An Information Model for the Monitoring of Network Security Functions (NSF)
draft-zhang-i2nsf-info-model-monitoring-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dacheng Zhang , Yi Wu , Liang Xia , Rakesh Kumar , Anil Lohiya | ||
| Last updated | 2016-09-27 | ||
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draft-zhang-i2nsf-info-model-monitoring-02
Network Working Group D. Zhang
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Experimental Y. Wu
Expires: April 1, 2017 Aliababa Group
L. Xia
Huawei
R. Kumar
A. Lohiya
Juniper Networks
September 28, 2016
An Information Model for the Monitoring of Network Security Functions
(NSF)
draft-zhang-i2nsf-info-model-monitoring-02
Abstract
The Network Security Functions (NSF) Capability interface exists
between the Service Provider's management system (or Security
Controller) and the NSFs to enforce the rule provisioning and
monitoring on the NSFs in the functional implementation level.This
document focuses on the monitoring part of it and proposes the
information model for it.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use cases for NSF monitoring data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Classification of NSF monitoring data . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Structure of NSF monitoring data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Exporting NSF monitoring data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Basic Information model for all monitoring data . . . . . . . 7
8. Extended Information model for structured monitoring data . . 8
8.1. System Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.1. Memory Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.2. CPU Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.3. Disk Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.4. Hardware Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.5. Interface Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. System Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2.1. Access Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2.2. Configuration Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3. System Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3.1. Access Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3.2. Resource Utilization Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.3.3. User Activity Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.4. System Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.4.1. Interface counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.5. NSF Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.5.1. DDoS Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.5.2. Session Table Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.5.3. Virus Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.5.4. Intrusion Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.5.5. Botnet Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.5.6. Web Attack Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.6. NSF Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.6.1. DDoS Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.6.2. Virus Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.6.3. Intrusion Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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8.6.4. Botnet Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.6.5. DPI Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.6.6. Vulnerabillity Scanning Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.6.7. Web Attack Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.7. NSF Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.7.1. Firewall counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.7.2. Policy Hit Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
According to [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework], the interface provided by a
NSF (e.g., FW, IPS, Anti-DDOS, or Anti-Virus) to administrative
entities (e.g., NMS, security controller) for configuring security
function in the NSF and monitoring the NSF is referred to as a
'capability interface'. The monitoring part of the capability
interface is meant to monitor the NSF e.g. events, logs, alarms,
operational state of the NSF. The monitoring of the NSF plays a very
important role in the overall security framework if done in a timely
and comprehensive way. The event generated by a NSF could very well
be an early indication of malicious activity or anomalous behavior.
The operational state of an NSF could also be a potential sign of
denial of service attacks or window into signature of an attack.
This draft proposes a comprehensive NSF monitoring informational
model that provide visibility into NSFs. This document will not go
into the design details of capability interface. Instead, this draft
is focused on specifying the information that a NSF needs to provide
in the monitoring part of the capability interface, as well as its
information model. Besides, [I-D.draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-
interface-im] specifies the information model for the rule
provisioning part of the capability interface.
2. Terminology
2.1. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2.2. Definition of Terms
This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-i2nsf-
terminology].
3. Use cases for NSF monitoring data
As mentioned earlier, monitoring plays a very critical role in the
overall security framework. The monitoring of the NSF provides very
valuable information to the security controller in maintaining the
provisioned security posture. Besides this, there are various other
reasons to monitor the NSFs as listed below:
o The security administrator could configure a policy that is
triggered on a specific event. The security controller would
monitor for the specified event and once it happens, it configures
additional security functions as per the policy.
o The events triggered by NSFs as a result of security policy
violation could be used by SIEM to detect any suspicious activity.
o The events and activity logs from NSFs could be used to build
advanced analytics such as behavior and predictive to improve the
security posture.
o The security controller could use events from the NSF for
achieving high availability. It could take corrective actions
such as restarting a failed NSF, horizontally scaling the NSF
etcetra.
o The events and activity logs from the NSF could aid in debugging
and root cause analysis of an operational issue.
o The activity logs from the NSF could be used to build historical
data for operational and business reasons.
4. Classification of NSF monitoring data
In order to maintain a strong security posture, it is not only
necessary to configure security policies on NSF but also requires
constantly monitoring NSFs for events and comprehensive logs. This
gives ability to security admins regarding what is happening in the
network in realtime. It is not possible to block all the internal
and external threats based on static security posture but requires a
very dynamic posture with constant visibility. This draft proposes a
set of monitoring data needed for this purpose as listed below:
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o System Alarms: This represents a set related to operational state
of the NSF. For example, the NSF could generate an alarm if NSF
experience an operational issue such as link failure and system
component failure or performance degradation. The operator could
configure the NSF with certain threshold and when those thresholds
are crossed, NSF would generate an alarm. The alarms usually
require immediate attention from the operator otherwise network
may go into unknown state and potentially exposing security
vulnerabilities. The set should only be used for sending critical
information to avoid operator constantly combing through large
amount of information.
o System Events: This represents a set of operational and
informational data from the NSF. For example, the NSF could
generate an event when a policy violation occurs in the NSF or
configuration change results into some issue. This kind of
information may not require an immediate attention from the
security admin but may be useful for visibility and security
analytics. Some vendors combine events and alarm into one
category.
o System Logs: This represents information generated by NSF systems
such as access and authorization activity logs, configuration
change logs and any other logs generated by NSFs. These logs are
important for debugging, auditing and security analytics.
o System counters: This represents set of counters generated by NSF
such as network interface counters (packets, bytes), drop, error
counters etc. These counters are useful in debugging and
visibility into operational behavior of the NSF.
o NSF Events: This represents events generated by a NSF for a
specific functionality such as generating event when IPS detects
attack signatures.
o NSF Logs: This represents logs generated by a NSF for a specific
functionality e.g. NAC device generating logs when it
authenticate a user session and the associated authorization
assigned to that user. Another example would be when a stateful
firewall generates log for each state created in the NSF and any
operation assigned such as traffic shaping or marking. These logs
provide window into the control and data path activities of a NSF.
o NSF Counters: This represents counters kept by NSF for a specific
functionality e.g. policy hits etc.
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5. Structure of NSF monitoring data
As explained in the above section, there is a wealth of data
available from the NSF that can be monitored. Some of this data
generated by NSF is structured such as alarm and other may be
unstructured or structure may be very specific to that NSF. This
draft proposes common information model that is valid for the
monitoring data and extended information model for structured data.
The following guidelines can be used to classify monitoring data as
structured or unstructured:
o System Alarms: This is structured data. The draft proposes an
extended information model for this.
o System Events: This is structured data. The draft proposes an
extended information model for this.
o System Logs: This is unstructured data. The draft proposes a
basic information model for this.
o System Counters: This is structured data. The draft proposes an
extended information model for this.
o NSF Events: This is structured and structured data. The draft
proposes an extended information model for this.
o NSF Logs: This may have structured and unstructured data. The
draft proposes an basic information model for this.
o NSF Counters: This is structured data. The draft proposes an
extended information model for this.
6. Exporting NSF monitoring data
As per the use cases of NSF monitoring data, the data need to be sent
to various consumers based on the needs and requirements. There are
multiple things to be considered for exporting this data to needed
parties as listed below:
o Pull-Push model: A set of data could be pushed by a NSF to the
needed party or pulled by the needed party from a NSF. A specific
data might need both the models at the same time if there are
multiple consumers with varying requirements. It really depends
upon the need and its usages to the consumer. In general, any
alarm is considered to be of great importance and must be sent
immediately for any meaningful action so it should be sent using
push model but logs are not as critical so could be pulled by the
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consumer. The I2NSF does not mandate a specific scheme for each
data set, it is up to each implementation.
o Export frequency: The monitoring data could be sent immediately
upon generation by a NSF to interested parties or pushed
periodically. The frequency of exporting the data depends upon
its size and timely usefulness. It is out of the scope of I2NSF
and left to each NSF implementation.
o Authentication: There may be a need for authentication between
monitoring data producer (NSF) and consumer to ensure that
critical information does not fall into wrong hands. This may be
necessary if the NSF directly export data to the consumer outside
its admin boundary. The I2NSF does not mandate when and how
specific authentication must be done.
o Subscription method: In order for the consumer to pull the data
from NSF or for NSF to push the data to a consumer, there must be
a mechanism for consumer to subscribe to the NSF data it is
interested in. There are few open source method available and it
is up to each implementation to decide the right one.
o Data transfer mode: The data could be pushed by NSF using a
connection-less model that does require a persistent connection or
streamed over a persistent connection. It depends upon the
requirement of the consumer and the nature of data. A particular
set of data can use either or both the mode based on
implementation.
o Transport method: There are lot of transport mechanism such as IP,
UDP, TCP. There are also open source implementations for specific
set of data such as systems counter. The I2NSF does not mandate
any specific method for a given data set, it is up to each
implementation.
7. Basic Information model for all monitoring data
There is must be some general information with each message sent from
a NSF that helps consumer in identifying meta data with that message.
o message_version: Indicate the version of the data format and is a
two-digit decimal numeral starting from 01
o message_type: Alarm, periodical report, etc
o time_stamp: Indicate the time when the message is generated
o vendor_name: The name of the NSF vendor
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o NSF_name: The name (or IP) of the device generatign the message
o NSF_type: Indicate the NSF type e.g., firewall, WAF, IPS
o NSF_version: The software version of the NSF
8. Extended Information model for structured monitoring data
This section covers the additional information associated with the
system messages. The extended information model is only for the
structured data such as alarm. Any unstructured data is specified
with basic information model only.
8.1. System Alarm
8.1.1. Memory Alarm
The following information should be included in a Memory Alarm:
o event_name: 'MEM_USAGE_ALARM'
o module_name: Indicate the NSF module responsible for generating
this alarm
o usage: specifies the amount of memory used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The memory usage exceeded the threshold'
8.1.2. CPU Alarm
The following information should be included in a CPU Alarm:
o event_name: 'CPU_USAGE_ALARM'
o usage: Specifies the amount of CPU used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The CPU usage exceeded the threshold'
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8.1.3. Disk Alarm
The following information should be included in a Disk Alarm:
o event_name: 'DISK_USAGE_ALARM'
o usage: Specifies the amount of disk space used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The disk usage exceeded the threshold'
8.1.4. Hardware Alarm
The following information should be included in a Hardware Alarm:
o event_name: 'HW_FAILURE_ALARM'
o component_name: Indicate the HW component responsible for
generating this alarm
o threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The HW component has failed or degraded'
8.1.5. Interface Alarm
The following information should be included in a Interface Alarm:
o event_name: 'IFNET_STATE_ALARM'
o interface_Name: The name of interface
o interface_state: 'UP', 'DOWN', 'CONGESTED'
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'Current interface state'
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8.2. System Events
8.2.1. Access Violation
The following information should be included in this event:
o event_name: 'ACCESS_DENIED'
o user: Name of a user
o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o message: 'access denied'
8.2.2. Configuration Change
The following information should be included in this event:
o event_name: 'CONFIG_CHANGE'
o user: Name of a user
o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o message: 'Configuration modified'
8.3. System Log
8.3.1. Access Logs
Access logs record administrators' login, logout, and operations on
the device. By analyzing them, security vulnerabilities can be
identified. The following information should be included in
operation report:
o Administrator: Administrator that operates on the device
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o login_ip_address: IP address used by an administrator to log in
o login_mode: Specifies the administrator logs in mode e.g. root,
user
o operation_type: The operation type that the administrator execute,
e.g., login, logout, configuration, etc
o result: Command execution result
o content: Operation performed by an administrator after login.
8.3.2. Resource Utilization Logs
Running reports record the device system's running status, which is
useful for device monitoring. The following information should be
included in running report:
o system_status: The current system's running status
o CPU_usage: Specifies the CPU usage
o memory_usage: Specifies the memory usage
o disk_usage: Specifies the disk usage
o disk_left: Specifies the available disk space left
o session_number: Specifies total concurrent sessions
o process_number: Specifies total number of system processes
o in_traffic_rate: The total inbound traffic rate in pps
o out_traffic_rate: The total outbound traffic rate in pps
o in_traffic_speed: The total inbound traffic speed in bps
o out_traffic_speed: The total outbound traffic speed in bps
8.3.3. User Activity Logs
User activity logs provide visibility into users' online records
(such as login time, online/lockout duration, and login IP addresses)
and the actions users perform. User activity reports are helpful to
identify exceptions during user login and network access activities.
o user: Name of a user
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o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o access_mode: User access mode. e.g., PPP, SVN, LOCAL
o online_duration: Online duration
o lockout_duration: Lockout duration
o type: User activities. e.g., Successful User Login, Failed Login
attempts, User Logout, Successful User Password Change, Failed
User Password Change, User Lockout, User Unlocking, Unknown
o cause: Cause of a failed user activity
8.4. System Counters
8.4.1. Interface counters
Interface counters provide visibility into traffic into and out of
NSF, bandwidth usage.
o interface_name: Network interface name configured in NSF
o in_total_traffic_pkts: Total inbound packets
o out_total_traffic_pkts: Total outbound packets
o in_total_traffic_bytes: Total inbound bytes
o out_total_traffic_bytes: Total outbound bytes
o in_drop_traffic_pkts: Total inbound drop packets
o out_drop_traffic_pkts: Total outbound drop packets
o in_drop_traffic_bytes: Total inbound drop bytes
o out_drop_traffic_bytes: Total outbound drop bytes
o in_traffic_ave_rate: Inbound traffic average rate in pps
o in_traffic_peak_rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in pps
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o in_traffic_ave_speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bps
o in_traffic_peak_speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bps
o out_traffic_ave_rate: Outbound traffic average rate in pps
o out_traffic_peak_rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in pps
o out_traffic_ave_speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bps
o out_traffic_peak_speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bps.
8.5. NSF Events
8.5.1. DDoS Event
The following information should be included in a DDoS Event:
o event_name: 'SEC_EVENT_DDoS'
o sub_attack_type: Any one of Syn flood, ACK flood, SYN-ACK flood,
FIN/RST flood, TCP Connection flood, UDP flood, Icmp flood, HTTPS
flood, HTTP flood, DNS query flood, DNS reply flood, SIP flood,
and etc.
o dst_ip: The IP address of a victum under attack
o dst_port: The port numbers that the attrack traffic aims at.
o start_time: The time stamp indicating when the attack started
o end_time: The time stamp indicating when the attack ended. If the
attack is still undergoing when sending out the alarm, this field
can be empty.
o attack_rate: The PPS of attack traffic
o attack_speed: the bps of attack traffic
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
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8.5.2. Session Table Event
The following information should be included in a Session
Table Event:
o event_name: 'SESSION_USAGE_HIGH'
o current: The number of concurrent sessions
o max: The maximum number of sessions that the session table can
support
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o message: 'The number of session table exceeded the threshold'
8.5.3. Virus Event
The following information should be included in a Virus Event:
o event_Name: 'SEC_EVENT_VIRUS'
o virus_type: Type of the virus, e.g., trojan, worm, macro Virus
type
o virus_name
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet where the virus
is found
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet where the virus is
found
o src_port: The source port of the packet where the virus is found
o dst_port: The destination port of the packet where the virus is
found
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet where the virus
is found
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet where the
virus is found
o file_type: The type of the file where the virus is hided within
o file_name: The name of the file where the virus is hided within
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o virus_info: The brief introduction of virus
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
8.5.4. Intrusion Event
The following information should be included in a Intrustion Event:
o event_name: The name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_Intrusion'
o sub_attack_type: Attack type, e.g., brutal force, buffer overflow
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port:The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o protocol: The employed transport layer protocol, e.g.,TCP, UDP
o app: The employed application layer protocol, e.g.,HTTP, FTP
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches
o intrusion_info: Simple description of intrusion
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
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8.5.5. Botnet Event
The following information should be included in a Botnet Event:
o event_name: the name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_Botnet'
o botnet_name: The name of the detected botnet
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port: The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o protocol: The employed transport layer protocol, e.g.,TCP, UDP
o app: The employed application layer protocol, e.g.,HTTP, FTP
o role: The role of the communicating parties within the botnet:
1. the packet from zombie host to the attacker
2. The packet from the attacker to the zombie host
3. The packet from the IRC/WEB server to the zombie host
4. The packet from the zombie host to the IRC/WEB server
5. The packet from the attacker to the IRC/WEB server
6. The packet from the IRC/WEB server to the attacker
7. The packet from the zombie host to the victim
o botnet_info: Simple description of Botnet
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches
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o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
8.5.6. Web Attack Event
The following information should be included in a Web Attack Alarm:
o event_name: the name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_WebAttack'
o sub_attack_type: Concret web attack type, e.g., sql injection,
command injection, XSS, CSRF
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port: The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o req_method: The method of requirement. For instance, 'PUT' or
'GET' in HTTP
o req_url: Requested URL
o url_category: Matched URL category
o filtering_type: URL filtering type, e.g., Blacklist, Whitelist,
User-Defined, Predefined, Malicious Category, Unknown
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
8.6. NSF Logs
8.6.1. DDoS Logs
Besides the fields in an DDoS Alarm, the following information should
be included in a DDoS Logs:
o attack_type: DDoS
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o attack_ave_rate: The average pps of the attack traffic within the
recorded time
o attack_ave_speed: The average bps of the attack traffic within the
recorded time
o attack_pkt_num: The number attack packets within the recorded time
o attack_src_ip: The source IP addresses of attack traffics. If
there are a large amount of IP addresses, then pick a certain
number of resources according to different rules.
o action: Actions against DDoS attacks, e.g., Allow, Alert, Block,
Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service.
8.6.2. Virus Logs
Besides the fields in an Virus Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Virus Logs:
o attack_type: Virus
o protocol: The transport layer protocol
o app: The name of the application layer protocol
o times: The time of detecting the virus
o action: The actions dealing with the virus, e.g., alert, block
o os: The OS that the virus will affect, e.g., all, android, ios,
unix, windows
8.6.3. Intrusion Logs
Besides the fields in an Intrusion Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Intrusion Logs:
o attack_type: Intrusion
o times: The times of intrusions happened in the recorded time
o os: The OS that the intrusion will affect, e.g., all, android,
ios, unix, windows
o action: The actions dealing with the intrusions, e.g., e.g.,
Allow, Alert, Block, Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service
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o attack_rate: NUM the pps of attack traffic
o attack_speed: NUM the bps of attack traffic
8.6.4. Botnet Logs
Besides the fields in an Botnet Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Botnet Logs:
o attack_type: Botnet
o botnet_pkt_num:The number of the packets sent to or from the
detected botnet
o action: The actions dealing with the detected packets, e.g.,
Allow, Alert, Block, Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service,
etc
o os: The OS that the attack aiming at, e.g., all, android, ios,
unix, windows, etc.
8.6.5. DPI Logs
DPI Logs provide statistics on uploaded and downloaded files and
data, sent and received emails, and alert and block records on
websites. It's helpful to learn risky user behaviors and why access
to some URLs is blocked or allowed with an alert record.
o type: DPI action types. e.g., File Blocking, Data Filtering,
Application Behavior Control
o file_name: The file name
o file_type: The file type
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
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o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
o action: Action defined in the file blocking rule, data filtering
rule, or application behavior control rule that traffic matches.
8.6.6. Vulnerabillity Scanning Logs
Vulnerability scanning logs record the victim host and its related
vulnerability information that should to be fixed. the following
information should be included in the report:
o victim_ip: IP address of the victim host which has vulnerabilities
o vulnerability_id: The vulnerability id
o vulnerability_level: The vulnerability level. e.g., high, middle,
low
o OS: The operating system of the victim host
o service: The service which has vulnerabillity in the victim host
o protocol: The protocol type. e.g., TCP, UDP
o port: The port number
o vulnerability_info: The information about the vulnerability
o fix_suggestion: The fix suggestion to the vulnerability.
8.6.7. Web Attack Logs
Besides the fields in an Web Attack Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Web Attack Report:
o attack_type: Web Attack
o rsp_code: Response code
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o req_clientapp: The client application
o req_cookies: Cookies
o req_host: The domain name of the requested host
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
8.7. NSF Counters
8.7.1. Firewall counters
Firewall counters provide visibility into traffic signatures,
bandwidth usage, and how the configured security and bandwidth
policies have been applied.
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
o in_interface: Inbound interface of traffic
o out_interface: Outbound interface of traffic
o total_traffic: Total traffic volume
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o in_traffic_ave_rate: Inbound traffic average rate in pps
o in_traffic_peak_rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in pps
o in_traffic_ave_speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bps
o in_traffic_peak_speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bps
o out_traffic_ave_rate: Outbound traffic average rate in pps
o out_traffic_peak_rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in pps
o out_traffic_ave_speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bps
o out_traffic_peak_speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bps.
8.7.2. Policy Hit Counters
Policy Hit Counters record the security policy that traffic matches
and its hit count. It can check if policy configurations are
correct.
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
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o hit_times: The hit times that the security policy matches the
specified traffic.
9. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
10. Security Considerations
The monitoring information of NSF should be protected by the secure
communication channel, to ensure its confidentiality and integrity.
In another side, the NSF and security controller can all be faked,
which lead to undesireable results, i.e., leakage of NSF's important
operational information, faked NSF sending false information to
mislead security controller. The mutual authentication is essential
to protected against this kind of attack. The current mainstream
security technologies (i.e., TLS, DTLS, IPSEC, X.509 PKI) can be
employed approriately to provide the above security functions.
In addition, to defend against the DDoS attack caused by a lot of
NSFs sending massive monitoring information to the security
controller, the rate limiting or similar mechanisms should be
considered in NSF and security controller, whether in advance or just
in the process of DDoS attack.
11. Acknowledgements
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework]
Lopez, E., Lopez, D., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., Zhuang,
X., Parrott, J., Krishnan, R., Durbha, S., Kumar, R., and
A. Lohiya, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-03 (work in
progress), August 2016.
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[I-D.xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im]
Xia, L., Strassner, J., Li, K., Zhang, D., Lopez, E.,
Bouthors, N., and L. Fang, "Information Model of Interface
to Network Security Functions Capability Interface",
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-06 (work in
progress), July 2016.
Authors' Addresses
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei
Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com
Yi Wu
Aliababa Group
Email: anren.wy@alibaba-inc.com
Liang Xia
Huawei
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Rakesh Kumar
Juniper Networks
Email: rkkumar@juniper.net
Anil Lohiya
Juniper Networks
Email: alohiya@juniper.net
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