name and an IP address instead of depending on the existing
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS and INTERNAL_IP4_DNS attributes.
Christian Huitema suggested to return a port number in the
attributes.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[Hash] "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-
parameters.xhtml#hash-algorithms>.
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[I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]
Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service binding
and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS SVCB and
HTTPS RRs)", draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-05 (work in
progress), April 2021.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8310] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Challenges and Changes in the
Internet Threat Model", draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-
t-04 (work in progress), July 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]
Huitema, C., Mankin, A., and S. Dickinson, "Specification
of DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections", draft-ietf-
dprive-dnsoquic-02 (work in progress), February 2021.
[RFC7619] Smyslov, V. and P. Wouters, "The NULL Authentication
Method in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 7619, DOI 10.17487/RFC7619, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7619>.
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[RFC7671] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8598] Pauly, T. and P. Wouters, "Split DNS Configuration for the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 8598, DOI 10.17487/RFC8598, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598>.
Appendix A. Sample Deployment Scenarios
A.1. Roaming Enterprise Users
In this Enterprise scenario (Section 1.1.3 of [RFC7296]), a roaming
user connects to the Enterprise network through an IPsec tunnel. The
split-tunnel Virtual Private Network (VPN) configuration allows the
endpoint to access hosts that resides in the Enterprise network
[RFC8598] using that tunnel; other traffic not destined to the
Enterprise does not traverse the tunnel. In contrast, a non-split-
tunnel VPN configuration causes all traffic to traverse the tunnel
into the enterprise.
For both split- and non-split-tunnel configurations, the use of
encrypted DNS instead of Do53 provides privacy and integrity
protection along the entire path (rather than just to the VPN
termination device) and can communicate the encrypted DNS server
policies.
For split-tunnel VPN configurations, the endpoint uses the
Enterprise-provided encrypted DNS server to resolve internal-only
domain names.
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For non-split-tunnel VPN configurations, the endpoint uses the
Enterprise-provided encrypted DNS server to resolve both internal and
external domain names.
Enterprise networks are susceptible to internal and external attacks.
To minimize that risk all enterprise traffic is encrypted
(Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).
A.2. VPN Service Provider
Legacy VPN service providers usually preserve end-users' data
confidentiality by sending all communication traffic through an
encrypted tunnel. A VPN service provider can also provide guarantees
about the security of the VPN network by filtering malware and
phishing domains.
Browsers and OSes support DoH/DoT; VPN providers may no longer expect
DNS clients to fallback to Do53 just because it is a closed network.
The encrypted DNS server hosted by the VPN service provider can be
securely discovered by the endpoint using the IKEv2 Configuration
Payload Attribute Type.
A.3. DNS Offload
VPN service providers typically allow split-tunnel VPN configuration
in which users can choose applications that can be excluded from the
tunnel. For example, users may exclude applications that restrict
VPN access.
The encrypted DNS server hosted by the VPN service provider can be
securely discovered by the endpoint using the IKEv2 Configuration
Payload Attribute Type.
Authors' Addresses
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Tirumaleswar Reddy
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com
Dan Wing
Citrix Systems, Inc.
USA
Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
Valery Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
RU
Email: svan@elvis.ru
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