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DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines
draft-bellis-dnsext-dnsproxy-00
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2009.
Abstract
This document provides guidelines for the implementation of DNS proxies, as found in broadband routers and other similar network devices.
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction
2.
Terminology
3.
The Transparency Principle
4.
Protocol Conformance
4.1.
Unexpected Flags and Data
4.2.
Unknown Resource Record Types
4.3.
Packet Size Limits
4.3.1.
TCP Transport
4.3.2.
Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
4.3.3.
IP Fragmentation
4.4.
Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
5.
DHCP's Interaction with DNS
5.1.
Domain Name Server (DHCP Option 6)
5.2.
Domain Name (DHCP Option 15)
5.3.
DHCP Leases
6.
Security Considerations
6.1.
Forgery Resilience
6.2.
Interface Binding
6.3.
Packet Filtering
7.
IANA Considerations
8.
Change Log
9.
Acknowledgements
10.
References
10.1.
Normative References
10.2.
Informative References
§
Author's Address
§
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements
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1. Introduction
Recent research ([SAC035] (Bellis, R. and L. Phifer, “Test Report: DNSSEC Impact on Broadband Routers and Firewalls,” September 2008.), [DOTSE] (Ahlund and Wallstrom, “DNSSEC Tests of Consumer Broadband Routers,” February 2008.)) has shown that many commonly-used broadband routers (and similar devices) contain DNS proxies which are incompatible in various ways with current DNS standards.
These proxies are usual simple DNS forwarders, but do not usually have any caching capabilities. The proxy serves as a convenient default DNS resolver for clients on the LAN, but relies on an upstream resolver (e.g. at an ISP) to perform recursive DNS lookups.
This documents describes the incompatibilities that have been discovered and offers guidelines to implementors on how to provide maximum interoperability.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
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3. The Transparency Principle
It is not considered practical for a simple DNS proxy to directly implement all current and future DNS features.
There are several reasons why this is the case:
- broadband routers usually have limited hardware resources
- firmware upgrade cycles are long, and many users do not routinely apply upgrades when they become available
- no-one knows what those future DNS features will be, nor how they might be implemented
- it would substantially complicate the configuration UI of the device
Furthermore some modern DNS protocol extensions (see e.g. EDNS0, below) are intended to be used as "hop-by-hop" mechanisms. If the DNS proxy is considered to be such a "hop" in the resolution chain then for it to function correctly it would need to be fully compliant with all such mechanisms.
Research has shown that the more actively a proxy participates in the DNS protocol then the more likely it is that it will somehow interfere with the flow of messages between the DNS client and the upstream recursive resolvers.
The task of the proxy SHOULD therefore be no more and no less than to receive DNS requests from clients on the LAN side, forward those verbatim to one of the known upstream recursive resolvers on the WAN side, and ensure that the whole response is returned verbatim to the original client.
It is RECOMMENDED that proxies should be as transparent as possible, such that any "hop-by-hop" mechanisms or newly introduced protocol extensions operate as if the proxy were not there.
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4. Protocol Conformance
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4.1. Unexpected Flags and Data
The Transparency Principle above, when combined with Postel's Robustness Principle (Postel, J., “Transmission Control Protocol,” September 1981.) [RFC0793], suggests that DNS proxies should not arbitrarily reject or otherwise drop requests or responses based on perceived non-compliance with standards.
For example, some proxies have been observed to drop any packet containing either the "Authentic Data" (AD) or "Checking Disabled" (CD) bits from DNSSEC (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions,” March 2005.) [RFC4035]. This may be because [RFC1035] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” November 1987.) originally specified that these unused "Z" flag bits "MUST" be zero. However these flag bits were always intended to be reserved for future use, so refusing to proxy any packet containing these flags (now that uses for those flags have indeed been defined) is not appropriate.
Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that proxies SHOULD ignore any unknown DNS flags and proxy those packets as usual.
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4.2. Unknown Resource Record Types
[RFC3597] (Gustafsson, A., “Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record (RR) Types,” September 2003.) requires that resolvers MUST handle Resource Records (RRs) of unknown type transparently.
All requests and responses MUST be proxied regardless of the values of the QTYPE and QCLASS fields.
Similarly all responses MUST be proxied regardless of the values of the TYPE and CLASS fields of any Resource Record therein.
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4.3. Packet Size Limits
[RFC1035] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” November 1987.) specifies that the maximum size of the DNS payload in a UDP packet is 512 octets. Where the required portions of a response would not fit inside that limit the DNS server MUST set the "TrunCation" (TC) bit in the DNS response header to indicate that truncation has occurred. There are however two standard mechanisms (described below) for transporting responses larger than 512 octets.
Many proxies have been observed to truncate all responses at 512 octets, and others at a packet size related to the WAN MTU, in either case doing so without setting the TC bit.
Other proxies have been observed to remove the TC bit in server responses which correctly had the TC bit set by the server.
If a DNS response is truncated but the TC bit is not set then client failures may result, in particular a naïve DNS client library might suffer crashes due to reading beyond the end of the data actually received.
Therefore if a proxy must unilaterally truncate a response then the proxy MUST set the TC bit. Similarly, proxies MUST NOT remove the TC bit from responses.
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4.3.1. TCP Transport
Should a UDP query fail because of truncation the standard fail-over mechanism is to retry the query using TCP, as described in section 6.1.3.2 of [RFC1123] (Braden, R., “Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support,” October 1989.) .
DNS proxies SHOULD therefore be prepared to receive and forward queries over TCP.
Note that it is unlikely that a client would send a request over TCP unless it had already received a truncated UDP response. Some "smart" proxies have been observed to first forward a request received over TCP to an upstream resolver over UDP, only for the response to be truncated, causing the proxy to retry over TCP. Such behaviour increases network traffic and causes delay in DNS resolution since the initial UDP request is doomed to fail.
Therefore whenever a proxy receives a request over TCP, the proxy SHOULD forward the query over TCP and SHOULD NOT attempt the same query over UDP first.
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4.3.2. Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
The Extension Mechanism for DNS (Vixie, P., “Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0),” August 1999.) [RFC2671] was introduced to allow the transport of larger DNS packets over UDP and also to allow for additional request and response flags.
A client may send an OPT Resource Record (OPT RR) in the Additional Section of a request to indicate that it supports a specific receive buffer size. The OPT RR also includes the "DNSSEC OK" (DO) flag used by DNSSEC to indicate that DNSSEC-related RRs should be returned to the client.
However some proxies have been observed to either reject (with a FORMERR response code) or black-hole any packet containing an OPT RR. As per Section 4.1 (Unexpected Flags and Data) proxies SHOULD NOT refuse to proxy such packets.
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4.3.3. IP Fragmentation
Support for UDP packet sizes exceeding the WAN MTU depends on the router's algorithm for handling fragmented IP packets. Several options are possible:
- fragments are dropped
- fragments are forwarded individually as they're received
- complete packets are reassembled on the router, and then re-fragmented (if necessary) as they're forwarded to the client
Option 1 above will cause compatibility problems with EDNS0 unless the DNS client is configured to advertise an EDNS0 buffer size limited to 28 octets less than the MTU. Note that RFC 2671 does recommend that the path MTU should be taken into account when using EDNS0.
Also, whilst the EDNS0 specification allows for a buffer size of up to 65536 octets, most common DNS server implementations do not support a buffer size above 4096 octets.
Therefore it is RECOMMENDED (whichever of options 2 or 3 above is in use) that routers SHOULD be capable of forwarding UDP packets up to a payload size of at least 4096 octets.
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4.4. Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
[RFC2845] (Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B. Wellington, “Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG),” May 2000.) defines TSIG, which is a hop-by-hop mechanism for authenticating DNS requests and responses at the packet level.
Whilst it's not impossible for a simple DNS proxy to implement TSIG directly it is not advised since parsing and validating received packets is a computationally intensive task, best left to full-featured DNS clients.
DNS proxies SHOULD be transparent to TSIG signed packets.
Similarly, as per Section 4.2 (Unknown Resource Record Types), DNS proxies SHOULD be capable to proxying packets containing TKEY (Eastlake, D., “Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR),” September 2000.) [RFC2930] Resource Records
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5. DHCP's Interaction with DNS
Whilst this document is primarily about DNS proxies, most consumers rely on DHCP (Droms, R., “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol,” March 1997.) [RFC2131] to obtain network configuration settings. Such settings include the client machine's IP address, subnet mask and default gateway, but also include DNS related settings.
It is therefore appropriate to examine how DHCP affects client DNS configuration.
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5.1. Domain Name Server (DHCP Option 6)
Most routers default to supplying their own IP address in the DHCP "Domain Name Server" option (Alexander, S. and R. Droms, “DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions,” March 1997.) [RFC2132]. The net result is that without explicit re-configuration many DNS clients will by default send queries to the router's DNS proxy. This is understandable behaviour given that the correct upstream settings are not usually known at boot time.
Most routers learn their own DNS settings via values supplied by an ISP via DHCP or PPP over the WAN interface. However whilst many routers do allow the end-user to override those values, some routers only use those end-user supplied values to affect the proxy's own forwarding function, and do not offer these values via DHCP.
When using such a device the only way to avoid using the DNS proxy is to hard-code the required values in the client operating system. This may be acceptable for a desktop system but it is inappropriate for mobile devices which are regularly used on many different networks.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that routers SHOULD support end-user configuration of values for the "Domain Name Server" DHCP option.
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5.2. Domain Name (DHCP Option 15)
A significant amount of traffic to the DNS Root Name Servers is for invalid top-level domain names, and some of that traffic can be attributed to particular equipment vendors whose firmware defaults this DHCP option to specific values.
Since no standard exists for a "local" scoped domain name suffix it is RECOMMENDED that the default value for this option SHOULD be empty, and that this option SHOULD NOT be sent to clients when no value is configured.
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5.3. DHCP Leases
It is noted that some DHCP servers in broadband gateways by default offer their own IP address for the "Domain Name Server" option (as describe above) but then automatically start offering the upstream settings once they've been learnt over the WAN interface.
In general this behaviour is desirable, but the effect for the end-user is that the settings used depend on whether the DHCP lease was obtained before or after the WAN link was established.
If the DHCP lease is obtained whilst the WAN link is down then the DHCP client (and hence the DNS client) will not receive the correct values until the DHCP lease is renewed.
Whilst no specific recommendations are given here, vendors may wish to give consideration to the length of DHCP leases, and whether some mechanism for forcing a DHCP lease renewal (i.e. by toggling the LAN port link state whenever the WAN link state changes from DOWN to UP) might be appropriate.
Another possibility is that the learnt upstream values might be persisted in non-volatile memory such that on reboot the same values can be automatically offered via DHCP. However this does run the risk that incorrect values are initially offered if the device is moved or connected to another ISP.
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6. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new protocols. However there are some security related recommendations for vendors that are listed here.
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6.1. Forgery Resilience
Whilst DNS proxies are not usually full-feature resolvers they nevertheless share some characteristics with them.
Notwithstanding the recommendations above about transparency it is often necessary for a DNS proxy to pick a new Query ID for outbound requests to ensure that responses are directed to the correct client.
It has been standard guidance for many years that each DNS query should use a randomly generated Query ID. However many proxies have been observed picking sequential Query IDs for successive requests.
DNS proxies SHOULD follow the relevant recommendations in [I‑D.ietf‑dnsext‑forgery‑resilience] (Hubert, B. and R. Mook, “Measures for making DNS more resilient against forged answers,” December 2008.), particularly those in Section 9.2 relating to randomisation of Query IDs and source ports.
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6.2. Interface Binding
Some routers have been observed to have their DNS proxy listening on both internal (LAN) and external (WAN) interfaces. In this configuration it is possible for the proxy to be used to mount reflector attacks as described in [RFC5358] (Damas, J. and F. Neves, “Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks,” October 2008.)
The DNS proxy in a router SHOULD NOT by default be accessible from the WAN interfaces of the device.
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6.3. Packet Filtering
The Transparency and Robustness Principles are not entirely compatible with the Deep Packet Inspection features of security appliances such as firewalls which are intended to protect systems on the inside of a network from rogue traffic.
However a clear distinction may be made between traffic that is intrinsically malformed and that which merely contains unexpected data.
Examples of malformed packets which MAY be dropped include:
- invalid compression pointers (i.e. those that run forward of the current packet offset, or which don't point at the start of another label).
- incorrect counts for the Question, Answer, Authority and Additional Sections (although care should be taken where truncation is a possibility).
Since dropped packets will cause the client to repeatedly retransmit the original request, it is RECOMMENDED that proxies SHOULD instead return a suitable DNS error response to the client (i.e. FORMERR) instead of dropping the packet completely.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document requests no IANA actions.
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8. Change Log
draft-bellis-dnsproxy-00
Initial draft
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9. Acknowledgements
The author would particularly like to acknowledge the assistance of Lisa Phifer of Core Competence.
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10. References
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10.1. Normative References
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10.2. Informative References
| [DOTSE] | Ahlund and Wallstrom, “DNSSEC Tests of Consumer Broadband Routers,” February 2008. |
| [SAC035] | Bellis, R. and L. Phifer, “Test Report: DNSSEC Impact on Broadband Routers and Firewalls,” September 2008. |
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Author's Address
| Ray Bellis | |
| Nominet UK | |
| Edmund Halley Road | |
| Oxford OX4 4DQ | |
| United Kingdom | |
| Phone: | +44 1865 332211 |
| Email: | ray.bellis@nominet.org.uk |
| URI: | http://www.nominet.org.uk/ |
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