Protecting Internet Routing Infrastructure from Outsider DoS Attacks
draft-zinin-rtg-dos-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2005-05-23
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-zinin-rtg-dos-02.txt

Abstract

The mechanism described in this document helps to secure an Internet Service Provider's router infrastructure from outsider attacks, including (but not limited to) Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks based on CPU and/or queue exhaustion (e.g., TCP SYN flooding and flooding of invalid MD5-signed routing protocol packets.) The presented approach is based on explicitly marking control packets from trusted sources by different link-layer encapsulation and does not require any modifications to user data exchange protocols, ICMP, routing protocols or changes to existing hardware in routers, which allows it to be deployed quickly throughout the Internet.

Authors

Alex Zinin (azinin@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)