MAC address randomization
draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Juan-Carlos Zúñiga  , Carlos Bernardos  , Amelia Andersdotter 
Last updated 2021-07-12
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Network Working Group                                         JC. Zuniga
Internet-Draft                                                    SIGFOX
Intended status: Informational                             CJ. Bernardos
Expires: January 13, 2022                                           UC3M
                                                         A. Andersdotter
                                                                   CENTR
                                                           July 12, 2021

                       MAC address randomization
               draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization-01

Abstract

   Internet privacy has become a major concern over the past few years.
   Users are becoming more aware that their online activity leaves a
   vast digital footprint, that communications are not always properly
   secured, and that their location and actions can be easily tracked.
   One of the main factors for the location tracking issue is the wide
   use of long-lasting identifiers, such as MAC addresses.

   There have been several initiatives at the IETF and the IEEE 802
   standards committees to overcome some of these privacy issues.  This
   document provides an overview of these activities, with the intention
   to inform the technical community about them, and help coordinate
   between present and futures standardization activities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2022.

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Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  MAC address usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  MAC address randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Privacy Workshop, Tutorial and Experiments at IETF and
           IEEE 802 meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Recent RCM activities at the IEEE 802 . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Recent MAC randomization-related activities at the WBA  . . .   7
   6.  MAC randomization-related activities at the IETF  . . . . . .   7
   7.  OS current practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Internet privacy is becoming a huge concern, as more and more mobile
   devices are getting directly (e.g., via cellular or Wi-Fi) or
   indirectly (e.g., via a smartphone using Bluetooth) connected to the
   Internet.  This ubiquitous connectivity, together with not very
   secure protocol stacks and the lack of proper education about privacy
   make it very easy to track/monitor the location of users and/or
   eavesdrop their physical and online activities.  This is due to many
   factors, such as the vast digital footprint that users leave on the
   Internet, for instance sharing information on social networks,
   cookies used by browsers and servers to provide a better navigation

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   experience, connectivity logs that allow tracking of a user's Layer-2
   (L2/MAC) or Layer-3 (L3) address, web trackers, etc.; and/or the weak
   (or even null in some cases) authentication and encryption mechanisms
   used to secure communications.

   This privacy concern affects all layers of the protocol stack, from
   the lower layers involved in the actual access to the network (e.g.,
   the MAC/Layer-2 and Layer-3 addresses can be used to obtain the
   location of a user) to higher layer protocol identifiers and user
   applications [wifi_internet_privacy].  In particular, IEEE 802 MAC
   addresses have historically been an easy target for tracking users
   [wifi_tracking].

   There have been several initiatives at the IETF and the IEEE 802
   standards committees to overcome some of these privacy issues.  This
   document provides an overview of these activities, with the intention
   to inform the community and help coordinate between present and
   futures standardization activities.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The following terms are used in this document:

      MAC: Medium Access Control

3.  Background

3.1.  MAC address usage

   Most mobile devices used today are Wi-Fi enabled (i.e. they are
   equipped with an IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network interface).
   Wi-Fi interfaces, as any other kind of IEEE 802-based network
   interface, like Ethernet (i.e.  IEEE 802.3) have a Layer-2 address
   also referred to as MAC address, which can be seen by anybody who can
   receive the signal transmitted by the network interface.  The format
   of these addresses is shown in Figure 1.

   Figure 1: IEEE 802 MAC Address Format (TBD)

   MAC addresses can either be universally administered or locally
   administered.  Universally administered and locally administered
   addresses are distinguished by setting the second-least-significant
   bit of the most significant byte of the address (the U/L bit).

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   A universally administered address is uniquely assigned to a device
   by its manufacturer.  Most physical devices are provided with a
   universally administered address, which is composed of two parts: (i)
   the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), which are the first
   three octets in transmission order and identify the organization that
   issued the identifier, and (ii) Network Interface Controller (NIC)
   Specific, which are the following three octets, assigned by the
   organization that manufactured the NIC, in such a way that the
   resulting MAC address is globally unique.

   Locally administered addresses override the burned-in address, and
   they can either be set-up by the network administrator, or by the
   Operating System (OS) of the device to which the address pertains.
   However, as explained in further sections of this document, there are
   new initiatives at the IEEE 802 and other organizations to specify
   ways in which these locally administered addresses should be
   assigned, depending on the use case.

3.2.  MAC address randomization

   Since universally administered MAC addresses are by definition
   globally-unique, when a device uses this MAC address to transmit data
   -especially over the air- it is relatively easy to track this device
   by simple medium observation.  Since a device is usually directly
   associated to an individual, this poses a privacy concern
   [link_layer_privacy].

   MAC addresses can be easily observed by a third party, such as a
   passive device listening to communications in the same network.  In
   an 802.11 network, a station exposes its MAC address in two different
   situations:

   o  While actively scanning for available networks, the MAC address is
      used in the Probe Request frames sent by the device (aka IEEE
      802.11 STA).

   o  Once associated to a given Access Point (AP), the MAC address is
      used in frame transmission and reception, as one of the addresses
      used in the address fields of an IEEE 802.11 frame.

   One way to overcome this privacy concern is by using randomly
   generated MAC addresses.  As described in the previous section, the
   IEEE 802 addressing includes one bit to specify if the hardware
   address is locally or globally administered.  This allows generating
   local addresses without the need of any global coordination mechanism
   to ensure that the generated address is still unique within the local
   network.  This feature can be used to generate random addresses,
   which decouple the globally-unique identifier from the device and

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   therefore make it more difficult to track a user device from its MAC/
   L2 address [enhancing_location_privacy].

3.3.  Privacy Workshop, Tutorial and Experiments at IETF and IEEE 802
      meetings

   As an outcome to the STRINT W3C/IAB Workshop [strint], on July 2014 a
   Tutorial on Pervasive Surveillance of the Internet - Designing
   Privacy into Internet Protocols was given at the IEEE 802 Plenary
   meeting in San Diego [privacy_tutorial].  The Tutorial provided an
   update on the recent developments regarding Internet privacy, the
   actions that other SDOs such as IETF were taking, and guidelines that
   were being followed when developing new Internet protocol
   specifications (e.g.  [RFC6973]).  The Tutorial highlighted some
   Privacy concerns applicable specifically to Link Layer technologies
   and provided suggestions on how IEEE 802 could help addressing them.

   Following the discussions and interest within the IEEE 802 community,
   on 18 July 2014 the IEEE 802 Executive Committee (EC) created an IEEE
   802 EC Privacy Recommendation Study Group (SG) [ieee_privacy_ecsg].
   The work and discussions from the group have generated multiple
   outcomes, such as: 802E PAR: Recommended Practice for Privacy
   Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies [IEEE_802E], and the 802c
   PAR: Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - Overview and
   Architecture Amendment - Local Medium Access Control (MAC) Address
   Usage [IEEE_802c].

   In order to test the effects of MAC address randomization, major
   trials were conducted at the IETF and IEEE 802 meetings between
   November 2014 and March 2015 - IETF91, IETF92 and IEEE 802 Plenary in
   Berlin.  The purpose of the experiments was to evaluate the use of
   MAC address randomization from two different perspectives: (i) the
   effect on the connectivity experience of the end-user, also checking
   if applications and operating systems (OSs) were affected; and (ii)
   the potential impact on the network infrastructure itself.  Some of
   the findings were published in [wifi_internet_privacy].

   During the experiments it was observed that the probability of
   address duplication in a network with this characteristics is
   negligible.  The experiments also showed that other protocol
   identifiers can be correlated and therefore be used to still track an
   individual.  Hence, effective privacy tools should not work in
   isolation at a single layer, but they should be coordinated with
   other privacy features at higher layers.

   Since then, MAC randomization has further been implemented by mobile
   operating systems to provide better privacy for mobile phone users

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   when connecting to public wireless networks [privacy_ios],
   [privacy_windows], [privacy_android].

4.  Recent RCM activities at the IEEE 802

   Practical experiences of Randomized And Changing MAC Addresses (RCM)
   in live devices helped researchers fine-tune their understanding of
   attacks against randomization mechanisms
   [when_mac_randomization_fails].  At IEEE 802.11 these research
   experiences eventually formed the basis for a specified mechanism
   introduced in the IEEE 802.11aq in 2018 which randomize MAC addresses
   that recommends mechanisms to avoid pitfalls [IEEE_802_11_aq].

   More recent developments include turning on MAC randomization in
   mobile operating systems by default, which has an impact on the
   ability of network operators to personalize or customize services
   [rcm_user_experience_csd].  Therefore, follow-on work in the IEEE
   802.11 mapped effects of potentially large uptake of randomized MAC
   identifiers on a number of commonly offered operator services in
   2019[rcm_tig_final_report].  In the summer of 2020 this work emanated
   in two new standards projects with the purpose of developing
   mechanisms that do not decrease user privacy and enable an optimal
   user experience when the MAC address of a device in an Extended
   Service Set is randomized or changes [rcm_user_experience_par] and
   user privacy solutions applicable to IEEE Std 802.11
   [rcm_privacy_par].

   The IEEE 802.1 working group has also published a specification that
   defines a local MAC address space structure, known as the Structured
   Local Address Plan (SLAP).  This structure designates a range of
   local MAC addresses for protocols using a Company ID (CID) assigned
   by the IEEE Registration Authority.  Another range of local MAC
   addresses is designated for assignment by administrators.  The
   specification recommends a range of local MAC addresses for use by
   IEEE 802 protocols [IEEE_802c].

   Work within the IEEE 802.1 Security task group on privacy
   recommendations for all IEEE 802 network technologies has also looked
   into general recommendations on identifiers, reaching the conclusion
   that temporary and transient identifiers are preferably in network
   technology design if there are no compelling reasons of service
   quality for a newly introduced identifier to be permanent.  This work
   has been specified in the recently published IEEE P802E: Recommended
   Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies
   [IEEE_802E].  The IEEE P802E specification will form part of the
   basis for the review of user privacy solutions applicable to IEEE Std
   802.11 (aka Wi-Fi) devices as part of the RCM [rcm_privacy_csd]
   efforts.

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   Currently, two task groups in IEEE 802.11 are dealing with issues
   related to RCM:

   o  The IEEE 802.11bh task group, looking at mitigating the
      repercussions that RCM creates on 802.11 networks and related
      services, and

   o  The IEEE 802.11bi task group, which will define modifications to
      the IEEE Std 802.11 medium access control (MAC) specification to
      specify new mechanisms that address and improve user privacy.

5.  Recent MAC randomization-related activities at the WBA

   At the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA), the Testing and
   Interoperability Work Group has been looking at the issues related to
   MAC address randomization and has identified a list of potential
   impacts of these changes to existing systems and solutions, mainly
   realted to Wi-Fi identification.

   As part of this work, WBA has documented a set of use cases that a
   Wi-Fi Identification Standard should address in order to scale and
   achieve longer term sustainability of deployed services.  A first
   version of this document has been liaised with the IETF as part of
   the MAC Address Device Identification for Network and Application
   Services (MADINAS) activities through the "Wi-Fi Identification In a
   post MAC Randomization Era v1.0" paper [wba_paper].

6.  MAC randomization-related activities at the IETF

   Several IP address assignment mechanisms such as the IPv6 stateless
   autoconfiguration techniques (SLAAC) [RFC4862] generate the Interface
   Identifier (IID) of the address from its MAC address (via EUI64),
   which then becomes visible to all IPv6 communication peers.  This
   potentially allows for global tracking of a device at L3 from any
   point on the Internet.  Besides, the prefix part of the address
   provides meaningful insights of the physical location of the device
   in general, which together with the MAC address-based IID, makes it
   easier to perform global device tracking.

   There are some solutions that might mitigate this privacy threat,
   such as the use of temporary addresses [RFC4191], the use of opaque
   IIDs [RFC7217], [I-D.gont-6man-deprecate-eui64-based-addresses].
   Next, we briefly describe how these solutions work.

   [RFC4191] identifies and describes the privacy issues associated with
   embedding MAC stable addressing information into the IPv6 addresses
   (as part of the IID) and describes some mechanisms to mitigate the
   associated problems.  The specification is meant for IPv6 nodes that

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   auto-configure IPv6 addresses based on the MAC address (EUI-64
   mechanism).  It defines how to create additional addresses (generally
   known as "temporary addresses") based on a random interface
   identifier for the purpose of initiating outgoing sessions.  These
   "random" or temporary addresses are meant to be used for a short
   period of time (hours to days) and would then be deprecated.
   Deprecated addresses can continue to be used for already established
   connections, but are not used to initiate new connections.  New
   temporary addresses are generated periodically to replace temporary
   addresses that expire.  In order to do so, a node produces a sequence
   of temporary global scope addresses from a sequence of interface
   identifiers that appear to be random in the sense that it is
   difficult for an outside observer to predict a future address (or
   identifier) based on a current one, and it is difficult to determine
   previous addresses (or identifiers) knowing only the present one.
   The main problem with the temporary addresses is that they should not
   be used by applications that listen for incoming connections (as
   these are supposed to be waiting on permanent/well-known
   identifiers).  Besides, if a node changes network and comes back to a
   previously visited one, the temporary addresses that the node would
   use will be different, and this might be an issue in certain networks
   where addresses are used for operational purposes (e.g., filtering or
   authentication).  [RFC7217], summarized next, partially addresses the
   problems aforementioned.

   [RFC7217] defines a method for generating IPv6 IIDs to be used with
   IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), such that an IPv6
   address configured using this method is stable within each subnet,
   but the corresponding IID changes when the host moves from one
   network to another.  This method is meant to be an alternative to
   generating Interface Identifiers based on MAC addresses, such that
   the benefits of stable addresses can be achieved without sacrificing
   the security and privacy of users.  The method defined to generate
   the IPv6 IID is based on computing a hash function which takes as
   input information that is stable and associated to the interface
   (e.g., MAC address or local interface identifier), stable information
   associated to the visited network (e.g., IEEE 802.11 SSID), the IPv6
   prefix, and a secret key, plus some other additional information.
   This basically ensures that a different IID is generated when any of
   the input fields changes (such as the network or the prefix), but
   that the IID is the same within each subnet.

   In addition to the former documents, [I-D.ietf-dhc-mac-assign]
   proposes an extension to DHCPv6 that allows a scalable approach to
   link-layer address assignments where preassigned link-layer address
   assignments (such as by a manufacturer) are not possible or
   unnecessary.  [I-D.ietf-dhc-slap-quadrant] proposes extensions to
   DHCPv6 protocols to enable a DHCPv6 client or a DHCPv6 relay to

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   indicate a preferred SLAP quadrant to the server, so that the server
   may allocate MAC addresses in the quadrant requested by the relay or
   client.

   Not only MAC and IP addresses can be used for tracking purposes.
   Some DHCP options carry unique identifiers.  These identifiers can
   enable device tracking even if the device administrator takes care of
   randomizing other potential identifications like link-layer addresses
   or IPv6 addresses.  [RFC7844] introduces anonymity profiles, designed
   for clients that wish to remain anonymous to the visited network.
   The profiles provide guidelines on the composition of DHCP or DHCPv6
   messages, designed to minimize disclosure of identifying information.
   [RFC7844] also indicates that the link-layer address, IP address, and
   DHCP identifier shall evolve in synchrony.

   Lately, the MAC Address Device Identification for Network and
   Application Services (MADINAS) IETF BoF has discussed the need to
   examine the effect of RCM schemes on network and application services
   in several scenarios identified as relevant.

7.  OS current practices

   Most modern OSes (especially mobile ones) do implement by default
   some MAC address randomization policy.  Table 1 summarizes current
   practices for Androiod and iOS, as the time of writing this document
   (original source: https://www.fing.com/news/private-mac-address-on-
   ios-14, updated based on findings from the authors).

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   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | Android 10+                     | iOS 14+                         |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | The randomized MAC address is   | The randomized MAC address is   |
   | bound to the SSID               | bound to the BSSID              |
   |                                 |                                 |
   | The randomized MAC address is   | The randomized MAC address is   |
   | stable across reconnections for | stable across reconnections for |
   | the same network                | the same network                |
   |                                 |                                 |
   | The randomized MAC address is   | The randomized MAC address is   |
   | reset when the device forgets a | reset when the device forgets a |
   | WiFI network                    | WiFI network                    |
   |                                 |                                 |
   | MAC address randomization is    | MAC address randomization is    |
   | enabled by default for all the  | enabled by default for all the  |
   | new WiFi networks. But if the   | new WiFi networks               |
   | device previously connected to  |                                 |
   | a WiFi network identifying      |                                 |
   | itself with the real MAC        |                                 |
   | address, no randomized MAC      |                                 |
   | address will be used (unless    |                                 |
   | manually enabled)               |                                 |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+

       Table 1: Android and iOS MAC address randomization practices

8.  IANA Considerations

   N/A.

9.  Security Considerations

   TBD.

10.  Acknowledgments

   TBD.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

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11.2.  Informative References

   [enhancing_location_privacy]
              Gruteser, M. and D. Grunwald, "Enhancing location privacy
              in wireless LAN through disposable interface identifiers:
              a quantitative analysis", Mobile Networks and
              Applications, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 315-325 , 2005.

   [I-D.gont-6man-deprecate-eui64-based-addresses]
              Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu, "Deprecating
              EUI-64 Based IPv6 Addresses", draft-gont-6man-deprecate-
              eui64-based-addresses-00 (work in progress), October 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-dhc-mac-assign]
              Volz, B., Mrugalski, T., and C. J. Bernardos, "Link-Layer
              Address Assignment Mechanism for DHCPv6", draft-ietf-dhc-
              mac-assign-09 (work in progress), September 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-dhc-slap-quadrant]
              Bernardos, C. J. and A. Mourad, "Structured Local Address
              Plan (SLAP) Quadrant Selection Option for DHCPv6", draft-
              ietf-dhc-slap-quadrant-12 (work in progress), October
              2020.

   [IEEE_802_11_aq]
              Group, 8. W. -. W. L. W., "IEEE 802.11aq-2018 - IEEE
              Standard for Information technology--Telecommunications
              and information exchange between systems Local and
              metropolitan area networks--Specific requirements Part 11:
              Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
              Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 5: Preassociation
              Discovery", IEEE 802.11 , 2018.

   [IEEE_802c]
              architecture, 8. W. -. 8. L., "IEEE 802c-2017 - IEEE
              Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:Overview
              and Architecture--Amendment 2: Local Medium Access Control
              (MAC) Address Usage", IEEE 802c , 2017.

   [IEEE_802E]
              architecture, 8. W. -. 8. L., "IEEE 802E-2020 - IEEE
              Recommended Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE
              802 Technologies", IEEE 802E , 2020.

   [ieee_privacy_ecsg]
              IEEE 802 Privacy EC SG, "IEEE 802 EC Privacy
              Recommendation Study Group",
              <http://www.ieee802.org/PrivRecsg/>.

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   [link_layer_privacy]
              O'Hanlon, P., Wright, J., and I. Brown, "Privacy at the
              link layer", Contribution at W3C/IAB workshop on
              Strengthening the Internet Against Pervasive Monitoring
              (STRINT) , February 2014.

   [privacy_android]
              Google/Open Handset Alliance, "Android Privacy: MAC
              Randomization",
              <https://source.android.com/devices/tech/connect/wifi-mac-
              randomization>.

   [privacy_ios]
              Apple, "Use private Wi-Fi addresses in iOS 14, iPadOS 14,
              and watchOS 7",
              <https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211227>.

   [privacy_tutorial]
              Cooper, A., Hardie, T., Zuniga, JC., Chen, L., and P.
              O'Hanlon, "Tutorial on Pervasive Surveillance of the
              Internet - Designing Privacy into Internet Protocols",
              <https://mentor.ieee.org/802-ec/dcn/14/ec-14-0043-01-00EC-
              internet-privacy-tutorial.pdf>.

   [privacy_windows]
              Microsoft, "Windows: How to use random hardware
              addresses", <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/
              how-to-use-random-hardware-addresses-ac58de34-35fc-31ff-
              c650-823fc48eb1bc>.

   [rcm_privacy_csd]
              SG, 8. W. R., "IEEE 802.11 Randomized And Changing MAC
              Addresses Study Group CSD on user experience mechanisms",
              doc.:IEEE 802.11-20/1346r1 , 2020.

   [rcm_privacy_par]
              SG, 8. W. R., "IEEE 802.11 Randomized And Changing MAC
              Addresses Study Group PAR on privacy mechanisms",
              doc.:IEEE 802.11-19/854r7 , 2020.

   [rcm_tig_final_report]
              TIG, 8. W. R., "IEEE 802.11 Randomized And Changing MAC
              Addresses Topic Interest Group Report", doc.:IEEE
              802.11-19/1442r9 , 2019.

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   [rcm_user_experience_csd]
              SG, 8. W. R., "IEEE 802.11 Randomized And Changing MAC
              Addresses Study Group CSD on user experience mechanisms",
              doc.:IEEE 802.11-20/1117r3 , 2020.

   [rcm_user_experience_par]
              SG, 8. W. R., "IEEE 802.11 Randomized And Changing MAC
              Addresses Study Group PAR on user experience mechanisms",
              doc.:IEEE 802.11-20/742r5 , 2020.

   [RFC4191]  Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
              More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
              November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7217]  Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
              Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

   [RFC7844]  Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
              Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.

   [strint]   W3C/IAB, "A W3C/IAB workshop on Strengthening the Internet
              Against Pervasive Monitoring (STRINT)",
              <https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/>.

   [wba_paper]
              Alliance, W. B., "Wi-Fi Identification Scope for Liasing -
              In a post MAC Randomization Era", doc.:WBA Wi-Fi ID Intro:
              Post MAC Randomization Era v1.0 - IETF liaison , March
              2020.

Zuniga, et al.          Expires January 13, 2022               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft          MAC address randomization              July 2021

   [when_mac_randomization_fails]
              Martin, J., Mayberry, T., Donahue, C., Foppe, L., Brown,
              L., Riggins, C., Rye, E., and D. Brown, "A Study of MAC
              Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and When it
              Fails", arXiv:1703.02874v2 [cs.CR] , 2017.

   [wifi_internet_privacy]
              Bernardos, CJ., Zuniga, JC., and P. O'Hanlon, "Wi-Fi
              Internet Connectivity and Privacy: Hiding your tracks on
              the wireless Internet", Standards for Communications and
              Networking (CSCN), 2015 IEEE Conference on , October 2015.

   [wifi_tracking]
              The Independent, "London's bins are tracking your
              smartphone", <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
              gadgets-and-tech/news/updated-london-s-bins-are-tracking-
              your-smartphone-8754924.html>.

Authors' Addresses

   Juan Carlos Zuniga
   SIGFOX
   Montreal  QC
   Canada

   Email: j.c.zuniga@ieee.org

   Carlos J. Bernardos
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad, 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   Spain

   Phone: +34 91624 6236
   Email: cjbc@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es/cjbc/

   Amelia Andersdotter
   CENTR
   Belliardstraat 20 (6th floor)
   Brussels  1040
   Belgium

   Email: amelia@centr.org
   URI:   https://www.centr.org

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